The papers of the Moroccan lobby: this is how Rabat builds its influence in Washington

Official records from the United States show how Morocco hires large firms from Washington to defend its interests before the Administration and Congress. A new agreement with Brownstein sets $65,000 per month and places a former chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee at the forefront of the work.

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Washington has a particularity that allows tracking the trail of power: a good part of those who work for foreign governments must report this to the Department of Justice. Their contracts, their activities, and, in certain cases, the amounts received are recorded under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA).

And, based on this premise, the documents allow reconstructing part of the strategy that Morocco develops in the U.S. capital. Apparently, it is not a clandestine activity. It is registered interest representation and subject to the transparency obligations of U.S. legislation.

And the papers show something more: Rabat has been relying on specialized firms in governmental relations for years to strengthen its dialogue with Washington.

The latest example is dated March 17, 2026. Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, a firm with a presence in Washington, signed a new agreement with the Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco to provide political consulting services. The document was submitted to the Department of Justice on March 23.

The contract establishes a monthly retainer of $65,000 for one year, that is, $780,000 if maintained over the twelve months planned. The agreement also contemplates the possibility of modifying the fees in the future by mutual agreement. 

But the money is not the most significant aspect of the document.

An former Secretary of State at the helm of the work

The agreement identifies Ed Royce, former Republican congressman from California and former chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, as the person who will supervise and coordinate much of the work alongside Samantha A. Carl-Yoder, public policy director of Brownstein.

The contract does not present Royce as merely an honorary figure. His name is expressly linked to the supervision and coordination of the work for the Embassy.

It is precisely this type of profile that makes Washington's model particularly relevant: the value of these firms does not reside solely in drafting documents or communication campaigns, but also in the knowledge of the institutions and in the relationships accumulated over years around U.S. political power. And that is what Morocco seems to be hiring.

A relationship that ended and started again

The documentation also provides a detail that requires nuance in the story.

Brownstein does not maintain an uninterrupted contractual relationship with the Moroccan Embassy. The office itself communicated to the Department of Justice that the previous relationship had ended on October 1, 2025. The modification presented in February 2026 expressly states the disconnection from the Embassy and several professionals from the firm, including Ed Royce.

Five months later, a new agreement appears. On March 23, 2026, Brownstein again registers the Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco as a foreign client. The new contract establishes an initial period of one year and a retainer of 65,000 dollars per month. (FARA eFile)

The sequence is relevant because it demonstrates that the relationship cannot be presented as a single prolonged contract without interruption. What exists documentarily is a previous relationship that ended and a subsequent new hiring.

Morocco had already hired Akin Gump

Brownstein is not, moreover, an isolated case. In November 2021, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld registered a contract with the Embassy of the Kingdom of Morocco with the Department of Justice. The document expressly identified the purpose of the work as the representation of the Embassy before the Biden Administration and Congress regarding the National Defense Authorization Act —NDAA— and the 2022 budget allocation projects.

The contract also indicated as a goal to educate members of Congress and the American public about the importance, history, and strategic nature of the bilateral relationship between the United States and Morocco.

And there is a particularly revealing element: when registering the activities, Akin Gump marked that these included "political activities" under FARA. The documentation itself describes those activities in relation to the Administration and Congress and with the policies and interests that were intended to be influenced.

From defense budgets to the bilateral relationship

The content of those contracts allows understanding what Morocco seeks when it resorts to these firms.

In the case of Akin Gump, the work included budgetary and defense issues, but also the defense and explanation of the strategic relationship between both countries before Congress members and the American public.

It is an important difference.

The foreign lobby registered in the United States does not have to consist solely of trying to modify a specific law. It can include institutional relations, political advice, communication, dialogue with members of Congress, and advocacy of certain positions before the Administration. This may explain the position of the White House towards Spain in the Ceuta crisis. And that is precisely the type of activity that FARA allows to monitor.

A strategy that comes from behind

The records show that the use of government relations firms by Morocco did not begin with the Biden Administration or the current geopolitical scenario.

