A cyberattack manipulates the cooling of dozens of supermarkets in Belgium and Sweden

The attackers remotely altered the cooling systems and activated the defrost mode, in an episode similar to the one recorded three weeks ago in France

EuropaPress 6576686 hombre coge productos refrigeradores supermercado madrid pocos minutos

EuropaPress 6576686 hombre coge productos refrigeradores supermercado madrid pocos minutos

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A cyberattack affected dozens of supermarkets in Belgium during the early hours of this Monday after the attackers managed to gain remote access to the computer systems that control their refrigeration facilities. The intrusion made it possible to modify the configuration of the equipment, stop the compressors and activate the defrost mode of the evaporators, which caused a rise in temperature in cold rooms and freezers.

The incident has affected around 40 Delhaize stores and another 15 Carrefour ones, although problems have also been recorded in Spar chain stores and in the meat company De Laet & Van Haver, based in Antwerp. In some establishments, the freezers reached temperatures close to 15 degrees, according to information released by Belgian media.

The attackers' intervention was not limited to blocking the systems or preventing the normal functioning of the establishments. In this case, remote access made it possible to directly modify the parameters of the refrigeration equipment, with consequences for food preservation. The alteration of these devices forced the affected businesses to activate emergency protocols during the night to prevent the incident from spreading and reduce merchandise losses.

Delhaize has described what happened as a "computer incident". For its part, the butcher shop chain De Laet & Van Haver has confirmed that the settings of its refrigeration systems were modified from outside. Specifically, the evaporators were switched to defrost mode, a function that is part of the regular maintenance of these devices, but which, when activated simultaneously or outside the expected cycles, causes a rise in temperature.

The first alerts arrived during the early hours of the morning

The attack began around midnight, although some managers of the establishments did not detect its consequences until several hours later. A Delhaize manager explained that the first alarms arrived around three in the morning. When checking the state of the facilities, he found the compressors stopped and the refrigeration systems expelling hot air instead of maintaining the temperature necessary to preserve the products.

The incident forced supermarkets to react quickly. Some establishments resorted to refrigerated trucks to transport and preserve the food while the operation of the facilities was restored. Others had to remove and discard part of the affected merchandise given the impossibility of guaranteeing that the cold chain had been maintained.

The technical response was also set in motion during the night. The specialized company Sabcobel mobilized its first technicians starting at one in the morning to intervene in the affected systems. Its CEO, Stephan Moelans, explained to the Belga agency that some 20 systems had been affected among the hundreds of installations the company manages.

The extent of the incident among different chains and establishments points to an operation that has reached refrigeration systems of different operators. The alteration of these devices is especially relevant because it affects an infrastructure essential for the daily functioning of supermarkets: it is not only about preventing access to a company's computer systems, but about using that access to modify the behavior of physical installations.

A pattern similar to the one recorded in France

The Belgian episode comes just three weeks after a series of similar attacks against supermarkets in France. In that case, the refrigeration systems of more than 350 establishments were subjected to manipulations, although some reports raised the scope of the incident to 700 stores. Episodes were also reported in the Netherlands and Belgium, which places the attacks in a context of growing concern over the security of digital systems that control industrial and commercial installations.

The chain of incidents is not limited to Belgian supermarkets. In Sweden, ICA establishments also suffered attacks during the night, with reports indicating that some systems even registered temperatures of up to 50 degrees. The coincidence in the type of infrastructure affected and in the method used raises questions about the vulnerability of connected devices that manage refrigeration installations.

These devices are part of the so-called industrial control systems, which make it possible to monitor and regulate physical processes through computer tools. Their connection to digital networks facilitates remote management and maintenance, but it can also open new access routes for those who manage to breach their security measures. In the case of supermarkets, a manipulation of this type can translate directly into material damage, product losses and problems in ensuring food safety.

The attack occurs, moreover, after Ahold Delhaize, the parent group of the Belgian chain, managed to recover last week from another cybersecurity incident. These are, however, different episodes and there is no publicly confirmed connection at the moment between both attacks.

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What legal procedures and requirements must supermarkets comply with to strengthen the cybersecurity of their industrial refrigeration systems in the European Union?

Supermarkets must protect connected refrigeration by combining operational security, food safety, and digital compliance. There is no single mandatory European certification for all these installations: the requirements depend on the company's activity, the Member State, the data processed, and its role as a user or marketer of equipment.

