The Police accuses the Government of making "propaganda" with Ceuta while keeping the Police without more agents or resources.

As of today, there is no single “major reform” of the Immigration Law in an advanced parliamentary phase, but rather several different processes. The main organic reform for the mandatory distribution of migrant minors among autonomous communities (file 122/000123) was rejected in the Congress on July 23, 2024, and its processing is concluded. The restrictive reform on residency by integration promoted by the right has one variant already rejected in the Congress (122/000191) and another originating from the Senate (15)622/000080 that remains formally alive but blocked in the amendment phase until September 2026. Additionally, the extraordinary regularization linked to the Popular Legislative Initiative (ILP) and the new proposals from the PP to extend hot returns by sea are in very initial phases or effectively displaced by government decisions via regulation.

1. “Canary” reform for migrant minors: initiative rejected

The joint bill by PSOE, Sumar, and Coalición Canaria to amend Organic Law 4/2000 and establish a mandatory distribution of unaccompanied minors among communities was registered in Congress in 2024 (file 122/000123). According to parliamentary processing information, this initiative:

• Was published and admitted for processing on July 18, 2024.
• The consideration was debated in the Plenary on July 23, 2024, in the so-called “super plenary” at the end of the session, as reported by the newspaper Demócrata in its super plenary guide.
• The vote was 171 yes, 177 no, and 1 abstention, so the consideration was rejected and the bill was concluded.

Demócrata had detailed the content of this reform in a specific analysis, and later another piece on “deadlines and formula” placed its failure in a political key (deadlines analysis). Subsequently, the Government opted to address the distribution of minors through a royal decree-law, which Congress ratified in April 2025, as reconstructed in this chronology. This executive route is no longer processed as a “reform of the Immigration Law” in the strict sense but as a ratified decree-law.

2. Restrictive reforms on residency by integration: one rejected and another blocked

In the XV legislature, reforms of the Immigration Law have also been proposed to restrict regularizations by residency by integration:

• Organic Law Bill 122/000191 (Congress): aimed to limit the regularization of irregular immigrants through residency by integration. It was rejected at the consideration phase on September 16, 2025, with 169 votes in favor, 177 against, and 1 abstention, so its processing concluded.
• Organic Law Bill (15)622/000080 (Senate): a practically identical text originating in the Upper House. The Senate considered it on November 19, 2025 (145 yes, 110 no, 1 abstention) and sent it to Congress, which initially opened the amendment period until November 28, 2025.

At this moment, according to the official schedule, the amendment period in Congress has been successively extended until September 2, 2026. This means that this organic reform remains formally in processing but frozen in the earliest phase (amendments to the entirety and to the articles), without having yet passed to the committee or subcommittee.

The texts and their rejection can be consulted in the official Congress bulletins in PDF format: initial publication 122/000123, subsequent associated bulletins (BOCG-15-B-137-2, BOCG-15-B-137-3) and those of initiative 122/000191 (BOCG-15-B-224-1, BOCG-15-B-224-2). The Senate variant’s itinerary can be followed in its bulletins (initiative publication, alternative text presentation, consideration).

3. ILP for extraordinary regularization and partial reform via other laws

Apart from these initiatives, there is a Popular Legislative Initiative (ILP) for an extraordinary regularization of foreigners in Spain that modifies the first transitional provision of Organic Law 4/2000. Congress considered this bill on April 9 (310 votes in favor and 33 against), as recorded in the official Congress note (consideration note), and in June 2024 rejected an alternative text, allowing the processing to continue (note on rejection of alternative text).

However, according to Demócrata newspaper, by the end of 2025 the ILP remained blocked in Congress, without substantive steps in committee or subcommittee (end of 2025 analysis). Later, the Government opted for an extraordinary regularization by royal decree (Immigration Regulation), reported by several Demócrata articles (decree preview, practical guide to regularization, key points after deadline closure) and rulings analyzed by Demócrata itself (judicial control). Formally, the ILP is still “in processing,” but no further information is available in the consulted sources about real progress since 2024.

Additionally, the Immigration Law has been indirectly amended through other regulations (for example, the criminal reform on multiple recidivism) and previous reforms already in force in the BOE, such as Organic Law 8/2000 and Organic Law 2/2009, which at the time modified the original 2000 text.

