The Pija and the Quinqui, the influencers who interviewed Sánchez and conquered Generation Z: their role before the 29N

In Spain, the participation of influencers in electoral campaigns is not prohibited, but it operates within a fragmented regulatory framework: the classic electoral law (LOREG), audiovisual regulation of influencers, campaign financing rules, data protection, and, from 2025, the European Regulation on transparency of political advertising. There is not yet a specific “electoral influencer law.”

1. What Spanish regulations say today

a) LOREG and the Electoral Board's doctrine

• The Organic Law of the General Electoral Regime (LOREG) regulates the campaign, spending limits, advertising, and institutional neutrality, but does not mention influencers as a specific category.
• The Instruction 3/2011 of the Central Electoral Board on article 53 LOREG clarifies that, from the call until the end of the campaign, the dissemination of paid electoral advertising or propaganda is prohibited in “press, radio or other digital media,” including internet advertising formats and banners, except during the permitted campaign period. It distinguishes between:
  • Contracted propaganda (commercial media, ads, banners), subject to prohibitions and limits.
  • Ordinary political activity and presence on social networks, which is allowed as long as there is no explicit request for votes or commercial contracting.
• The Instruction 4/2007 of the Electoral Board reminds that all campaign and propaganda rules also apply to “new electronic information and communication technologies,” that is, websites, email, SMS, and today, social networks.
• Recent resolutions from regional electoral boards — for example, in the 2026 Andalusian elections — emphasize:
  • Prohibition of explicitly asking for votes outside the campaign period, including if the message is spread via social networks.
  • Prohibition of electoral propaganda on the reflection day, including social media posts or institutional messages from public officials.
  • Rejection of anonymous campaigns on the internet or on the street that violate LOREG's transparency requirements.

In practice, an influencer expressing their political opinion as a citizen falls under freedom of expression; if acting on behalf of a party or candidate, their content may be considered electoral propaganda, with all consequences regarding expenses, limits, and permitted periods.

b) Financing and control of expenses on networks

The instructions from the Court of Auditors on auditing electoral accounts (for example, for the 2025 Extremadura elections) make clear that electoral advertising on social networks is part of electoral expenses, although it is not counted within the specific sub-limit for “press and radio.” It is, in any case, subject to the overall spending limit of the electoral process.

2. Influencers as “users of special relevance” in audiovisual services

Specific regulation of influencers comes through audiovisual law, not electoral law:

• The Law 13/2022, General Audiovisual Communication Law, and its regulatory development through Royal Decree 444/2024, create the figure of “users of special relevance” in video-sharing services (essentially large influencers).
• These users are considered providers of audiovisual communication services for certain purposes, especially:
  • Respect for general principles of audiovisual communication.
  • Enhanced obligations in protection of minors.
  • Compliance with rules on audiovisual commercial communications.
• The CNMC has already sanctioned well-known creators (such as Ibai Llanos or Jordi Wild) for not properly identifying advertising or for failing to comply with classification and warning requirements, showing that the audiovisual authority is willing to apply these rules also in the influencer ecosystem.

In an electoral campaign, this intersects with LOREG: a “user of special relevance” influencer who disseminates messages sponsored by parties must clearly identify them as advertising and also respect electoral periods, limits, and prohibitions.

3. Data protection and political microtargeting

• The Circular 1/2019 of the Spanish Data Protection Agency develops article 58 bis LOREG (data processing and electoral propaganda). It is very restrictive with political microtargeting and profiling voters with sensitive data, precisely because of the risk of manipulation in digital campaigns.
• It requires that obtaining and using data for electoral propaganda (including dissemination on networks) strictly complies with the GDPR; practices such as intensive profiling, use of big data, or inferring ideology from network data are considered highly problematic.

4. European novelties: Political advertising Regulation

Since October 10, 2025, Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on transparency and targeting of political advertising is fully applicable. It requires that every political ad, including on social networks, be clearly identified as such and inform, among other elements, about:

• Who sponsors and pays for it.
• What amount or consideration has been paid.
• Whether targeting or personalized dissemination has been used and with what criteria.

Political content disseminated by an influencer will be considered “political advertising” if it is paid for or commissioned within the framework of a campaign or the defense of a political cause, even if presented as a personal opinion. In contrast, unpaid expressions will generally continue to be treated as protected speech, unless they violate other rules (hate crimes, etc.).

