A possible malfunction in the LZB system and human error, possible causes of the collision between the AVE and the Iryo in Toledo

Sources from the Executive indicate that the trains resumed circulation under human control after the automatic safety system failed. The first analyses point to the error possibly having occurred during that phase, although the causes of the accident have still not been officially clarified

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The first information about the circumstances of the Urda (Toledo) railway accident points to the trains involved, the AVE 2080 and the Iryo 6076, possibly having been traveling under the Lateral Signaling Blocking (BSL) system due to a fault in the LZB system. This circumstance has not yet been confirmed by Adif, although the possible incident in the signaling system and a subsequent human error appear as the main hypotheses about the origin of the accident, after Government sources indicated that the trains resumed circulation under human control following a failure of the automatic safety system.

According to the first information, the fault would initially have forced the convoys to stop, before the resumption of rail traffic was authorized through alternative circulation procedures. Always according to the Government, preliminary analyses point to an Adif operator possibly having made a mistake during this human control phase, a circumstance whose relation to the collision will have to be clarified by the official investigation.

A possible LZB fault before the accident

The LZB (Linienzugbeeinflussung) is a railway protection system that allows the circulation of trains to be continuously supervised and information to be transmitted directly to the equipment installed in the cabs, so that drivers receive indications about the authorized speed, braking distances and the conditions they must respect during the journey.

Its use on certain high-speed lines allows the convoys to circulate with constant supervision, especially important when the speeds reached make the distances needed to stop a train considerably greater than those usual in the conventional network.

The information known so far points to a fault in this system having forced the circulation conditions to be modified before the accident, although it has still not been specified when the failure was detected, how long it remained out of service or what measures those responsible for rail traffic adopted.

What the Lateral Signaling Blocking is and how it works

When the automatic protection system associated with the automatic block stops working properly, railway regulations provide for alternative procedures that allow traffic to continue under certain safety conditions, among them Lateral Signaling Block (BSL).

Unlike the usual regime of continuous supervision, this procedure uses the signals installed alongside the tracks to regulate the entry of trains into the different block sections, so that each new movement authorization depends on the safety conditions established for the corresponding section being met.

The Railway Traffic Regulation establishes that the sections must be free before authorizing certain movements and that the signals must prevent the entry of trains when incompatible movements may occur.

The use of this procedure is regulated and does not necessarily imply a loss of safety, although it requires applying the operational conditions provided for situations in which the usual automatic system is not functioning.

The Government points to a human error by Adif after the signaling failure

The first conclusions being handled by government sources point to the fact that an Adif operator could have made a mistake after a breakdown forced traffic to be managed under human control, a hypothesis that, if confirmed, would make it possible to explain why the safety mechanisms did not prevent the collision.

According to this version, the trains were initially stopped when the automatic signaling system failed and were later authorized to continue, although it is still not clear what specific instructions were transmitted or how the movement of both convoys was coordinated.

The possible failure would have occurred precisely during that phase of traffic resumption, when the decisions of the traffic controllers acquired special importance as the automatic supervision system was not available in its usual conditions.

High-speed service between Madrid and Andalusia interrupted

The accident between AVE 2080 and Iryo 6076 took place this Wednesday, October 28, in Urda (Toledo), on the Madrid-Andalusia high-speed line, where the collision caused several carriages to leave the track and part of the train to fall down an embankment.

The accident has left fatalities and numerous injured, while emergency services continue attending to those affected and the authorities work to clarify the circumstances of the collision.

Adif communicated the suspension of rail traffic between Madrid and Andalucía after reporting "an impact between two trains", with no official forecast at the moment to restore service.

The investigation will have to determine whether the possible failure of the LZB forced a change in the circulation regime and whether, during the subsequent management, the human error pointed to by the first government reports occurred.

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What is the current status of the official investigation into the Urda railway accident and what are the next planned steps?

The investigation into the Urda railway accident is, as of October 28, 2026, in an initial phase: Adif is analyzing the sequence of the collision and the operation of its systems, but there are no official conclusions yet about the cause. There is also no record of the publication of an independent technical report, a timeline for its conclusions, or determined responsibilities. It is important to distinguish the work already communicated from the foreseeable checks that do not yet constitute an announced program.

