Essential services demand from the Treasury a reform of the Public Procurement Law due to the increase in costs.

As of today, the reform of the Public Sector Contracts Law (LCSP) to introduce stable price review mechanisms is not in an advanced stage of parliamentary processing. The core of this possible reform lies in a Sumar parliamentary bill that is still pending consideration in the Congress, while other related initiatives have remained as non-legislative motions or vetoes to amendments, without materializing into effective changes to the LCSP text.

1. Central initiative: Bill for price updating

The piece most directly aimed at reforming the LCSP in terms of price review is the “Bill for the updating of prices in public sector contracts”, presented by the Plurinational Sumar Parliamentary Group in the Congress:

• Chamber: Congress of Deputies.
• Type: Bill.
• Author group: Plurinational Sumar Parliamentary Group.
• Identifier: 122/000158.
• Procedural status: admitted for processing and pending consideration by the Plenary since 03/29/2025.
• Official file: initiative detail 122/000158 .

The text proposes an explicit amendment to Law 9/2017, on Public Sector Contracts, with two main pillars:

• Changes to article 100, strengthening the obligation to itemize and justify salary costs in the base bidding budget.
• The creation of a new article 103 bis, which enables the price update of contracts when salary increases arise from legal norms or collective agreements, provided that salary costs represent at least 30 % of the bidding budget.

This bill defines a contradictory procedure so that companies can request a price update during the contract term and contemplates positive administrative silence if no resolution is made within the deadline. Concession contracts and contracts shorter than one year are excluded.

However, despite its detailed content, the initiative is blocked at the earliest stage: it has not yet passed the debate for consideration in the Plenary, so no phase of committee, working group, or amendments on the articles has opened.

2. Other related parliamentary initiatives

Besides this bill, there are other initiatives aimed at flexibilizing price review in public procurement, but with less direct scope on the LCSP or without binding normative effects:

• A Non-Legislative Motion by the Sumar group itself in the Congress (161/000948) proposes, among other issues, “incorporating the necessary modifications to flexibilize the review and updating of contract prices”, explicitly citing article 103 of the LCSP. Its status is pending processing, as it is a political impulse initiative without legal rank. Text at: BOCG Series D, no. 163 .
• According to the interview with Javier Sigüenza (alianzAS) in Demócrata, interview in Demócrata , various groups (such as PNV or Junts) have presented amendments to other legislative texts to modify article 103 LCSP, but the Government has vetoed these amendments, preventing the debate from resulting in effective change.
• In parallel, there is political and social pressure to modify the current price review regime, reflected in initiatives such as the joint declaration of CEOE and the Third Sector Platform, which propose reforming the Deindexation Law and article 103 LCSP to allow a review linked to cost evolution ( CEOE press release ), but these are positions of actors, not in-force regulations.

3. Summary of the current status

With the available information, the situation can be summarized as follows:

• As of August 2026, there is no approved LCSP reform introducing a more flexible general price review regime than the current article 103.
• The only clearly identified structural legislative initiative is the Bill 122/000158 from the Sumar Group, which remains pending consideration in the Congress.
• There are multiple demands and proposals (unions, employers, third sectors, parliamentary groups) to reform the LCSP and the Deindexation Law, but the Ministry of Finance acts as a political blocking point, vetoing amendments and not promoting its own bill.
• Meanwhile, the price review regime continues to be that of article 103 of the LCSP, complemented by periodic Finance orders setting review indices for certain contracts (for example, Order HAC/725/2026 ).

Consequently, the “possible reform” to include broader price review mechanisms is currently in a very embryonic phase: there is a specific bill on the table and broad political and sectoral debate, but without the substantive parliamentary processing having started nor a governmental agreement materialized to amend the LCSP.

The Ministry of Finance holds a central position in the Spanish public procurement system, but it does not act as the "sole contracting authority" of the public sector; rather, it functions as a normative, governance, and supervisory authority of the model, especially at the state level. Its competences are mainly based on Law 9/2017, on Public Sector Contracts (LCSP), development regulations, and the ministry's own organizational royal decrees.

