The declassified documents disprove Sánchez about Ceuta: how far did the CNI's warning go?

Based on the available parliamentary information, there is no record in this legislature of a specific law or bill exclusively dedicated to the “management of migration crises at the Ceuta border.” The issue is mainly being addressed through initiatives for promotion and oversight (motions, appearances, questions) and a general non-legislative proposal on massive illegal immigration. Therefore, rather than a “regulation in process” with the rank of law focused solely on Ceuta, what exists is a set of related political initiatives at various stages of processing.

1. Non-Legislative Proposal on Massive Illegal Immigration (Congress)

In the Congress of Deputies, the following initiative appears, of a general nature but related to the management of irregular immigration:

• Type: Non-legislative proposal.
• Proposing group: Vox Parliamentary Group.
• Identifier: 162/000233.
• Short title: Non-legislative proposal to establish the framework of action for public administrations in response to the negative effects of massive illegal immigration.
• Last known milestone: publication of the initiative in the Official Bulletin of the General Courts on 05/17/2024, at which point it moved to the status of registered and published initiative.

The status indicated in the record is that, after its publication, the initiative remained pending, that is, open and awaiting further decisions (inclusion or not on the agenda, debate, vote, etc.). The available information only specifies this publication milestone, without providing subsequent data on debate or voting. Therefore, from a parliamentary perspective:

• The non-legislative proposal is registered and published.
• Its processing is open, with no record in the consulted information of a subsequent milestone that would allow affirming it has already been debated, approved, or rejected.
• It is a political orientation initiative, not a norm with the rank of law: it sets criteria and demands to the Government but does not by itself create a legal regime for managing migration crises.

2. Initiatives in the Senate specifically linked to Ceuta

In the Senate, several initiatives explicitly focused on Ceuta and irregular immigration appear:

• Appearance of the Minister of the Interior before the Interior Commission, to report on measures against massive illegal immigration in Spain, “especially the Canary region and the City of Ceuta.”
  Identifier: (15)711/000325 – XV Legislature.
• Written question about immigration in Ceuta, particularly regarding strategies to address a 171.5% increase in immigrants arriving by land to the city.
  Identifier: (15)684/007300 – XV Legislature.
• Motion urging the Government to strengthen human and material resources at the Ceuta border in response to the seasonal increase in irregular entry attempts.
  Identifier: (15)661/001390 – XV Legislature.

These three initiatives are instruments of government oversight and political promotion, not bills or legislative proposals. The consulted documentation provides their official titles and identification but does not detail, in the available excerpt, the specific stage of processing (whether the appearance has already taken place, if the motion was debated or voted on, etc.).

In terms of “parliamentary status,” it can be stated that:

• They are initiatives registered in the XV Legislature of the Senate, linked to immigration and the Ceuta border.
• They fall within the functions of control, debate, and political orientation (appearances, questions, motions), and do not yet constitute a regulation with the rank of law on managing migration crises at that border.

3. Summary on the specific “regulation” for Ceuta

With the available information, it can be summarized as follows:

• No law in process exclusively referring to the management of migration crises at the Ceuta border is identified in the General Courts.
• There is a general non-legislative proposal on massive illegal immigration (Congress, 162/000233), in the status of registered and published initiative, pending further known parliamentary steps.
• In the Senate, several initiatives (appearance, question, motion) directly address the situation in Ceuta, but in terms of government oversight and resource strengthening, not as processing of a specific law.

If you are interested in a specific initiative (for example, the motion to strengthen resources at the border) or the final outcome of any of them, it is possible to delve deeper by searching for its debate and, if applicable, the vote in the corresponding chamber.

The National Intelligence Center (CNI) is, according to Law 11/2002 and Law 36/2015 on National Security, the public body responsible for providing the Prime Minister and the Government with the intelligence necessary to prevent and avoid serious risks and threats to national security. It always acts subject to the legal system and under specific parliamentary and judicial controls.

