Morocco sent an email to all MEPs to influence the vote on Ceuta.

The mission of Morocco before the EU and NATO conveyed this Monday to the MEPs its commitment to readmit Moroccan citizens, unaccompanied minors, and nationals of third countries, a message echoed by the MEP of the PNV Oihane Agirregoitia during the plenary.

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20260915 EP 209984D CCR 0047 MEDIUM

20260915 EP 209984D CCR 0047 MEDIUM

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The mission of Morocco to the EU and NATO sent an email to the MEPs this Monday to convey its position on the migration crisis in Ceuta and to ensure that Rabat is willing to readmit all affected persons. The MEP from PNV Oihane Agirregoitia put the content of the message on the table of the plenary this Tuesday and demanded that Morocco fulfill the commitment conveyed in writing.

"Morocco commits to readmit all affected persons, including Moroccan citizens, unaccompanied minors, and nationals of third countries", states the email sent by the Moroccan diplomatic mission to the European institutions and NATO, as Agirregoitia read literally during her speech.

"Then let it be done"

The Basque MEP used the content of the email to demand that the commitment expressed by Rabat be translated into action. "Then let it be done," Agirregoitia responded from the hemicycle, before questioning whether the situation on the ground reflects what Morocco has conveyed to the representatives of the European Parliament.

The intervention occurred in a context marked by migration pressure on Ceuta and by the European debate on the management of external borders. Agirregoitia defended the need to address the situation through a combination of border control, fighting against mafias, international protection, and the return of those who do not have the right to remain, always within the legal framework. "We are not going to look the other way regarding the responsibilities of the Kingdom of Morocco, the Spanish Government, or the European Union, but we are also not going to enter or participate in circuses," she stated.

The MEP described the situation as a "violated European external border," a city "overwhelmed," security problems, and minors in conditions she deemed undignified, in addition to pointing out the response of Spain and other member states.

The commitment of Rabat, on the table

It was at that point that Agirregoitia revealed that the MEPs had received an email the day before from the mission of Morocco to the EU and NATO. The diplomatic communication included Rabat's commitment regarding the readmission of those affected by the crisis.

The MEP has publicly conveyed the content of the message and has demanded its implementation. The focus has thus shifted from Morocco's political position to a concrete commitment communicated directly to the members of the European Parliament. Agirregoitia has questioned whether the images and information that are becoming known about the situation are consistent with the commitment expressed by the diplomatic mission. "Well, let it be done, because the images we are seeing on television and the information we receive do not say the same thing," she has pointed out. The message sent to the MEPs explicitly includes three groups: Moroccan citizens, unaccompanied minors, and nationals of third countries.

The position defended by the PNV MEP has sought to combine border control with protection obligations and fundamental rights. "Order and humanism," she has summarized. Agirregoitia has also focused on the socioeconomic conditions of Morocco and has linked the management of migratory flows with the need to address social inequalities.

"Morocco, a country that is hosting and aspires to host the final of a World Cup in 2030, should have the capacity to address these and other social realities and inequalities," she has stated. The MEP has added that "that is governing and distributing wealth," thus placing the migratory issue beyond the immediate management of arrivals and returns.

The email from the Moroccan mission has thus introduced a concrete element into the European debate: Rabat assures the MEPs that it will readmit all affected persons, including unaccompanied minors and nationals of third countries. Now, the demand raised from the European plenary is that this commitment communicated in writing is realized.

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What stage is the processing of new migration policies in the European Union related to the management of external borders at?

As of September 2026, the EU's "new migration policies" related to the management of external borders are no longer in the legislative processing phase: the core of the Migration and Asylum Pact has been fully in force since June 12, 2026, and the Union is in a phase of operational implementation and practical adjustment. In parallel, complementary pieces (such as the new common return system and the 2028‑2034 financial architecture) are being negotiated to support this framework.

