Morocco secures the border with Ceuta ahead of the call on August 15 and Spain raises the deployment.

In Spain, migration policy is in the midst of regulatory and parliamentary change: the Royal Decree‑Law on migrant minors is being processed as a bill, a new Foreigners Regulation and its subsequent amendment have been approved, and the Congress has debated various bills (some already lapsed) to toughen or relax residency, registration, and nationality. In Morocco, the basic legal framework (Law 02‑03 on entry and stay of foreigners) remains, with a reform agenda on migration and asylum that has not materialized into new major laws, while operational cooperation with Spain and the EU is mainly articulated through agreements and administrative practice. I do not have a detailed and updated Moroccan parliamentary database, so I can only offer an overview, not a “case-by-case” status as in the Spanish case.

1. Spain: main pieces under processing and already approved

1.1. Migrant minors and distribution among Autonomous Communities

The Government approved Royal Decree‑Law 2/2025, of March 18, on urgent measures to guarantee the best interests of children and adolescents in extraordinary migratory contingencies, ratified by the Congress and processed as a bill. The Council of Ministers reference and its publication in the Official State Gazette (BOE) show that the text is already in force as a decree‑law, and the parliamentary file (case 121/000055) indicates that the deadline for amendments to the bill is extended until 9-2-2026, so it remains “under processing” in the Congress committee.

In parallel, the Executive has approved the urgent processing of the regulation developing this decree‑law, according to the Council of Ministers agreement of May 6, 2025, recorded in the corresponding reference, which also places the migrant minors policy in an intense phase of regulatory development.

1.2. Foreigners Regulation and its reform

The major recent normative piece is the Regulation of Organic Law 4/2000, approved by Royal Decree 1155/2024, of November 19, published in the BOE of 11-20-2024 after consultations and public hearing (prior consultation and hearing). The text “comprehensively reforms” the previous regulation and, according to the BOE itself, is intended to facilitate the social inclusion of migrants.

This regulation has already been amended by Royal Decree 316/2026, of April 14, published in the BOE of 04-15-2026. The Council of Ministers reference of April 14 ([link]) indicates that the amendment responds to the need to adjust and deploy new authorization figures. Several agreements and administrative conventions published in the BOE (for example, on reception and recording of applications by Government Delegations and Social Security) show that this reform is already in the phase of practical implementation, not just normative design.

1.3. Parliamentary initiatives on foreigners, registration, and residency

Various bills of very different nature have been processed in the Cortes:

• Tightening residency and expulsion: Vox’s Organic Law Bill to restrict regularization by residency (case 122/000191) was rejected in the Congress Plenary on 9-16-2025 (169 yes, 177 no, 1 abstention), ending its processing.
• An almost identical initiative from the Senate (Organic Law Bill amending LO 4/2000 to restrict residency, 124/000038 / 622/000080) was taken into consideration and sent to the Congress; the Senate extended the amendment deadline until 9-2-2026, so it remains “pending amendments.”
• Vox’s Bill to amend the Basic Law of Local Regime and limit registration in cases of occupation and “illegal immigration” (122/000039) has been in the amendment submission phase since 2024, with no news of a total vote.
• The Organic Law Bill delegating state immigration powers to Catalonia (122/000172), agreed between PSOE and Junts, was rejected on 9-23-2025 (173 yes, 177 no), also closing its processing.
• The Organic Law “on multiple reoffending,” which includes an amendment to LO 4/2000, was definitively approved on 3-26-2026, according to the Senate ([link]); it is already in the publication and application phase.

1.4. Nationality and groups linked to migratory flows

Regarding nationality linked to migratory contexts, notable are:

• The Bill on granting nationality to Sahrawis born under Spanish administration (122/000072), whose committee report was approved and sent to the Plenary; the report was published on 8-7-2026 ([link]), so the text is in an advanced phase, still pending plenary vote and subsequent Senate passage.
• Sumar’s Bill to count “stay for studies” for nationality purposes and allow retention of original nationality (122/000230) has been admitted for processing since 12-23-2025 and awaits consideration (file).

1.5. Other executive decisions with migratory impact

At the Government level, multiple punctual decisions have been adopted: extension of foreigner identity cards for displaced persons from Ukraine (Order INT/96/2026), annual instructions for the “Vacations in Peace 2026” program for Sahrawi minors (resolution of 6-3-2026), or the II National Strategy for Territorial Equity and Demographic Challenge, which incorporates the migratory dimension ([link]).

