Sánchez will not support "even from afar" the draft of the European budget

The president of the Government warns that the latest proposal from the Irish presidency for the Multiannual Financial Framework is not acceptable and claims Spain's future status as a net contributor to demand new sources of community funding.

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The president of the Government, Pedro Sánchez, has taken advantage of his arrival at the first meeting of the European Council of this political course to outright reject the latest proposal on the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), which introduces a cut of up to 8% compared to the initial plans. "We do not agree with the text that is currently on the table. It is clearly insufficient," the socialist leader has censured before the press in Brussels.

The warning comes at a particularly delicate moment for the budget negotiations among the Twenty-Seven. The latest Negobox presented by the Irish presidency incorporates adjustments that affect, among other items, cohesion and competitiveness policies, distancing the positions of the capitals regarding the volume and distribution of the upcoming community budget. "It is not acceptable, I will express this in the room," Sánchez has anticipated before participating in the discussions that the heads of state and government will hold over the next two days.

Moncloa defends that Spain "is on its way" to becoming one of the main economies in the eurozone, an evolution that will lead the country to acquire the status of net contributor to the community budget. That is to say, it will contribute more resources to the European coffers than it will receive through the various funding policies and programs.

"This gives us a dose of responsibility," Sánchez has assured, who intends to use this new position to claim greater budgetary ambition and avoid that the adjustments fall exclusively on the traditional policies of the Union. The initial intention of the president of the European Council, António Costa, was to reach a political agreement on the next European budget, of nearly two trillion euros, before the end of the year. The goal was to have enough margin to "develop the relevant legislative acts before 2027."

However, the differences between the capitals now threaten to push that timeline further away. "There is still a very substantial difference," the Spanish president has diagnosed, who assumes that the conversations that will intensify over the next few months will be "complex and difficult," although he maintains hope of finding a "common ground" among the different negotiating blocks.

Sánchez disconnects the negotiation from the electoral advance

The head of the Executive has also wanted to clear up any doubts about the consequences that the Spanish electoral call may have on the position that Madrid will defend in the coming weeks. In response to questions about the coincidence of budget negotiations with the electoral contest underway in Spain, Sánchez has guaranteed that he will keep his priorities intact before his community partners. "I will defend it before and after the elections," he has stated.

The message coincides with the position that Moncloa has been conveying on the eve of the summit. The Executive rejects that the electoral advance could alter the intensity of its participation in negotiations that it considers decisive for defining the financial capacity of the Union during the next budgetary cycle.

Beyond its opposition to the cuts proposed by Dublin, Spain is among the member states that are pushing for the agreement on the Multiannual Financial Framework to be accompanied by a new basket of own resources that allows for an increase in community revenues. The Spanish position involves exploring new fiscal figures at the European level that reduce the budget's dependence on national contributions. In other words, that a greater financial capacity of the Union does not necessarily imply demanding additional contributions from the capitals. "We need more resources to finance Europe," they defend from the Spanish delegation.

In this regard, Sánchez has pointed out the possibility of introducing new taxes on energy companies as one of the alternatives with which the Spanish Government would feel comfortable. The debate on own resources thus emerges as one of the main pending issues to unlock the conversations. For Madrid, the discussion on the overall volume of the next MFF cannot be separated from the need to identify new sources of income that allow sustaining community priorities without shifting the entire financial burden to the member states. A position that the Spanish president will convey to his counterparts during a summit in which, for the moment, budgetary differences continue to weigh more than the possibilities of reaching a preliminary agreement.

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AI-GENERATED CONTENT

At what stage of the parliamentary procedure is the Multiannual Financial Framework currently within the EU institutions?

As of 15 October 2026, the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) exists in a dual institutional reality: the 2021‑2027 MFF is fully in force and was already revised mid-term, while the new 2028‑2034 MFF is still in the interinstitutional negotiation phase between the Commission, Council, and Parliament, with no final regulation approved.

1. What does the “procedure phase” of the MFF in the EU mean?

The MFF is adopted through a special legislative procedure (Article 312 TFEU):

  • the European Commission submits the MFF regulation proposal;
  • the Council (Member States) must approve it by unanimity;
  • the European Parliament does not co-legislate but must give its consent by an absolute majority of its members.

In terms of “phases,” once the Commission’s proposal is submitted, a political negotiation opens between the Council and Parliament that only concludes when:

  • the Council reaches a comprehensive political agreement on the volume, priorities, and architecture of the seven-year budget;
  • the Parliament issues its final consent to the text reflecting that agreement;
  • the Council formally adopts the MFF regulation.
2. Status of the current 2021‑2027 MFF

The 2021‑2027 MFF is in the final execution phase:

  • it was adopted in 2020, with Parliament’s consent and Council’s approval;
  • it underwent a significant mid-term revision in February 2024 to strengthen allocations related to Ukraine, migration, external action, and strategic technologies, adjusting global ceilings and using flexibility instruments;
  • the Council conclusions on the 2027 annual budget already describe it as the last year of the current MFF, focused on executing agreed priorities and reallocations derived from that revision.