The Migration and Asylum Pact, adopted in May/June 2024 following the political agreement reached in 2023, groups ten interrelated legislative files that thoroughly reform the Common European Asylum System. Among them are:

  • Detection and Border Control Regulation, which imposes systematic identity, security, health, and vulnerability checks on anyone who irregularly crosses the external border or is detected in an irregular situation.
  • Asylum and Migration Management Regulation (AMMR), which updates the rules for determining the responsible State for an application (the former "Dublin") and creates a permanent solidarity mechanism among Member States.
  • Asylum Procedure Regulation (APR), which introduces a mandatory border procedure for certain categories of applicants, so that processing (and, if applicable, return) is carried out directly at the external border.
  • Crisis and Force Majeure Regulation, designed for situations of migratory crisis or instrumentalization of flows.
  • Eurodac Reform, which turns the database into a broader tool to track irregular entries and secondary movements.
  • Reception Conditions Directive and Qualification Regulation, which harmonize protection standards and reception conditions.
  • EU Asylum Agency (EUAA), already operational as a fully-fledged agency supporting Member States.

According to the European Commission, this entire package began to be applied in practice on June 12, 2026, a date marking the end of the transitional period and the start of the new system in all Member States (Commission note of 11/06/2026). However, the Commission itself emphasizes that this is a "complex set of reforms" that still requires intense legal and operational work: adapting national legislations, establishing adequate reception capacities, deploying infrastructures for border procedures, and ensuring independent mechanisms for monitoring fundamental rights (report of 08/05/2026).

In strictly border-related matters, the current emphasis is on:

  • Operationalizing border procedures (triage, biometric registration, rapid screening of applications with low protection probability) at key land and sea entry points.
  • Ensuring that all Member States have physical infrastructures and sufficient personnel to manage the new model of "border control + rapid decision + return."
  • Fully deploying technological systems, such as the Entry/Exit System and the enhanced Eurodac, integrated into the border management strategy.

In parallel with the Pact, the legal and financial framework is being built to sustain these policies in the medium term:

  • In July 2026, the Council agreed on its partial negotiating position on the regulations that will set EU financial support for migration, border management, and internal security within the 2028‑2034 financial framework. These funds will help States implement the Pact and modernize external border management (Council, 15/07/2026).
  • The Commission has also presented a new Common European Return System, designed to complement the Pact, whose negotiation between Parliament and Council (trilogues) was ongoing in 2026, according to the Commission itself.
  • Specific rules on the list of safe countries of origin and on the concept of safe third country have been adopted, with implementation also aligned with June 2026, as part of strengthening border control and returns.

In summary, as of September 2026, the purely legislative phase of the new European migration framework on external borders is essentially closed: the Migration and Asylum Pact is already binding and applicable law. The focus has shifted to practical implementation at borders, correcting imbalances between States, and negotiating additional instruments (returns, 2028‑2034 financing) that allow consolidating and stably financing this new regime of integrated external border management of the Union.

How are the new border procedures of the Migration and Asylum Pact applied in practice at points like the Canary Islands, Ceuta, or the Aegean? What role does Frontex play within the new European integrated border management framework and how has it changed with the Pact? What main criticisms do NGOs and human rights organizations make about the Migration and Asylum Pact and its impact on migrants?

What are the powers and functions of Members of the European Parliament regarding border control and migration according to European regulations?

Members of the European Parliament do not directly manage borders nor decide on individual migration or asylum cases, but they play a central role in defining and overseeing European policy in these areas. Their power derives from the competences of the European Parliament set out in the Treaties (mainly the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU) and the Parliament's Rules of Procedure.

1. Legislative function in borders and migration

Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, most EU rules on border control, visas, immigration, and asylum are adopted through the ordinary legislative procedure, that is, in co-decision between the European Parliament and the Council. This means that:

  • MEPs can propose amendments to draft regulations and directives concerning:
    • management of external borders (Schengen Borders Code, Schengen Information System, entry and exit systems, etc.);
    • common visa policy;
    • legal immigration (blue card, family reunification, students and researchers, seasonal workers, etc.);
    • fight against irregular immigration (e.g., return rules);
    • common European asylum system (Dublin regulation, asylum procedures, refugee qualification, reception, etc.).
  • The Parliament, by majority, can approve or reject the law at the final reading; without MEP approval, the legislative act does not proceed.
  • Occasionally, it can force negotiations with the Council (the so-called trilogues), directly influencing the final content of legislation.