2. Morocco: stable framework, slow reforms, and cooperation with Spain/EU

I do not have as fine a Moroccan legislative tracking as the Spanish one, and searches have not returned clear references to specific numbered projects in the House of Representatives or the House of Councillors on foreigners or asylum between 2023 and 2026. With accessible information, it can be stated:

• The core remains Law 02‑03 on entry and stay of foreigners, emigration, and illegal immigration, very focused on control and sanction. No new “major foreigners law” approved and in force replacing it has been identified in the consulted sources.
• Plans for a specific asylum law and a deep reform of 02‑03 appear in expert and NGO reports, but without trace of final approval in the chambers.
• Migration policy has been articulated mainly through agreements and operational cooperation with Spain and the EU: \- meetings of the Permanent Spanish-Moroccan Migration Group, such as the one held in Marrakech in 2024, highlighted by Moncloa and the Ministry of the Interior (Moncloa note, Interior note), focused on circular migration and fight against mafias. \- negotiation of a “comprehensive” EU-Morocco association agreement where migration management occupies a central place, mentioned by the newspaper Demócrata ([link]).
• The EU, for its part, has proposed a list of “safe countries of origin” including Morocco, which affects the treatment of its nationals in European asylum procedures, as reported by El País.
• Demócrata has documented how Morocco has become a key partner in the externalization of European border control and, at the same time, an actor that can use migratory flows as a political pressure instrument in crisis contexts such as Ceuta 2021 and 2026 (analysis 1, analysis 2).

In summary, while Spain is intensely reforming its foreigners legislation, protection of migrant minors, and nationality through royal decree-laws and ongoing bills, in Morocco the migratory legislative framework seems more stable and innovations concentrate on cooperation practice with Spain and the EU, not on a new “migration law” already approved. For an exact map of projects in the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors, it would be necessary to go directly to their official databases.

The Minister of the Interior is the highest political authority responsible for border security in Spain as the head of the department that directs public security policy and the actions of the State Security Forces and Corps. This position generally derives from the so-called “departmental principle,” by which each minister assumes broad autonomy and responsibility in their material scope, according to the Government Law. Specific regulations in security, foreigners, immigration, and asylum project onto this general framework functions attributed to the Ministry of the Interior, and in several cases directly to the minister, concerning control of entry and exit from the territory, border surveillance, and management of irregular migratory flows.

General framework of the minister’s powers

Law 50/1997, of the Government, establishes the so-called departmental principle, which “grants the head of each Department broad autonomy and responsibility in the scope of their respective management.” Applied to the Ministry of the Interior, this means the minister is ultimately responsible for internal security policy, which includes border security and police control of entries and exits from national territory.

Law 40/2015, on the Legal Regime of the Public Sector, organizes the General State Administration and reserves executive powers to ministries in the material areas assigned to them. The specific structure of the Ministry of the Interior and the internal distribution of functions (Secretary of State for Security, General Directorates of Police and Civil Guard, etc.) are detailed in royal decrees of basic organic structure, such as Royal Decree 146/2021 and the regulations that modify or develop it.

Command over Security Forces and internal coordination

Organic Law 2/1986, on Security Forces and Corps, establishes that maintaining public security is an exclusive competence of the State and corresponds to the Government of the Nation, although it is operationally shared with Autonomous Communities and local entities. In this context, the law provides coordination mechanisms, including the Security Policy Council, a political body with equal composition “presided over by the Minister of the Interior and integrated by the competent Councillors in security matters of the Autonomous Communities,” which articulates coordination of security policies, also in the border area.

From an operational point of view, surveillance and control of land, sea, and air borders is exercised through the National Police Corps (today National Police) and the Civil Guard, dependent on the Ministry of the Interior according to Organic Law 2/1986 and the organic structure regulations (for example, Order INT/859/2023 on the Directorate General of Police, [link]). The minister politically directs this action through the Secretary of State for Security.

Powers in immigration and foreigners

Organic Law 4/2000, on the rights and freedoms of foreigners, establishes that “it corresponds to the Government (…) the definition, planning, regulation, and development of immigration policy,” explicitly including as principles the “management of migratory flows” and “the fight against irregular immigration and the prosecution of illicit trafficking of persons” (article added by Organic Law 2/2009). This policy is mainly executed through the Ministry of the Interior, which assumes operational management of entry and exit controls, foreigners’ sanction proceedings, and police actions against irregular immigration.

Organizationally, this function is reinforced with specific instruments such as the Coordination Authority for actions against irregular immigration in the Strait, Alboran Sea, and adjacent waters, created by Council of Ministers Agreement published by Order PCI/842/2018 ([link]), attached to the Ministry of the Interior.

Specific powers in asylum and border control

Law 12/2009, regulating the right of asylum and subsidiary protection, grants the Minister of the Interior very specific decision-making powers at the border. The text provides that when a foreign person who does not meet the requirements to enter Spanish territory requests international protection at a border post, “the Minister of the Interior may not admit the application” when inadmission grounds apply, and “may deny the application” by reasoned resolution.

The law itself establishes that against such inadmission or denial at the border “a request for reexamination may be submitted, which will suspend the effects thereof” and that “the resolution of said request, which will correspond to the Minister of the Interior, must be notified (…) within two days.” That is, asylum legislation configures the minister as the ultimate decision-making authority at the border phase (inadmission, denial, and reexamination), with direct impact on the entry or provisional stay of applicants.

These powers are exercised in a broader context of border control, in which Organic Law 4/2015 on citizen security also operates, whose special regime of rejection at the border for Ceuta and Melilla has been interpreted by the Constitutional Court in Judgment 172/2020 ([link]), delimiting the margins of action of security forces under the Ministry of the Interior’s direction.

