The vote against Pedro Sánchez: the factor that the PSOE fears for the 29-N

The rejection of Pedro Sánchez constitutes one of the main obstacles that the PSOE identifies in its attempt to recover the electoral initiative before November 29.

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According to what El Español publishes this Saturday, socialist sources admit that the block formed by PP and Vox maintains a very high mobilization that they attribute, to a large extent, to the opposition to the president of the Government.

The diagnosis introduces a difficulty for the strategy that Moncloa has implemented after the dissolution of Congress. The socialists believe they have managed to shift the debate towards housing and social rights, but they acknowledge that this new agenda has not yet translated into a significant movement among the electoral blocks.

The question is how much the rejection of Sánchez really weighs in the decision to go vote. Electoral studies allow for an approximation of the phenomenon, although there is still no measurement that determines what percentage of the electorate plans to participate on 29-N mainly to prevent the socialist leader from continuing to govern.

The precedent of 23J: one in three PP voters wanted to punish the Government

The rejection of the Executive as an electoral motivation is not new. The Center for Sociological Research already found evidence of its importance after the general elections of July 23, 2023.

In its post-electoral study from September of that year, approximately one in three voters of the Popular Party pointed to punishing the Government or the desire for change as a reason to choose the candidacy of Alberto Núñez Feijóo.

The data was particularly significant because the PP had not managed to oust Sánchez from La Moncloa, despite winning the elections with 137 deputies.

In the overall electorate, 11.2% mentioned voting to punish the Government or the desire for change as the reason for their decision. Another 8% explained their vote by the will to oppose a party or political block.

These were responses collected after voting. They do not equate to a survey on future participation, but confirm that opposition to the Government was already a relevant component of electoral behavior.

The same study also found differences between the two main right-wing parties. Among PP voters, punishing the Executive stood out particularly, while among Vox voters, the electoral program was the most mentioned reason, at 26.1%.

This is an important distinction: the rejection of Sánchez can share space with ideological or programmatic motivations that do not disappear when the dominant issue of the campaign changes.

The 59.3% of Spaniards express anger towards Pedro Sánchez

The emotional dimension of that opposition appears in a more recent investigation.

The first Political Emotions Barometer of Spain, prepared by the Political Research Team of the University of Santiago de Compostela, places Pedro Sánchez among the leaders who provoke the most intense reactions.

According to the study, 59.3% of respondents express anger towards the president of the Government and 61.6% express concern.

The results, presented in September and obtained through 600 interviews conducted between June and July, also show the other side of that polarization: Sánchez is the leader who evokes the most pride, with 24%.

Feelings are not exclusive. The same person can experience concern and anger towards a politician, even when maintaining their electoral support.

In fact, the study detects negative emotions even among socialist voters.

That is why the percentage of anger cannot be interpreted as 59.3% of citizens willing to vote against Sánchez. What it does confirm is the intensity of the emotions generated by the president, one of the elements that researchers consider relevant to understanding political polarization.

The resistance of PP and Vox after the electoral advance

The first electoral test of Sánchez's new strategy has arrived with the 40dB survey, published on October 9 by El País and Cadena SER.

The poll, conducted on October 7 and 8, after the election call, places the PP at 31.9%, the PSOE at 28.1%, and Vox at 18.9%.

The socialists improve by seven tenths compared to the previous survey. But the PP also rises by three tenths and Vox gains another five.

The sum of PP and Vox reaches 50.8% of the estimated vote. Their central projection of seats is 198 deputies, 22 above the absolute majority.

The most relevant conclusion for the socialist strategy is that the growth of the PSOE has not been accompanied by an equivalent weakening of the right.

The Government has managed to place housing at the center of public discussion, but the first data on voting intention do not yet show a break in the balance between blocks.

Vox retains 92.8% of its voters and the PP retains 74.5%

The electoral strength of the right has another explanation in the transfer of votes.

According to the same survey from 40dB., Vox retains the voting intention of 92.8% of those who supported it in the general elections of 2023.

The PP retains 74.5% of its former voters and the PSOE 70.9%.

These figures measure declared voting loyalty, not effective participation, but they allow for identifying a difference between the electorates.

The party of Santiago Abascal presents an especially high cohesion. The PP also retains a broad majority of its voters, although it suffers a significant transfer towards Vox.

