General elections in Spain

Surveys and broad front: how many seats is the debate about the left's lists worth

A common candidacy of the analyzed forces obtains 39 deputies, compared to 26 with two lists and 25 with up to three. The provincial model of DEMÓCRATA, based on the 40dB. barometer, places the difference for PP and Vox at eight seats, although it maintains its absolute majority. The analysis incorporates a scenario conditioned to 70% participation.

8 minutes

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By Demócrata

Published

8 OCT, 2026 - 22:36

Last updated

8 OCT, 2026 - 22:36

8 minutes

The debate about the broad front is fought between names, primaries, and acronyms, but it also has a translation in seats. With the same votes, grouping Sumar, Podemos, and the territorial forces included in this analysis raises their representation from 25 to 39 deputies. Of the fourteen they recover, eight come from PP and Vox and six from PSOE.

That is the result of the provincial exercise of DEMOCRAT: unity improves the joint representation of the space, but not all the recovered deputies change blocks. PP and Vox go from 197 to 189, still above the 176 of the absolute majority.

The scope of the alliance matters. This calculation incorporates ERC, EH Bildu, BNG, and Adelante Andalucía, in addition to the space of Sumar and Podemos. Gathering only these last two candidacies produces a different and smaller effect. They are different coalitions and must be measured as such.

One, two, or three: which candidacies are being compared

The negotiation remains open. Ada Colau has conditioned her willingness to lead the Broad Front on expanding the project to more forces, including Podemos. Irene Montero maintains the demand for open primaries. None of these positions confirms an agreement with all the territorial parties.

One of the hypotheses circulating proposes two alliances: Sumar, IU, Más Madrid, and Comuns on one side; Podemos with ERC, EH Bildu, BNG, and Adelante on the other. The analysis takes that configuration as a possibility and compares it with the integration of all the considered forces and with their separation.

**One, two, or even three candidacies: what is being compared**
Configuration	Composition
A common list	The space of Sumar, Podemos, and the analyzed territorial forces share a ballot in each constituency.
Two candidacies	Sumar and its space on one side; Podemos with ERC, EH Bildu, BNG, or Adelante in their respective territories on the other.
Up to three candidacies	Sumar, Podemos, and the corresponding territorial force run separately. Where there is no modeled third force, there are two left.

These are electoral hypotheses. IU, Más Madrid, and Comuns are included in the space of Sumar: no additional percentages are assigned to them. Other parties, such as Junts, PNV, or CUP, remain outside the compared alliances. "Up to three" does not mean three state lists present in all provinces.

The unit is measured where the deputies are distributed: in each constituency. ERC does not provide votes outside of Catalonia, nor does BNG outside of Galicia. It is also not assumed that a territorial alliance adds new support by presenting itself with a shared brand.

Where the votes come from: an identified survey and the map of 23J

The starting point is the October barometer from 40dB for EL PAÍS and SER, published on October 5. Its estimate places the PP at 31.6%, the PSOE at 27.4%, Vox at 18.4%, Sumar at 5.6%, Podemos at 2.7%, and SALF at 2%. The rest of the candidacies and the blank make up 12.3%.

DEMÓCRATA distributes those figures by provinces through an adjustment based on the final results of 23J. For the candidacies of the rest, their relative proportions from 2023 are maintained. Therefore, their support within the calculation are territorial assumptions, not individual estimates published now by 40dB.

The exercise allows isolating the effect of the lists: between one configuration and another, no vote changes. What changes is the candidacy to which it is added. No bonuses for leadership are incorporated, nor is it assumed that a coalition attracts abstainers.

The common list gains fourteen seats; PP and Vox lose eight

**Distribution with the starting percentages from 40dB.**
Configuration	PP	PSOE	Vox	Analyzed space	Other forces	PP + Vox
A common list	125	104	64	39	18	189
Two candidacies	132	109	65	26	18	197
Up to three candidacies	132	110	65	25	18	197

Source: DEMÓCRATA model. "Analyzed space" always includes the space of Sumar, Podemos, ERC, EH Bildu, BNG, and Adelante Andalucía. The territorial forces only contribute the votes assigned in their constituencies. All votes are maintained between configurations. Each row sums 350 deputies, excluding the subtotal column PP + Vox. The seats are self-calculations, not a projection published by 40dB.

