Aena-CNMC clash over the fee to airlines: the numbers of a battle of 2.6 billion

As of today, with the information available in institutional databases and the press, DORA III (Airport Regulation Document 2027‑2031) does not appear as an initiative under processing in the Congress or the Senate. Its processing is basically administrative and governmental, not parliamentary, and it is in the phase prior to its submission and final approval by the Council of Ministers, followed by its publication in the Official State Gazette (BOE).

1. Nature of DORA III: why it "does not have its own parliamentary phase"

The DORA is a regulatory instrument provided for in Law 18/2014 that sets, in five-year periods, the tariff path, investments, and quality standards of Aena's airport network. The precedents:

• DORA 2017‑2021 was approved by Agreement of the Council of Ministers, published by Resolution of the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (BOE-A-2017-2052).
• DORA 2022‑2026 followed the same scheme, with Resolution of September 29, 2021 (BOE-A-2021-15917).

In none of these cases was there a bill or specific legislative proposal that processed the DORA as such; it is approved by the Government and published in the BOE. The Parliament only intervenes indirectly, through:

• Framework laws such as the Air Safety and Navigation Law or the Sustainable Mobility Law, where amendments have been introduced regarding prior consultations or criteria for the DORA (for example, the amendment on participation of councils and island councils recorded by Demócrata: article on the air safety law).
• Non-legislative motions or initiatives related to airport fees and investments.

Therefore, strictly speaking, there is no autonomous “parliamentary phase” of DORA III comparable to that of a law; what may exist are parliamentary debates on rules that affect it or on its content, but the DORA itself is approved within the Executive branch.

2. Current status of the processing of DORA III

Recent sources place the procedure at an intermediate point, still prior to final approval by the Council of Ministers:

• In September 2025, Minister Óscar Puente presented the Aena investment proposal for the 2027‑2031 period, within the framework of DORA III, describing it as one of the “first steps of the regulated process” and noting that the document “continues its processing until it receives final green light from the Council of Ministers” (Moncloa press release).
• In April 2026, the president of the airline employers' association ALA recalled that, “before September 30, the Directorate General of Civil Aviation must submit the DORA III proposal to the Council of Ministers” (Demócrata, interview with Gándara), which fits with the deadlines of Law 18/2014.
• The economic and political press repeatedly refers to DORA III as a “future” document that will regulate 2027‑2031 (for example, reports on the Sustainable Mobility Law or on the PP amendment to freeze fees, e.g., article on Aena's investment plan), but they do not yet report a formal agreement of the Council of Ministers nor its publication in the BOE.

Based on these sources, what can be affirmed is that:

• DORA III is in the technical drafting, consultations, and reports phase, with a proposal from Aena already presented and politically debated.
• Institutional databases do not yet show a resolution from the Directorate General of Civil Aviation publishing the Council of Ministers' agreement approving DORA III, as is the case with DORA I and DORA II.
• Therefore, as of September 8, 2026, the pending decisive phase is the formal approval by the Council of Ministers and its publication in the BOE.

3. Next steps until final approval

Following the pattern of DORA I and II and what Law 18/2014 establishes, the remaining process, simplified, is as follows:

• 1) Finalization of the proposal by the Directorate General of Civil Aviation, based on:
  • The initial proposal from Aena.
  • Allegations received in regional airport coordination committees and other bodies (for example, the bilateral body with the Basque Government cited in ministerial press releases).
  • Reports from the CNMC, AESA, and other economic bodies.
• 2) Report from the Government Delegated Commission for Economic Affairs, which endorses the document before its submission to the Council of Ministers.
• 3) Approval by the Council of Ministers of the Agreement approving DORA III 2027‑2031.
• 4) Publication in the BOE:
  • The Directorate General of Civil Aviation issues a resolution ordering the publication of the Council of Ministers' Agreement and the DORA III itself as an annex, exactly as in 2017 and 2021.
  • The publication in the BOE sets the effective date (likely January 1, 2027) and gives full legal effect to the document.
• 5) Possible political and judicial review:
  • The Parliament may debate DORA III indirectly (questions, appearances, motions, non-legislative proposals, etc.).
  • Affected operators may, if applicable, challenge specific aspects of the tariff regime before the courts or the CNMC.