1. Determine which obligations apply

The first procedure is to document a regulatory scope assessment by entity and country. A supermarket is not automatically subject to NIS2 just for selling food: its activity, size, possible national classification, and additional operations such as production, distribution, or logistics must be verified. The competent authority and the national incident reporting procedure must also be identified. The INCIBE guidance helps carry out this verification.

DORA, aimed at the financial sector, does not directly apply to an ordinary supermarket for using electronic payments.

2. Manage and certify risks

When NIS2 is applicable, the company must adopt technical, organizational, and operational measures proportional to the risk. This includes risk analysis, incident management, continuity, recovery, supplier security, maintenance and vulnerabilities, training, and evaluation of control effectiveness. Management must assume the corresponding oversight.

For refrigeration, it is advisable to translate these obligations into verifiable actions:

  • Inventory controllers, sensors, programs, connections, and maintenance accesses.
  • Separate industrial networks from corporate and point-of-sale terminals.
  • Restrict remote access through individual accounts, multi-factor authentication, and revocable authorizations.
  • Eliminate default passwords, control changes, and test updates before installing them.
  • Maintain copies of configurations, alarms, and recovery or manual operation procedures.

These actions are ways to reduce risk, not a universal technological list imposed literally on all supermarkets.

3. Purchase equipment and contract secure maintenance

The Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 on Cyber Resilience covers products with connected digital elements, including industrial control components. Its obligations mainly fall on manufacturers, importers, and distributors, not automatically on the supermarket user.

As of November 2, 2026, the notification obligations provided for manufacturers apply from September 11, 2026; general application begins on December 11, 2027. The entire regime should not be presented as fully enforceable today. See the Regulation text and the implementation timeline.

In purchases and contracts, it is advisable to require security support, component updates, vulnerability communication, correction deadlines, access traceability, and cooperation in incidents. Compliance, documentation, and CE marking must be verified according to the applicable regime and its dates.

4. Protect personal data

The GDPR applies if platforms include identifiable accounts, technician records, or other personal data; not just for measuring temperatures. Responsibilities must be defined, access and retention limited, processors properly contracted, and international transfers regulated. Impact assessments are required when appropriate due to risk, not automatically.

A personal data breach must be notified to the authority within 72 hours when there is a risk to rights and freedoms. A thermal failure without compromised personal data does not by itself trigger that notification.

5. Prepare response and verification

The plan must coordinate IT, maintenance, quality, and data protection: isolate equipment, preserve evidence, recover temperatures, and evaluate or remove food whose safety cannot be guaranteed. Communications under NIS2, data protection, and food safety must be analyzed separately.

Finally, it is advisable to keep analyses, contracts, tests, and decisions. ISO/IEC 27001 and IEC 62443 provide references for management and industrial controls; they are not universal mandatory certifications nor do they replace legal compliance.

What are the competencies and responsibilities of Ahold Delhaize executives regarding IT security in commercial facilities?

At Ahold Delhaize, IT security is a shared responsibility among management, supervision, and technical teams: senior management manages risk and allocates resources; the Supervisory Board oversees that management; and technology leaders implement the measures. In commercial facilities, this responsibility covers data and payments as well as connected refrigeration, surveillance, and store operations equipment.

It is advisable to distinguish the competencies recorded in corporate documentation from recommended operational functions: public sources do not allow attributing each control in each establishment to a specific executive.

Distribution of corporate competencies
  • Management Board: responsible for overall management, strategy, and business risks. In cybersecurity, it must integrate technological risk into business decisions, set priorities, and provide resources to protect operational continuity.
  • Supervisory Board: supervises and advises management without assuming daily technical operation. Its role is to verify that relevant risks are identified, adequate controls exist, and detected deficiencies receive follow-up.
  • Audit, Finance & Risk Committee: reviews audits, risk management, and internal control, including IT-related controls. Its focus is on the effectiveness of those controls and correction of deficiencies.
  • Technology Committee: oversees technological issues, IT architecture, digital strategy, data, and cybersecurity. It complements the audit perspective by monitoring technological decisions and risks.

This distribution is described in the 2025 corporate governance documentation and the group's sustainability statements.

Technology management and security

The CTO, the technology leader, is assigned areas such as IT architecture, digital platforms, data, and cybersecurity. Functionally, technology management must translate these competencies into secure and recoverable systems, manage obsolescence, and integrate protection into new stores, applications, and services.