What is known and what remains pending

The accident occurred this morning, at 8:54 a.m., near kilometer point 118 of the Madrid-Andalusia line, between Mora and Orgaz and Urda. According to official information collected by Demócrata, Renfe's AVE 2080 rear-ended Iryo 6076, causing the derailment of the last two cars of the latter.

Adif has opened an internal technical analysis and is reviewing the systems and operational sequence, without having identified the cause yet, according to information gathered by EFE. High-speed traffic between Madrid and Andalusia was suspended; no forecast for restoration had been communicated in the information consulted.

A failure of the LZB or human error is not confirmed. The LZB is the system that transmits traffic information to the train and supervises its speed and braking. As explained by Demócrata, its operation, detection of track occupancy, and received authorizations must be verified. It also remains to be clarified whether the Iryo was completely stopped or moving at a lower speed.

Who is involved
  • Adif: analyzes the infrastructure, signaling, and traffic management. Its internal investigation should not be confused with the independent technical investigation.
  • Renfe and Iryo: are the operators involved and must provide technical and operational information about their trains. Teams from Adif and Renfe have been dispatched to the site, according to Demócrata.
  • Ministry of Transport: is gathering information; the minister went to Adif's H24 control center in Atocha at 9:40 a.m.
  • Junta de Castilla-La Mancha: has activated PLATECAM to coordinate emergencies and assistance, according to Europa Press. This function does not equate to determining railway causes.

In the sources consulted, there is no record of a formal opening communication, preliminary report, or CIAF schedule for Urda. Therefore, a concrete deployment of independent investigators or a delivery date cannot be presented as announced.

Expected next steps

The technical reconstruction should focus on the following checks. These are expected lines of work, not actions whose completion has been communicated:

  • Preserve and examine evidence: trains, track, safety installations, and communications.
  • Analyze traffic data: speeds, orders and authorizations, cab indications, alarms, and brake application.
  • Reconstruct the chronology: position of both trains, information available in traffic control, and personnel actions.
  • Determine contributing factors: possible technical anomalies, exceptional procedures, communications, maintenance, or supervision.
  • Formulate safety recommendations: if risks appear that justify urgent measures, differentiating them from the eventual judicial attribution of responsibilities.

In short, there is still no public deadline for the final report nor a definitive package of improvements. The next verifiable milestone will be a formal communication about the independent investigation or a technical advance that allows moving from hypotheses to conclusions supported by evidence.

What are the competencies and functions of Adif operators in railway traffic management according to current regulations?

The Adif operators involved in traffic have as their essential function to order, control, and coordinate railway traffic safely, both under normal conditions and in case of failures or incidents. It is advisable to distinguish the legal competencies of Adif, as infrastructure administrator, from the powers of each worker: these depend on their position, authorization, and applicable procedures, and do not constitute a general faculty to decide on any aspect of the service.

Regulatory framework and division of responsibilities

The Railway Sector Law 38/2015 assigns to the administrator the control, supervision, and inspection of infrastructure and traffic. It is also responsible for allocating capacity: the time slots that allow a train to travel between two points. These institutional competencies should not be confused with the immediate regulation carried out by operational personnel.

The Railway Traffic Regulation, approved by Royal Decree 664/2015, establishes the rules for trains and maneuvers, communications, blockings, signaling, and actions in case of abnormalities. Royal Decree 929/2020 completes this framework: administrators and railway companies are responsible for safe operation and risk control corresponding to their activity.

Main operational functions

  • Regulate traffic. Order and supervise movements to coordinate trains and adjust actual circulation to schedules and assigned capacity, applying operating rules.
  • Establish safe routes. Manage signals, switches, and interlockings —devices that prevent incompatible movements— from stations or control posts. Regulatory conditions must be verified before allowing each movement.
  • Apply blockings and authorizations. Use procedures that maintain separation between trains and transmit the orders provided by regulations. Authorizations do not exempt from required safety checks.
  • Coordinate works. Exchange information with maintenance and other responsible parties, applying protocols for works, track occupations, and tests, so they are compatible with authorized circulation.
  • Manage incidents. Adopt, within their powers, protective measures against failures, obstacles, accidents, or adverse weather conditions. These may include stops, speed restrictions, or operational changes according to established procedures.
  • Communicate and document. Coordinate with drivers, railway companies, and other traffic posts; transmit relevant information and record orders and incidents to ensure traceability.