15.6% of those who voted for the PP in 2023 now declare their intention to choose Vox. The opposite movement, from Vox to the PP, does not reach 2%.

The change modifies the internal distribution of the right-wing bloc, but does not necessarily reduce its joint strength.

For the PSOE, the difficulty lies precisely in that the competition between Feijóo and Abascal can redistribute votes within the same space without substantially weakening their parliamentary sum.

The rejection of Sánchez does not alone explain the growth of Vox

The interpretation of anti-Sanchismo as the main mobilizing element needs precision.

The rejection of the president can function as a common motivation for voters of the PP and Vox, but it does not explain alone the differences between both parties.

Vox has built its own electoral offer around issues such as immigration, security, and certain cultural and social policies.

The data from 2023 already showed that programmatic component. And the current polls indicate that the growth of Vox comes from several simultaneous movements: it retains almost all of its previous voters, attracts voters from the PP, and gains support among people who did not go to vote in the previous general elections.

In the latest survey from 40dB., 12.7% of those who declare having abstained in 2023 now express intention to vote for Vox.

This percentage does not mean that 12.7% of all abstentionists will finally go to the polls to support Abascal. It does show that the party finds opportunities for growth also outside the electorate that participated three years ago.

The mobilization of former abstentionists does not belong exclusively to the left.

The paradox of Sánchez: he is the preferred for president, but the right dominates the polls

There is another piece of data that complicates the automatic identification between personal rejection and electoral behavior.

The 40dB survey also asks who the preferred candidate to preside the Government is.

Pedro Sánchez leads that ranking with 32.2% of the responses, compared to 29.3% for Alberto Núñez Feijóo.

However, the PP appears as the leading force in vote estimation and, along with Vox, exceeds the absolute majority in the central projection of seats.

The difference reveals that the preference for a candidate and the intention to vote for a party are not equivalent measures.

Sánchez retains significant personal support, but the forces that backed his investiture arrive at the campaign with a much lower estimated representation than they achieved in 2023.

Therefore, the electoral competition is not reduced to a comparison of popularity between Sánchez and Feijóo. The preferences of Vox voters, party loyalty, and the distribution of seats among all candidacies also come into play.

The mobilization for housing also does not guarantee votes for the left

The socialist strategy is based on one idea: turning the housing crisis into the central issue of the campaign can activate discontented or distant progressive voters from the polls.

But the relationship between social protest and voting is not automatic.

The mobilizations for housing bring together citizens with different economic situations, ideological preferences, and electoral behaviors.

The data from the 40dB survey show that the PSOE slightly improves after the electoral advance, but so do the PP and Vox. Sumar and Podemos, on the other hand, decline compared to the previous measurement.

It is a result that forces a distinction between social mobilization and electoral performance.

That concern for housing increases does not determine which party will receive those votes. A voter may hold the Government responsible for the evolution of prices, the regional or municipal administrations for their policies, or the entire political system.

In that scenario, a campaign focused on housing can benefit different forces for different reasons.

The other rejection: opposition to Vox also mobilizes

Anti-Sanchismo is not the only negative emotion capable of intervening in an election.

The Political Emotions Barometer from the University of Santiago shows that Santiago Abascal is the leader who evokes the most fear among the four analyzed leaders, with 43% of respondents.

Affective polarization works in different directions.

A study by the Murcian Center for Public Opinion Studies, CEMOP, detected that affective polarization had increased by 30.6% between 2021 and 2024. The research attributed a good part of the increase recorded between 2023 and 2024 to the greater rejection of socialist voters towards the Popular Party.

This means that the politics of rejection is not an exclusive phenomenon of the right.

In 2023, the fear of a government of PP and Vox was part of the electoral mobilization of the left during the last weeks of the campaign.

The unknown of 29-N is how those two opposing forces will combine: those who want Sánchez to leave the government and those who want to prevent a parliamentary majority of PP and Vox.

The PSOE acknowledges that changing the agenda does not yet change the votes

The reflection of the socialist leaders collected by Fernando Garea in El Español fits with that difficulty.

According to the information published this Saturday, the PSOE believes it has regained political initiative after the dissolution of Congress and has managed to place housing in a debate area that it judges more favorable.

But its sources also admit that the polls continue to show a solid majority for PP and Vox and that the rejection of the president keeps a part of that electorate very mobilized.

