Sánchez accumulates 6,600 euros in electoral fines and faces a new file from the JEC

Currently, the sanctioning procedure of the Central Electoral Board (JEC) against Pedro Sánchez is in its initial instruction phase, following the JEC's decision to initiate proceedings but without a firm sanction yet. The immediate deadlines revolve around the hearing procedure for the Prime Minister himself and the possible decision of the JEC before the general elections on November 29.

Current status of the file

According to information published on October 15, 2026, the Central Electoral Board agreed to initiate sanctioning proceedings against Pedro Sánchez for possible violation of the duty of institutional neutrality during the electoral period, following the press conference held at the Palacio de la Moncloa on October 6, the day he announced the call for general elections for November 29. In that appearance, the JEC considers that he did not limit himself to informing about government decisions but included messages with electoral content, including the request to achieve a “more resounding majority” and critical assessments of the opposition and the management of other parties, using an institutional framework and official channels to disseminate them (El Español, Demócrata).

The JEC acts following complaints filed, among others, by the Popular Party and the Se Acabó la Fiesta candidacy, accusing the president of having turned an institutional statement into a campaign act. The JEC's agreement also includes the order to remove from the Government's institutional websites and channels (official pages and communication profiles of La Moncloa) the audiovisual content of the appearance in the part containing messages considered electoralist (20minutos, Vozpópuli).

It is important to emphasize that, as of today (October 15, 2026), what exists is the initiation of the file and the JEC's requirements, not a sanction already imposed and firm. Some media have presented the decision as if the fine had already been issued, but the coinciding reports from several newspapers and the Demócrata newspaper insist that the procedure is open and pending allegations and final resolution (El Confidencial, Demócrata).

Deadlines and possible consequences

The JEC's agreement now opens the hearing procedure. According to the information disseminated by these media:

• Pedro Sánchez has 10 business days from the formal notification of the initiation agreement to submit allegations and provide the arguments he deems appropriate in his defense (El Español).
• In parallel, he is offered the possibility of a voluntary payment: the press mentions a reference amount of 2,400 euros, which could be reduced to 1,800 euros if he also acknowledges his responsibility within the same ten-day period. This route implies an early termination of the procedure under the terms provided in the JEC's doctrine for similar infractions.
• If voluntary payment with acknowledgment is not chosen, the Central Electoral Board must evaluate the allegations and issue a sanctioning or acquittal resolution. The news recalls that, in similar cases, the JEC handles a fine range between 300 and 3,000 euros, depending on the severity of the violation of the duty of neutrality (Vozpópuli).

The JEC's internal deliberation deadlines are not specified in concrete days in the available information. However, due to the proximity of the November 29 elections and the usual practice of the body in previous files related to electoral campaigns, it is expected that the resolution will be issued before the voting day, although this is not stated as a formal commitment in the known agreements.

Appeals and closure of the procedure

Once the JEC adopts its final resolution (whether imposing a fine or dismissing the file), the agreement will be final in administrative terms, but subject to contentious-administrative appeal. The recent doctrine of the Central Electoral Board itself establishes that:

• Appeals against the JEC's sanctioning agreements may be filed before the Third Chamber (Contentious-Administrative) of the Supreme Court.
• The deadline to file such appeal is two months from the notification of the resolution, according to the criterion that the JEC usually applies in its agreements and that its own publications reproduce (JEC – 2024 agreements, JEC – 2025 agreements).

In summary, as of today, the procedure against Pedro Sánchez is open, in the allegations phase, and without a firm sanction. The key short-term milestones are the counting of the ten business days for the Prime Minister to respond to the file or, if applicable, opt for voluntary payment, and the subsequent decision of the Central Electoral Board, which may be appealed before the Supreme Court.

During electoral periods, the Prime Minister maintains political leadership and heads the Executive, but his capacity to use institutional communication is strongly limited by electoral regulations and institutional advertising rules. The central objective of these norms is to guarantee the neutrality of public powers and equality among political forces.

