Feijóo calls to convene the Commission of Official Secrets due to the contradictions regarding the warnings from the CNI in Ceuta.

The so-called Official Secrets Commission (formally called the Commission for the control of credits allocated to reserved expenses) is essentially governed by the same general rules as any Commission of the Congress, complemented by the regime of secret sessions provided for in the Regulations. It does not have a specific chapter in the Regulations, so one must refer to the rules on Commissions, sessions, and agenda.

1. Who formally convenes the Commission

According to the general regime of the Commissions:

• Each Commission has its own Board, elected from among its members, with a Presidency, Vice Presidencies, and Secretariats (art. 41).
• In parliamentary practice, the calling of Commission sessions corresponds to its Presidency, which acts within the framework of the general calendar set by the Chamber and the agreements of the Board of the Congress and the Board of Spokespersons.

In the case of the Official Secrets Commission, this means that:

• The Presidency of the Commission issues the specific call for the session (day, time, place, secret nature).
• It always acts within the ordinary periods or extraordinary sessions of the Congress regulated in article 61 (ordinary periods and possibility of extraordinary sessions at the request of the Government, the Permanent Deputation, or the absolute majority of the Congress).

2. Who can initiate or request the meeting

The Regulations generally provide that sessions may be held on days other than the usual ones:

• By agreement of the Commission itself, at the initiative of its Presidency, of two Parliamentary Groups or of one fifth of its members (art. 62.2).

This rule illustrates the general criterion: in addition to the initiative of the Presidency of the Commission, the Groups and a qualified minority of members of the Commission can push for it to meet. In a Commission as sensitive as the Official Secrets one, this political impetus capacity is especially relevant to guarantee parliamentary control.

3. Inclusion in the calendar and setting the agenda

The overall calendar and planning of the Congress's activity are set within the competencies of the Board of the Congress and the Board of Spokespersons. On that basis, each Commission organizes its work:

• The Board of the Commission and its Presidency determine the session days within the general calendar.
• The agenda of each Commission session is also set by the Presidency and the Board of the Commission, considering:
  • Matters referred by the Plenary or other bodies of the Congress.
  • Requests for appearances or information addressed to the Commission.
  • Initiatives from the Groups and the deputies who are members.

In the Official Secrets Commission, this translates into the Presidency selecting and ordering the reports, appearances, or explanations about reserved expenses that must be addressed in each session, always within the required confidentiality framework.

4. Secret nature of the sessions

The Regulations establish a general regime of secret sessions for the Commissions (art. 64):

• As a general rule, Commission sessions are not public to the general public, although accredited media may attend unless they are secret (art. 64.1).
• Any Commission may declare its session secret by agreement of the absolute majority of its members, at the initiative of its Board, the Government, two Parliamentary Groups, or one fifth of its members (art. 64.2).

The Commission for the control of credits allocated to reserved expenses is precisely configured as a Commission whose sessions and documentation have a reserved or secret nature, fitting into this general regime of information protection.

5. Quorum and majorities for it to be held

Regarding quorum and adoption of agreements, the general rules of operation of the Chamber apply (arts. 78 and 79):

• For the Commission to meet and adopt agreements, the majority of its members must be present (quorum for constitution).
• Agreements are generally adopted by simple majority of the members present, except when the Constitution, an organic law, or the Regulations themselves require a special majority (art. 79.1).

If at the time of voting it is found that there is no quorum, the vote is postponed for a maximum of two hours; if the lack of quorum persists, the matter is moved to a later session, according to article 78.

6. Minutes and confidentiality

As with any body of the Congress, minutes are taken of the Commission sessions (art. 65). In the case of secret sessions:

• A single stenographic record is made which is kept in the Presidency of the Chamber.
• It can only be consulted by the deputies under the terms agreed by the Board, and the agreements are published in the Journal of Sessions in the manner determined by it, preserving the secret nature of what was discussed.

Thus, the procedure for convening and operating the Official Secrets Commission is not exceptional in terms of formal steps, but it is in the intensity of confidentiality and in the systematic use of the regime of secret sessions and confidential documentation provided for in the Regulations.