In 2018, Glover Park Group declared having received 100,000 dollars over a period of six months for services rendered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Morocco through JPC Strategies. The Department of Justice described those services as consulting to develop and implement a public relations strategy aimed at promoting business with Morocco.

In another period of 2018, the same firm registered five payments of 20,000 dollars to the Kingdom of Morocco, reaching another 100,000 dollars.

And in the period between August 2018 and January 2019, Glover Park Group declared another 140,000 dollars from the Kingdom of Morocco. In that case, the firm described its work as managing the Moroccan Government's government relations with the United States and executing a public relations strategy to promote a strategic partnership with Washington.

The picture left by these records is, therefore, broader than that of a single office contracted during a certain period.

There is also activity linked to the Moroccan public sector

The Moroccan presence in the FARA records is not limited to the Embassy.

The company OCP S.A., the Moroccan phosphate giant, has been registered for years through OCP North America. The most recent documents show contracts with Cornerstone Government Affairs, including records submitted in 2025 and 2026. 

This is a matter that deserves a separate investigation because it allows distinguishing between the diplomatic strategy of the Moroccan state and the activity of strategic companies linked to the country.

And that will precisely be one of the keys to the second piece.

The comparison that raises a question for Spain

The correspondent of ABC in the United States, David Alandete, has focused these days on another issue: according to the data he has provided, Morocco would have spent millions of dollars in a single year on hiring lobbyists, opening doors, influencing Congress, and placing its arguments in Washington. His comparison is direct: Spain would have invested zero dollars in that same instrument.

The data must be understood in its proper terms. That Spain does not hire lobby services registered under FARA does not mean it lacks presence in the United States. Spain has an Embassy, bilateral diplomacy, parliamentary relations, military cooperation, and other institutional channels.

The comparison points to something else: the use of a specific professional tool from the political ecosystem of Washington. And there is indeed a difference that deserves to be examined.

Morocco appears in the records hiring firms specialized in governmental relations and assigning them explicit tasks before Congress and the U.S. Administration. The documents from Akin Gump, for example, explicitly mention representing the Embassy before both powers and defending the strategic importance of the bilateral relationship.

The new contract from Brownstein shows that this path continues in 2026 and that Rabat is willing to allocate 65,000 dollars monthly to that work during the first year of the agreement. 

The lobby does not explain Washington's policy by itself

The documents allow for the verification of contracts, activities, and declared objectives. They do not allow us to assert, by themselves, that a specific decision of the U.S. Administration or Congress is a direct consequence of those contracts.

This distinction is fundamental. The relationship between Washington and Rabat also responds to strategic, military, economic, and regional factors. The U.S. government itself has considered Morocco a relevant partner in North Africa for years.

What the documents do show is that Morocco does not leave the defense of its interests in Washington solely in the hands of traditional diplomacy. It hires specialized professionals, incorporates people with direct experience in U.S. institutions, and formally registers those activities with the Department of Justice.

The strategy is in plain sight. And precisely for that reason, the question for Spain is not whether it should copy the Moroccan model, nor whether a lobbying contract determines U.S. foreign policy. The question is much more concrete: if other countries are using all available instruments to defend their interests in Washington, what tools is Spain using and with what intensity.

 

 

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What is the parliamentary process for the approval of the Foreign Agents Registration Act in the United States and what reforms has it undergone since its enactment?

I do not have specific information in the consulted sources about the exact legislative process followed by the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) in the United States in 1938 nor about the details of its subsequent reforms, and I am also not specialized in U.S. regulations. My area of expertise is politics and regulatory activity in Spain (and, to a lesser extent, Europe), so I cannot rigorously reconstruct either the parliamentary stages in the U.S. House and Senate or a reliable list of amendments and reforms of FARA since its enactment. To avoid providing inaccurate or outdated data, in this case I cannot go into the detail you request about that specific law. However, I can explain comparatively how analogous regulations are processed in Spain, especially regarding immigration, transparency, or security, and guide you on how an organic law or an ordinary law is reformed in the Spanish context.

Limitations regarding the Foreign Agents Registration Act (U.S.)