With up to three candidacies, the analyzed space sums 25 representatives: six from Sumar, two from Podemos, and seventeen from the considered territorial forces. The PP obtains 132, the PSOE 110, and Vox 65.

With a common ballot, that space reaches 39. The PP drops to 125; the PSOE to 104; and Vox to 64. The improvement of fourteen deputies is distributed as follows: seven come from the PP, six from the PSOE, and one from Vox.

The sum of the PSOE and the analyzed forces goes from 135 to 143. To measure if the balance between blocks changes, that joint gain of eight is important, in addition to the increase in representation of the unitary candidacy.

The model locates the recoveries in fourteen constituencies, among them Alicante, Barcelona, Bizkaia, A Coruña, Navarra, Málaga, and Valencia. The sum works both where two candidacies compete for the last deputy and where one of them is left without representation.

Two alliances do not produce the same result as a common ballot

In the configuration of two candidacies, the Sumar space maintains six deputies and the alliance of Podemos with the territorial forces gathers twenty. They are 26 in total: one more than with the separation, but thirteen less than with the common candidacy.

This additional deputy comes from the PSOE, which goes from 110 to 109. PP and Vox retain their 197. In this assumption, therefore, the partial agreement redistributes representation within the left without reducing the sum of the right.

This does not measure the electoral appeal of Colau, Rufián, Montero, or any other leader. An alliance could mobilize support that the calculation keeps still, or lose voters who would not accept their new partners. The data used do not allow assigning in advance a premium or a punishment for those names.

It is also advisable to distinguish between electoral alliance and parliamentary coordination. To achieve the calculated effect, the votes must count for the same candidacy within each constituency. Sharing events, messages, or a subsequent strategy in Congress does not equate to adding ballots in the counting.

Adelante Andalucía: the missing data to complete the portrait

The vote of Adelante included in the calculation comes from its candidacy for Congress in 2023, located in Cádiz, and from the adjustment applied to the forces of the rest. It does not reproduce its subsequent autonomous result nor estimate how much it would obtain if it ran in a general election with a different implantation.

Directly transferring a percentage from the Andalusian elections and subtracting it from the PSOE would alter two things at once: the candidacies and the votes. To measure only the effect of the lists, this exercise avoids that transfer without evidence.

The lack of a self-estimate for general elections limits what can be concluded about Adelante. Its presence is contemplated, but the model does not intend to measure a possible growth of that formation compared to 2023.

The test of 23J: fragmenting also benefits the PSOE

The historical contrast allows observing the mechanism with real votes. In 2023, Sumar ran with Podemos integrated and obtained 31 deputies. The PP achieved 137, the PSOE 121, and Vox 33. PP and Vox totaled 170.

If the vote of that candidacy is divided into two lists, in a uniform proportion of 75.61% and 24.39% by province, its joint representation drops from 31 to 18 deputies. The other votes remain intact.

**Historical contrast: dividing the Sumar candidacy from 23J**
Configuration	PP	PSOE	Vox	Sumar + Podemos	Other forces	PP + Vox
Official result of 2023	137	121	33	31	28	170
Hypothetical division of Sumar	141	129	33	18	29	174

Source: JEC and calculation of DEMÓCRATA. The vote of Sumar is divided into two candidacies in a proportion of 9.3/3, equivalent to 75.61% and 24.39%. The other votes and the provincial magnitudes of 2023 are preserved. This historical test only affects Sumar: it does not integrate territorial forces. Each row sums 350, excluding the subtotal PP + Vox.

The PSOE gains eight deputies, the PP four, and the PNV one. Vox maintains its 33. PP and Vox reach 174: four more than at the polls, but still two less than the absolute majority.

The result depends on that specific territorial division. It does not demonstrate that any separation would have produced exactly those seats nor reconstructs how citizens would have reacted to two candidacies.

What the calculation checks and what depends on the assumptions

The program first reproduces the 350 official deputies from 23J, province by province. For the current scenario, it uses the distribution from the 2026 call, with 38 deputies in Madrid and eight in Cádiz.

It applies D'Hondt and the 3% barrier of valid votes from each province; in Ceuta and Melilla, the most voted candidacy wins.

The adjustment preserves the weight of each province in the valid votes of 2023. Sumar and Podemos start from the territorial profile of their joint candidacy; SALF is initially distributed with the same percentage in all constituencies.