Spanish legislation does not directly and in detail define the powers of the president of the Popular Party (PP) as an individual position. What it does establish is the general legal framework for political parties and, within that framework, grants each party the capacity to set in its statutes the internal organization and functions of its bodies, including the president. Therefore, the powers of the PP president derive mainly from the party's own statutes, while state regulations set the limits and basic principles that must be respected.

1. Applicable constitutional and legal framework

First, the Spanish Constitution (article 6) recognizes political parties as fundamental instruments for political participation. It requires them to have:

• Democratic structure and functioning.
• Respect for the Constitution and the law.
• Transparency in their activity and special responsibility in the formation and expression of popular will.

Secondly, the Organic Law 6/2002, on Political Parties (LOPP), develops this mandate and regulates:

• Requirements for the constitution and registration of the party.
• Minimum content of the statutes, including the determination of governing and internal control bodies, as well as their functions.
• Requirement of democratic internal procedures for the election of bodies and decision-making.
• Legal responsibility regime of the party and its administrators.

Within this framework, the PP president is configured as a party governing body and, generally, as one of its “administrators” for responsibility purposes. The law does not detail what he or she can or should do internally, but it does condition those functions to respect democratic principles, the Constitution, and laws.

2. Powers derived from the principle of internal autonomy

The LOPP recognizes parties a broad organizational autonomy. This means that:

• Each party decides which bodies it has (president, board of directors, executive committee, etc.).
• It defines in its statutes the specific functions of each.
• It internally regulates the procedures for election, replacement, and dismissal of its leaders.

Consequently, the specific powers of the PP president —for example, presiding over collegiate bodies, proposing internal appointments, representing the party in institutional acts, or signing certain decisions— are not set in a state law but in the Popular Party's statutes and the regulations that develop them. Spanish legislation requires that these internal rules:

• Be democratic and respect the rights of members.
• Be applied in accordance with the law, without violating fundamental rights.
• Be consistent with the party's registration and the statutory information deposited therein.

3. Typical functions within the current legal framework

Although the law does not list specific powers, from the set of norms and the statutory practice of parties, several typical functions of the president of a national party like the PP can be identified, always under the umbrella of internal autonomy:

• Legal and political representation of the party: the president is usually the highest representative before institutions, other parties, and public opinion. Legislation recognizes this relevance insofar as, in many legal acts, those holding the presidency are presumed to act on behalf of the party according to its statutes.
• General political direction: within statutory limits, usually sets the major strategic lines, coordinates political and electoral action, and proposes orientations to other bodies. The law does not define this function but requires that the party's overall action respect democratic principles.
• Presidency of collegiate bodies: it is common for the party president to chair bodies such as the national board of directors, the executive committee, or similar. Here the legislation intervenes only indirectly, requiring that decision-making in those bodies be democratic and respectful of members' rights.
• Legal and patrimonial responsibility: for responsibility towards third parties and compliance with obligations (e.g., financing, accounting, or criminal responsibility of parties), the president may be considered one of the main administrators. The LOPP and party financing regulations (including the Organic Law of the General Electoral Regime, in the electoral financing part) impose duties of control, transparency, and collaboration with the Court of Auditors on governing bodies.

4. Legal limits to their powers

The powers of the PP president, although defined internally, are legally limited by:

• The Constitution and fundamental rights (for example, they cannot adopt discriminatory decisions or contrary to the ideological freedom of members).
• The Law on Parties, which allows sanctions, suspension, or even judicial dissolution of the party if its actions —directed by its governing bodies— seriously violate the constitutional order.
• Regulations on party financing and accounting, which impose transparency and control obligations and may generate liabilities if breached.
• The party's own internal statutory regime, which binds the president: they cannot act ultra vires, that is, beyond the powers attributed by the statutes.

In summary, Spanish legislation does not offer a “closed catalog” of powers for the president of the Popular Party. What it does is establish the general framework (internal democracy, legality, responsibility) within which the PP statutes assign the president their specific functions of representation, political direction, and management, always under internal democratic control and subject to the legal system.

The National Intelligence Center (CNI) does not have a specific “alert law,” but its capacity to issue warnings and official communications to other State bodies is supported by a regulatory framework that sets competencies, principles of action, information classification regime, and coordination mechanisms in national security.

