The question arises every time a survey brings PP and Vox closer to La Moncloa: what if the same happens as in 2023? The memory has a real basis. Before the 23J, numerous polls depicted a majority for the right that did not materialize. But turning that precedent into a guarantee of a socialist comeback would be another mistake: treating a past election as if it were the script for the next one.
The case of IMOP allows examining that possibility with figures. Its last survey before the general elections of 2023 placed the PSOE at 28.2% and the PP at 32.9%. The results were, rounded to one decimal, 31.7% for the socialists and 33.1% for the populars. The poll came very close to the percentage of the PP but left the PSOE 3.5 points below its result. It also overestimated Vox: it attributed 14.5% to it and obtained 12.4%. If those same deviations were to repeat over the published percentages of IMOP from October 23, the PSOE would surpass the PP. It is a hypothesis that can be calculated. What cannot be affirmed is that it will be fulfilled.
The calculation that would place the PSOE first
The new delivery of IMOP for El Confidencial places the PP at 28.5%, the PSOE at 27.1%, and Vox at 20%. Frente Amplio obtains 8.9% and Podemos, 1.9%. The exercise consists of adding to each party the difference between its real result of 2023 and the estimate of the last IMOP of that campaign. The PP would be added two tenths; the PSOE, 3.5 points; Vox would be subtracted 2.1. The hypothetical result would be a PSOE at 30.6%, ahead of a PP at 28.7%. Vox would remain at 17.9%.
For the alternative left, the comparison is less direct. Podemos ran integrated in Sumar in 2023, while now it appears separately. Applying the deviation of that coalition together would leave Frente Amplio and Podemos at 10.3%, compared to the 10.8% they sum in the current poll. It is an approximation between political spaces whose composition is also not identical. These figures do not constitute a new electoral estimate. They are the answer to a specific question: what would happen if the errors of that survey were to be reproduced exactly.
First in votes, but without a majority of its own
The most relevant data of the exercise is not only that the winner changes. It is that the change in order between PSOE and PP does not eliminate the joint advantage of the right.
With the historical adjustment, PP and Vox would sum 46.6%. PSOE, Frente Amplio, and Podemos would reach 40.9%. The difference between those groups would reduce from the current 10.6 points to 5.7, but it would still be favorable to the two right-wing formations. Nationalist and regionalist candidacies, decisive in numerous investitures, are excluded from that comparison. The provincial distribution of the vote, which determines the allocation of deputies, is also missing.
For that reason, winning in national percentage and gathering support to govern are different issues. A first PSOE could find itself with an alternative parliamentary majority. And a lower sum of votes could reach an investiture majority depending on the seats and agreements between parties. The national percentage guides the strength of each candidacy. It does not resolve governability by itself.
The precedent of 2023 was not an equal error for all
Talking about "the polls failed" can hide important differences. The last IMOP of 2023 estimated the vote of PP and Sumar with quite a proximity. The deviation was more concentrated in PSOE and Vox. In deputies, the study gave PP between 134 and 142; PSOE, between 98 and 108; Vox, between 38 and 42; and Sumar, between 31 and 34. The final results were 137, 121, 33, and 31, respectively. PP and Sumar stayed within their ranges; PSOE exceeded them and Vox ended up below.
The midpoints of the ranges of PP and Vox summed 178 deputies. In the polls, they gathered 170. That difference of eight seats was enough to change the political reading of the result. However, automatically subtracting eight deputies from any new IMOP poll does not constitute a validated predictive method. The error of one election is not a debt that the next one has to repay.
The moment of the campaign changes the comparison
There is another problem when using 2023 as a reference: not all surveys were conducted at the same distance from the polls. At the end of May of that year, an IMOP attributed 144 deputies to the PP and 52 to Vox: 196 between both. Its last delivery in July placed the sum around 178, taking the midpoints of the ranges. Choosing the first reference would lead to discounting 26 seats compared to the final result. Choosing the last would lead to discounting eight. These are operations that produce very different political conclusions. The distance between an early poll and the electoral result can incorporate both estimation errors and real changes in voters during the campaign. Without additional information, it is not possible to accurately separate how much corresponds to each factor.
The current survey was published on October 23, 37 days before November 29, but its interviews were conducted from the 13th to the 16th. Directly comparing it with a poll closed in the last days of the 23J campaign introduces a relevant temporal discrepancy.
What would need to be verified to talk about a comeback
The evolution of the PSOE must be observed in several comparable deliveries, preferably within each polling firm. It is also important to verify whether its advance comes from former abstainers, from PP voters, or from other left-wing candidates.
The effects are not equivalent. Recovering a voter from the PP simultaneously reduces the support of a competitor and increases one's own. Attracting a voter from Frente Amplio can strengthen the PSOE without increasing the joint vote of that space. Even so, any of those movements can modify the provincial distribution of seats.
Participation adds another unknown. A general increase does not automatically benefit the left or the right: it depends on who comes to vote and where they do so. To assert that the error of 2023 may be repeated, current indications about those mechanisms would be needed. The historical precedent invites keeping the uncertainty open; it does not identify on its own who is undervalued today.
What IMOP says and what this analysis raises
The current poll places the PP ahead of the PSOE. The hypothesis of repeating the final deviations of 2023 would reverse that order, but would maintain the advantage of PP and Vox over PSOE, Frente Amplio, and Podemos in joint percentage.
A projection of seats is not offered based on those adjusted percentages. To elaborate it, it would be necessary to distribute the votes by constituencies and consider the candidacies of each province. Directly transferring historical errors in deputies would be a different exercise and would not validate that distribution.
The precedent of 23J reminds us that a majority announced by the polls may not reach the ballot boxes. It also reminds us of something less comfortable for any party: uncertainty does not belong to anyone. It can favor a comeback, hinder it, or alter the balance between possible partners.