For Vox in Santa Cruz de Tenerife, where it did not present a list for Congress in 2023, it is assumed that it now runs and its initial profile is built with the PP-Vox relationship from Las Palmas. It is a decision of the model.

All configurations sum 350 deputies. The common condition is that the alliances preserve the votes of their members intact. The model checks the performance of those supports, not the political viability of the agreements nor their ability to attract new voters.

The final scenario: one, two, or three candidacies with 70% participation

The last test incorporates differential mobilization. It uses the certainty of voting declared at 40dB.: 67.6% of those who remember having voted for the PP are completely sure of participating, compared to 65.4% of Vox, 63.8% of Sumar, and 62.5% of the PSOE.

The reference for participation is set, as a supposition, at 67% and is raised to 70%. This is not a starting rate published by the polling agency. The model transfers those profiles of voting recall to the current electorates and increases the probability of participation among the least certain.

Podemos is assigned the Sumar profile of 2023, a candidacy in which it was integrated; for SALF and the rest, the general average is used. These equivalences are additional assumptions. Without the individual crossover between probability of voting and current intention, this section should be read as an exploratory extension.

The adjustment leaves the PP at 31.4%, the PSOE at 27.5%, and Vox at 18.3%. Sumar retains approximately 5.6% and Podemos 2.7%. With those same votes, the three configurations are repeated.

**One, two, or even three candidacies with 70% participation**
Configuration	PP	PSOE	Vox	Analyzed space	Other forces	PP + Vox
A common list	124	104	63	40	19	187
Two candidacies	130	109	65	27	19	195
Up to three candidacies	130	110	65	26	19	195

Source: conditioned model of DEMÓCRATA. The analyzed space includes Sumar and its members, Podemos, ERC, EH Bildu, BNG, and Adelante Andalucía. The reference participation of 67% is a supposition, not a forecast from 40dB. Certainty profiles by voting recall are transferred to the current electorates. Each row retains the same votes and totals 350 deputies, excluding the PP + Vox column. It is not an empirical estimate of the effect of reaching 70%.

With a common list, the analyzed forces reach 40 deputies, compared to 27 with two candidacies and 26 with up to three. The difference between unity and separation is again fourteen seats: six from the PP, six from the PSOE, and two from Vox.

PP and Vox go from 195 to 187. Unity takes away eight representatives, but keeps their total eleven above the absolute majority. With two candidacies, they retain the same 195 as with complete separation.

By varying the reference participation between 66% and 68%, while maintaining the destination at 70%, the common list obtains 39 or 40 seats and PP and Vox sum 187 or 188. With the separation, the right remains at 195 or 196. These are limited checks of the model, not confidence intervals.

The negotiation can reduce the cost of competing for the same votes. In the calculated scenarios, that savings is not enough to change the majority. To go further, it would also be necessary for the response of voters to the candidacies to change, something that the sum of ballots cannot guarantee.

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What is the current status of the negotiation for a broad left-wing front and what are the next steps in processing possible alliances?

As of October 8, 2026, the negotiation for a broad left-wing front in Spain is at a decisive stage, marked by the early election on November 29. There is already a relatively stable core alliance — the so-called Broad Front around Movimiento Sumar, Izquierda Unida, Más Madrid, and the Comuns — but key issues remain open: whether or not to include Podemos, the definition of electoral leadership, and the integration of territorial allies such as Compromís.

1. Situation of the “hard” Broad Front (Sumar, IU, Más Madrid, Comuns)

Since February 2026, Sumar, IU, Más Madrid, and the Comuns have been consolidating a common alliance as a “shared home” for the left alternative to the PSOE. In joint public events, they have presented themselves as a winning and stable project, aiming to go beyond a mere electoral coalition and to serve as a common home for progressive organizations and movements wishing to join.

Within this framework, they have been shaping a new space that now takes the form of the Broad Front, with an agenda focused on public services, housing, strengthening the welfare state, and expanding rights. The political approach emphasizes:

Avoiding the dispersion of votes to the left of the PSOE.
Offering a confederal structure respectful of the autonomy of each organization and territory.
Keeping the door open to other forces that “are not superfluous unless they self-exclude.”