1. Basic regulatory framework

• Organic Law 5/1985, of the General Electoral Regime (LOREG), especially article 50 and related provisions, which regulate institutional campaigns and prohibitions on public powers during the “electoral period”. (BOE LOREG)
• Law 29/2005, on Institutional Advertising and Communication, which sets the principles and objectives of institutional campaigns of the General State Administration and its public sector. (BOE Law 29/2005)
• Instruction 2/2011 of the Central Electoral Board, which interprets article 50 LOREG, particularly regarding institutional campaigns and inaugurations during the electoral period. (BOE Instruction 2/2011 JEC)

These norms do not create “special powers” for the Prime Minister but frame and limit the use he, as the highest authority of the Government, can make of institutional communication resources while the electoral process lasts.

2. What the Prime Minister can do in institutional communication

• Strictly electoral informative communication: article 50.1 LOREG allows, during the electoral period, institutional campaigns to inform about:
  • Voting date.
  • Voting procedure.
  • Requirements and procedure for postal voting.
  These campaigns must be carried out in free spaces of publicly owned media and “without influencing, in any case, the orientation of voters' votes”. The Prime Minister, as head of the Executive, can promote and endorse this type of communication, but its content must be strictly neutral. (LOREG, art. 50)
• Ordinary institutional communication necessary for public services: Instruction 2/2011 of the JEC admits informative campaigns “essential for safeguarding the public interest or for the proper functioning of public services”, always without electoral connotations or references to achievements. The Prime Minister can appear to manage crises, emergencies, or relevant government decisions, but the message must be technical or informative, not self-praising or aimed at vote capture. (Instruction 2/2011)
• General direction of government communication: Law 29/2005 assumes that the Government, by virtue of article 97 CE, issues institutional campaigns to inform about policies and public services, and requires that these campaigns be at the “strict service of the needs and interests of citizens”, be truthful, neutral, and not intended to “praise the Government's work”. During the electoral period, these principles combine with the specific prohibitions of the LOREG, further narrowing the Prime Minister's margin of action. (Law 29/2005)

3. Specific limits and prohibitions during the electoral period

From the publication of the call until the voting day (“electoral period” according to the JEC), the Prime Minister, acting as a public power, is subject to clear prohibitions:

• Prohibition of institutional campaigns with achievements: the LOREG prohibits “any act organized or financed, directly or indirectly, by public powers that contains references to achievements or results obtained, or that uses images or expressions coincident or similar to those used in their own campaigns” by competing parties. This forbids the Prime Minister from using press conferences, spots, or institutional materials to highlight Government results during the electoral period. (LOREG, art. 50.2)
• Prohibition of inaugurations: the same provision, developed by Instruction 2/2011, prohibits “any act of inauguration of public works or services or projects thereof” during the electoral period, even if they may enter into operation. The Prime Minister cannot cut ribbons or lead acts that may be perceived as showcasing government achievements, except for periodic commercial, cultural, or similar events in which there are no references to achievements nor is the vote intention induced. (Instruction 2/2011)
• Separation between institutional communication and propaganda: Law 29/2005 requires a clear separation between institutional campaigns and “evaluation, judgment, and political information”, which must be channeled through other means. In campaigns, this implies that the Prime Minister can hold acts and rallies as a candidate, but those acts must be financed and organized by his party, not by the Government or the Administration.

4. Control and responsibility

The Central Electoral Board and the competent electoral boards control that the Government's actions and, in particular, those of the Prime Minister, respect these limits. They act at the request of a party (complaints, appeals, or consultations) and can order the cessation of campaigns, rectification of messages, and, if applicable, propose sanctions or declare the violation of institutional neutrality.

In summary, during the electoral period the Prime Minister retains his capacity to inform and manage, but cannot use institutional communication to showcase achievements, inaugurate works, or, in general, influence the vote intention through public communication resources.

The Organic Law of the General Electoral Regime (LOREG) establishes a specific sanctioning regime for violations of institutional neutrality during electoral processes. The Central Electoral Board (JEC) applies this regime by combining the material provisions on neutrality (especially articles 50, 52, 53, and 66) with the general clause of infractions and sanctions in article 153 LOREG (BOE-A-1985-11672).