The party thus faces two different electoral objectives. It needs to recover progressive votes and, at the same time, reduce the advantage of the opposing bloc.

The available data do not allow establishing how much of the vote for PP and Vox on November 29 will primarily respond to personal rejection of Sánchez, how much to the assessment of his management, and how much to the proposals of each party.

They do allow identifying three precedents: in 2023, the punishment of the government was already a prominent motivation among PP voters; in 2026, Sánchez continues to provoke intense negative emotions; and the first poll after the electoral advance maintains a high vote fidelity in the right bloc.

The next check will be whether the following polls detect changes in the expected participation, the transfer of votes between blocs, and the support for progressive forces after the mobilizations for housing.

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

At what stage of parliamentary processing is the call for the November 29 elections, and what are the next planned steps?

The call for the general elections on November 29, 2026 (29‑N) is no longer in any “parliamentary processing phase” in the strict sense. The procedure has been closed with the approval and publication of Royal Decree 806/2026, of October 5, dissolving the Congress of Deputies and the Senate and calling elections, published in the BOE on October 6, 2026 and in force from that same day (text in BOE).

This royal decree, issued under article 115 of the Constitution and article 42.1 of the LOREG, dissolves the Cortes of the XV Legislature and sets the election date for the Congress and Senate for Sunday, November 29, 2026. It is neither processed nor voted on in the Chambers: it is a Government decision, formalized by the King, which directly takes effect.

Institutional situation after dissolution

  • Since October 6, the Congress and Senate elected on July 23, 2023 are dissolved; the mandate of deputies and senators ceases, except for those who are part of the Permanent Deputation.
  • The Cortes, therefore, no longer process ordinary laws or political initiatives. Any “parliamentary phase” related to the electoral call has ended with the entry into force of the royal decree.
  • Meanwhile, the Permanent Deputations of the Congress and Senate remain active to:
    • Safeguard the powers of the Chambers.
    • Decide on the validation or repeal of royal decree-laws approved by the Government during the electoral period.
    • Exercise functions related to states of alarm, exception, and siege.

In parallel, many bills and legislative proposals that were in process lapse due to the legislature ending; they must be registered again, if desired, before the future Cortes.

Electoral calendar already set

Royal Decree 806/2026 and the official notes from the Congress and Senate detail the basic calendar, according to the LOREG:

  • Call and start of the electoral period:
    • October 5: deliberation of the Council of Ministers and signing of the royal decree.
    • October 6: publication in the BOE and entry into force of the dissolution and the call. From that moment the electoral period applies (54 days until voting).
  • Coalitions and candidacies (approximate dates according to official information available):
    • Until October 16: deadline to communicate electoral coalitions.
    • Between October 21 and 26: submission of candidacies for Congress and Senate.
    • End of October / beginning of November: publication and final proclamation of lists by the electoral boards.
  • Electoral campaign:
    • From Friday, November 13 at 00:00 h to Friday, November 27 at 24:00 h, fifteen days of official campaign, as established by the royal decree and recalled by the Congress note (Congress press release).
    • November 28: reflection day, without electoral propaganda.
  • Election day:
    • November 29, 2026: general elections for Congress and Senate; polling stations will be open from 9:00 to 20:00 h (according to the usual schemes established by the LOREG and the INE, see INE note).
  • General scrutiny and proclamation of elected candidates:
    • From December 2 the general scrutiny takes place by the electoral boards, which review and consolidate provisional results.
    • Once claims are resolved, the official proclamation of the elected to Congress and Senate occurs.

Constitution of the new Cortes and subsequent steps

  • The royal decree sets that the new Chambers will meet in constitutive session on December 23, 2026 at 10:00 h, within the maximum period of 25 days after the elections imposed by article 68.6 of the Constitution.
  • That day each Chamber:
    • Elects the Board (Presidency, Vice Presidencies, and Secretariats).
    • Deputies and senators swear allegiance to the Constitution and fully acquire their status as members.
    • The period opens for the constitution of parliamentary groups.
  • Once the Congress is constituted, the procedure for the investiture of the president of the Government (art. 99 CE) is activated, with prior consultations by the King to the representatives of the groups and the corresponding debate and vote in the Lower Chamber.