Regarding leadership, recent movements point to a balance between territories. Mónica García, who initially was strongly considered as a possible head of the national list, has supported that the electoral leadership of the Broad Front be assumed by Ada Colau, reserving the candidacy for Madrid for herself. The proposal, promoted by Más Madrid, still needs to be ratified by Colau and the coalition forces as a whole, but it signals the intention to share weight between Madrid and Barcelona and to reinforce the municipalist and social profile of the project.

2. Podemos’ position: primaries and risk of a double list

The major point of friction is the relationship with Podemos. After the break with Sumar in 2023 and several electoral cycles of direct competition, there has been some recomposition at the regional level (such as the “Por Andalucía” agreement), but at the national level the political and organizational distance remains significant.

For these early general elections, Podemos has set as a condition an open and joint primary of the entire left to choose leadership and lists, with a proposed schedule placing these primaries around October 14–15. The Sumar, IU, Más Madrid, and Comuns environment acknowledges that the debate about the selection method is relevant and that primaries are part of the available democratic arsenal, but demands from Podemos first an explicit declaration of willingness to converge and, only afterward, to collectively negotiate the specific mechanism.

Currently, the central disagreement is precisely that: while the Broad Front prioritizes closing political architecture and leadership through consensus among organizations, Podemos wants legitimacy to come from an open primary process that reorders internal forces in the space. If no agreement is reached before the legal deadlines, the scenario of two separate lists to the left of the PSOE remains on the table, with the risk of seat penalties in many provinces.

3. Compromís and territorial alliances

Compromís has made clear that it will not organically integrate into the new national space of Sumar, which it perceives as too centralized, but it does not close the door to specific electoral pacts in the Valencian Community. Its red line is to preserve a “100% Valencian” candidacy with its own identity, which could coordinate with the Broad Front to optimize results without diluting its brand.

A similar logic could be replicated with other regional or municipal forces (Chunta Aragonesista, Més per Mallorca, local platforms), through “variable geometry” formulas: national agreements where efficient and differentiated lists where each actor has its own implantation.

4. Next steps and political calendar

With the early election, the “processing” of these alliances is marked by very specific deadlines:

Until mid-October (around the 16th): legal deadline to register coalitions before the Electoral Board. Any agreement with Podemos or territorial forces must be closed, at the latest, then.
October 14–15: dates on which Podemos intends to hold its open primaries. If they do not materialize in a shared agreement, the probability of running separately will increase.
October 17: planned event of the Broad Front to officially present its brand, minimum program, and head of the list. This event is designed as the project’s launch, with or without Podemos.
Last ten days of October: final registration of candidacies and ordering of lists in each constituency.

In summary, the negotiation of the broad left front is advanced in its core (Sumar, IU, Más Madrid, Comuns) but incomplete in its perimeter (Podemos, Compromís, and other territorial forces). The next two weeks will be decisive: how the leadership selection method, territorial distribution of candidacies, and degree of autonomy of the brands are resolved will determine whether there is a single large alternative candidacy to the PSOE or a more fragmented alliance map.

Can you detail what programmatic differences separate Podemos from the Broad Front beyond the primary method? What impact could two separate lists to the left of the PSOE have in some key provinces according to the 2023 results? How are the PSOE and other partners like ERC or Bildu reacting to the possible consolidation of the Broad Front?

What are the competencies and political trajectory of Ada Colau and Irene Montero, and to which parties do they belong?

Ada Colau and Irene Montero are two references of the Spanish left emerging from the social mobilization cycle after 15-M, but they have developed their careers in different areas: Colau in Barcelona municipalism and housing policy; Montero in national politics, institutional feminism, and more recently, the European Parliament. Below I detail their main political competencies, trajectory, and party or space affiliations.

Ada Colau Ballano

Trajectory and main positions

Activist origin: Born in Barcelona in 1974, she became known as a housing rights activist. She was co-founder and spokesperson of the Platform for People Affected by Mortgages (PAH), from where she promoted campaigns against evictions and the real estate bubble.
Jump to municipalism: In 2014 she led the citizen platform Guanyem Barcelona, the embryo of Barcelona en Comú, which brings together activists and left-wing parties.
Mayor of Barcelona (2015–2023): Elected in 2015 and re-elected in 2019, becoming the first woman mayor of Barcelona. She left the mayoralty in 2023 and subsequently her councilor seat.