1. Normative function and system design

The LCSP (article 1 and Book IV) assigns the State the basic regulation of public procurement for the entire Spanish public sector. Within this framework, Finance is the competent department to:

• Promote and propose legal and regulatory reforms in public procurement (bills, royal decrees, ministerial orders), including those developing the LCSP and those transposing European directives (such as Royal Decree-Law 3/2020, of February 4, which transposes directives in special sectors).
• Regulate organizational and procedural aspects through ministerial orders and resolutions, both for the General State Administration and, in part, for the state public sector (for example, Order HFP/1500/2021 on delegation of competences and management limits, or orders setting thresholds under article 324.5 LCSP).
• Coordinate integrity and anti-corruption initiatives in procurement, as reflected in the draft Open Administration Law and the State Anti-Corruption Plan, whose coordination falls to Finance through an interministerial commission.

2. Collegiate bodies attached to Finance

a) State Public Procurement Advisory Board

The LCSP, in its Book IV, establishes the State Public Procurement Advisory Board as the main regulatory and consultative body in this area for the state public sector. It is attached to the Ministry of Finance and is assigned key functions:

• Issuing interpretative reports and instructions on the LCSP and its application, which guide the actions of contracting authorities. Recent press highlights that its criteria have been decisive, for example, regarding price review.
• Acting as a reference point vis-à-vis the European Commission, submitting information required by European directives.
• Managing company classification commissions, whose agreements have general effect for contracting authorities (LCSP, provisions on classification).
• Channeling, through the Public Procurement Cooperation Committee, coordination with autonomous communities and local entities, including drafting the proposal for the National Public Procurement Strategy.

b) Independent Office for Regulation and Supervision of Procurement (OIReScon)

Article 332 LCSP creates OIReScon as an independent collegiate body, attached to the Ministry of Finance "for organizational and budgetary purposes." Its functions, developed by Royal Decree 342/2023, include:

• Supervising procurement by all contracting authorities of the public sector, ensuring correct application of the law and, in particular, the principles of publicity, competition, and integrity.
• Approving the National Procurement Strategy, preparing the Annual Supervision Report and a triennial report, and issuing general recommendations and instructions.
• Verifying compliance with transparency and conflict of interest prevention obligations and detecting systemic irregularities.

c) Central Administrative Tribunal for Contractual Appeals (TACRC)

According to article 45 LCSP, the TACRC is attached to Finance and acts with full functional independence. It handles special appeals in procurement matters and claims provided for in the LCSP and article 120 of Royal Decree-Law 3/2020. Additionally, through agreements (such as those signed with the Generalitat Valenciana or the Principality of Asturias), it can assume appeals from autonomous communities and local entities, reinforcing Finance's role as the state node for oversight and guarantee of the appeals system.

3. Centralized procurement and internal bodies

Within the General State Administration, Finance directs the centralized procurement policy provided in the LCSP (article 229 and related):

• Declares certain goods and services as centralized procurement and regulates the catalog through orders such as Order EHA/1049/2008 and its subsequent amendments (Order HFP/761/2022, Order HFP/457/2018).
• Organizes the centralized procurement bodies and their delegated competences, as reflected in Order HAC/1185/2024 on centralized procurement.
• Creates and regulates the procurement boards and procurement committees of the ministry's central services (Order HAC/581/2024), which act as assistance bodies in bidding procedures.

4. General Intervention, Procurement Platform, and contracting authorities

The General Intervention of the State Administration (IGAE), integrated within Finance, exercises internal legality and accounting control over expenditure and contracts of the General State Administration and its state public sector. Moreover, it will be a central piece in future citizen audits of procurement foreseen in the Open Administration Law, coordinated with Finance.

Regarding the Public Sector Procurement Platform, although its legal basis is in the LCSP (publicity and contracting profile), recent reforms position Finance as a key actor in its technological reformulation (incorporation of AI and advanced analytics) and in the governance of procurement data.

Facing contracting authorities (State, autonomous communities, local entities, and institutional public sector), Finance does not replace their contracting competences but acts as:

• Basic regulator and system coordinator (LCSP and development regulations).
• Reference body for consultation, supervision, and appeals through the Advisory Board, OIReScon, TACRC, and IGAE.
• Promoter of integrity, transparency, and rationalization policies that condition the contracting practice of all administrations.