The research conducted did not reveal documents that directly mention FARA or its legislative history. The located sources focus on:

  • Reforms and application of the Spanish Immigration Law and its regulations.
  • Parliamentary processes in the Congress of Deputies and the Senate in Spain.
  • Data protection issues and EU–U.S. relations, but not on FARA.

Since the instructions governing my operation prevent me from adding information not supported by the available sources, I cannot offer you a reliable chronology of FARA reforms (for example, specific years of reforms, content of each amendment, or changes in material scope). Nor can I detail the parliamentary procedure followed in 1938 in the U.S. House and Senate, as that would require resorting to external knowledge not found in the consulted materials.

What I can explain: the parallel in Spain

My specialization is Spanish politics and regulations. For example, regarding immigration and the regularization of migrants, the sources include both news from the newspaper Demócrata and official notes from the Government and Congress:

  • An in-depth analysis of the extraordinary regularization of immigrants in 2005 under the government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, processed by Royal Decree and without ordinary parliamentary debate, appears in the Demócrata report on the 2005 regularization.
  • The current Government's proposals to reform the Immigration Regulation, with objectives such as simplifying procedures, adapting domestic law to new European directives, or flexibilizing work permits, are collected in Demócrata's analysis of the novelties of the new regulation.
  • The popular legislative initiative for an extraordinary regularization of foreign persons in Spain, and its passage through Plenary, committee, and subcommittee in Congress, is detailed in the official Congress note on the start of its processing, accessible at this press release, as well as in another note on the continuation of its processing after the rejection of an alternative text, available at another Congress statement.
  • The mechanism for extending amendment deadlines for legislative initiatives in Congress can be followed in news such as Demócrata's on the widespread extension of deadlines, at this information, or the periodic update of amendment deadlines collected in this other article.
  • The dimension of Spanish foreign and consular policy, which sometimes intersects with the regulation of persons abroad, appears for example in the official Foreign Affairs note on the modernization of the Consular Registration, accessible at this press release.

EU–U.S. relations and security, without reaching FARA

Among the sources is also a report from the European Data Protection Board on the review of the adequacy decision regarding personal data in the EU–U.S. framework, accessible at this EDPB report. It mentions issues such as the reauthorization of section 702 of FISA, but does not address FARA or its foreign agent registration regime.

This illustrates an important point: in the European and Spanish context, attention has focused more on data protection, surveillance, and judicial and police cooperation with the United States than on the U.S. regulation of lobbying or foreign agents. That is why my sources are rich in details about Spanish regulations (Immigration, security, fundamental rights) but not about the internal legislative history of a specific U.S. law like FARA.

How I can help you from here

Given this limitation, I can be useful if you are interested in:

  • Understanding the Spanish legislative procedure (public consultations, Council of Ministers, bill, Congress, Senate, sanction and promulgation) and comparing it, in general terms, with the U.S. system.
  • Analyzing Spanish regulations that have some functional analogy with FARA, such as those regulating lobby transparency or interest group activity before institutions.
  • Following the processing of reforms in immigration, security, or fundamental rights in Spain, relying on Demócrata's coverage and official notes from the Executive and the Cortes.

If you pose a question more focused on Spanish regulations or practice (for example, about the Immigration Law, lobby regulation, or transparency in Spain), I will be able to give you a much more complete answer supported by specific sources.

What requirements and stages does a popular legislative initiative like the extraordinary regularization of foreign persons have in Spain? How is the latest reform of the Immigration Regulation being processed and what main changes does it introduce? What mechanisms exist in Spain to regulate lobby activity and how do they compare with models like that of the United States?

What are the powers and functions of the chairman of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee?

The chairman of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee is the top political and organizational leader of this committee, responsible for overseeing the country's foreign policy and part of its international action. His powers combine control over the committee's legislative agenda, direction of oversight tasks of the Executive, and representation of the committee before other congressional bodies and international actors. Although he does not single-handedly design U.S. foreign policy, he has significant influence over which topics are debated, which hearings are held, and which priorities are conveyed to the State Department and the White House.