1. General mission and scope of action

Law 11/2002 defines the CNI as the body responsible for providing information, analysis, studies, and proposals that allow preventing and avoiding dangers, threats, or attacks against:

• The independence and territorial integrity of Spain.
• National interests (political, economic, industrial, commercial, and strategic).
• The stability of the rule of law and its institutions.
• The rights and freedoms of citizens and the welfare of the population.

It can operate both inside and outside the national territory, reflecting its strategic character and its fit within an interdependent international environment. In the framework of Law 36/2015, the CNI is one of the “agents and instruments” of the National Security System, integrated into the coordinated action directed by the Prime Minister.

2. Specific functions in national security matters

Among the functions expressly attributed to the CNI by Law 11/2002, with direct impact on national security, are:

• Obtaining, evaluating, interpreting, and disseminating intelligence necessary to protect and promote Spain’s interests in political, economic, industrial, commercial, and strategic areas.
• Prevention, detection, and neutralization of activities by foreign services, groups, or individuals that endanger the constitutional order, sovereignty, integrity and security of the State, institutional stability, national economic interests, or the welfare of the population.
• International cooperation with other intelligence services and international organizations, essential in areas such as terrorism, cybersecurity, or arms proliferation.
• Other technical functions of information gathering and processing (for example, in signals and communications), aimed at producing strategic intelligence.

Law 36/2015 places these functions within the National Security policy: the CNI contributes to the “State action” aimed at protecting rights and freedoms, guaranteeing the defense of Spain and its constitutional values, and cooperating with partners and allies in international security.

3. Political direction, planning, and coordination

The CNI’s objectives for each period are set by the Government through the Intelligence Directive, which is secret and approved annually by the Council of Ministers. In this way:

• It is ensured that its actions align with the politically defined national security priorities.
• The principle of specialization and effectiveness is reinforced by specifying priority areas and threats.

Law 11/2002 emphasizes the principle of coordination with the other State intelligence services. Within the framework of Law 36/2015, this coordination is part of the National Security System and crisis management mechanisms, in which CNI intelligence is a key piece for risk assessment and decision-making.

4. Legal controls and limits

The CNI is governed by the principle of full submission to the legal system. Its powers are not discretionary in an absolute sense but are framed within specific legal authorizations and under specific controls:

• Parliamentary control: Law 11/2002 provides that a specialized parliamentary committee (the one controlling credits for reserved expenses) receives the objectives approved by the Government and an annual report on its compliance and activities. This committee also handles official secrets, allowing substantive control in a necessarily classified area.
• Prior judicial control: Organic Law 2/2002 establishes that any CNI activity affecting the inviolability of the home or the secrecy of communications (articles 18.2 and 3 of the Constitution) requires prior authorization from a Supreme Court Magistrate, specifically designated for this function. The request must be justified, specifying measures, affected persons, places, and duration, and decisions are made within very short deadlines, maintaining classification as secret.
• Limitation of interference and data protection: the law requires destroying obtained information unrelated to the purpose that justified the authorization, acting as an additional guarantee against misuse or mass intelligence gathering.

All this is complemented by a specific budgetary and personnel regime but always under the general rules of the Administration and parliamentary control of reserved credits, ensuring that the CNI’s powers in national security are exercised within a guarantee framework.

Faced with a massive entry of migrants, the Ministry of the Interior does not have a “blank check”: its coordination must fit within several simultaneous legal frameworks — immigration and asylum, civil protection, national security, and human rights — which set minimum procedural obligations and very clear material limits.

1. General human rights and constitutional framework

Any action is subject to the Constitution (especially the rights to life and integrity, liberty and security, effective judicial protection, non-discrimination) and international human rights treaties (ECHR, EU Charter of Fundamental Rights). This implies:

• Prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment and of returns that expose to serious risk.
• Prohibition of collective expulsions and the need for individualized assessment of each case.
• Respect for basic guarantees in any measure limiting rights (justification, proportionality, minimum necessary duration, and judicial control).