Additionally, the Parliament can request the Commission to present new legislative proposals in these areas, guiding the future evolution of EU migration and border policy.

2. Budgetary function

The European Parliament is a budgetary co-legislator, which grants MEPs key power over resources allocated to borders and migration:

  • They approve the Multiannual Financial Framework (long-term EU budget), which sets the major spending ceilings, including funds for:
    • Borders and visa management;
    • Asylum, migration, and integration;
    • Cooperation with third countries on migration matters.
  • They negotiate and approve the annual budget, being able to increase, reduce, or reorient relevant allocations (e.g., Asylum, Migration and Integration Funds or the Integrated Border Management Fund).
  • They link the use of these funds to respect for EU law and fundamental rights, through resolutions and political conditions.
3. Democratic control and agency oversight

MEPs exercise important political oversight over the application of migration and border regulations:

  • They can invite and demand hearings from the European Commission, the Council, and agency directors such as Frontex (European Border and Coast Guard Agency), the EU Asylum Agency, or Europol, to explain their actions.
  • They approve or deny the discharge of budgetary management of these agencies, assessing whether they have acted legally, effectively, and respecting fundamental rights.
  • They create working groups, fact-finding missions, or temporary committees to analyze possible abuses, pushbacks, conditions in reception centers, etc.
  • They submit written and oral questions to the Commission and Council about specific incidents or general practices in border and migration management.
4. Defense of fundamental rights

European law requires respect for the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in all policies, including borders and migration. Within this framework:

  • MEPs ensure that rules respect the non-refoulement principle, the right to asylum, the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment, and the protection of minors.
  • They can promote resolutions and plenary debates denouncing violations (e.g., at external borders or in the treatment of asylum seekers), politically pressuring the Commission and Member States.
  • They oversee the use of border surveillance technologies (biometric systems, databases, interoperability), demanding guarantees of data protection and privacy.
5. External dimension and international agreements

EU migration and border policy has a strong external dimension (readmission agreements, cooperation with third countries, migration partnerships). In these areas:

  • The Parliament must give its consent to numerous international agreements, without which they cannot enter into force (e.g., readmission or police cooperation agreements).
  • It controls, through the budget and political action, that agreements respect international human rights standards.
  • MEPs participate in interparliamentary delegations and joint forums with third countries, where they raise issues related to migration and borders.

In summary, European regulations grant MEPs decisive powers in the creation of rules, in the allocation of resources, and in the democratic and fundamental rights oversight of the EU's border and migration policy, although daily execution remains in the hands of Member States and specialized agencies.

What legal requirements must be met for Morocco to be able to readmit migrants from European territory?

Morocco's readmission of migrants from European territory (in practice, mainly from Spain and particularly Ceuta and Melilla) is not automatic: it is based on international agreements and EU and Spanish law, and requires meeting a series of material requirements and procedural guarantees. The framework is summarized below.

1. Basic legal framework

There are three major overlapping normative levels:

