Washington has a particularity that allows tracking the trail of power: a good part of those who work for foreign governments must report this to the Department of Justice. Their contracts, their activities, and, in certain cases, the amounts received are recorded under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).
And, based on this premise, the documents allow reconstructing part of the strategy that Morocco develops in the U.S. capital. Apparently, it is not a clandestine activity. It is registered interest representation and subject to the transparency obligations of U.S. legislation.
And the papers show something more: Rabat has been relying on specialized firms in governmental relations for years to strengthen its dialogue with Washington.
The latest example is dated March 17, 2026. Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, a firm with a presence in Washington, signed a new agreement with the Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco to provide political consulting services. The document was submitted to the Department of Justice on March 23.
The contract establishes a monthly retainer of $65,000 for one year, that is, $780,000 if maintained over the twelve months planned. The agreement also contemplates the possibility of modifying the fees in the future by mutual agreement.
But the money is not the most significant aspect of the document.
An former Secretary of State at the helm of the work
The agreement identifies Ed Royce, former Republican congressman from California and former chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, as the person who will supervise and coordinate much of the work alongside Samantha A. Carl-Yoder, public policy director of Brownstein.
The contract does not present Royce as merely an honorary figure. His name is expressly linked to the supervision and coordination of the work for the Embassy.
It is precisely this type of profile that makes Washington's model particularly relevant: the value of these firms does not reside solely in drafting documents or communication campaigns, but also in the knowledge of the institutions and in the relationships accumulated over years around U.S. political power. And that is what Morocco seems to be hiring.
A relationship that ended and started again
The documentation also provides a detail that requires nuance in the story.
Brownstein does not maintain an uninterrupted contractual relationship with the Moroccan Embassy. The office itself communicated to the Department of Justice that the previous relationship had ended on October 1, 2025. The modification presented in February 2026 expressly states the disconnection from the Embassy and several professionals from the firm, including Ed Royce.
Five months later, a new agreement appears. On March 23, 2026, Brownstein again registers the Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco as a foreign client. The new contract establishes an initial period of one year and a retainer of 65,000 dollars per month. (FARA eFile)
The sequence is relevant because it demonstrates that the relationship cannot be presented as a single prolonged contract without interruption. What exists documentarily is a previous relationship that ended and a subsequent new hiring.
Morocco had already hired Akin Gump
Brownstein is not, moreover, an isolated case. In November 2021, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld registered a contract with the Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco with the Department of Justice. The document expressly identified the purpose of the work as the representation of the Embassy before the Biden Administration and Congress regarding the National Defense Authorization Act —NDAA— and the 2022 budget allocation projects.
The contract also indicated as a goal to educate members of Congress and the American public about the importance, history, and strategic nature of the bilateral relationship between the United States and Morocco.
And there is a particularly revealing element: when registering the activities, Akin Gump marked that these included "political activities" under FARA. The documentation itself describes those activities in relation to the Administration and Congress and with the policies and interests that were intended to be influenced.
From defense budgets to the bilateral relationship
The content of those contracts allows understanding what Morocco seeks when it resorts to these firms.
In the case of Akin Gump, the work included budgetary and defense issues, but also the defense and explanation of the strategic relationship between both countries before Congress members and the American public.
It is an important difference.
The foreign lobby registered in the United States does not have to consist solely of trying to modify a specific law. It can include institutional relations, political advice, communication, dialogue with members of Congress, and advocacy of certain positions before the Administration. This may explain the position of the White House towards Spain in the Ceuta crisis. And that is precisely the type of activity that FARA allows to monitor.
A strategy that comes from behind
The records show that the use of government relations firms by Morocco did not begin with the Biden Administration or the current geopolitical scenario.
In 2018, Glover Park Group declared having received 100,000 dollars over a period of six months for services rendered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Morocco through JPC Strategies. The Department of Justice described those services as consulting to develop and implement a public relations strategy aimed at promoting business with Morocco.
In another period of 2018, the same firm registered five payments of 20,000 dollars to the Kingdom of Morocco, reaching another 100,000 dollars.
And in the period between August 2018 and January 2019, Glover Park Group declared another 140,000 dollars from the Kingdom of Morocco. In that case, the firm described its work as managing the Moroccan Government's government relations with the United States and executing a public relations strategy to promote a strategic partnership with Washington.
The picture left by these records is, therefore, broader than that of a single office contracted during a certain period.
There is also activity linked to the Moroccan public sector
The Moroccan presence in the FARA records is not limited to the Embassy.
The company OCP S.A., the Moroccan phosphate giant, has been registered for years through OCP North America. The most recent documents show contracts with Cornerstone Government Affairs, including records submitted in 2025 and 2026.
This is a matter that deserves a separate investigation because it allows distinguishing between the diplomatic strategy of the Moroccan state and the activity of strategic companies linked to the country.
And that will precisely be one of the keys to the second piece.
The comparison that raises a question for Spain
The correspondent of ABC in the United States, David Alandete, has focused these days on another issue: according to the data he has provided, Morocco would have spent millions of dollars in a single year on hiring lobbyists, opening doors, influencing Congress, and placing its arguments in Washington. His comparison is direct: Spain would have invested zero dollars in that same instrument.
The data must be understood in its proper terms. That Spain does not hire lobby services registered under FARA does not mean it lacks presence in the United States. Spain has an Embassy, bilateral diplomacy, parliamentary relations, military cooperation, and other institutional channels.
The comparison points to something else: the use of a specific professional tool from the political ecosystem of Washington. And there is indeed a difference that deserves to be examined.
Morocco appears in the records hiring firms specialized in governmental relations and assigning them explicit tasks before Congress and the U.S. Administration. The documents from Akin Gump, for example, explicitly mention representing the Embassy before both powers and defending the strategic importance of the bilateral relationship.
The new contract from Brownstein shows that this path continues in 2026 and that Rabat is willing to allocate 65,000 dollars monthly to that work during the first year of the agreement.
The lobby does not explain Washington's policy by itself
The documents allow for the verification of contracts, activities, and declared objectives. They do not allow us to assert, by themselves, that a specific decision of the U.S. Administration or Congress is a direct consequence of those contracts.
This distinction is fundamental. The relationship between Washington and Rabat also responds to strategic, military, economic, and regional factors. The U.S. government itself has considered Morocco a relevant partner in North Africa for years.
What the documents do show is that Morocco does not leave the defense of its interests in Washington solely in the hands of traditional diplomacy. It hires specialized professionals, incorporates people with direct experience in U.S. institutions, and formally registers those activities with the Department of Justice.
The strategy is in plain sight. And precisely for that reason, the question for Spain is not whether it should copy the Moroccan model, nor whether a lobbying contract determines U.S. foreign policy. The question is much more concrete: if other countries are using all available instruments to defend their interests in Washington, what tools is Spain using and with what intensity.