1. Competence basis of the CNI to issue alerts

The Law 11/2002, of May 6, regulating the CNI defines the Center's main mission as providing the President of the Government and the Government with the information and intelligence necessary to prevent and avoid risks or threats against Spain's independence and integrity, national interests, and the stability of the rule of law.

Among its functions (initial articles) are included:

• Obtaining, evaluating, interpreting, and disseminating intelligence necessary to protect Spain's political, economic, industrial, commercial, and strategic interests, both inside and outside the national territory.
• Preventing, detecting, and enabling the neutralization of activities by foreign services, groups, or individuals that endanger State security and the population's well-being.
• Promoting cooperative relations with other intelligence services, national and international.

Law 11/2002 itself establishes that the CNI will act under the principle of coordination with other State intelligence services and that it “will maintain with the rest of the Public Administrations (…) the necessary cooperation and coordination relations for the best fulfillment of its missions.” From this derives the basic legal authorization to issue alerts or official communications to other bodies when necessary for risk prevention.

2. Principles of action and controls

Law 11/2002 subjects the CNI to the principle of legality and parliamentary and judicial control (complemented by Organic Law 2/2002 on prior judicial control of certain activities). Although this law focuses on information gathering, its principles also permeate dissemination:

• Legality and submission to the legal system: alerts must relate to the functions and objectives legally assigned.
• Effectiveness, specialization, and coordination: communications must be useful, directed to competent authorities, and fit within established coordination channels.
• Secrecy and protection of sources and means: information that could reveal procedures, personnel, or capabilities is subject to a rigorous confidentiality regime.

3. Classification and protection of information

Law 11/2002 expressly establishes that the activities, organization, means, procedures, personnel, facilities, and sources of the CNI, as well as information that could lead to their knowledge, are classified information with a “secret” level, according to official secrets legislation.

This legislation is specified in Law 9/1968, on official secrets, amended by Law 48/1978, which:

• Allows declaring as “classified matters” those subjects whose disclosure could harm or endanger State security and defense.
• Reserves to the Council of Ministers the competence to classify and declassify.
• Prohibits communication or dissemination of classified matters outside legal limits, sanctioning their disclosure.

From this it follows that CNI alerts:

• Must circulate only among authorized bodies and persons with a “need to know.”
• Must be transmitted through secure channels appropriate to the classification level.
• Must respect the rules of access, use, and custody of classified information both at origin (CNI) and destination (receiving body).

4. Integration into the National Security System

Law 36/2015, on National Security, configures the National Security System and specifies that intelligence and information services:

• Permanently support the System, providing information, analysis, studies, and proposals to prevent and detect risks and threats and contribute to their neutralization.
• Are integrated through liaison and coordination mechanisms determined by the National Security Council.

This law obliges Administrations with competencies in areas of special interest (cybersecurity, health security, critical infrastructures, etc.) to establish coordination and information exchange mechanisms, “especially regarding surveillance and alert systems against possible risks and threats.” CNI alerts are inserted into these formal surveillance and alert systems, often through the National Security Council and its specialized committees, with technical support from the National Security Department.

5. Chain of command and internal procedure

Law 11/2002 and its regulatory development (organizational structure and personnel statute) configure a CNI with:

• Direction with the rank of Secretary of State, General Secretariat, and units determined by regulation.
• Objectives set annually by the Government in the Intelligence Directive (approved by the Council of Ministers).
• Strategic supervision through the Government Delegated Commission for Intelligence Affairs, which proposes objectives and evaluates their fulfillment.

In practice, the requirements for an alert to be issued are:

• That the risk or threat fits within the functions and objectives of the CNI.
• That the content respects the classification and protection of information and is directed to competent bodies to act.
• That it is articulated through the internal chain of command (reports, intelligence notes, formal communications) and, when appropriate, within the circuits of the National Security System (National Security Council, specialized committees, civil protection, or other sectoral alert systems).

All this under the premise that the CNI provides intelligence and warnings, but the decision on executive measures corresponds to the competent political and administrative bodies.