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Based on the parliamentary and press information consulted, as of today there is no law, bill, or royal decree-law in the General Courts whose main purpose is specific aid or tax incentives for the pharmaceutical sector (industry, R&D, or pharmacies). What exists is a combination of: pharmaceutical regulatory reforms under processing, executive programs of economic incentives, and motions or political guidelines, but without a closed sectoral tax scheme in the legislative process.

General Courts: what is and isn’t under processing

1. Absence of a “pharmaceutical tax incentives law” as such

Specific searches in the Congress and Senate databases for the last 18 months (02-24-2025 to 08-24-2026), combining terms such as “tax aid,” “tax incentives,” “tax benefits,” and “pharmaceutical sector,” do not yield:

• Neither government bills with that central sectoral focus.
• Nor bills registered by groups with that main purpose.
• Nor validated royal decree-laws that establish a specific tax regime for the pharmaceutical industry.

Debates, questions, motions, and non-legislative proposals calling to “improve tax benefits aimed at R&D&i activities” to strengthen the pharmaceutical fabric are found, but these are non-legislative or guiding initiatives, without concrete tax provisions or their own regulatory path.

2. Draft Law on Medicines and Medical Devices

The major ongoing text directly affecting the sector is the Draft Law on Medicines and Medical Devices, approved by the Council of Ministers on July 21, 2026, which is now beginning its processing in Congress and Senate ( Council of Ministers agreement ).

According to official notes and sector analysis ( analysis in Redacción Médica ), this law:

• Deeply reforms the framework of pricing and financing of medicines.
• Recognizes incremental innovation and adjusts the reference pricing system.
• Serves as an umbrella for industrial strategies such as the future “Protech Plan” for medical technology.

However, its content focuses on the regulatory regime, evaluation, financing, and mandatory contributions (for example, the review of deductions from Royal Decree-law 8/2010 on industry contributions to the National Health System), more than on introducing new classic tax incentives (deductions in Corporate Tax, etc.) specifically aimed at pharma.

3. Other recent related state regulations, but not sectoral tax ones

• Royal Decree-law 11/2026, of May 12, on pharmaceutical copayment, validated by Congress and processed as a bill ( Official Congress Gazette – validation ). It affects the patient contribution in pharmaceutical provision, not tax incentives for companies.
• Law 7/2025 creating the State Public Health Agency, already approved, which introduces changes in the pricing system and in the treatment of incremental innovation ( parliamentary report ), but again, without establishing a sectoral tax aid or deduction regime.

Executive programs of economic incentives

4. Profarma Plan and future “Protech”-type schemes

Parallel to the legislative route, the Government is using executive programs of economic incentives:

• Profarma Plan 2025-2026, relaunched by the Ministry of Industry ( official note ), which is not a law under processing, but a program that allows companies to reduce mandatory contributions to the National Health System based on their industrial and innovative performance. These are relevant economic incentives, but implemented via program and existing regulations, not through a new tax law.
• The announced “Protech Plan” for medical technology, linked precisely to the future Draft Law on Medicines ( coverage by Redacción Médica ), which aims to replicate the Profarma logic (incentives linked to investment, production, and innovation), but whose specific design will depend on how the parliamentary processing of the framework law progresses.

Both instruments exemplify that the incentive policy for the sector is mainly channeled through regulatory and programmatic routes, rather than through major sectoral tax reforms negotiated in Parliament.

Regional scope and general measures

At the regional level, the following have been identified:

• Lines of subsidies and aid for industrial R&D&i (Andalusia, Catalonia, Asturias, etc.), some applicable to biomedicine or health, but with a multisectoral vocation.
• Regulations on fees and budgets where pharmaceutical authorizations and provisions are regulated (for example, the 2026 Fiscal and Administrative Measures Law of Cantabria for pharmaceutical establishment fees), without incorporating positive tax incentive schemes like a “specific pharma deduction.”

General political orientation

The picture that emerges is one of intense reform of the regulatory and pricing framework, along with executive programs like Profarma, and constant pressure from the sector (Farmaindustria and others) to strengthen R&D deductions and improve economic incentives ( Farmaindustria’s positions ). But, to date, this has not yet materialized in a “pharmaceutical tax incentives law” under identifiable parliamentary processing as such.

It is likely that any eventual sectoral tax improvements will be negotiated, if they come to fruition, as specific amendments within: the Draft Law on Medicines, future budget laws, or general Corporate Tax reforms, rather than as a single monographic text.

