Haaretz reveals that Netanyahu received a warning about the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, and did not inform the security chiefs.

Based on the available information, there is no record, as of today, of a fully established official parliamentary commission in the Israeli Parliament to comprehensively investigate the October 7, 2023 attack. The news rather points to a scenario of political deadlock in the Knesset and investigative initiatives driven by the Government itself (ministerial commission) and judicial and multilateral bodies, but not to an operational state parliamentary commission.

1. Situation in the Israeli Parliament (Knesset)

According to the newspaper Demócrata, the State Control Committee of the Israeli Parliament has again rejected the opening of a parliamentary investigation into the October 7 attacks:

• The article "The Israeli Parliament once again dismisses the proposal to investigate the October attacks" details that this committee has decided not to proceed with opening an investigation into security failures and management prior to the attack.
• This refusal is part of a series of initiatives promoted by the opposition that sought the creation of an official commission; the parliamentary majority has repeatedly chosen to discard the investigation in parliamentary venue.

In strictly parliamentary terms, this places the issue in a phase prior to the opening of an investigative commission: the proposals have been debated in the competent committee but have not passed the approval threshold. There is no record of:

• Formal creation of a state investigative commission by the Knesset.
• Regulations, schedule, list of witnesses, or work plan approved by Parliament.

2. Ministerial investigative commission promoted by the Government

Although Parliament has not launched a commission as such, progress has been made in a government-origin investigative mechanism. Demócrata reports, in the article "Ben Gvir and Smotrich will collaborate in the formulation of the October 7 investigative commission", the creation of a:

• Ministerial commission chaired by Yariv Levin, Minister of Justice, tasked with defining the functions, competencies, deadlines, and structure of a future investigative commission on October 7.
• This body includes several ministers, among them Bezalel Smotrich (Finance) and Itamar Ben Gvir (National Security), as well as other cabinet members.
• This commission has the mandate to issue recommendations within 45 days, so that the Executive can then formally establish the investigative commission.

In other words, the phase this mechanism is in is an internal preparatory phase within the Government: a group of ministers is tasked with designing the scope and format of the future investigation, but it has not yet been configured as a fully operational investigative commission nor, in any case, as a parliamentary commission.

3. Criticism and judicial oversight in Israel

Meanwhile, there is intense debate about the independence and legitimacy of the proposed investigative mechanisms:

• The article "The Supreme Court of Israel demands the Government clarify the creation of the October 7 commission" reports that the Israeli Supreme Court has asked the Executive to clarify the conditions of the commission's creation, amid doubts about its independence.
• Both the opposition and victims' associations question whether a commission designed and controlled by the same Government that must be investigated can be considered a credible official investigation.
• There have also been citizen mobilizations demanding a genuine independent state commission, as reported in the chronicle "Hundreds of people demand a state commission in Tel Aviv on the thousandth day since October 7".

This reflects that the institutional architecture of the investigation is still in political and legal dispute, without having crystallized into an investigative commission with a status equivalent to a fully recognized parliamentary commission.

4. International and judicial investigations (non-parliamentary)

Apart from the Israeli Parliament, investigative avenues from courts and international bodies related to Israel's response after October 7 have been opened or promoted:

• The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is examining South Africa's claim of alleged genocide in Gaza, directly linked to the offensive initiated after the October 7 attacks (article on South Africa at the ICJ).
• The International Criminal Court (ICC) maintains investigations into possible international crimes related to the Gaza offensive, also arising from October 7, as shown by several reports on sanctions and political pressures on the ICC.

However, these are international judicial investigations, not parliamentary investigations. Therefore, strictly in terms of the “parliamentary phase,” the answer is that the Israeli Parliament has not yet launched its own investigative commission on the attack, and initiatives remain in a phase of recurrently rejected proposals, while the Government develops, in parallel, a commission designing the future investigation subject to criticism and review by the Supreme Court.

In Israel, the prime minister is the central figure of the executive power and the most influential political actor in the system. Their functions and powers are mainly determined by the Basic Laws (especially the Basic Law: The Government), which act as a sort of material constitution of the country. Unlike a presidential system, the prime minister emerges from the parliamentary majority in the Knesset and governs as long as they retain its confidence.

Appointment and institutional position

The prime minister is, as a general rule, a member of the Knesset whom the President of the State tasks with forming a government after consulting the parties. Their authority rests on:

• Being the head of Government: leads the cabinet and coordinates the ministers' actions.
• Political responsibility before the Knesset: the Government as a whole requires an initial vote of confidence and can be toppled by a constructive vote of no confidence (which proposes another prime minister).
• Dual legal anchoring: subject to the Basic Law and judicial review, including the Supreme Court acting as High Court of Justice.

Government leadership and ministerial coordination

The prime minister's main function is to direct the general policy of the Government. This includes:

• Setting the strategic lines of government action (security, economy, social policy, settlements, foreign relations, etc.).
• Calling and presiding over cabinet meetings, setting the agenda and directing deliberations.
• Resolving conflicts between ministries, acting as a coordination and arbitration body when there are disagreements over competencies or priorities.
• Supervising the execution of government decisions, being able to require ministers to implement cabinet or ministerial committee agreements.

Although each minister has their own sectoral competencies, the prime minister exercises transversal leadership and can influence the orientation of all portfolios, especially in sensitive areas such as defense and foreign relations.

Appointment and dismissal of ministers

A key power relates to the composition of the Government:

• Proposes to the President of the State the appointment of ministers, who are usually members of the Knesset but not necessarily.
• Can request the dismissal of a minister; formally decreed by the president but at the prime minister's initiative.
• Decides the distribution of portfolios (which ministries exist and who occupies them), within the framework of coalition agreements signed.
• Can temporarily assume an additional ministerial portfolio if it becomes vacant, until a new person is appointed.