  • International human rights and asylum law (Geneva Convention, European Convention on Human Rights, non-refoulement principle), which prohibit collective expulsions and returns to places where the person may suffer persecution, torture, or inhuman treatment.
  • EU law, particularly the new Return Regulation and the Migration and Asylum Pact, which set common rules for return decisions, return procedures, and the possibility of agreements with third countries on return and readmission. The Council has specified that these agreements or "arrangements" can only be concluded with countries where international human rights standards and the non-refoulement principle are respected, and must detail the return procedure and conditions of stay in the third country (EU Council note).
  • Spanish domestic law (Aliens Act and its regulation), which regulates border rejection, return, and expulsion, and requires identification, motivated administrative resolution, legal assistance, interpreter, and access to asylum. The Constitutional and Supreme Courts' jurisprudence has reinforced that summary returns without individual assessment are not allowed, and the Andalusian High Court of Justice has declared immediate returns of people arriving by swimming without procedure or guarantees illegal (TSJA ruling on Ceuta).
2. Relevant agreements with Morocco
  • Spain–Morocco bilateral readmission agreement of 1992, on "circulation, transit, and readmission of foreigners who entered irregularly," signed in 1992 and in force since 2012, which allows requesting Morocco to readmit:
    • its own nationals who have entered Spain irregularly from its territory;
    • and, under certain conditions, third-country nationals who have accessed from Morocco.
    Recent press and analyses remind that "readmissions are not automatic" and that the problem is usually their practical application, not the absence of an agreement.
  • 2007 agreement on unaccompanied minors, which establishes a specific framework for preventing irregular migration of minors, their protection, and "concerted return" (with reinforced guarantees, verification of reception conditions, and individualized case files).
  • EU–Morocco migration cooperation, which is not currently articulated through a large fully operational "readmission agreement," but rather through:
    • visa policy, trade, and financing conditioned on readmission cooperation (for example, the new EU Generalised Scheme of Preferences introduces "readmission conditionality" for irregular migrants to maintain trade advantages, according to the European Parliament: EP note on GSP);
    • and operational agreements on border control and police cooperation.
3. Specific requirements for Morocco to be able to readmit

On this basis, for Morocco to legally be able to—and accept to—readmit migrants from the EU, the following requirements must be met, in summary:

  • Legal basis for readmission:
    • there must be an enabling instrument (bilateral readmission agreement, EU–Morocco agreement or arrangement, or ad hoc commitment compatible with these frameworks);
    • this instrument must comply with EU law and international obligations, including the non-refoulement principle.
  • Identification and nationality:
    • the person must be properly identified (personal data, biometrics if necessary);
    • Morocco must recognize them as its national for readmission of Moroccans, or accept readmission as a transit/third safe country in the case of third-country nationals;
    • for third countries, agreements usually require proof that entry was from Morocco.
  • Individualized procedure and guarantees:
    • in Spain, a return or expulsion procedure must be processed according to the Aliens Act: identification at police station, administrative resolution, right to lawyer and interpreter, possibility to appeal and to apply for asylum;
    • collective expulsions are not allowed; each case must be individually assessed, as recalled by the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and Andalusian justice;
    • people arriving by swimming or by sea cannot be rejected at the border without procedure; they require a formal return decision, as jurisprudence and specialized legal press remind.
  • Respect for human rights and asylum:
    • readmission cannot be carried out if there is a risk of serious human rights violations, persecution, or ill-treatment in the country of return (non-refoulement principle);
    • access to international protection procedures must be guaranteed when the person requests it or there are indications of protection needs;
    • there are specific protections for minors, pregnant women, and other vulnerable groups, stricter in the case of unaccompanied minors under the 2007 agreement.
  • Consular cooperation and deadlines:
    • Morocco must cooperate consularly (recognize the person, issue a safe-conduct or travel document);
    • Spain must execute the return within legal deadlines (e.g., before exhausting the 72 hours of police detention without judicial authorization for internment), without political understandings overriding these limits.

In summary, Morocco can only legally readmit migrants from European territory when there is an activated conventional basis (bilateral or with the EU) case by case, identity and nationality have been verified, an individualized procedure with all guarantees under EU, Spanish, and international law has been followed, and the readmission does not violate the non-refoulement principle or other fundamental rights.

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Which group was NOT explicitly mentioned in the Morocco email as part of the readmission commitment?

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Who made public the content of the email sent by the Moroccan diplomatic mission to the EU and NATO?

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What combination of measures did Oihane Agirregoitia advocate to address the situation in Ceuta?

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