4. Recent new bills: hot returns by sea

Finally, in July 2026 the PP registered in Congress a new organic law bill to amend the tenth additional provision of the Immigration Law and allow border rejections also for those entering by sea in Ceuta and Melilla. The content of this proposal is described in several Demócrata reports (bill presentation, extension, Feijóo’s political stance, legal analysis). As of August 4, 2026, everything indicates that this bill is in a very initial phase: registered and pending qualification and scheduling of the consideration debate in the Plenary.

In summary, the parliamentary situation of the Immigration Law today is fragmented: a failed organic reform for minors, another restrictive one on residency by integration blocked in amendments, an ILP for regularization practically frozen, and newly registered proposals, while most effective changes are materializing via regulation and government decrees rather than through a unified major organic reform.

The Secretariat of State for Security (SES) is the senior body of the Ministry of the Interior that concentrates public security competencies and, within them, those related to immigration, foreign affairs, border control, and the fight against irregular immigration. Its basic framework is set in Royal Decree 734/2020, of August 4, on the organic structure of the Ministry of the Interior, modified by Royal Decree 146/2021. In this scheme, the SES directs and coordinates the actions of the National Police and Civil Guard in migration matters, regarding control of entries and exits from the territory and internal security. Below is a summary of its main areas of competence and primary functions in this field.

1. Organic framework and material scope

According to the current organic structure, the SES is responsible for planning, directing, coordinating, and executing the government policy on internal security. Within this general umbrella are inserted the policies of:

• Foreign affairs and immigration, insofar as they affect public order and citizen security.
• Borders, both land, maritime, and air, including border posts.
• Fight against irregular immigration, in coordination with other departments and the European Union.

Royal Decree 734/2020, developed and modified by Royal Decree 146/2021, distributes these matters among the general directorates dependent on the SES (mainly National Police and Civil Guard), so that the Secretariat of State sets strategic orientation and coordinates operational execution.

2. Functions of the SES in immigration, foreign affairs, and borders

In this area, the functions of the Secretariat of State for Security can be grouped into several major functional blocks:

• Definition and coordination of migration security policy
  The SES participates in defining the Government’s policy on immigration from the perspective of internal security: control of flows at the border, prevention of irregular immigration, and prosecution of linked criminal networks. It conveys these guidelines to police forces and supervises their compliance.
• Border control and police management of entry and exit
  It directs and coordinates the actions of the National Police (air and maritime borders and document control) and Civil Guard (surveillance of land, maritime, and coastal borders) at national border crossings. This includes organizing deployments at ports, airports, and land posts, as well as responding to arrival peaks.
• Fight against irregular immigration and organized networks
  From the SES, strategies for prevention and repression of irregular immigration linked to mafias and human trafficking are planned and coordinated. Joint operations, surveillance deployments, and criminal investigation actions are promoted, as well as cooperation with specialized European agencies.
• Execution of administrative resolutions in foreign affairs matters
  In coordination with competent bodies in migration and asylum policy, the SES channels police action linked to the execution of administrative resolutions: detention for irregular stay, expulsions and returns, location of foreigners in irregular situations, among others, always within the applicable legal and judicial framework.
• Management of security in immigration-related facilities
  The SES assumes responsibility for public order and security in facilities related to migration management (centers for the stay of foreigners, first reception devices, or border facilities), ensuring the integrity of persons and maintaining security.

3. International and European cooperation

The international dimension is key in this matter. From the Secretariat of State for Security, the following are promoted:

• Bilateral police cooperation with countries of origin and transit of migrants, through Interior attachés and joint teams.
• Spanish participation in European operations and mechanisms for border control and fight against irregular immigration, in coordination with other competent ministries.
• Exchange of information and best practices with international organizations specialized in migration and security.

4. Limits of available normative information

The exhaustive detail of the functions of the Secretariat of State for Security in immigration, foreign affairs, and borders is collected in Royal Decree 734/2020, of August 4, which develops the basic organic structure of the Ministry of the Interior, as amended by Royal Decree 146/2021. In the consulted sources, only the title is available and not the full articles, so an article-by-article list of competencies cannot be offered beyond this functional synthesis of its role in migration security. No further information is available in the consulted sources.