The Spanish Agency of Medicines and Medical Devices (AEMPS) is the state authority competent in Spain to authorize and supervise the manufacturing of medicines and, in the field of medical devices, to grant the operating license of the facilities, also when manufacturing is done “for third parties” (contract manufacturing). Its powers are mainly based on the Revised Text of the Law on guarantees and rational use of medicines and medical devices (Royal Legislative Decree 1/2015), Royal Decree 824/2010 for pharmaceutical laboratories, and Royal Decree 192/2023 for medical devices.

1. Authorization of manufacturers and contract manufacturing

In the case of medicines, article 63 of the Law on guarantees (as reflected in Royal Decree 824/2010) establishes that any natural or legal person engaged in the manufacture of medicines “or any of the processes it may include, even those of fractioning, packaging, and presentation for sale” must be previously authorized by the AEMPS, even if the manufacturing is exclusively for export. This obligation also applies when manufacturing is carried out on behalf of a third party (marketing authorization holder or another company).

Royal Decree 824/2010 specifies that its scope includes the manufacture of human and veterinary medicines, authorization of manufacturing and importing laboratories, registration of pharmaceutical laboratories, and inspection and quality control. The laboratory manufacturing for third parties must have manufacturer authorization, comply with good manufacturing practices (GMP), and have a responsible technical director.

For medical devices, Royal Decree 192/2023 expressly designates the AEMPS as the “competent authority” for the purposes of Regulation (EU) 2017/745 and provides that natural or legal persons engaged in manufacturing, importing, assembling, or sterilizing medical devices require a prior operating license granted by the AEMPS. It is explicitly established that this license is also required when “complete manufacturing of products for third parties” is performed. The license may cover both own and contracted activities in the same facility.

2. Inspections and compliance with good manufacturing practices

Royal Decree 824/2010 assigns the AEMPS the inspection of pharmaceutical laboratories, including contract manufacturers, to verify compliance with European Union good manufacturing practices and the detailed GMP guide. The Agency can order facility inspections, sample collection, and other control actions, and its laboratories are part of the European Network of Official Control Laboratories, according to the Statute approved by Royal Decree 1275/2011.

In the field of medical devices, Royal Decree 192/2023 dedicates a specific chapter to inspection and market control, entrusting the AEMPS with surveillance activities, facility inspections, and adoption of health protection measures in coordination with autonomous communities. This also applies to manufacturers producing on behalf of third parties or for exclusive use by healthcare centers when Agency intervention is required.

3. Quality control, registrations, and pharmacovigilance

The Law on guarantees and its regulatory development assign the AEMPS:

• Registration of pharmaceutical laboratories and active ingredient manufacturers, including modifications and transfers, accessible to inspection authorities (articles on laboratory and active ingredient manufacturer registries).
• Official quality control through its Official Control Laboratories, integrated into the European network and coordinated by the EDQM, which can intervene in batch verification and resolve medicine quality issues.
• Supervision of pharmacovigilance and medical device vigilance: the AEMPS coordinates the Spanish Pharmacovigilance System for human and veterinary medicines (Law 10/2013 and AEMPS Statute) and manages the medical device vigilance system provided in Royal Decree 192/2023, receiving and evaluating serious incidents and corrective actions.

4. Modification of authorizations and sanctioning power

The Revised Text of the Law on guarantees empowers the AEMPS to:

• Modify, suspend, or revoke medicine authorizations when quality guarantees are not met, required quality controls are not performed, or a health risk is detected. This includes the case of manufacturing for third parties if the non-compliance originates in the contracted manufacturer.
• Require effective commercialization or maintain/suspend authorizations for health or sanitary interest reasons.
• Exercise sanctioning functions within the infringement and sanction regime of the Law on guarantees itself, regarding non-compliance in manufacturing, importing, distribution, or surveillance, without prejudice to the sanctioning competence of other health authorities.

In summary, in contract manufacturing schemes, the AEMPS not only authorizes and registers the manufacturer and facilities but also inspects GMP compliance, can require corrections or cease activity, participates in official quality control, and directs pharmacovigilance and medical device vigilance systems, also having powers to modify or revoke authorizations and propose or impose sanctions when manufacturing conditions for third parties compromise product safety, quality, or efficacy.

The most recent regional election results in the Community of Madrid are those of the May 28, 2023 elections. Based on those data and the political and sectoral archives, it is possible to identify which parties maintain a more clearly favorable attitude towards the pharmaceutical industry and public-private collaboration in healthcare.

