The European funds before their final exam: the impact on business competitiveness

José Alberto González-Ruiz, general secretary of CEOE, analyzes in DEMÓCRATA the results of the Recovery Plan five years after its implementation and warns of the need to measure its success by its impact on private investment, productivity, and growth, and not just by the pace of execution of European funds.

6 minutes

OPINIÓN PLANTILLA   2026 10 02T142556.656

OPINIÓN PLANTILLA 2026 10 02T142556.656

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When the European Union approved the Recovery and Resilience Mechanism (RRM), Spain received an exceptional opportunity to address some of the structural weaknesses that have historically limited the growth of our economy: low productivity, insufficient business size, the deficit of investment in innovation and the need to accelerate the digital and energy transition.

Five years after the launch of the Recovery, Transformation and Resilience Plan (RRP), it is necessary to carry out a rigorous evaluation of its results. Not to question the importance of the instrument or the effort made by the different administrations, but to determine to what extent the mobilized resources are achieving the objective for which they were conceived: to permanently transform the Spanish productive fabric.

This concern is not isolated, but is shared by various analysts and is evident in the recent evolution of the Recovery Plan itself. Thus, the Simplification Addendum approved in 2026 was driven by the recognition of structural delays in the execution of European funds in numerous member states and the need to eliminate administrative obstacles that were hindering the effective arrival of resources to the real economy. The modification of the RRP does not respond, therefore, to a strategic review of the productive model, but to the urgent need to adapt the instruments in light of the difficulties encountered during its implementation.

Spain has already received more than 77 billion euros in European transfers and has deployed an institutional architecture of enormous complexity to channel these resources. Of these, according to the AIReF, by the first half of 2026, calls have been resolved through formalized contracts and grants for a total amount close to 65 billion euros. The formal submission of the request for the seventh disbursement, which involves the evaluation of 30% of the committed investments and the mobilization of 21.462 billion in transfers and 4.4 billion in loans, would remain pending. However, in the final phase of the program, the fundamental issue is no longer the volume of committed funds or the number of calls published. The true measure of its success lies in the effective impact on business investment, productivity, competitiveness, and the long-term growth capacity of our economy.

From CEOE and its associated members, we have supported from the beginning the effective mobilization of these European funds, actively collaborated in the established governance mechanisms, made technical proposals to improve procedures, and maintained a permanent dialogue with the Government, the autonomous communities, local entities, and European institutions to facilitate that the resources reached the productive fabric. Our vision of the Recovery, Transformation, and Resilience Plan evaluated this mechanism as an instrument that should act as a counter-cyclical catalyst to modernize our productive fabric through the dual ecological and digital transition, the improvement of productivity, and the promotion of private investment.

The objective of the Plan would not be to replace the budgetary resources necessary for the programmed development of the annual budgets, especially on the current expenditure side, but to incentivize private investment and complement capital resources to raise potential growth and productivity, which constitute the true structural challenges of the Spanish economy.

A substantial part of the European resources remains trapped in different administrative phases

While it is true that the economy has maintained growth rates driven by public consumption and employment, it has not done so on the basis of productivity. According to BBVA Research, since the fourth quarter of 2019, the Spanish GDP has grown by 12.1%, but GDP per occupied person has barely advanced by 0.2% and per hour worked by 2.4%. At the same time, private investment has shown weak and irregular behavior. By the end of 2025, business investment in real terms was still 3.3 points below its pre-pandemic levels, while public investment had increased by more than 50%.

For this reason, it is particularly significant that a substantial part of the public debate has ended up focusing on the speed of spending and not on the effective capacity of the Plan to boost productivity and potential growth.

From the problem of administrative management to the impact on the real economy

One of the main problems detected during these years has been the existence of a growing distance between the administrative management of funds and their materialization in productive projects. The consequence is evident: a substantial part of the European resources continues to be trapped in various administrative phases, when it should be financing business projects capable of generating investment, quality employment, and increases in productivity.

Perhaps one of the most relevant conclusions of recent months is that the various addenda to the Plan presented to maximize disbursements have incorporated numerous approaches that business organizations have been advocating since the beginning of the Plan's execution.

Some instruments were designed without adequate adaptation to the real investment conditions of companies

The Addendum presented for the receipt of the seventh disbursement modifies 96 measures, compared to the 62 initially planned, and incorporates extensive processes of administrative simplification, elimination of intermediate milestones, flexibility of documentary justification, and orientation of controls towards final results and not merely procedural ones. Likewise, the Commission and the Government expressly recognize that numerous measures have had to be recalibrated due to lack of business demand, problems in supply chains, unforeseen technical complexities, and cost inflation.

These circumstances do not constitute a mere management anecdote. They are the confirmation that some instruments were designed without adequate adaptation to the real investment conditions of companies.

There is also a question that deserves special attention. The Addendum approved in 2026 eliminates from European conditionality a total of 17 reforms with the rank of law initially linked to the disbursements of the MRR. Among them are initiatives as relevant to business competitiveness as the Industry Law or the Land and Urban Rehabilitation Law. Although these reforms remain formally on the national agenda, their disconnection from European disbursements reduces the incentives for their processing and approval.

From the business perspective, this issue is not minor. The availability of developable land, the reduction of regulatory burdens, market unity, or industrial modernization can have a much more lasting impact on competitiveness than many specific investments financed with European funds.

The risk of the last phase

Spain now faces the most delicate moment of the execution of the Plan. Numerous milestones and objectives linked to investments and reforms (almost a third of those initially committed) remain pending, whose correct certification will be essential to complete the disbursement process. The European Commission itself still maintains pending evaluation objectives linked to the sixth tranche of payments.

At the same time, the recent evolution of the Addendum reflects an additional reduction of more than 1.250 million euros in the tranche of loans initially planned for Spain, as a consequence of the reformulation or elimination of various instruments whose execution did not reach the expected levels. This reduction does not only imply less public financing. It also implies a lower capacity to generate multiplier effects on private investment, precisely in those sectors with the greatest capital needs.

It will be necessary to recover the spirit that inspired the program from its origin: to use European funds as a lever to multiply private investment and strengthen the potential growth of our country

The risk is not only losing future funding. If certain investments are not adequately justified or certain commitments are not fulfilled, there are correction and financial recovery mechanisms provided in the community regulations. Any adjustment would ultimately impact public accounts that continue to bear a debt close to 100% of GDP.

The Spanish economy is still on time to turn this extraordinary mobilization of resources into a true economic transformation. The development of the financing mechanism Spain Grows will take over. To achieve this, it will be necessary to recover the spirit that inspired the program from its origin: to use European funds as a lever to multiply private investment and strengthen the potential growth of our country.

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José Alberto González-Ruiz is the general secretary of CEOE