International cooperation and integrated border management

In the international dimension, the Ministry of the Interior acts as the Spanish counterpart in agreements on border management and immigration. A recent example is the “Agreement (…) between the Ministry of the Interior of the Kingdom of Spain and the International Organization for Migration relating to (…) Assisted voluntary return and Reintegration and Integrated border management,” published in the BOE on December 6, 2025 ([link]). Although the text focuses on specific projects, it reflects that Interior, and by extension its head, assumes the State’s representation in integrated border management and return programs, closely linked to border security.

The last elections to the Assembly of Ceuta were held on May 28, 2023, within the cycle of local elections called throughout Spain, but the consulted sources do not show the detailed seat distribution by parties nor the specific vote percentages for the city. It can be stated that, after those elections, the autonomous city continued organized around its two main institutional bodies —Government Council and Assembly of Ceuta— and that both are chaired in the XI Legislature by Juan Jesús Vivas Lara. Beyond these institutional elements, no complete official data on the current distribution of seats by political groups in the Assembly of Ceuta is available in the analyzed sources, so it is not possible to offer a rigorous numerical chart.

Results of the last elections to the Assembly of Ceuta

The elections that renewed the Assembly of Ceuta are framed within the local elections of May 28, 2023. The Central Electoral Board published the general framework of those local elections and, subsequently, an error correction through the resolution of October 20, 2025, which expressly refers to the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla as part of that electoral process. However, that document, as it appears in the consulted fragments, does not include the breakdown by candidacies in Ceuta (neither number of seats by party nor exact votes).

The reviewed databases also do not include a specific statistical summary of Ceuta’s results equivalent, for example, to that existing for the European Parliament elections in the Central Electoral Board agreement of June 27, 2024. In the case of the European elections, the BOE records aggregated data for Ceuta, but this is a different type of election, not the local Assembly.

Therefore, based on the available sources, it can only be assured that:

• The last elections to the Assembly of Ceuta were held on May 28, 2023, within the local election cycle.
• They were local/autonomous scope elections (the Assembly of Ceuta is the representative body of the autonomous city).
• No official chart with seat distribution by party or vote percentages in Ceuta is available in the consulted sources.

Any detailed figure on how many deputies each party (PP, PSOE, Vox, or other local formations) obtained does not appear in accessible documents and it would not be responsible to reconstruct it without documentary support.

Institutional composition of the Parliament of Ceuta

In Ceuta’s case, the body equivalent to an autonomous parliament is the Assembly of Ceuta. According to a Senate divulgative note on the autonomous city, the main institutional bodies are “the Government Council and the Assembly of Ceuta” and, in the XI Legislature, “both institutions are chaired by Juan Jesús Vivas Lara” (Senate news on Ceuta).

The same institutional arrangement is observed in the official agenda of the central Government, where it is repeatedly recorded that various ministers hold meetings with the “president of the Autonomous City of Ceuta, Juan Jesús Vivas, in the Palace of the Assembly,” confirming the Assembly’s role as the seat of local political power. There are several recent examples:

• Meeting of Minister Elma Saiz with Vivas in the Palace of the Assembly of Ceuta (agenda of April 4, 2024).
• Visit of Minister Ángel Víctor Torres and meeting with Vivas in the Palace of the Assembly (agenda of April 18, 2024).
• Meeting of Vice President Sira Rego with the Ceuta president in the same building (agenda of September 4, 2024).

At the national political level, the Prime Minister, Pedro Sánchez, has also emphasized Vivas’s institutional role and that of the Assembly during official acts in the city. At the inauguration of the new maritime terminal of Ceuta, covered by the newspaper Demócrata, Sánchez thanks Vivas for his “institutional loyalty” and recalls that the PP leader is the longest-serving regional leader in office since 2001 (Demócrata chronicle on the maritime terminal).

Indications about the political plurality of the Assembly

Although the reviewed sources do not offer the exact seat distribution, they allow inferring that the Assembly of Ceuta is formed by several political groups. For example, a Demócrata piece on the dismissal of the Government delegate in Ceuta indicates that Cristina Pérez Valero had been “second vice president of the Assembly’s Governing Board” before moving to the state position, and that her successor in the Government Delegation is Miguel Ángel Pérez Triano, secretary general of the PSOE of Ceuta (article on the Government Delegation). This confirms the socialist presence in the Board and, therefore, in the Assembly.

On the other hand, various chronicles about the recent migratory crisis in the city indicate that President Vivas (PP) has achieved institutional declarations “supported by all Ceutan political forces” defending Ceuta’s Spanishness (Demócrata analysis on Feijóo and Ceuta). This shows that at least PP, PSOE, and other local and state formations coexist in the Assembly, although it is not specified how many seats each contributes.

In summary, the sources allow a clear description of the institutional framework (Assembly and Government Council chaired by Juan Jesús Vivas) and the political plurality of the Chamber, but do not detail the exact number of deputies per party nor the numerical composition of the groups. No further information is available in the consulted sources to complete that level of detail.