In practice, this ability to configure and reshape the cabinet grants significant political power over coalition partners.

Relations with the Knesset and legislative function

Although Israel is a parliamentary system, the Government and its head have a central role in the legislative process:

• The prime minister sets the Government's legislative agenda, deciding which projects are presented to the Knesset and with what priority.
• Can enforce voting discipline on coalition parties in key initiatives, conditioning governmental stability.
• Intervenes, directly or through emissaries, in the negotiation of laws with other groups, especially on institutional reforms and budgets.
• Has a decisive role in the approval of the state budget: without a budget, the system foresees automatic consequences, including possible dissolution of the Knesset, which strengthens their leverage.

Foreign policy, security, and emergencies

The Israeli prime minister concentrates relevant powers in fields considered existential for the State:

• Leads foreign policy, in close coordination with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and represents the country before other heads of government and international organizations.
• Has decisive influence over the security establishment (Israel Defense Forces, intelligence services, etc.), presiding over security forums and making strategic decisions together with the Minister of Defense and the security cabinet.
• In situations of armed conflict or serious crisis, leads decisions on military operations and emergency management, within the framework of the laws of war and parliamentary and judicial oversight.

Term duration and responsibility

The prime minister remains in office as long as they retain the support of a majority in the Knesset and no legal cause of incompatibility or relevant criminal conviction arises. The Basic Law provides mechanisms for:

• Political responsibility: constructive vote of no confidence, dissolution of the Knesset, and early elections linked to Government stability.
• Legal responsibility: the prime minister is subject to criminal law and judicial review, can be investigated and tried, with specific rules on suspension or dismissal in case of a final conviction.

Overall, the figure of the Israeli prime minister combines a great concentration of political power with parliamentary and judicial control mechanisms derived from the parliamentary structure and the centrality of the Basic Laws in the country's constitutional system.

In the Israeli legal system, the so-called State Commissions of Inquiry are governed by the Commissions of Inquiry Law of 1969, which establishes a specific framework distinct from a simple political or ministerial commission. From the available press information, several key legal features can be extracted, although not all procedural details are explicitly stated in the consulted sources.

Basic legal framework

The Commissions of Inquiry Law of 1969 provides for the creation of state commissions to examine facts of special public relevance. According to the newspaper Demócrata summarizing a recent ruling by the Supreme Court of Israel, this law indicates that:

• Commissions must "examine independently, professionally, and impartially" the events that justify their creation.
• Their members must be selected by the President of the Supreme Court.

These two elements are the legal essence of the “state investigative commission”: a body with a legal mandate of independence and with a composition not freely decided by the Government, but passing through the highest judicial authority in the country.

Who intervenes in the creation of the commission

The political controversy in Israel following the October 7, 2023 attacks illustrates the difference between a genuine state commission and a merely governmental or ministerial commission:

• According to Demócrata, Benjamin Netanyahu's Government has opted for a ministerial commission, formed by several ministers and chaired by the Minister of Justice.
• The Supreme Court, when examining that decision, explicitly relies on the 1969 Law to remind that the commissions of inquiry provided therein must be independent and that members must be chosen by the President of the Supreme Court.

From this contrast, a central criterion emerges: when strictly speaking of a “state investigative commission” in the sense of the 1969 Law, the political decision to establish it may come from the Government or the Knesset, but the designation of the specific members belongs to the President of the Supreme Court, which aims to shield its autonomy from the Executive.

Material requirements

Although the news does not transcribe the full text of the Commissions of Inquiry Law of 1969, it does allow identification of several material requirements:

• The existence of "events that justify its creation", usually events of great national impact (for example, an attack like that of October 7).
• The purpose of carrying out a thorough examination of political, administrative, or security responsibilities, with a technical and non-partisan approach.
• The commission's commitment to act with independence, professionalism, and impartiality, as expressly stated in the law according to the cited Supreme Court ruling.

Public opinion pressure, victims, and parliamentary opposition usually trigger this mechanism, precisely because a forum perceived as external to the implicated Government is sought.

Threshold of signatures or votes

Regarding the number of signatures or majority of votes necessary to formally constitute a state investigative commission, the consulted journalistic sources do not detail a specific numerical threshold set by the law. They do reflect debates and votes in the Knesset on the opportunity to open an investigation, but without breaking down the exact technical requirement (simple majority, qualified majority, etc.) demanded by the 1969 law.

Therefore, with the accessible information, it can be stated that:

• A formal decision by the competent political authorities (Government and/or Parliament) is necessary to activate the law and request the creation of the commission.
• There is no precise figure of votes or signatures required by the law in the reviewed sources, so that data cannot be specified without directly consulting the Hebrew normative text or other specialized legal material.

Judicial control and guarantee of independence

An important feature of the Israeli system is the role of the Supreme Court's oversight. Demócrata reports that the Supreme Court has demanded the Executive justify why it does not create an independent commission and has directly invoked the Commissions of Inquiry Law of 1969. This suggests that:

• The decision not to resort to the state commission mechanism can be subject to challenge before the Supreme Court.
• The court can assess whether the created body respects the law's requirements (independence, professionalism, impartiality, and participation of the Supreme Court President in the appointment of its members).

In sum, the essential legal requirements derived from the current framework are: a mandate to investigate facts of great public relevance, a status of reinforced independence, the selection of members by the President of the Supreme Court, and the possibility of judicial supervision of the political decision to create—or not create—a true state investigative commission.