Emergencies, limits, and authorization

The Railway Sector Law obliges the administrator to adopt necessary measures to restore normality in significant disruptions and to have a contingency plan. When infrastructure becomes temporarily unusable due to exceptional causes, it allows suspending services without prior notice for urgent repairs. This is a power of the administrator, executed through its competent organization, not an unlimited discretionary power of any operator.

Actions must respect transparency, impartiality, and non-discrimination among companies. Additionally, the law states that functions inherent to the management of the control, traffic, and safety system cannot be entrusted to third parties.

Individual exercise requires training, aptitude, and authorization according to railway personnel regulations, including Order FOM/2872/2010. Traffic personnel do not replace the driver nor assume all responsibilities of the railway company: their responsibility focuses on assigned functions, required checks, and orders they issue.

What requirements does railway regulation establish to authorize train circulation under the Lateral Signaling Block procedure?

To dispatch or allow a train to proceed under Lateral Signaling Block (BSL), the Railway Traffic Regulation requires five cumulative conditions: free block section, absence of incompatible maneuvers at adjacent stations, block section locked, established exit route, and regulatory movement order. The specific regulation is found in articles 4.2.2.1 to 4.2.2.3 of the Regulation approved by Royal Decree 664/2015.

When it can be applied

BSL is applied on high-speed lines equipped with Automatic Control Block (BCA) when the train's automatic protection system linked to it does not function normally, or when a train not equipped with it or whose onboard equipment is faulty must circulate.

Safety separation is guaranteed by the indications of signals protecting the block sections. In BSL, the block section is the segment between signals that may show stop and in which normally only one train can be present. Articles 1.5.1.13 and 1.5.1.14 add that this blocking requires suitable installations and must be indicated in the Driver's Route Book.

The five requirements to authorize circulation

Article 4.2.2.2 requires verifying the following before dispatching the train or allowing it to proceed:

  • Block section free of trains. According to article 1.5.1.13, to consider it free, the last train must have fully cleared it and a Blocked Track Delivery regime, used for certain works or tests, must not be established.
  • Absence of authorized maneuvers on the same track affecting the same route at adjacent stations. It is not enough that there is no other train inside the block section.
  • Block section locked by the devices available for this purpose. Verifying it is free does not replace this action.
  • Established exit route. The route for which the train will be dispatched must be set.
  • Regulatory movement order. Must be given according to article 1.5.1.8; previous checks do not replace this order.
If a signal does not function correctly

Article 4.2.2.3 allows the Traffic Manager to authorize passing exit signals or those located at neutralization posts, junctions, or block posts that present an abnormality. They may authorize it at normal speed once it is verified that the block section is free, indicating the track of circulation when appropriate. To verify this clearance, they may request confirmation of arrival, passage, or siding from the last train's driver by telephone.

This authorization must respect the guarantees of article 5.2.1.2: absence of incompatible movements, correctly set switches, route verification, and communication of orders or speed restrictions that the signal cannot transmit. Protection of level crossings on the route must also be activated when present. If certain checks cannot be made directly or by responsible personnel, they may be visually entrusted to the driver, identifying the affected elements and their required position.

Transition from BCA and BSL failure

According to article 4.2.3.3, if the automatic system causes a stop, the driver informs the Centralized Traffic Control Traffic Manager, who, if applicable, authorizes resumption under BSL with the corresponding conditions. If it is arranged that all trains circulate this way between two stations due to failure, each driver must be notified of the disconnection of the protection system linked to BCA.

If BSL also fails, the automatic blocking abnormality rules apply, which contemplate establishing telephone blocking with express authorization. The BSL abnormality regime was modified by Royal Decree 1011/2017, effective from January 9, 2019.

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