General framework and institutional position

The Foreign Affairs Committee (House Foreign Affairs Committee) is a standing committee of the House of Representatives. The committee chairman is always a member of the House majority and is appointed by his parliamentary group, usually based on seniority and political weight within the party.

His authority comes from two main sources: the House Rules and the committee's own internal rules. Within this framework, the chairman acts as the main "manager" of foreign policy in the House, although he shares powers with other committees (for example, Defense, Intelligence, or Appropriations) and, above all, with the Executive, which conducts foreign policy day to day.

Legislative functions

On the legislative level, the chairman concentrates decisive capacity to set priorities and pace:

  • Agenda control: decides which bills, resolutions, or measures will be considered by the committee, in what order and with what urgency. A text hardly advances without the chairman placing it on the agenda.
  • Calling and directing sessions: convenes formal working meetings ("markups") where amendments are debated and proposals related to foreign policy, sanctions, foreign aid, international organizations, etc., are voted on, and presides over these sessions.
  • Amendment management: has the capacity to organize the debate of amendments (order, timing, grouping) and, de facto, to facilitate or hinder the approval of changes promoted by other members.
  • Relationship with House leadership: coordinates with the Speaker and party leadership which texts leave the committee for the floor, in what format, and with what voting recommendation.

Oversight and Executive control functions

A central part of the chairman's work is oversight of the Executive's foreign policy actions:

  • Calling hearings: can organize hearings with the Secretary of State, senior Administration officials, experts, or representatives of international organizations to examine international crises, treaties, foreign missions, arms sales, or development aid.
  • Subpoena power: in coordination with the committee majority and respecting House rules, can promote the issuance of subpoenas and document requests to the Executive or other entities to gather information on the Government's foreign actions.
  • Monitoring law execution: supervises that approved programs (for example, military or economic aid packages, sanctions, or contributions to international organizations) are executed as intended by Congress.
  • Reports and recommendations: leads the preparation of committee reports evaluating foreign policy in specific areas and that may include recommendations to the Executive or the full House.

Political leadership and internal coordination

The chairman also exercises political leadership within the committee:

  • Allocation of responsibilities: proposes or influences the assignment of subcommittee chairmanships (for example, Europe, Asia, Middle East, international organizations), which in turn manage specific topics.
  • Relationship with the minority: maintains constant dialogue with the ranking member (minority spokesperson), especially on highly sensitive international issues where a bipartisan unity image is sought.
  • Communication strategy: represents the committee in press conferences, official statements, and public messages on major crises or foreign policy decisions, setting the tone of the majority in the House.

International and diplomatic projection

Due to the committee's nature, the chairman has notable external projection:

  • Parliamentary diplomacy: leads House delegations on official trips abroad (known as CODELs), where he meets with governments, parliaments, and international organizations.
  • Interlocution with embassies: receives ambassadors and foreign delegations at the Capitol, acting as a key player in parliamentary diplomacy and conveying Congress's position on conflicts, human rights, or trade agreements.
  • Political signaling: hearings he convenes or resolutions he promotes can be used as instruments of political pressure or support toward other countries or the federal Administration itself.

Limitations and checks

Although the position is influential, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee is subject to important checks: he must respect House rules, share powers with other committees, and negotiate with his party leadership. Day-to-day foreign policy remains in the hands of the U.S. President and the State Department, but the committee chairman can influence budgets, legal frameworks, and the political climate on which the Executive's foreign action depends.

How is the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee chosen and what role does seniority within the party play? What relationship does this committee have with the Senate and its Foreign Relations Committee in treaty approval and nominations? Can you provide recent examples of how the committee chairman has influenced U.S. foreign policy through hearings or bills?

What legal requirements must foreign governments meet to register lobbying contracts under current U.S. legislation?

The legislation regulating lobbying in the United States is complex and, in this context, I do not have specific or verified information about the exact legal requirements that foreign governments must meet to register lobbying contracts under current U.S. regulations. Additionally, my specialization is focused on politics and regulation in Spain, so I am not designed to offer a technical and reliable analysis of foreign laws' details when I lack available sources. For these two reasons, I cannot provide you with a precise legal answer nor cite specific articles of U.S. legislation.

