Europe has just discovered that it may need new friends. And it has done so in a rather European way: with a solemn speech, a category that does not exist in the Treaties, and the task of explaining what it consists of postponed for later.
On September 16, Ursula von der Leyen dedicated a good part of her State of the Union speech to describe a world in which European certainties have evaporated: energy, China, climate, security, technology, migration, deterioration of the international order. The list of threats is long and the menu, unappetizing. And, in the midst of so much calamity, a surprise appeared: proposing Canada as the first “associated member” of the European Union.
The proposal has some audacity and some improvisation, because that figure does not exist in the Treaties. It is like announcing the inauguration of a train station before deciding where to put the tracks. But perhaps it is not bad news: precisely because the category does not exist, Europe can invent it.
It is like announcing the inauguration of a train station before deciding where to put the tracks
Mark Carney, who spoke the next day before the European Parliament, seemed willing to give content to the idea. Without transatlantic hugs, he spoke of defense, energy, critical minerals, technology, and economic mobility and cooperation. Canada needs to diversify its dependencies, and Europe needs partners capable of reducing theirs.
There lies the interesting part. It is not about turning Canada into the twenty-eighth member state, a rather cumbersome way of solving a problem that no one has raised, but about having a country that cannot and does not need to be one participate closely in certain European policies. Canada could be the first experiment of a Europe of variable geometry towards the outside: not a new institution, but a new way of using those that already exist.
It is not about turning Canada into the twenty-eighth member state
And we would not be starting from scratch. CETA exists, although not all member states have ratified it yet, there is a EU-Canada Strategic Partnership, and, since this year, Canada participates in SAFE, the European defense instrument, as the first non-European country. The paradox is almost too good to waste: Europe wants to make Canada an associated member without having ratified the trade agreement it already has with it. Before inventing new institutions, it might be better to make better use of those that already exist.
And here appears the argument of those who think that this whole operation is a nice fantasy.
The hinges are rusty
Wolfgang Münchau, in Unherd, argues that all this is a nice fantasy. His criticism deserves to be taken seriously because it does not just say that the idea is bad: he asks what it is for when both have more immediate problems. His argument has ammunition. CETA has been waiting for ratification for years. Canada maintains significant trade barriers between its provinces. A good part of the defense cooperation is already being developed in NATO. And Europe has internal problems - productivity, investment, competitiveness, regulation, capital markets - that should occupy Brussels before embarking on a new geopolitical adventure.
Münchau compares the initiative to Robert Musil's “parallel campaigns”: a lot of activity, a lot of movement, a lot of scenery and the suspicion that an attempt is being made to solve a world that no longer exists. The image is effective: Europe, with the roof to be fixed, designing the terrace.
Up to this point, Münchau is right. Where I disagree is in thinking that a difficulty proves that an opportunity does not exist; sometimes it proves the opposite. If CETA has been incomplete for years, we must ask ourselves why and, above all, what prevents its resolution. If Canada maintains internal barriers, it will have to eliminate them. If Europe has competitiveness problems, it will have to solve them. And if NATO covers a good part of defense, it will have to be determined what the EU-Canada relationship can contribute that NATO cannot. Münchau's objections should not close the door, but rather help decide what needs to be done on the other side.
Canada cannot fix Europe, nor can Europe fix Canada. But perhaps they can help each other do what each knows it needs and what is politically more difficult to do alone. And this is where my optimism may seem excessive to some friends. But I do not think it is naive.
Crises have a curious property: while they last, everyone talks about them as a threat; however, some of the great political transformations occur when circumstances force doing what for years was considered too difficult, expensive, or complicated.
The European integration received its first major boost precisely from the conviction that continuing as before was more dangerous. In easy times, governments manage; in difficult times, those with leadership can change the rules. And Europe is not precisely living in an easy moment, Canada neither.
That is why I do not see this relationship as an alliance between two perfectly ordered economies that, having resolved all their problems, are looking for something to do on a Tuesday afternoon. I see it the other way around: two partners with different problems discovering that some are complementary. Canada has resources and technological capabilities, and needs to diversify markets and investments. Europe has market, industry, and financial capacity, and needs energy, critical minerals, and reliable partners. It is not a relationship between two perfects, but between two imperfects that can be useful to each other.
From the declaration to the architecture
For the idea to work, something must be done that Europe does not always do with enthusiasm: make it concrete.
The first stage would have to be primarily commercial: complete CETA and expand it to digital trade, services, public procurement, and investments. Canada does not need to enter the single market; it is enough to eliminate obstacles where both want.
The second, defense. SAFE is already an open door in which it can participate in certain European defense purchases and projects. The next step would be to progressively develop common programs for armament, air defense, ammunition, space, and cybersecurity. Not to replace NATO, but to reinforce the European pillar of Western security. There could even be a Schengen of defense: not for Canadian soldiers to move around Europe like a German tourist heading to the Costa Brava, but to simplify the movement of troops and material, logistical procedures, certifications, and interoperability.