5. Ongoing reforms and debates (2024‑2026)

• The Government has approved a draft reform of LOREG (2025) mainly aimed at making certain electoral debates mandatory and publishing microdata from polls. Although it does not focus on influencers, it is part of a broader effort to update the electoral regime for the digital age.
• In parallel, bills on digital services and media governance are being processed, an organic law on the proper use of artificial intelligence that addresses systems capable of influencing electoral processes, and non-legislative proposals have been presented to criminalize malicious dissemination of deepfakes during campaigns.
• Politically and in the media, there is an increasingly intense debate on how to treat major content creators acting as “new media”, including reference podcasts attended by national leaders in pre-campaign.

6. Snapshot: what exists and what is missing

In summary, today:

• Influencers can participate in electoral campaigns, but:
  • If they are paid or receive consideration, their content is considered advertising and, in an electoral context, propaganda subject to LOREG and the Court of Auditors' control.
  • Those of “special relevance” are also subject to the obligations of the General Audiovisual Communication Law and CNMC supervision.
  • In the EU, paid messages with electoral purpose must be identified as political advertising with the enhanced transparency of Regulation 2024/900.
• However, there is no specific Spanish regulation that expressly defines the “electoral influencer”, their limits, and their own obligations: adaptation is done in layers (electoral, audiovisual, data, consumer) and is still under construction.

The reforms in preparation aim to close some of these gaps, but to date, the key legal boundary remains the remuneration and the electoral purpose of the content rather than the mere fact that it is disseminated by an influencer.

The President of the Government of Spain is the highest authority of the Executive Power and their role is mainly regulated in the 1978 Constitution, especially in articles 97 to 100, as well as other scattered references (for example, regarding dissolution of the Cortes or political responsibility of the Government). Their powers can be grouped into several major functions: direction of the Government and political action, relationship with the Cortes Generales, role in the Crown, and responsibility and control.

1. Direction of Government action and general policy

Article 97 of the Constitution establishes that the Government directs domestic and foreign policy, the civil and military administration, and the defense of the State, and adds that it exercises executive function and regulatory power. Within this framework, the President of the Government is the one who directs the Government's action and coordinates the functions of the other members.

This implies, in particular:

• Setting the major political orientations of the Executive (legislative priorities, economic, social, foreign, security policies, etc.).
• Coordinating and arbitrating among different ministries when there are conflicts of competence or differences of opinion.
• Promoting and supervising the execution of the Council of Ministers' decisions and ensuring coherence of governmental action.
• Politically representing the Government before public opinion and on the international stage as the main person responsible for the State's general policy.

2. Appointment and dismissal of ministers

According to article 100 of the Constitution, the other members of the Government (vice presidents and ministers) are appointed and dismissed by the King at the proposal of the President of the Government. This means that:

• The President decides the Government's structure (which ministries exist, how many, and what competencies they accumulate).
• Selects the people who make up the Council of Ministers and can freely dismiss them.
• It is up to the President to politically delimit the responsibilities of each portfolio and reorganize the Cabinet when deemed convenient.

In practice, this power strengthens their position as head of the Executive, since they control the composition and political functioning of the Government.

3. Relationship with the King and role in formal State acts

The Constitution does not designate the President as “head of State” (this condition belongs to the King), but attributes a central role in preparing and articulating the Crown's formal acts. Thus:

• The President proposes to the King the appointment and dismissal of ministers (art. 100 CE).
• Intervenes in the proposal of other high State officials whose appointment formally corresponds to the King, through the corresponding regulations.
• In practice, directs the Government–Crown relationship, since most acts of the King require governmental countersignature.

The President also embodies the political leadership of the State before other heads of Government, international summits, and external organizations.

4. Relationship with the Cortes Generales and political responsibility

The President of the Government is also the key figure in the relationship with Parliament:

• They are invested by the Congress of Deputies, which grants or denies confidence in the investiture debate.
• They are the main person responsible for accountability before the Cortes: responding to interpellations, questions, and appearances, and defending the Government's main legislative initiatives.
• The Congress can demand their responsibility through a motion of censure; if it passes, the President ceases and is replaced by the alternative candidate.
• They can raise a vote of confidence to obtain explicit support from the Congress on their program or a relevant decision; if lost, they must resign.

Although the power to dissolve the Cortes and call elections is formally exercised through the King, the political initiative in this matter practically corresponds to the President of the Government, according to the constitutional framework and development legislation.