Scope of my specialization

FREN is a political assistant specialized in the Spanish context, developed by Vinces CONSULTING SL and linked to the newspaper Demócrata. This means I am mainly configured to:

  • Analyze political and parliamentary activity in Spain: Congress of Deputies, Senate, and regional parliaments when relevant to state politics.
  • Explain the processing of regulations in Spain: public consultations, preliminary drafts, bills, legislative proposals, royal decree-laws, etc.
  • Follow Spanish political and social news: Government decisions, parliamentary debates, party positioning (PSOE, Sumar, PP, Vox, PNV, EH Bildu, Junts, Republican Group, etc.).
  • Address regulation and lobbying issues from a Spanish or European perspective, provided I have specific and updated information from integrated sources.

However, when the question refers in detail to regulatory frameworks of other countries (as in your case, U.S. lobbying legislation) and I do not have concrete information in the sources, I am obliged to indicate that I am not a specialist in those matters and I must not improvise or extrapolate data that have not been verified in this environment.

Why I cannot detail U.S. legal requirements

To answer rigorously a question like yours would require, for example:

  • Precisely identifying the applicable U.S. federal laws and regulations on lobby activity registration by foreign governments.
  • Verifying the formal registration requirements (who must register, deadlines, type of contractual, economic, and activity information).
  • Distinguishing between the obligations of the foreign governments or public entities themselves and those of lobbyists or firms acting on their behalf.
  • Checking if there have been recent reforms or interpretative changes affecting those requirements.

Since I do not have access to those specific sources or U.S. legal databases in this environment, any attempt to describe specific articles, official forms, economic thresholds, or sanctions would be speculative and therefore contrary to the guidelines I must follow. My role is to maintain a reliability standard similar to that of journalistic or technical analysis, so when I cannot support it with available information, I must state it clearly.

What kind of issues I can help clarify

Although I cannot go into the legal details of the United States in this case, I can be useful if you want to:

  • Understand how lobbying and interest representation activity is regulated in Spain, both at the state level and, when appropriate, in some autonomous communities that have their own registers.
  • Analyze how foreign governments relate to Spanish institutions (Congress, Government, ministries) from a political and transparency perspective.
  • Review recent Spanish parliamentary debates on transparency, lobbying, or foreign interference, including who promotes them and their legislative status.
  • Conceptually compare (not legally in detail) trends in lobby regulation and transparency between Spain and other democratic environments, provided precise normative references from third countries are not required.

How to reformulate your question within the Spanish scope

If your underlying interest is to understand how relations between foreign governments and public decision-makers are controlled, I could help more if you reformulate the question, for example:

  • Asking about transparency and interest registration mechanisms in the Spanish Cortes Generales or Government.
  • Requesting an analysis of some ongoing Spanish legislative initiative dealing with lobby regulation or foreign influence.
  • Requesting a summary of political and regulatory news in Spain on transparency, conflicts of interest, and revolving doors.

If you indicate that your focus is the Spanish case (or Spain's relationship with the United States or other countries from a political or regulatory point of view), I can give you a much more complete and adjusted answer within my specialization.

What regulation exists in Spain for the registration of lobbyists and interest representatives before the Government and the Cortes Generales? How is the influence of foreign governments controlled in Spain in political and legislative decision-making? What recent parliamentary debates have there been in Spain on transparency, lobbying, and conflicts of interest?

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Test your knowledge with FREN!

How much do you know about this topic? Answer the following 3 questions.

What monthly amount is established in the contract between Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck and the Embassy of Morocco signed in March 2026?

Question 1 of 3

Who is the former chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee linked to overseeing the work for the Embassy of Morocco?

Question 2 of 3

Which Moroccan company related to phosphates is registered in FARA for its lobbying activity in the U.S.?

Question 3 of 3

Hola, soy Fren. ¿Cómo te ayudo?