The CISO, or information security officer, typically develops policies, risk assessments, threat monitoring, and incident coordination. They must inform management about vulnerabilities and corrective measures, working with operations, maintenance, and data protection. A corporate compliance job posting confirms functions of policies, audits, indicators, and correction of findings; it does not alone constitute a complete job description for the CISO role.

What this implies for commercial facilities

Practical application requires coordinating IT security and operational security. Priority measures include:

  • Identifying cash registers, payment terminals, cameras, networks, and connected refrigeration controls.
  • Separating commercial networks and operational equipment, limiting permissions, and protecting remote access by suppliers.
  • Maintaining updates, anomaly monitoring, recoverable backups, and continuity tests.
  • Defining who can isolate systems, activate maintenance, and protect or remove merchandise in an incident.

These are operational priorities, not controls whose full implementation can be assumed. Their relevance is tangible: Demócrata reported on November 2 manipulations of refrigeration in Delhaize stores. The news distinguishes that episode from another group incident and does not confirm a connection between them.

Responsibility and limits

An attack does not automatically prove personal negligence. To assess responsibilities, effective competencies, decisions, known alerts, resources, and response must be examined. Management should document assessments, budgets, audits, and follow-up on corrections.

Additionally, legal obligations depend on the country and operating entity. NIS2 applicability should not be presumed just for selling food, nor should forecasts of a Spanish draft bill be presented as current obligations. Personal data protection and payment security requirements also require specific attention.

What European and national regulations govern the protection of critical infrastructures against cyberattacks in the food sector?

The protection of the food sector against cyberattacks combines two complementary regimes: critical infrastructure and network and information system security. In Europe, the NIS2 and CER directives stand out; in Spain, Law 8/2011 and Royal Decree-Law 12/2018, with their regulatory developments. Not every food company is automatically a critical infrastructure: activity, size, impact, and administrative designation matter.

1. European framework

  • Directive (EU) 2022/2555, NIS2. It is the European cybersecurity reference. Its Annex II includes food production, processing, and distribution, specifically companies dedicated to wholesale distribution and industrial production or processing. It generally covers medium and large companies, with exceptions allowing smaller entities to be included due to their relevance. These companies are, in principle, important entities; they can be essential by identification as critical entities or other special cases. See the INCIBE explanation.
  • NIS2 obligations. Include risk management, incident response, business continuity, recovery, supplier and system security, and responsibility of governing bodies. Its application to the sector does not necessarily require prior designation as a critical operator. The transposition deadline ended on October 17, 2024, according to the European Commission.
  • Directive (EU) 2022/2557, CER. Regulates the resilience of critical entities and includes food. It complements NIS2 through risk assessment, physical protection, crisis management, continuity, and recovery from sabotage, disasters, and other interruptions. It does not replace digital obligations: both directives must be applied coordinately, without duplicating matters covered by NIS2.
  • Directive (EU) 2016/1148, original NIS. It is the predecessor replaced by NIS2. It did not explicitly include food among its mandatory sectors, although Spain expanded its scope by incorporating it into its legal system.

2. Spanish regulations

  • Law 8/2011, of April 28. Establishes measures to protect critical infrastructures against deliberate physical and cyber attacks. Its annex expressly includes food as a strategic sector. It requires identification and designation: an infrastructure is critical when it is indispensable, lacks alternatives, and its disruption would have a serious impact on essential services. Text in the BOE.
  • Royal Decree 704/2011, of May 20. Develops the previous law: regulates planning, Operator Security Plans and Specific Protection Plans, and responsible security and liaison figures. The Resolution of September 8, 2015 specifies the minimum contents of those plans. PIC Regulation and minimum contents.
  • Royal Decree-Law 12/2018, of September 7. Regulates network and system security and incident notification. Its Article 2 covers essential services dependent on digital systems in the strategic sectors of Law 8/2011: therefore, also food, when the operator has been identified under this regime. It requires risk management even with outsourced systems. Text in the BOE.
  • Royal Decree 43/2021, of January 26. Specifies security measures, information security officer, supervision, and notifications. Its Article 3 specifically contemplates authorities for food, including AESAN. Regulatory development.

3. Practical application and transition

The sources consulted place the Spanish adaptation to NIS2 and CER still in process; a proposal should not be confused with current legislation. For a food company, it is appropriate to verify its designation under PIC or as an essential service operator and, separately, its inclusion by activity and size in NIS2. The assessment should cover industrial systems, traceability, logistics, and cold chain: the goal is to preserve both digital security and supply continuity.

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