In summary: the call for 29‑N is no longer in parliamentary processing, but in the phase of execution of the electoral calendar. The institutional focus now shifts to the development of the campaign, the voting day, the scrutiny, and the constitution of the new Cortes and the next Government.

What exact scope of action does the Permanent Deputation have while the Cortes are dissolved before 29‑N? Which legislative initiatives have lapsed with the dissolution and could be reactivated in the next legislature after the elections? How is the 54-day period between the call and the date of 29‑N legally calculated according to the LOREG?

What are the powers and attributions of the president of the Government in Spain according to the Constitution?

The 1978 Spanish Constitution configures the president of the Government as the central piece of the executive power. He is not just a “primus inter pares,” but the body that directs the Government's action and coordinates its members, with a set of explicit own powers enshrined in the constitutional text.

1. Direction of the Government's action (art. 97 CE)

The core of the president's functions appears in article 97 of the Constitution, which establishes that the Government directs domestic and foreign policy, the civil and military Administration, and the defense of the State, exercising executive function and regulatory power. Within this framework, the president of the Government is the one who:

  • Sets the main lines of Government policy (domestic, foreign, economic, social, defense, etc.).
  • Coordinates the ministers' actions, ensuring unity of criteria and action among the different departments.
  • Arbitrates and resolves internal competence conflicts within the Government itself.

Although article 97 refers to the Government as a whole, constitutional practice and article 98 (which attributes to him the “direction of the Government's action”) make the president the ultimate responsible for that directing power.

2. Appointment and dismissal: relationship with the King and the Cortes (arts. 62, 99, 101 CE)

The president's powers are always understood within his dual relationship with the King and the Cortes Generales:

  • He is appointed by the King after investiture by the Congress of Deputies (art. 99 CE). Although this phase is initiated by the King, the invested president becomes the political protagonist of governmental life.
  • His dismissal causes the dismissal of the entire Government (art. 101 CE), showing that the Government is “personalized” in the president: when he resigns, dies, or loses a vote of confidence, the entire Executive falls.
3. Designation and dismissal of ministers (art. 100 CE)

Article 100 establishes that the other Government members are appointed and removed by the King, at the proposal of the president of the Government. From this derive several specific powers:

  • Propose the appointment of ministers, freely choosing the heads of each department.
  • Propose the dismissal of ministers, reshaping the Government according to political needs.
  • Configure the internal structure of the Cabinet (creation, suppression, or redistribution of portfolios, through Government norms), within constitutional and legal limits.
4. Political responsibility before the Congress (arts. 108, 112, 113, 114 CE)

The president is politically accountable before the Congress of Deputies:

  • The Government as a whole is jointly responsible before the Congress (art. 108 CE), but that responsibility is channeled through the figure of the president.
  • He can raise a vote of confidence on his program or a general policy declaration (art. 112 CE). If he does not obtain a simple majority, he must resign.
  • He can be subject to a motion of censure (art. 113 CE), which necessarily proposes an alternative candidate for the presidency. If the motion succeeds, the president ceases and is replaced by the censoring candidate (art. 114 CE).

These provisions underline that the president's position ultimately rests on parliamentary confidence.

5. Proposal of dissolution of the Cortes and referendum (arts. 92 and 115 CE)
  • Article 115 CE recognizes the president's power to propose to the King the dissolution of the Congress, the Senate, or the Cortes Generales, and the calling of elections. This is one of his most relevant powers, as it grants him the capacity to “return the word” to the electorate.
  • Article 92 CE provides that certain consultative referendums are called by the King at the proposal of the president of the Government, with prior authorization from the Congress. The president, therefore, is responsible for politically initiating these processes.
6. Direction of the relationship with the King and countersignature (arts. 62 and 64 CE)

Many acts of the King require countersignature by the president of the Government or the competent minister (art. 64 CE). In many cases, the countersignature corresponds directly to the president, which implies:

  • Assuming the political responsibility for those acts.
  • Acting as interface between the Crown and the Government, channeling decisions formally adopted by the King but materially governmental.
7. Representation of the Government and general political direction

Although the Constitution does not exhaustively list all functions, it can be inferred that the president:

  • Represents the Government in its relations with other State powers and abroad, without prejudice to the King's functions as Head of State.
  • Promotes the Government's legislative projects and its presence in the Cortes.
  • Guides the Executive's position on major State issues (European integration, defense policy, territorial model, etc.).

