The two legal routes to suspend TikTok in Spain: an urgent three-month measure and the judicial blocking planned in the DSA

As of November 10, 2026, the full legal empowerment of the CNMC as coordinator of digital services has not yet been completed. The government project that was supposed to grant it these powers expired on October 6, 2026, so it is no longer pending approval in that process. It is important to distinguish this from its designation as coordinator, made on January 25, 2024: being designated does not equate to having all the necessary national powers.

What has happened with the legislative routes

• First attempt: Royal Decree-Law 9/2024. Approved on December 23, 2024, it modified the CNMC and information society services legislation to grant it supervision, investigation, and sanctioning powers. However, the Congress did not validate it — that is, did not agree to keep it in force — on January 22, 2025. That route did not consolidate the empowerment, as noted by Demócrata on the background.
• Second attempt: government project. The draft bill was presented on February 25, 2025; its public consultation was open from March 6 to 14, and on July 15 an urgent opinion was requested from the Council of State. The Council of Ministers approved on July 29 the Draft Law amending various legal provisions for the improvement of democratic governance in digital services and regulation of the media, to submit it to Congress. This is recorded in the Council of Ministers reference.
• Progress and closure of the project. In April 2026 it was in the Economy Committee of Congress, in the hearing phase, according to Demócrata's follow-up. But it expired on October 6 with the dissolution of the Cortes. Therefore, describing it today simply as a project in process would be incorrect.
• Separate parliamentary route. There was also a socialist bill focused on unlocking the CNMC's empowerment, without the set of media reforms. Congress rejected on April 14, 2026, starting its processing, according to Demócrata's information. It also did not produce an enabling law.

What powers it intended to complete

The project amended Law 34/2002, on information society services and electronic commerce, and Law 3/2013, creating the CNMC. It sought to provide internal coverage for the control of digital intermediaries through information requests, investigations, inspections, and sanctions, as well as adapting the supervisor's organization. The Government explained this scope when approving the project.

This does not mean that the European Digital Services Act, or DSA, is pending application: its obligations have been directly applicable since February 2024. What remains is to complete the Spanish framework so that the CNMC fully exercises its corresponding functions, respecting the competences of other authorities, including the Spanish Data Protection Agency.

Current practical consequence

The CNMC continues acting as coordinator in cooperation areas: on November 4, 2026, it gathered platforms, authorities, and civil society to coordinate measures ahead of the elections, according to its official communication. That activity alone does not prove the approval of full empowerment.

In conclusion, the designation exists, but the legislative reform has not been completed. The expired project cannot continue automatically: a new instrument with the rank of law will be necessary. The consulted sources do not show a subsequent regulation that has closed this gap.

The National Commission on Markets and Competition (CNMC) has a dual mission: to defend competition in markets and to supervise certain regulated sectors, for the benefit of consumers and users. It acts with autonomy and independence and combines investigative, decision-making, regulatory, and advisory functions.

Its basic framework is Law 3/2013, along with the Competition Defense Law, sectoral legislation, and its Organic Statute. Its main powers are grouped in the following areas.

1. Competition defense

The CNMC investigates behaviors that may restrict competition and processes the corresponding sanctioning procedures. It also conducts studies and reports on the competitive functioning of markets.

Another essential function is control of business concentrations: it examines mergers, acquisitions, and other notifiable operations to assess whether they hinder effective competition. It does not control all operations, only those meeting legal requirements; those of European dimension generally correspond to the European Commission, unless referred to Spain. These functions are framed in article 5 of Law 3/2013 and Law 15/2007.

2. Sectoral supervision and regulation

Articles 6 to 11 of Law 3/2013 grant it specific competences:

• Telecommunications: analyzes markets, identifies operators with significant power, and imposes, when appropriate, specific obligations to promote competition.
• Electricity and gas: establishes methodologies for access tolls and remuneration of networks and other regulated facilities. Approves certain values and amounts, supervises markets, and performs inspection functions.
• Postal services: monitors the universal postal service, verifies its net cost and the accounting of the designated operator, supervises network access, and manages its financing fund.
• Audiovisual communication: supervises the market within its legal powers and prepares reports, among others, on women's representation and media literacy. This area is complemented by the General Audiovisual Communication Law.
• Airport tariffs: informs the Airport Regulation Document and controls transparency, consultations, and non-discriminatory application of Aena's tariffs.
• Railway: guarantees objective and non-discriminatory access conditions, supervises fees and capacity allocation, and controls competition among operators.