Competencies and management axes

Housing and social emergency: Her hallmark has been housing rights policies: expansion of public and social housing stock, negotiation with banks and funds to avoid evictions, and regulatory pressure on empty housing and tourist rentals.
Urbanism and city model: She promoted urban transformation measures aimed at sustainable mobility, traffic reduction, and creation of pedestrian spaces, aligned with the “city for people” agenda.
Tourism and regulation of tourist rentals: She defended stricter regulation of tourist apartments, linking tourist pressure with neighborhood displacement and rent increases.
Rights agenda: Her discourse and part of her municipal action also focused on LGBTI rights, feminism, refugee reception, and citizen participation.

Party affiliation

Central figure of Barcelona en Comú, a municipalist platform with participation from Podemos, ICV, EUiA, Equo, and citizen activism.
Reference in the Comuns and Catalunya en Comú space, and later close to the national sphere of Sumar and the current Broad Front project to the left of the PSOE.
Her affiliation is less to a classic party and more to a confederal municipalist and confluence space.

Irene Montero Gil

Trajectory and main positions

Origin profile: Born in Madrid in 1988, she is a psychologist. She comes from left-wing youth movements and social activism; she was linked to the housing movement and joined Podemos early (2014).
Podemos leadership: Part of the leadership core since the founding stage. She has been a leader of the State Citizen Council, chief of staff to Pablo Iglesias, and one of the party’s most visible spokespersons.
Member of Congress: Elected for Madrid in the 2015 general elections and held the seat until 2023. In the XII Legislature, she served as parliamentary spokesperson for Podemos and Unidos/Unidas Podemos, playing a central role in government oversight debates and budget negotiations.
Minister of Equality (2020–2023): In the first PSOE–Unidas Podemos coalition government, she assumed the Ministry of Equality, within the Unidas Podemos quota.
Member of the European Parliament (since 2024): After being vetoed on the Sumar lists in 2023, she led Podemos’ own candidacy for the 2024 European elections and was elected MEP, integrated into the Left group (GUE/NGL).

Competencies and work lines

Equality and gender-based violence: As minister, she coordinated state policies against gender violence, equality between women and men, and anti-discrimination efforts.
Sexual and reproductive rights: She promoted legal reforms on abortion and the expansion of sexual and reproductive rights, with a strong feminist imprint.
Emblematic laws: She led the processing of the law on comprehensive guarantee of sexual freedom (“only yes means yes”) and the so-called Trans Law. Both reinforced the rights agenda, although the first generated intense controversy due to sentence reviews following its initial application.
European agenda: As an MEP, her activity focuses on committees and delegations related to women’s rights, gender equality, housing, and social rights, transferring to the European level the political axes she defended in Spain.

Party affiliation

Member and leader of Podemos since 2014; one of the organization’s most recognizable faces.
Key figure in the Unidos Podemos and later Unidas Podemos coalitions, which grouped Podemos, Izquierda Unida, and other forces to the left of the PSOE.
After the break between Podemos and Sumar, she maintains a direct organic link with Podemos and is its main reference in the European Parliament.

In summary, Ada Colau embodies the confluence municipalism born from the housing movement, with competencies centered on urban and social management of Barcelona, while Irene Montero represents Podemos’ evolution from Congress and the Ministry of Equality to the European Parliament, with a marked focus on gender equality and social rights.

Can you detail the main housing policies promoted by Ada Colau during her terms as mayor of Barcelona? What were the specific contents of the “only yes means yes” law and the Trans Law promoted by Irene Montero, and what controversies did they generate? How are Ada Colau and Irene Montero currently related to the Broad Front projects and the recomposition of the left to the left of the PSOE?

How many times in previous legislatures has left-wing fragmentation affected the distribution of seats in Congress?

According to the compiled analyses, there are at least two recent general elections in which it can be documented quite clearly that left-wing fragmentation (mainly to the left of the PSOE) reduced the number of seats obtained in Congress compared to a scenario of greater unity: 2015 and 2023. In other cycles, this effect has also been debated, but with less precise quantification in the materials consulted.

1. How fragmentation acts in the Spanish system

Electoral studies and analyses agree that the key effect is not just “running together or separately,” but:

Where the votes are concentrated (small or large provinces).
How many votes the bloc sums in total.
Whether candidacies from the same ideological space compete against each other in constituencies that allocate few seats.