In summary, the Constitution configures the president of the Government as the true political decision-making center of the Executive: he directs, coordinates, answers to Parliament, proposes the appointment and dismissal of ministers, can promote the dissolution of the Cortes and the calling of referendums, and countersigns many acts of the King, thus concentrating the political responsibility of the democratic Government.

Can you explain in detail the investiture procedure of the president of the Government according to the Constitution? What differences exist between the powers of the president of the Government and those of the King in the Spanish constitutional system? How is the political responsibility of the president of the Government articulated before the Cortes, with recent examples?

What results did PP, PSOE, and Vox obtain in the last general elections held in Spain?

In the last general elections held in Spain, on July 23, 2023 (23J), the three major nationwide parties positioned on the right-left axis —PP, PSOE, and Vox— obtained the following results in the Congress of Deputies:

  • People's Party (PP): 33.05 % of the votes and 137 seats.
  • Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE): 31.70 % of the votes and 121 seats.
  • Vox: 12.38 % of the votes and 33 seats.

These data correspond to the official results of 23J in the Congress, as consolidated by the electoral administration. The PP became the first force both in vote percentage and number of deputies, surpassing the PSOE, which remained the second force at a close percentage but with a larger difference in seats. Vox consolidated as the third national force, although with significantly less weight than the two major parties.

Basic reading of the results

The combination of vote percentage and seats helps to understand the balance of power that emerged from the polls:

  • The PP, with 33.05 % and 137 deputies, clearly improved its results compared to the previous electoral cycle and positioned itself as the main reference of the right-wing bloc. However, those 137 seats were far from an absolute majority (176) and required adding support from other formations.
  • The PSOE obtained 31.70 % and 121 seats, a competitive result in terms of votes, very close to the PP in percentage, but penalized in seats by provincial distribution. Despite being second, the combination with other left-wing and nationalist forces opened the possibility of forming alternative majorities.
  • Vox reached 12.38 % and 33 seats. In seats, its weight was key for the arithmetic of the right-wing bloc: the PP + Vox sum reached 170 deputies, a high level but still insufficient to govern alone with an absolute majority.

The design of the Spanish electoral system —provincial constituencies with allocation by the D’Hondt method— means there is no linear translation between vote percentage and seats. Therefore, with a relatively small vote gap (just over 1.3 points between PP and PSOE), the difference in representation was wider: 16 seats advantage of PP over PSOE.

Political consequences of these percentages and seats

From these results, the parliamentary landscape was marked by three main elements:

  • Impossibility of an absolute majority of the right alone: despite PP's victory, the sum with Vox (137 + 33 = 170) did not reach the 176 seats needed. This forced, in any conservative government scenario, to seek support from other forces, especially territorial ones (UPN, Canary Coalition, or others).
  • PSOE's capacity to form alternative majorities: with 121 deputies and a vote percentage very close to PP's, PSOE maintained a sufficient base to negotiate investiture and governability with left-wing formations and nationalist and independentist parties. The key was not only its isolated result but its position at the center of a potentially broader parliamentary bloc.
  • Vox's role as the third actor of the right-wing bloc: the 12.38 % and 33 seats placed Vox in a decisive position for any right-wing majority. Although distanced from PP and PSOE, its parliamentary weight became a decisive factor in all combinations analyzed for a possible conservative alternative.

In summary, in the last general elections (23J 2023) PP won in votes and seats with 33.05 % and 137 deputies, PSOE was very close in percentage with 31.70 % and 121 seats, and Vox obtained 12.38 % and 33 seats. The overall picture explains why, despite PP's victory, government formation depended on PSOE's ability to build agreements with other forces and the impossibility of the right-wing bloc to reach an absolute majority in Congress on its own.

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Test your knowledge with FREN!

How much do you know about this topic? Answer the following 3 questions.

What percentage of former Vox voters declare an intention to vote for this party again according to the 40dB. survey published after the 29-N call?

Question 1 of 3

What emotion did 59.3% of respondents express towards Pedro Sánchez according to the Political Emotions Barometer?

Question 2 of 3

What is the estimated combined vote of PP and Vox according to the 40dB. survey after the 29-N call?

Question 3 of 3