3. Conflict resolution

Article 12 allows resolving disputes between operators in expressly attributed matters: telecommunications access and interconnection, access to energy and postal networks, airport tariffs, and railway services, among others. Therefore, it is not a general instance for any claim: there must be a specific legal competence.

4. Investigation, inspection, and binding regulation

Articles 27 and 28 allow inspecting companies and requesting necessary information through motivated and proportionate requests. Actions requiring it need consent or judicial authorization. Confidentiality of obtained information must be respected.

Besides exercising sanctioning powers according to applicable legislation, it can approve binding circulars when expressly authorized. Article 30 requires their publication in the BOE and participation of affected parties.

5. Promotion of competition and cooperation

The CNMC develops advisory functions, competition promotion, and arbitration. It can challenge certain administrative acts and regulations below the law that hinder effective competition.

Finally, it cooperates with regional authorities, courts, the European Commission, and authorities of other member states. It applies European competition rules and can exchange evidence and provide investigative assistance within legal limits. Its action thus combines general market oversight with specifically delimited sectoral interventions.

To judicially request the blocking of a platform under the DSA, it is not enough to detect illegal content: a legally empowered authority must act, alternative measures must have been exhausted, and especially serious circumstances must concur. Article 51.3 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 configures a temporary access restriction as a last resort, not a general government power to shut down platforms.

1. Competence and legal empowerment

The request corresponds to the competent digital services coordinator, within the distribution of powers of the DSA and national law. A ministry cannot replace it by political decision nor assume its powers by reporting facts to the Prosecutor's Office.

In Spain there is an additional difficulty: according to Demócrata, November 10, the designation of the CNMC as coordinator was not initially accompanied by sufficient legal empowerment to exercise all these powers, and the proposal to empower it was rejected in April 2026. Therefore, the designation alone does not resolve its capacity to activate this mechanism.

2. Cumulative material requirements

According to article 51 of the DSA, these conditions must concur:

• All other available powers to end the infringement must have been exhausted.
• The non-compliance persists and is causing serious harm that cannot be avoided by other measures.
• The infringement constitutes a crime that threatens life or safety of persons.

Therefore, any administrative non-compliance or mere presence of illegal publications is not enough. The request must prove the facts, the persistence of harm, and why removing specific content or other less restrictive actions are insufficient.

3. Mandatory prior actions

Before going to court, the coordinator must require the provider's management body to examine the situation, adopt and present an action plan to end the infringement, ensure its execution, and report on the measures taken. Then it must assess whether the response is sufficient.

Additionally, it must invite interested parties to submit written observations during a period of at least two weeks. This prior hearing has an exception when the coordinator acts at the request of the European Commission under article 82. This is explained in the Demócrata analysis.

4. Judicial control and scope of the blocking

The request must identify the affected service, justify its necessity and proportionality, and delimit the technical and temporal scope. In principle, access to the service is restricted; only if technically unfeasible can access be limited to the online interface where the infringement occurs.

The provider, affected recipients, and third parties with legitimate interest must be able to participate in the judicial procedure. The judge must weigh the severity, duration, and recurrence of the non-compliance and avoid undue restrictions on access to lawful information. The ruling must be reasoned and subject to applicable review and appeal guarantees.

The initial restriction lasts four weeks; extensions are subject to judicially authorized conditions. In Spain, article 11 of the LSSI reinforces judicial reservation when the restriction affects freedom of expression and information.

5. European coordination

Finally, the competence of the Member State of establishment and the European Commission must be respected. For very large platforms, the Commission supervises certain specific obligations; article 82 allows it to request action from the coordinator of the Member State of establishment. A Spanish authority cannot ignore this distribution because the harm affects Spanish users.