1. Who can be sanctioned?

• Authorities and officials: Article 153.1 provides, for “authorities or officials”, higher fines than for individuals, which includes high-ranking political officials and public administration executives.
• High-ranking officials in a broad sense: Presidents, ministers, regional councilors, mayors, general directors, heads of management bodies, and, in general, those who hold public powers and use institutional means during the electoral period.
• Individuals: Any person who infringes mandatory LOREG norms without reaching the level of a crime can also be sanctioned, but with the lowest fine range.
• Other qualified subjects: For some behaviors (e.g., propaganda by judges, prosecutors, Armed Forces, or members of Electoral Boards), the LOREG aggravates the criminal reproach (arts. 52 and 144.2), and if it does not reach the crime threshold, it can be redirected to the scope of article 153.

2. Typical behaviors that violate institutional neutrality

The key provisions are as follows:

• Article 50:
  • Only allows institutional campaigns of pure information (voting date, procedure, postal voting) “without influencing, in any case, the orientation of the vote”.
  • Prohibits, from the call until voting, acts financed directly or indirectly by public powers that contain references to achievements or results or use images or expressions coincident with those of party campaigns.
  • Prohibits inaugurations of public works or services in that period with political projection purposes.
• Article 53:
  • Prohibits disseminating electoral propaganda once the campaign has ended (reflection day and voting day).
  • Prohibits electoral advertising or propaganda from the call and before the formal start of the campaign through posters, commercial supports, or media insertions, even if “ordinary activities” of parties are invoked.
• Other neutrality provisions:
  • Article 52: forbids propaganda and campaign activities to judges, prosecutors, Armed Forces, security forces, and active members of Electoral Boards.
  • Article 66: requires informative neutrality and pluralism in public media during the electoral period.

The JEC considers sanctionable any use of acts, means, or institutional resources to favor or harm electoral options, when it does not reach a crime but breaches these duties.

3. Range of sanctions and graduation criteria

• Administrative fines (art. 153.1 LOREG):
  • For authorities or officials: from 300 to 3,000 euros.
  • For individuals: from 100 to 1,000 euros.
• Infractions regarding electoral surveys (art. 153.2): fine from 3,000 to 30,000 euros.
• Electoral expenses exceeding limits: referred to Organic Law 8/2007 on party financing (art. 153.3), with its own sanctioning regime.

Although the LOREG does not expressly list graduation criteria, the JEC's doctrine applies general principles: gravity of the conduct, relevance of the position, scope of dissemination, repetition or recidivism, and degree of cooperation with the cessation requirement.

4. Sanctioning procedure before the JEC

Article 153 limits itself to attributing the sanctioning competence to the competent Electoral Board. Procedural details are completed with the JEC's own practice and general principles of administrative sanctioning law.

• Initiation:
  • Usually based on claims or complaints from parties, candidacies, individuals, or other Electoral Boards.
  • It can also act ex officio when it perceives an infraction in actions it already knows (e.g., when resolving a resource on institutional advertising).
• Instruction:
  • Request for information or report from the involved Administration or body.
  • Communication to the alleged infringer of the facts and violated provisions, with a hearing procedure for allegations and, if applicable, proposal of evidence.
  • Possibility to issue orders to cease or immediate removal of campaigns, websites, messages, or illicit acts as urgent corrective measures.
• Resolution:
  • Motivated agreement that qualifies the conduct as a LOREG infraction (art. 50, 52, 53, 66, etc.) and applies article 153 to set the fine.
  • Must respect the principles of legality and typicity (only for a provided infraction), proportionality, and non bis in idem regarding possible electoral crimes (if there are indications of crime, it is referred to the Public Prosecutor and cannot be sanctioned twice for the same facts).
• Appeals:
  • Against agreements of Provincial or Zone Boards, appeal may be filed before the JEC, which resolves in electoral administrative proceedings.
  • JEC's sanctioning agreements are appealable before the contentious-administrative jurisdiction, generally before the Supreme Court, with the deadlines and rules of the Law regulating such jurisdiction.

In summary, the LOREG allows the JEC to sanction high-ranking officials who use their institutional position and public resources to influence the vote during the electoral period, through an abbreviated procedure but subject to the essential guarantees of administrative sanctioning law.