5. Function of direction and representation of the State

Beyond express powers, the Constitution configures the President as the center of political life of the parliamentary system:

• Directs domestic policy, coordinating Government action vis-à-vis autonomous communities, social agents, and other public powers.
• Leads foreign and defense policy, within the framework set by the Constitution and laws, representing Spain in the European Union and in international forums at the highest political level.
• Assumes the highest political responsibility for the Executive's performance, both before the Cortes and the citizenry.

Overall, the Constitution configures the President of the Government as the true head of the Executive Power and main person responsible for the State's political orientation, always subject to the confidence of the Congress of Deputies and parliamentary control.

Pedro Sánchez Pérez-Castejón became President of the Government on June 2, 2018, after the successful motion of no confidence against Mariano Rajoy. Until that moment, his professional trajectory combined economic training, experience in international organizations and consulting, university teaching, and a rising political career in the PSOE, first at the local level and later at the national level.

Academic training and early years

Born in Madrid in 1972, he joined the PSOE in 1993, at 21 years old. In 1995 he graduated in Economics and Business Sciences from the Royal University College María Cristina of El Escorial, a center affiliated with the Complutense University of Madrid. Later, he completed a master's degree in European Union Economics at the Free University of Brussels and advanced studies on European economic and monetary integration at the Ortega y Gasset University Institute.

Already in the 2000s, he deepened his academic profile: in 2012 he obtained a PhD in Economics and Business from Camilo José Cela University, where he later worked as a professor of Economics. Some biographies also mention complementary training in leadership and business management at business schools such as IESE, always linked to the economic and management field.

Professional experience prior to institutional politics

Before consolidating as an elected official, Sánchez held various responsibilities in the private sector and international field:

• After finishing his university studies, he worked in New York for an international consulting firm, which gave him initial experience in the global business environment.
• In the late 1990s, he moved to Brussels, where he worked in the PSOE delegation to the European Parliament as assistant and advisor, among others, to socialist MEP Bárbara Dührkop.
• He later was part of the cabinet of the United Nations High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the context of institutional reconstruction after the war, becoming familiar with international action and peace missions.
• Upon returning to Spain, he was responsible for international relations at the Organization of Consumers and Users (OCU).
• During those years, he also worked as a consultant and advisor for the PSOE leadership and private clients, applying his economic training.

At the same time, since the late 2000s, he began to combine his political career with university teaching, as an associate professor of Economics at Camilo José Cela University, teaching subjects related to economic structure and history of economic thought.

First public offices: Madrid City Council

His leap to institutional politics came at the local level. In the 2003 municipal elections, he was included in the PSOE candidacy for Madrid City Council and took office as a councilor in 2004. He renewed his seat in the 2007 elections, remaining in the council until 2009.

During this stage, he held various positions in the Madrid institutional framework: he was a representative in the General Assembly of Caja Madrid and participated in management bodies of municipal companies, such as the Madrid Municipal Promotion Company and the Municipal Housing and Land Company. This phase gave him experience in urban management, housing, and public services.

Parliamentary career in the Congress of Deputies

In 2009, after Pedro Solbes's resignation, Sánchez took a seat as deputy for Madrid, joining the IX Legislature of the Congress. He did not obtain a seat in the 2011 general elections but returned to the Chamber in 2013, again as deputy for Madrid.

During the X Legislature, he participated in parliamentary work related to economy, budgets, and international policy, gaining visibility within the Socialist Parliamentary Group. He held his seat until October 2016, when he resigned amid the PSOE internal crisis over Mariano Rajoy's investiture.

Organic rise in the PSOE until 2018

Alongside his institutional activity, Sánchez climbed positions within the party. A member since 1993, linked to the Madrid federation, he made a decisive leap in 2014: at that year's Federal Congress, he was elected secretary general of the PSOE through primaries, succeeding Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba.

As secretary general, he became leader of the opposition and socialist candidate for the Presidency of the Government in the 2015 and 2016 general elections. After the PSOE decided to abstain to facilitate Rajoy's investiture in October 2016, he resigned as secretary general and left Congress, but in 2017 he regained party leadership by winning the internal primaries again, ratified by the 39th Federal Congress.

From that position, still in opposition, he promoted the June 2018 motion of no confidence which, once approved by Congress, opened the door to his appointment as President of the Government. Until that moment, his professional trajectory had combined a solid academic foundation in Economics, international and private sector experience, university teaching, municipal management in Madrid, parliamentary representation, and leadership of the main opposition party.