'Midterms' 2026: what they are, what Trump is playing for and why they can change the course of the United States

I cannot answer your question in detail because I specialize in Spanish politics and institutions (Cortes Generales, regional parliaments, BOE, regulations, and political actors in Spain) and I am not designed to provide advice or systematic explanation about United States electoral law.

Specifically, my usual scope of work includes issues such as:

• Requirements to be a candidate for the Congress of Deputies or the Senate in Spain (age, nationality, ineligibilities, etc.).
• Operation of the Spanish electoral system (LOREG), constituencies, vote counting, electoral thresholds.
• Processing of laws, royal decrees, and other initiatives in the Spanish chambers.
• Composition and functioning of governments, ministries, and other public bodies in Spain.
• Political and parliamentary context in Spain, as well as sectoral regulations and policies.

On the other hand, the issue you raise — the legal requirements to run for the United States House or Senate in hypothetical “midterm elections” — falls squarely within U.S. constitutional and electoral law (federal and, where applicable, state), which is outside my area of expertise.

If you need a precise and reliable answer on this topic, the most appropriate is to consult directly:

• The United States Constitution (articles on Congress, age, citizenship, and residency requirements for the House of Representatives and Senate).
• Federal laws on elections and campaign finance.
• The official rules and guides of the Federal Election Commission (FEC) and the electoral authorities of each State.
• Academic material or manuals on U.S. constitutional and electoral law.

If you want, I can help you to:

• Explain in detail the requirements to be a candidate in Spain for the Congress or the Senate.
• Compare the Spanish model with other systems in conceptual terms (closed vs. open lists, majoritarian vs. proportional systems, etc.), as long as we remain on a general and not normative level about specific countries outside Spain.
• Analyze political, institutional, or comparative implications taking the Spanish system as a reference.

If it is useful to you, you can reformulate the question, for example:

• To focus it on Spain: “What requirements exist to be a candidate for the Congress or the Senate in Spain and how are they regulated?”
• Or: “What are the main differences, in general terms, between eligibility requirements in Spain and in other parliamentary systems?” (without requesting normative detail of a specific country outside Spain).

With one of those formulations, I could give you a developed explanation, supported by Spanish regulations and the real functioning of our institutions.

The fact that the President of the United States does not control either chamber of Congress (neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate) does not alter their formal constitutional functions, but it greatly conditions how they can exercise them and what political margin they have. The Constitution keeps their powers intact; what changes is the viability of their agenda and the way they use executive and veto powers.

1. Head of State and Head of the Executive Branch

The Constitution (Article II) establishes that the President is the head of the Executive Branch. This function does not depend on the composition of Congress:

• Leads the federal administration: appoints and dismisses cabinet secretaries (equivalent to ministers), senior officials, and heads of executive agencies.
• Ensures the execution of laws (“take care that the laws be faithfully executed”): oversees that agencies apply current legislation, even when it comes from hostile congressional majorities.
• Issues executive orders and memoranda: can modulate how laws are applied within the margins they allow. With an opposing Congress, they usually intensify the use of this tool to advance their agenda where the legislature does not cooperate.

As head of state, they represent the nation abroad, direct symbolic policy, and perform ceremonial functions (speeches, state visits, decorations), independently of congressional control.

2. Relationship with Congress: political initiative and veto

The President does not have formal legislative initiative as in many parliamentary systems, but the Constitution gives them key levers:

• Legislative agenda: can propose bills to Congress, negotiate texts, and use the “bully pulpit” (their public visibility) to politically pressure, although they depend on an adverse majority for their initiatives to be processed.
• Veto power: can veto laws passed by Congress. Overriding the veto requires a two-thirds majority in both chambers. In a legislature where the President is from one party and both chambers from another, the veto becomes a central tool to block legislation contrary to their program.
• Signing or not signing spending laws: in a context of annual budgets and debt limits, their signature is crucial. The threat to veto budget laws can be used as a negotiation instrument, although with the risk of government shutdowns.
• Message to Congress: the Constitution obliges them to periodically inform about the “state of the Union” and they can recommend measures; this speech is a key moment to confront or force the congressional majority.

3. Foreign and defense policy

The President is Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and directs foreign policy:

• Negotiates treaties, which then require Senate ratification (two-thirds). With a Senate controlled by the opposition, the formal treaty route is complicated and the use of executive agreements or unconventional political commitments gains weight.
• Leads military operations within legal limits (including the War Powers Resolution) and congressional budgetary control.
• Conducts diplomacy, recognizes governments, receives ambassadors, and sets strategic priorities, with broad executive margin even in a “divided government” situation.