Spain has formally identified in the sources a classic bilateral readmission agreement with Morocco and several migration cooperation frameworks that include return and readmission with Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia, and Ukraine, in addition to EU-global agreements affecting all member states. There is no official and complete list of all readmission agreements signed by Spain in the sources, so only those expressly mentioned in official documents or political press can be detailed. There is also no record in these sources of a specific readmission agreement with Algeria, something the Ministry of the Interior itself has acknowledged. What does appear is a Spanish policy focused on “migration diplomacy” with countries of origin and transit, where readmission is one piece of broader cooperation.

1. The readmission agreement with Morocco

Demócrata news recalls that Spain and Morocco have had a specific readmission treaty for decades. The article on migratory pressure in Ceuta explains that there is a “agreement on circulation, transit, and readmission of foreigners who entered irregularly,” signed in Madrid on February 13, 1992, and entered into force in October 2012, and that remains part of the Immigration regulations according to Interior (Demócrata article).

Various pieces on the Ceuta crisis in July 2026 emphasize that this agreement allows the delivery to Morocco of both Moroccan citizens and third-country nationals who have accessed irregularly from its territory, always under strict conditions and with prior identification of persons (Spain-Morocco understanding; Sánchez statements). Another analysis by the newspaper highlights that in 2021 about 4,000 people were returned to Morocco “through the readmission agreement” (Ceuta chronicle).

The same Demócrata piece clarifies, however, that the problem is not the absence of the treaty but its “limited practical application” and the degree of effective collaboration of Moroccan authorities. That is, the agreement exists and is in force, but its use depends on political, operational, and legal factors (identification, asylum requests, minors, etc.).

2. Migration agreements with Mauritania, Senegal, and Gambia

In the Ceuta crisis, Minister Ángel Víctor Torres explained that Spain would use “the migration agreements we have signed with several countries, including Morocco, also Mauritania and Senegal,” to organize returns, always respecting rights and distinguishing personal situations (Torres statements). In the same logic, another Demócrata report notes that the Government wants migration cooperation with Algeria to reach a level “similar to that established with Morocco and Mauritania” (analysis on Algeria).

Officially, the Ministry of the Interior places Mauritania as a “priority strategic partner” in migration cooperation and describes a joint roadmap with five priorities, one of which explicitly is “irregular migration, migrant trafficking, human trafficking, return, and readmission” (Moncloa note on Mauritania). Although no autonomous “readmission agreement” like Morocco’s is detailed, readmission is integrated into that framework.

Additionally, the Ministry of Inclusion records the signing of memoranda of understanding with Mauritania, Gambia, and Senegal for circular migration. These agreements are mainly oriented toward legal temporary work pathways, but Moncloa itself emphasizes that they are part of broader cooperation on return and reintegration of returned migrants (agreements with Mauritania, Gambia, and Senegal).

3. Readmission protocol with Ukraine

In June 2026, Interior reported that Fernando Grande-Marlaska had signed in Kiev a “Implementation Protocol on the Readmission of Persons” with his Ukrainian counterpart, described as “a further step” in managing migratory flows and bilateral trust (Moncloa note on Ukraine). The full text is not provided, but it is explicitly qualified as a readmission agreement, in this case focused on returns from Spain to Ukraine (and vice versa, according to usual standards).

4. Countries without specific agreements and European framework

Contrasting these examples, a Demócrata piece quotes the Secretary of State for Security admitting that “there are no agreements with Algeria; hopefully, but none exist” regarding repatriations, although there is police cooperation and a decrease in arrivals (same piece on Algeria). This illustrates that Spain combines countries with clear readmission or return agreements (Morocco, Mauritania, Senegal, Gambia, Ukraine) with others where returns are based on ad hoc cooperation and general frameworks.

In parallel, the EU is strengthening its Return Regulation and the “readmission conditionality” in trade agreements, which also affects Spain as a member state (Council note; European Parliament). But these are European instruments, not bilateral agreements of Spain, and the consulted sources do not break down with which countries Madrid has signed readmission treaties beyond those already mentioned. No further information is available in the consulted sources about other possible bilateral readmission agreements.