2023 Regional Election Results in the Community of Madrid

In the 2023 elections to the Madrid Assembly, the vote and seat distribution of the main parties was as follows (summary taken from multiple subsequent analyses of surveys using 2023 as a reference, for example Sigma Dos and Data10):

• PP (Isabel Díaz Ayuso): around 47.8% of the votes and 70 seats (absolute majority out of 135). Various subsequent polls recall this data when comparing new scenarios, e.g., Data10 projecting that the PP would go “from 47.8% to 50.3% and from 70 to 73 seats” compared to the 2023 regional elections (Demócrata).
• PSOE: around 18.2% of the votes and 27 seats, tied with Más Madrid; cited as “positioned as the second force with 18.21% and 27 seats” (Demócrata).
• Más Madrid: also around 18.3% of the votes and 27 seats, “replicating the 2023 result, in which it obtained 27 seats and 18.37%” according to Sigma Dos (Demócrata).
• Vox: approximately 7.3% of the votes and 10 seats, which subsequent polls take as a reference when indicating it would rise from “the 10 it obtained in 2023, when it registered 7.3% of the votes” (Demócrata).
• Podemos–IU–Green Alliance: fell below 5% and, consequently, without representation in the Assembly; subsequent analyses mention their “difficulties to regain parliamentary representation” in Madrid (Demócrata).

Which parties are more favorable to the pharmaceutical industry?

Crossing these results with the public position of each party regarding the pharmaceutical sector and public-private collaboration, the political map is as follows:

PP (regional government)

• It is, by far, the main political ally of the pharmaceutical industry in Madrid. The regional government has launched the 2025-2028 Biopharmaceutical Innovation Strategy in collaboration with Farmaindustria, which seeks to “facilitate access to innovation, strengthen the research ecosystem, and encourage industrial investment” (Farmaindustria and Demócrata).
• Minister Fátima Matute has repeatedly defended the role of the industry and public-private collaboration, emphasizing that the biopharmaceutical sector is “an essential strategic ally” and that Madrid wants to be a “reference in biopharmaceutical innovation” (Redacción Médica).
• The Madrid Executive has also signed an agreement with Farmaindustria for the ethical promotion of medicines, which “strengthens the collaboration of the public administration with the pharmaceutical industry, a key agent in the health system” (Demócrata).
• Politically, the PP defends a model with strong public-private hospital collaboration and values pharmaceutical investment and clinical trials in the region.

Vox

• Shares, essentially, a favorable view of private healthcare and sees it as an “ally, an indispensable complement” to public healthcare, as reflected in debates on hospital concessions in the Assembly (InfoSalus).
• In key votes, it has supported the maintenance of the mixed model alongside the PP and opposed left-wing initiatives to audit and reverse public-private collaboration in healthcare (Gaceta Médica and Demócrata).
• Its discourse is less sectoral than the PP’s (less focused on innovation and more on ideology and “national priority”), but in terms of regulatory climate, it is not hostile to the pharmaceutical industry and supports a significant role for private provision.

PSOE

• In Madrid, the PSOE holds an intermediate position: it defends public healthcare and has denounced “privatization” and “overcosts” associated with the concession model (InfoSalus), but does not propose a frontal break with the pharmaceutical industry as such.
• At the state level (Ministry of Health), the PSOE-Sumar space has promoted reforms on equity, expenditure control, and price regulation, as well as the idea of a public pharmaceutical industry in some niches, pointing to a more regulatory than business-promoting approach.
• For the sector, the PSOE is a relevant interlocutor but with an agenda more focused on access, prices, and equity than on industrial incentives.

Más Madrid and Podemos–IU–Green Alliance

• Más Madrid is at the critical pole. It has described public-private healthcare collaboration as “parasitism of healthcare” and has proposed exhaustive audits and progressive reversal of concessions to 100% public management (Gaceta Médica; Demócrata).
• The Podemos–IU–Green Alliance space, although currently without seats in Madrid, nationally advocates formulas such as a public pharmaceutical industry and is very critical of private “big pharma” (see, for example, the article on Javier Padilla’s public pharmaceutical industry proposal covered in the press: The Objective).
• Both spaces support research and access to medicines but are openly hostile to the system’s core depending on private companies, so they cannot be considered “pro-industry” parties from a business perspective.

Summary

In the Community of Madrid, the bloc most clearly aligned with the interests of the pharmaceutical industry—in terms of public-private collaboration, regulatory security, and industrial promotion—is formed by the PP (which also governs with an absolute majority and concentrates 47-48% of the vote) and, at a second level, by Vox as a potential partner in the same ideological space. The PSOE maintains a more regulatory and vigilant position, while Más Madrid and the Podemos–IU–Green Alliance space are clearly more hostile to the current collaboration model and prioritize reversion to direct public management.