The third leg would be technology. Canada provides minerals, energy, and capabilities in artificial intelligence and space; Europe, a gigantic market, industry, universities, and a formidable regulatory capacity, which should be used with moderation: there is no need for Brussels to regulate the last screw before manufacturing it. Canadian participation in Horizon Europe and Erasmus+ would have a value that goes far beyond the budgetary: a strategic alliance is not built only with prime ministers and officials with blue folders, but also with scientists, students, and companies. If they study, research, and create companies together, the alliance will stop being a press release and become a community.
From there would arise a fourth stage: selective mobility. There is no need to transfer European free movement; it would be enough to facilitate it for students, researchers, and qualified professionals. Moving from being able to visit the other to being able to build a part of one's own life on the other side of the Atlantic.
There is no need to transfer European free movement; it would be enough to facilitate it for students, researchers, and qualified professionals
And then, the most novel piece: institutional participation. Canada could be invited, without a vote, to certain meetings of the European Council and the Councils of Ministers when issues of the partnership are discussed: defense, energy, trade, technology, or the Arctic. It would not make sense for it to participate in a meeting about the common agricultural policy, but it should be at the table when Europe discusses North Atlantic defense or critical minerals or certain strategic supply chains.
It would not be about consulting Canada after deciding, but about discussing with Canada sitting at the table. And that requires a counterpart: if it participates in European policies, it cannot be a simple rule-taker that applies rules decided without it. It would need normative consultation mechanisms. Without a vote, yes, but not like that guest who smiles for the photo and goes home while the others decide.
Only then would it make sense to formalize a status of reinforced association. Article 217 of the Treaty already allows for association agreements with third countries that establish reciprocal rights and obligations and special procedures. A constitutional revolution is not needed: the relationship can be built and named afterward. And perhaps that is the change of mentality that Europe needs.
For decades, the question has been who can enter the Union. Now it should be another: with whom can we build more Europe without needing to make them European?
Canada could be the first case. After that, other partners could appear, each based on their interests and capabilities. Not a queue of candidates for accession, but a toolbox with different degrees of integration.”
This would also force a rethink of Europe itself. A Union of 27 that needs several nights of European Council meetings to agree does not become a geopolitical power overnight. There is no shortage of diagnoses: we have Draghi and Letta reports, compasses, pacts, strategies, and now even new categories of friends. What is lacking is the capacity to turn them into power. A strategic partnership cannot be a collection of photographs and summits with flags behind; it has to produce results.
An opportunity in difficult times
There are risks, of course. Some member states will think that there is already enough work with 27 to manage a partner number 28 that would not exactly be the 28th. Others will fear complicating the institutional architecture. And there will be those who believe that Europe should first solve its internal problems. They all have a point, but Europe has been using its difficulties as an excuse for too long: when an opportunity arises, a new reason to wait appears. This way, one can spend a whole European life waiting for a suitable moment that rarely comes. The question is not whether Europe and Canada have problems, they do and many, but whether they have the leadership to turn some of them into a reason to cooperate.
Cooperating does not mean replacing Washington with Ottawa. Europe does not need to exchange one dependency for another, but to have more options. If the transatlantic bond wants to survive, it will need allies capable of having their own interests and cooperating with each other. Trump's anger at this approach would be almost anecdotal if it weren't so revealing: that two democratic allies strengthen relations should not threaten anyone, and if someone perceives it that way, it may be an additional reason to do so. Not to confront Washington, but to talk to Washington from a less vulnerable position.
Von der Leyen has opened a door that the Treaties still do not know how to name. Carney has begun to explain what might be behind it. Münchau reminds us, rightly, that the hinges are rusty and that there are rooms in the house that need urgent renovation. But that does not mean closing the door, but rather getting to work.
Because crises also have a virtue that calm times tend to hide: they force decisions. And Europe has been diagnosing its weaknesses for too long to afford to turn another moment of danger into another collection of reports, summits, and nice statements. The difficulties of CETA do not demonstrate that the relationship is impossible, they demonstrate that there is work pending. Canada's internal barriers do not demonstrate that Ottawa cannot be a European partner, they demonstrate that Canada is also trying to build a more integrated market. And that NATO already exists does not make EU-Canada cooperation useless, it forces us to ask what Europe, as a Union, can do that a military alliance cannot do.
Canada does not need to enter Europe, nor does Europe need to turn Canada into European. What they need is something simpler and, at the same time, more difficult: to be able to count on each other when things get tough.
Because in politics, as in life, difficulties can be an excuse to do nothing. Or exactly the reason to do it.