In summary: DORA III is not in a classic “parliamentary phase”, because its approval occurs within the Government. The key point in its processing, based on the sources consulted, is the submission of the final proposal to the Council of Ministers, its approval by agreement, and the subsequent publication in the BOE, which will complete the process and start the 2027‑2031 period.

In Spanish legislation, the Airport Regulation Document (DORA) is established in Law 18/2014, of October 15, as the basic economic regulation instrument for the network of general interest airports managed by Aena. Although Law 18/2014 assigns the DORA to the scope of the Ministry responsible for civil aviation and its approval by the Council of Ministers, the specific distribution of functions within the Ministry —and particularly of the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGAC)— is clearly seen in the approval resolutions of DORA 2017‑2021 and 2022‑2026 published in the BOE.

1. Basic regulatory framework of the DORA

Law 18/2014 (article 26 and related) defines the DORA as a five-year document that:

• Establishes the minimum capacity, quality, and service conditions of Aena's airport network.
• Sets the tariff path for airport public patrimonial services.
• Determines the investments to be made and other economic and operational parameters of the airport manager.
• Must be approved by the Council of Ministers, upon proposal of the Ministry responsible for air transport.

The Law refers to the Ministry and the Government but does not go into the detail of administrative units. This specification is practically done through the DGAC, as shown by the resolutions publishing the Council of Ministers' agreements on the DORA.

2. Role of the DGAC in drafting the DORA

The Resolution of February 20, 2017 of the DGAC, which publishes the Council of Ministers' Agreement approving DORA 2017‑2021, and the Resolution of September 29, 2021, regarding DORA 2022‑2026, specify several specific functions of the DGAC in the drafting phase:

• DRAFTER of the DORA: both resolutions indicate that the DORA is “drafted by the Directorate General of Civil Aviation” of the competent Ministry. That is, the DGAC is the technical-administrative body responsible for drafting the text of the DORA.
• Starting from Aena's proposal: it is stated that the DGAC's drafting of the DORA “started from a proposal by Aena”. This implies that the DGAC:
  • Receives the proposal from Aena S.M.E., S.A.
  • Analyzes it in light of the legal framework of Law 18/2014.
  • Adapts and completes it to form the DORA draft to be submitted to the Minister.
• Consultations with users and territorial bodies: the resolutions indicate that Aena's proposal has been “previously consulted with representative associations of airport infrastructure users” and that it has been forwarded to the Airport Coordination Committees of autonomous communities and statutory cities. In practice, the DGAC:
  • Organizes and channels these consultations and submissions.
  • Incorporates the results into the DORA file.
• Request and coordination of sectoral reports: the annexes of the DORA 2017‑2021 and 2022‑2026 resolutions indicate that, during processing, reports were requested from:
  • The National Commission on Markets and Competition (CNMC).
  • The State Aviation Safety Agency (AESA).
  • The Directorate General of Economic Policy of the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
  The DGAC acts as the instructing body, requesting, receiving, and evaluating these reports within the administrative file of the DORA.
• Submission of the proposal to the Minister: once consultations and reports are completed, the DGAC prepares the final text of the DORA and submits it to the Minister of Transport (formerly Development), who presents it to the Council of Ministers. Legally, the proposal to the Council of Ministers is from the Minister, but the technical work and text formulation rest with the DGAC.

3. Role of the DGAC in approval and publication

The formal competence for approval of the DORA corresponds to the Council of Ministers, according to Law 18/2014. However, the cited resolutions assign relevant functions to the DGAC in the final phase:

• Publication in the BOE: both in 2017 and 2021, the Director General of Civil Aviation himself signs the resolution ordering the publication in the “Official State Gazette” of the Council of Ministers' Agreement and the DORA text as annexes. This is a specific competence: the DGAC is the body responsible for officially publicizing the DORA.
• Certification of the approved content: by annexing the Council of Ministers' Agreement and the full DORA document to the resolution, the DGAC acts as the body that identifies and certifies the text that has been effectively approved by the Government.