There is no new comprehensive reform package of the 2021‑2027 MFF in procedure comparable to that of 2024. What is envisaged in the short term are, at most, technical or limited adjustments (for example, to cover additional needs for Ukraine or unforeseen crises), which would be processed through specific proposals, but the main political focus has shifted to the post-2027 framework.

3. Procedure phase of the new 2028‑2034 MFF

Regarding the post-2027 MFF, the current sequence is as follows:

  • European Commission: presented its 2028‑2034 MFF proposal on 16 July 2025, close to two trillion euros and based on a new architecture (national and regional plans, Competitiveness Fund, “Global Europe,” etc.). Since then, it has maintained “constructive exchanges” with the Council and Parliament on the content of that proposal.
  • European Parliament: has already approved its political mandate on the next MFF, embodied in a report/resolution adopted in April 2026. It sets priorities (more spending, rejection of certain cuts, defense of the weight of cohesion and CAP, more own resources, etc.) and criticizes key parts of the architecture designed by the Commission.
  • However, that mandate is not yet the final consent required by the Treaties: the Parliament will have to vote again when there is a closed text resulting from negotiation with the Council.

On the governments’ side:

  • the Council and European Council remain in an internal negotiation phase, without unanimous agreement on the overall budget volume nor on the distribution between traditional policies (cohesion, CAP) and new priorities (defense, competitiveness, energy transition, migration);
  • partial mandates have been reached in some sectoral regulations linked to the future framework (for example, on “Global Europe” or Horizon Europe), allowing trilogues on those programs, but everything remains conditional on the agreement on the MFF as a whole;
  • capitals are working with the political objective of closing the agreement before the end of 2026, so that in 2027 the development legislation can be completed and the new framework enters into force on 1 January 2028, although in practice no one rules out negotiations extending through 2027.
4. Summary of the current phase

In parliamentary procedure language, today the 2028‑2034 MFF is in an advanced interinstitutional negotiation phase:

  • the Commission’s legislative proposal is on the table;
  • Parliament has set its political negotiation position but has not yet issued consent on a definitive text;
  • the Council has not yet reached the unanimity necessary on the essential parameters of the framework;
  • trilogues revolve around partial mandates and remain open on the main chapters.

Until that global agreement is closed and Parliament gives its consent, the new MFF does not move to the final adoption phase. Therefore, there is still no approved post-2027 MFF regulation; the current framework remains the 2021‑2027 one, revised in 2024 and in its last execution stretch.

Could you detail exactly what role each institution (Commission, Council, and Parliament) plays in the negotiation and adoption of the MFF? What positions have Spain and the so-called “friends of cohesion” defended in the negotiation of the 2028‑2034 MFF? How do the 2024 revision and the future 2028‑2034 MFF affect the main allocations of interest to Spain, such as cohesion and CAP?

What are the main powers and functions of the President of the European Council according to the Treaty of Lisbon?

The Treaty of Lisbon, particularly the Treaty on European Union (TEU), clearly establishes for the first time the figure of the President of the European Council as a stable position, distinct from the rotating presidencies of the Member States. Their powers focus on political leadership, high-level external representation, and consensus-building among heads of State or Government.

The key article is Article 15 of the TEU, which defines both the nature of the European Council and the role of its president. From this provision and the rest of the Lisbon Treaty framework, their main powers and functions can be summarized as follows.

1. Direction and preparation of the European Council’s work

The President of the European Council:

  • Presides over and directs the meetings of the European Council, i.e., the summits attended by the heads of State or Government of the Member States, the Commission President, and occasionally the High Representative.
  • Drives the work of the European Council, ensuring its continuity and coherence, both between meetings and in relation to the Union’s general priorities. This involves an active role in setting the agenda and selecting strategic topics.
  • Prepares the meetings “and ensures their smooth running” in close cooperation with the Commission President and the General Affairs Council (the Council formation that legally and politically prepares the European Councils).
  • Ensures that the European Council conclusions reflect a possible and politically acceptable compromise for all States, acting as mediator and consensus facilitator.
2. Promotion of action and general political orientation

The Treaty of Lisbon grants the European Council the function of “providing the Union with the necessary impetus for its development and defining its general political directions and priorities”. The president embodies and articulates this role.