4. Appointments and the judiciary

The President appoints federal judges and Supreme Court justices, as well as ambassadors and senior officials, “with the advice and consent of the Senate”:

• In a Senate controlled by the opposition, this function still exists but is very limited: the chamber can block or delay nominations, forcing the President to negotiate more moderate profiles or resort to temporary appointments when the law allows.
• Nevertheless, if confirmation is achieved, judicial appointments have a structural impact in the long term on the interpretation of the Constitution and laws, even beyond the legislature.

5. Regulatory power and executive discretion

Faced with a hostile Congress, the President tends to maximize:

• Executive orders and agency regulations, to redefine the application of previous laws (for example, on immigration, environment, or labor rights).
• Enforcement guidance: deciding prosecution or oversight priorities (which sectors are inspected more, which behaviors are prioritized in federal prosecution, etc.).
• Pardon and commutation power, a strictly presidential competence that does not go through Congress.

6. Political and leadership function

Although the Constitution mainly regulates formal powers, the President always retains strong political and communicative leadership:

• Sets the position of their party at the national level and influences campaigns for Congress and governorships.
• Can present proposals even knowing they will not succeed, to set the agenda and force the parliamentary majority to define itself before public opinion.
• In crisis contexts (economic, health, security), their capacity to coordinate the federal state is central, even with an adverse Congress.

In summary, their constitutional functions are not reduced by the fact of not controlling any chamber, but the emphasis shifts from legislative production toward the use of veto, executive action, foreign policy, and symbolic and public opinion leadership.

In the Spanish political system, there are no “midterm elections” (midterm elections) as such: the only elections that reconfigure the Congress of Deputies are general elections. The last held before 2026 were on July 23, 2023, from which the 15th Legislature emerged. Based on official data and analysis from Demócrata, the starting composition — which marks the power distribution throughout the legislature — was as follows:

• People's Party (PP): 137 seats
• Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE): 121 seats
• Vox: 33 seats
• Sumar: 31 seats
• Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC): 7 seats
• Junts per Catalunya (Junts): 7 seats
• Euskal Herria Bildu (EH Bildu): 6 seats
• Basque Nationalist Party (PNV): 5 seats
• Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG): 1 seat
• Canarian Coalition (CC): 1 seat
• Navarrese People's Union (UPN): 1 seat

The total sum is 350 deputies, the number set by the Constitution for the Congress. These figures are considered, strictly speaking, the “final composition” resulting from the July 23, 2023 elections: the definitive distribution of seats by proclaimed candidacies once the counts are closed and any appeals resolved.

This distribution is corroborated, among other sources, by Demócrata's analysis of polls and the July 23 results, which details that:

• The PP obtained 137 deputies.
• The PSOE achieved 121 deputies, its best vote result but behind the PP in seats.
• Vox remained at 33 deputies.
• Sumar secured 31 seats, also then including Podemos.
• The rest of the regional forces (ERC, Junts, EH Bildu, PNV, BNG, CC, and UPN) complete the chamber up to 350 seats.

From the perspective of political blocs, July 23 left a very fragmented Congress:

• The sum of PP and Vox reached 170 seats, six short of an absolute majority (176).
• The bloc that ended up supporting Pedro Sánchez's investiture was built from PSOE (121) and Sumar (31), supported by nationalist and independentist forces (ERC, Junts, EH Bildu, PNV, BNG) and by CC at the key moment of the investiture.

Why is it called “final composition” if there are changes during the legislature?

Throughout the 15th Legislature, numerous resignations from seats and replacements of deputies have occurred. Demócrata's reports quantify, for example, that:

• By August 2024, one in ten seats had already changed holders since the constitutive session.
• By January 2025, it was said that one in eight deputies who started the legislature had resigned their seat.

However, these movements do not alter the distribution of seats by party or candidacy that comes from the polls: each vacancy is filled by the next candidate on the corresponding electoral list in that constituency. That is:

• If a PP deputy resigns, the next on the PP list for that province enters.
• If a Sumar deputy leaves, they are replaced by another from the Sumar list.

Therefore, when asked about the “final composition” of Congress after the last elections held before 2026, the relevant reference is not personal changes, but the numerical distribution of seats by parties established by the July 23, 2023 elections and maintained until the dissolution of the Cortes.

Date and institutional context

The general elections of July 23, 2023 led to the constitution of Congress on August 17, 2023, the date on which the 15th Legislature was formally opened. That was the last full renewal of Congress before the early election call for November 29, 2026.

In summary, on the threshold of 2026, the composition that politically counts as the “final” result of the last prior general elections remains defined by that distribution of 137 seats to PP, 121 to PSOE, 33 to Vox, 31 to Sumar, and the rest to regional forces (ERC, Junts, EH Bildu, PNV, BNG, CC, and UPN), without internal replacements having modified the party arithmetic in the chamber.