4. Connection with the general competencies of the DGAC

The above functions are supported by the general framework of Law 21/2003, on Air Safety, which establishes the Ministry responsible for civil aviation —through the DGAC— as the aeronautical authority responsible for planning, supervision, and control of civil aviation and aeronautical inspection. In this context, the DGAC's involvement in the DORA is understood as part of its competencies in:

• Planning and economic regulation of the state airport network.
• Guaranteeing operational safety and service quality through coordination with AESA.
• Technical liaison with Aena, users, and other bodies of the General State Administration.

In summary, according to legislation and its practical application, the DGAC does not “approve” the DORA —the Council of Ministers does—, but holds a set of specific competencies in instruction, technical drafting, coordination of consultations and reports, and official publication that place it at the center of the DORA regulatory process.

The current president of the National Commission on Markets and Competition (CNMC) is Juan José Ganuza Fernández. His appointment was published in the Official State Gazette on July 22, 2026, assuming a six-year term leading the regulator, replacing Cani Fernández, who had presided over the institution between 2020 and 2026, as detailed by the CNMC itself and the newspaper Demócrata (CNMC note, profile in Demócrata).

Education and academic profile

Juan José Ganuza is, above all, an academic economist specialized in competition and regulation. He is a professor of Economics and Business at the Pompeu Fabra University (UPF), where he has developed nearly three decades of teaching and research career. His work has focused on several fields closely linked to the CNMC's mandate:

• Competition policy and fight against cartels and abuse of dominant position.
• Market regulation, especially in sectors with strong public supervision.
• Digital economy and the challenges posed by large platforms.
• Public procurement and design of rules for public sector purchases.

According to the profile published by Demócrata, he has a broad international scientific output and has served as editor or editorial manager in leading industrial economics journals, which reinforces his image as a technical expert rather than a political figure.

Previous positions and responsibilities

Before becoming president of the CNMC, Ganuza had accumulated a solid career in academic institutions and economic policy analysis:

• Director of the Master’s in Competition and Market Regulation at the Barcelona School of Economics for about ten years, a program noted as a reference in Spain in regulatory matters (Demócrata news).
• Head of the Competition and Market Regulation area at Funcas, where he worked on studies and analyses applied to regulated markets (Demócrata explains).
• President of the Economics Area of the State Research Agency (AEI), a position he held at the time of his CNMC nomination.
• Frequent collaborator of the CNMC before his appointment, participating in seminars and specialized publications on competition and regulation.

His designation responds, according to reports, to a technical and academic profile. Demócrata emphasizes that this trait differentiates him from previous CNMC presidents who came more directly from the Administration or State legal bodies.

Appointment and parliamentary process

The Council of Ministers proposed Juan José Ganuza as president of the CNMC in its meeting on June 23, 2026, as part of the partial renewal of the agency's board (news about the Government's proposal).

According to Law 3/2013 creating the CNMC, his candidacy was examined by the Economy, Trade and Digital Transformation Committee of the Congress. On July 14, 2026, the Committee evaluated the suitability of Ganuza and the new proposed board members. The candidacy was endorsed by the majority, despite opposition votes from PP and Vox, who questioned his political independence (parliamentary report).

After this parliamentary control procedure —which does not imply a direct election but the power of veto by absolute majority—, the appointment was formalized by Royal Decree and made official with publication in the BOE on July 22, 2026. Since then, he presides over the CNMC Plenary and the Competition Chamber, as stated in the agency's official note (composition of the Chambers).

Political career and party affiliation

In the information available from official and journalistic sources used for this response:

• No previous parliamentary career or positions in political groups in legislative chambers are recorded.
• No mention of organic positions in political parties or notable membership.
• The profiles consulted repeatedly describe a “technical” and “academic” profile, and the criticism from some groups focuses precisely on his supposed closeness or distance to the Government, but without attributing an explicit political career.

With the available evidence, it can be said that Juan José Ganuza's career is fundamentally academic and as an expert in regulation and competition, with experience in analysis and economic advisory bodies, and without a public history of elected or organic political positions.