2. Immigration: Organic Law 4/2000 and development

Organic Law 4/2000 on the rights and freedoms of foreigners establishes both minimum rights and coordination bases. From the consulted excerpts, it follows that:

• The Interior Ministry must coordinate with Autonomous Communities, Ceuta, Melilla, and municipalities through strategic immigration plans and bodies such as the Sectoral Immigration Conference for joint actions, also regarding unaccompanied foreign minors.
• Specific limiting measures (border removals, periodic appearances, etc.) can only be adopted by motivated resolution of the Minister of the Interior, individualized, proportionate, and for the indispensable time, within a sanctioning procedure with guarantees.
• The law recognizes enhanced rights for minors (education, social benefits) and foreigners with disabilities, which requires specific circuits in mass arrival situations.

In practice, any response device (CIE, custody devices at the border, transfers) must respect these rights and sanctioning procedures, without shortcuts motivated by numerical pressure.

3. Asylum and international protection

Law 12/2009, regulating the right to asylum and subsidiary protection, and the Reception System Regulation (Royal Decree 220/2022) — issued “in accordance” with that law — set key obligations:

• Existence of a single procedure to assess both refugee status and subsidiary protection, which must also be applied in mass influx scenarios.
• Strengthening of procedural guarantees: understandable information, real possibility to apply for asylum at the border, UNHCR intervention, and access to judicial precautionary measures (according to the preamble of Law 12/2009).
• Family extension of protection and specific reunification procedures, which require considering family unity in transfers and reception.
• Articulation of a reception system in international protection matters (RD 220/2022), with places, services, and minimum standards that Interior must activate and coordinate without discrimination among applicants.

4. Civil protection: national interest emergencies

Law 17/2015 of the National Civil Protection System and the State General Emergency Plan for Civil Protection (PLEGEM), approved by Council of Ministers Agreement on December 15, 2020, establish the management framework for “civil protection emergencies of national interest.” The PLEGEM provides that:

• The Ministry of the Interior is the highest national authority in civil protection and exercises the direction of the PLEGEM in all its phases, especially in emergencies of national interest.
• The Plan defines the organic-functional framework, resource mobilization mechanisms, and coordination scheme among Administrations in civil protection emergencies.
• Interior must organize support to other Administrations and coordination with Autonomous Communities, Government delegations and sub-delegations, and other operational services.

If a massive arrival is classified as a civil protection emergency of national interest, Interior is obliged to activate the PLEGEM, constitute the State Coordination and Direction Committee (CECOD), and ensure permanent communications between management bodies and operational services.

5. National security and crisis planning

Law 36/2015 on National Security and the 2021 National Security Strategy (approved by Royal Decree 1150/2021) frame massive arrivals as a cross-cutting security challenge:

• Law 36/2015 conceives national security as a shared State policy requiring coordination among all administrations and sectoral systems.
• The Strategy identifies irregular migratory flows as a risk linked to Spain’s position as an external EU border and points to the need to regulate flows and combat irregular migration and trafficking networks, integrating capacities of different Administrations.
• In case of “situations of interest for national security,” Interior must integrate into the crisis management mechanisms of the National Security System, coordinated from the Prime Minister’s Office.

6. Minimum procedural obligations in practice

Summing up these frameworks, the basic legal requirements that Interior must respect when coordinating responses to a massive entry alert are at least:

• Activate formal coordination mechanisms (PLEGEM, national security bodies, Sectoral Immigration Conference) with participation of Autonomous Communities and local entities.
• Guarantee border controls with strict respect for fundamental rights, without disproportionate use of force or collective expulsions.
• Establish individualized identification and registration circuits that allow detecting asylum seekers, trafficking victims, and other vulnerable profiles.
• Ensure effective access to the asylum procedure and the reception network, with understandable information and sufficient resources even under pressure situations.
• Apply specific protocols for minors and vulnerable persons, guaranteeing education, social care, and family unity according to LO 4/2000 and Law 12/2009.
• Justify and limit in time any restrictive measure (detentions, internments, movement restrictions), with judicial control and respect for the principle of proportionality.

Compliance with these requirements is not optional: it is the condition for the management of a massive migrant entry to be legally sustainable and compatible with Spain’s international commitments.