With the D’Hondt method and provincial constituencies, when two left-wing forces move at low percentages in provinces with 3, 4, or 5 deputies, it is easy that neither obtains a seat even though together they would have. This is the mechanism by which fragmentation turns “real” votes into votes without representation and, by rebound, facilitates that PP and Vox (or other forces from the other bloc) take the last seats in dispute.

2. 2015 elections: Podemos + confluences vs IU

In the general elections of December 20, 2015, Podemos and its confluences obtained 69 seats and Izquierda Unida–Unidad Popular, 2, that is, 71 deputies in total to the left of the PSOE.¹ Various subsequent analyses simulated what would have happened if they had run on a single list with the same volume and distribution of votes.

One of those simulations estimated that a joint candidacy could have reached around 85 seats, that is, about 14 more than the real sum separately.³
The hypothetical increase was concentrated precisely in small and medium provinces, where running divided left them out of the last seat allocation.

From the point of view of your question, 2015 is a clear case in which fragmentation of the Podemos/IU space negatively affected the distribution of seats for the alternative left and, by extension, conditioned the arithmetic of Congress.

3. 2016 elections: unity without additional reward

In June 2016, Podemos and IU ran already in coalition as Unidos Podemos. Paradoxically, they again obtained around 71 seats, a result very similar to the sum of 2015.¹ The key here is another lesson:

Unity on a single list did not guarantee more seats because the coalition lost about a million votes compared to the 2015 sum.³

Strictly speaking, 2016 does not add a “new case” of penalty due to fragmentation — because they already ran together — but it does show that unity plus sufficient vote volume and good territorial distribution are necessary conditions at the same time.

4. 2023 elections: Sumar and Podemos partially separated

In the general elections of July 23, 2023, Sumar integrated much of the alternative left, but not throughout the territory and the relationship with Podemos was conflictive. The result was:

31 seats for Sumar and just over 3 million votes (12.3%).⁵

Based on these data, several counterfactual analyses studied what would have happened if Sumar and Podemos had run fully united:

A simulation cited by Demócrata estimated that a joint candidacy could have obtained about a dozen additional seats compared to the real distribution, maintaining the same total number of votes.⁵
Another approach placed, only in the provinces where they competed separately, a possible joint result of about 23 seats versus the 13 actually obtained by the separate lists.⁹

Again, the effect was concentrated in constituencies such as Cádiz, Málaga, Córdoba, Zaragoza, Asturias, Balearic Islands, or Las Palmas, where the sum of votes would have crossed the practical threshold to gain an additional seat, but separately they fell short.⁹ Here we do talk about a second general election where the available evidence points to fragmentation costing seats to the left-wing bloc.

5. So, “how many times” has it happened?

With the materials at hand, it can be said with certainty that:

In 2015 and 2023 left-wing fragmentation to the left of the PSOE had a measurable impact on the distribution of seats in Congress, with estimates of between ten and fifteen deputies potentially lost in each case compared to a hypothetical unitary list.
In 2016, despite running united, the alternative left did not improve its representation due to vote loss, reinforcing the idea that unity + volume + good territorial distribution are necessary conditions simultaneously.

Academic studies on the Spanish electoral system also analyze other cycles since the 1980s, but in the documentation consulted here the only general elections in which the cost of fragmentation is quantified in some detail are 2015 and 2023 (and, negatively, the “no gain” of 2016). Therefore, we can affirm that at least on two clearly documented occasions the division of the left has significantly altered the distribution of seats in Congress.

Could you detail province by province some concrete example in 2015 where the sum of Podemos and IU would have given an extra seat? In which specific constituencies in 2023 do Demócrata’s analyses calculate the greatest loss of seats due to the separation between Sumar and Podemos? How does the effect of left-wing fragmentation compare with that of the right in terms of seats lost or gained?

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How much do you know about this topic? Answer the following 3 questions.

How many deputies would the Sumar, Podemos, and territorial forces space obtain if they ran on a common list according to the model?

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How many seats would PP and Vox jointly lose if the left presented a single list?

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What result does the Sumar, Podemos, and territorial forces space obtain if they run separately in up to three candidacies?

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