The possibility of modifying the economic conditions of an ongoing public contract is currently strongly restricted by the combination of Law 9/2017, on Public Sector Contracts (LCSP), and Law 2/2015, on the deindexation of the Spanish economy. The general rule is price stability: it can only be altered in the specific cases of price review provided by law or through contractual modifications that respect the material and procedural limits set in the LCSP.

1. Basic regulatory framework

The general regime of price and review in public sector contracts is concentrated in article 103 of the LCSP, to which, for example, Finance's price review index orders refer (such as Order HAC/817/2025 and Order HAC/1054/2025, published in the BOE, which expressly state that "the price review regime of public sector contracts is regulated in article 103 of Law 9/2017"). The LCSP preamble itself explains that:

• A distinction is made between estimated value, base bidding budget, and contract price, to avoid confusion.
• Price review is adapted to Law 2/2015, on deindexation, so that general indices are not used, but specific indices reflecting the cost components of the service.

Additionally, various audits and fiscal resolutions (such as the Resolution of April 11, 2024, of the Joint Committee for Relations with the Court of Auditors, published in the BOE: resolution on public sector contracting) emphasize that modification clauses must be clearly and thoroughly provided in the tender documents.

2. Ordinary price review

According to the excerpts of the LCSP consulted:

• Prices can only be subject to periodic and predetermined review under the terms of the price review chapter.
• In general, review is only allowed in:
  • Works contracts.
  • Supply contracts for manufacturing armament and equipment for Public Administrations.
  • Energy supply contracts.
  • Other contracts whose investment recovery period is equal to or greater than five years.
• In contracts other than the above, review may be admitted if the sum of raw materials, intermediate goods, and energy exceeds 20% of the base bidding budget; in that case, the review only affects that fraction of the price.
• Depreciation, financial costs, general expenses, or industrial profit costs are never subject to review.

The decision to allow ordinary review requires:

• Prior justification in the file.
• Setting a review formula in the tender, based on official indices and specific to the contract.
• Application of indices approved by Finance through orders like those cited.

The practical result, repeatedly pointed out by business and union organizations in Demócrata articles, is that many service contracts do not have an effective channel to update their price in the face of structural cost increases (e.g., minimum wage hikes or new social contributions), because the LCSP + Deindexation Law combination prevents "automatic indexations" and greatly restricts review.

3. Exceptional price review in works

Apart from ordinary review, the legislator has enabled in recent years exceptional price review mechanisms, especially for public works contracts, through Royal Decree-Law 3/2022 and its development. Several news and analyses (Seopan, ANCI, etc.) mention that:

• Exceptional review is allowed to absorb extraordinary increases in material and energy costs.
• There are percentage limits on the recognition of these overruns (sources mention a 20% cap in exceptional review for certain contracts signed before 2021).
• The regime has been criticized as insufficient and calls are made for its extension or reactivation adapted to new price shocks.

These exceptional routes do not generally apply to service contracts, where pressure focuses on labor costs.

4. Contractual modifications impacting price

Another way to alter economic conditions is modifying the contract itself (change of scope, units, execution conditions, etc.). From the LCSP it follows that:

• If as a consequence of a contract modification the price varies, the contractor must adjust the final guarantee to maintain proportion with the new price.
• This adjustment obligation does not apply to mere price reviews carried out according to the legal review regime, which are considered distinct from contractual modification.

Parliamentary and Court of Auditors oversight emphasizes that:

• Modification clauses must be expressly included in the tender, drafted clearly, precisely, and unequivocally.
• The file must justify the needs to be covered, the price calculation according to the market, and the award criteria, so that any subsequent modification is anchored in that initial motivation.

5. Role of budgetary rules

Finally, any economic modification of a public contract is conditioned by the existence of adequate and sufficient credit and by budgetary stability and expenditure control rules, materialized in Council of Ministers agreements and General Intervention instructions on "basic requirements" of the intervention function. Some of these agreements, published in the BOE, specify that expenditure increases derived from contractual modifications are subject to reinforced control.

In summary, current regulation only allows altering the economic conditions of ongoing public contracts when:

• The possibility of review or modification has been foreseen and detailed in the tender documents and contract.
• Material requirements are met (admitted contract types, cost structure, exceptional shocks).
• A formally motivated file is respected, with economic report and contracting authority agreement subject to financial control.

Outside these specific cases, the rule is price immutability during the contract term.