  • Contributes to defining the long-term political agenda of the Union (major strategies, multiannual frameworks, economic, climate, security priorities, etc.).
  • Helps coordinate the Union’s response to crises and challenges (financial, health, geopolitical), convening extraordinary meetings when necessary and promoting conclusions that guide subsequent legislative and executive action.
  • Ensures coherence among different policies discussed at the highest level, trying to avoid contradictions between sectoral decisions adopted by the Council and the broad lines agreed by the heads of State or Government.
3. External representation of the Union

One of the innovations of the Treaty of Lisbon is clarifying who represents the Union externally. According to the TEU:

  • The President of the European Council “ensures, at his level and in his capacity, the external representation of the Union on issues concerning the common foreign and security policy (CFSP)”, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative.
  • This translates into participation in summits with third countries (for example, with the United States, China, or strategic partners) and in international organizations when the political level is heads of State or Government.
  • Acts as a political spokesperson for the positions agreed by the European Council, explaining them to the international public and other global actors.
4. Consensus-building and institutional balance

Although the President of the European Council does not exercise direct executive functions nor has legislative initiative, the Treaty of Lisbon assigns a strong dimension of institutional and political leadership:

  • Acts as arbiter and mediator among Member States when there are conflicts of interest, trying to build compromises that advance European integration.
  • Helps maintain the balance among institutions (European Council, Council, Commission, European Parliament), respecting their respective powers but seeking overall coherence in the Union’s action.
  • Presents the European Parliament with a report after each European Council, accounting for decisions taken and promoting transparency and interinstitutional dialogue.
5. Status and limits of the office

The Treaty of Lisbon also sets essential elements of the president’s status:

  • Elected by the European Council by qualified majority for a term of two and a half years, renewable once.
  • Cannot hold a national mandate simultaneously, reinforcing their European character and avoiding conflicts of loyalty.
  • Exercises functions without replacing the prerogatives of the Commission (which retains legislative initiative and general representation of the Union) nor the High Representative in the CFSP, which clearly defines the boundaries of their role.

In sum, the Treaty of Lisbon makes the President of the European Council a key figure of strategic political leadership, cohesion among Member States, and high-level external representation, but without granting them executive power or direct legislative competences.

What legal requirements must be met to introduce new own resources into the European Union budget?

The introduction of new own resources into the European Union budget is strictly regulated because it directly affects the EU’s financial autonomy and the burden borne by Member States. The legal requirements are concentrated at three levels: primary law (Treaties), the Own Resources Decision (ORD), and derived legislation that develops technical aspects.

1. Treaty framework

The starting point is the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), especially Article 311. This provision establishes that:

  • The Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry out its policies.
  • The budget must be financed entirely with own resources, without prejudice to other revenues.
  • The own resources system is established by a Council decision, which requires unanimity and subsequent approval by Member States according to their constitutional requirements.
  • The European Parliament must be consulted before the Council adopts that decision.

From this framework arise several substantial legal requirements: unanimity in the Council, Parliament’s participation, national ratification, and respect for the EU’s objectives and competences set out in the Treaties.

2. Own Resources Decision (ORD)

The key legal instrument to introduce a new own resource is the ORD, a special-ranking derived law act. To create a new resource (for example, linked to an environmental tax or a digital levy), these requirements must essentially be met:

  • Proposal from the European Commission: the Commission designs the new resource (tax base, calculation method, implementation schedule, relation to other revenues) and submits a legislative proposal to amend or replace the existing ORD.
  • Consultation of the European Parliament: the Parliament issues an opinion. It has no formal veto power over the ORD, but its political position is very relevant and usually conditions the final content.
  • Unanimity in the Council: all Member States, meeting in the Council, must approve the text. Any State can block the introduction of the new resource.
  • National ratification: once adopted by the Council, the ORD does not enter into force until each Member State ratifies it according to its internal constitutional law (national parliament, possible constitutional reviews, etc.).

Only when this cycle is completed and the ORD enters into force can the new own resource legally integrate the Union’s financing system.

3. Material requirements of the new resource

Besides the procedure, the new resource must comply with a series of material criteria, although they are not always exhaustively formulated in the Treaties:

  • Compatibility with the Treaties: it cannot encroach on competences reserved to the States nor violate fundamental freedoms (free movement of goods, services, capital, or persons) unless there is a clear legal basis.
  • Relative fiscal neutrality: in practice, the resource should not severely distort competition in the internal market.
  • Fairness among Member States: the burden sharing must be perceived as reasonably fair; therefore, corrections, caps, or compensation mechanisms are negotiated when a resource disproportionately impacts a country.
  • Predictability and sufficiency: the resource must generate relatively stable and predictable revenues, adequate to cover multiannual budgetary needs.

4. Implementing legislation and annual budget

Once the new resource is introduced in the ORD, additional legislation is usually required:

  • Implementing regulation: details how Member States calculate the bases, how contributions are made, what controls the Commission exercises, and how errors are corrected.
  • Integration into the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF): the volume and timing profile of the resource influence spending ceilings and must be consistent with the MFF in force.
  • Annual budget: each year, when adopting the EU budget, the ORD rules are applied to determine how much each Member State contributes based on the new resource.

In sum, to introduce a new own resource, a simple political decision is not enough: a formal Council decision by unanimity is essential, with participation of the European Parliament and national ratification, within the framework of Article 311 TFEU. Additionally, the resource must be Treaty-compatible, fair among States, technically applicable, and coherent with the Union’s overall budgetary system.

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What percentage of cuts does the latest Multiannual Financial Framework proposal introduce compared to the initial plans?

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According to Sánchez, what status will Spain soon reach in relation to the community budget?

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What is one of Spain's proposals to increase EU revenues without relying solely on national contributions?

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