Netflix is preparing the dismissal of 1,000 workers, 6% of its workforce, in its largest adjustment since 2022.

I cannot rigorously detail the specific legal and labor process that Netflix must follow in the United States and in each of the other countries where it operates, because this issue requires a comparative analysis of national legislations, collective agreements, and business practices that goes beyond my scope: I specialize in Spanish politics and institutions (laws, parliaments, government, parties, regulators, and public actors), not in international labor law or the corporate case law of specific companies outside that framework.

That said, I can offer you a general, indicative framework on how collective dismissals are usually structured in modern legal systems, and explain in more detail the Spanish case — which is within my scope — so you have a point of comparison. This does not replace labor legal advice in each country, but it can help you organize your ideas.

1. Common elements in many countries for a collective dismissal

In much of the advanced economies, collective dismissals (layoffs, redundancies, collective dismissals) share several features, although the details vary significantly:

• Quantitative threshold: the law usually defines when a dismissal becomes “collective” based on the number of people affected within a certain period (for example, X people in a company of size Y within Z days).
• Business justification: the company is usually required to prove economic, technical, organizational, or productive causes (drop in revenues, technological restructuring, closure of business lines, etc.).
• Information and consultation: a period of information and consultation with the workers’ representation (unions or committees) is usually required, where the company explains the reasons, scope, and mitigating measures (reassignments, voluntary departures, etc.).
• Notification to public authorities: in many countries, notification to a labor administrative authority (ministry, agency, state office) is required before executing the measure, sometimes with waiting periods.
• Objective selection criteria: regulations and collective bargaining usually require that the selection of affected persons follows objective and non-discriminatory criteria.
• Compensations and accompanying measures: minimum legal compensations are set, which can be improved in negotiation, and may include relocation plans, training, job search support, etc.

In the United States, for example, there is a federal regulation (the law known as the WARN Act) mainly focused on the obligation to give advance notice to workers and authorities when plant closures or mass layoffs occur, but the set of rights and compensations largely depends on state legislation and individual contracts or agreements.

2. The Spanish case as a reference: the collective dismissal (ERE)

In Spain, where I can clearly refer to the legal and institutional framework, collective dismissals are channeled through a procedure regulated in the Workers’ Statute and its regulatory development, commonly called expediente de regulación de empleo (ERE) when it involves terminations.

• Definition of collective dismissal: it is considered such when certain thresholds of affected persons are exceeded within a 90-day period, depending on the size of the company (for example, 30 workers in companies with more than 300 people).
• Opening of a consultation period: the company must formally communicate the intention to initiate a collective dismissal to the legal workers’ representation and the labor authority, providing an explanatory report, economic documentation, number and categories of affected persons, selection criteria, and planned schedule.
• Negotiation with workers’ representation: a consultation period opens, with formal meetings, where alternatives are negotiated (temporary reductions of working hours, suspensions, organizational changes) and, if no viable alternative exists, the dismissal conditions (compensations, relocations, prioritization of certain groups, etc.).
• Report from the Labor Inspectorate: the labor authority may request a report from the Labor Inspectorate on the documentation and correctness of the procedure, although under the current model it does not “authorize” or “deny” the ERE, but supervises legality.
• Company decision and execution: once the consultation period ends, if there is an agreement, it is applied under the agreed terms; if not, the company may make the decision, which can be challenged before the social jurisdiction. Workers can claim against their specific dismissal.

This Spanish scheme can serve as a contrast to what happens in other countries where Netflix operates: in each jurisdiction you should check which law defines when a dismissal is collective, what consultation procedures are mandatory, what role public authorities have, and what standards of compensation or protection are required.

In summary, I cannot provide you with a detailed country-by-country map of the legal and labor process for a Netflix collective dismissal, but I can help you — as I have done — understand the general logics of these types of processes and explain in detail how they are regulated in Spain. If you need to go deeper into a specific country, it is essential to consult local specialists in labor law or the legal sources of that country.

The question you raise refers to the corporate governance of private US companies (specifically, publicly traded companies in the audiovisual sector in the US) and the powers of an internal management figure, the co-chief executives. However, my specialization is restricted to the field of Spanish politics and public institutions (and, by extension, political actors, regulations, and public debate connected to that environment). This means I am not designed to offer a technical and reliable analysis of corporate governance structures in foreign business areas that are not clearly within the Spanish regulatory or institutional sphere.

In practice, this has several important implications regarding what I can and cannot do with your specific question:

• I cannot reliably detail the typical powers of co-chief executives in publicly traded audiovisual companies in the US (for example, in terms of formal division of powers vis-à-vis the board of directors, audit committees, reporting obligations to the SEC, or industry common practices) because that requires a specialized knowledge base in US corporate law and governance that is not part of my scope.
• I cannot provide you with a company-by-company comparative chart (Hollywood studios, majors, publicly traded streaming platforms, etc.), nor cite bylaws, shareholder agreements, or internal power pacts, which are the real sources where the details of those powers are defined.
• I do not have specific access to corporate governance databases unrelated to the Spanish institutional or regulatory field, so I could not properly verify or contrast detailed information about specific companies.

What I can do is explain, at a very general and abstract level, the types of issues usually involved when talking about co-executive management or co-CEO figures, without entering into the US case law or audiovisual sector particularities:

• In co-CEO structures there is usually a division of functions between two top executives who share the leadership of the company’s daily management, while the ultimate ownership of supervisory and strategic decision-making power rests with the body equivalent to the board of directors.
• This division can be functional (for example, one focused on operations/production and the other on finance/business development), geographical (different regions), or by lines of activity (e.g., film vs. television, content vs. technology), depending on the company’s complexity.
• There is usually a statutory or contractual definition of joint or several powers (who can sign what, when joint action of both is required, what powers the board can delegate to each, etc.), precisely to avoid overlaps and conflicts.
• In publicly traded companies, the general framework is conditioned by securities market regulations and transparency requirements to the relevant stock market regulator, but the fine design is set in each company’s internal governance documents.

Beyond this very basic conceptual description, going into “what are the powers and functions” of co-chief executives in publicly traded audiovisual companies in the US would exceed my area of expertise and could lead you to incorrect conclusions, because it would mix general inferences with details I cannot support in that field.

On the other hand, where I can add value is in issues such as:

• How the audiovisual sector is regulated and supervised in Spain and the European Union from a public perspective (audiovisual laws, regulatory authorities, audiovisual media services regulations, European production quotas, etc.).
• What Spanish and European rules say about corporate governance of publicly traded companies in the public-regulatory sphere (disclosure obligations, codes of good governance, shareholder participation, etc.).
• How Spanish political and institutional actors have positioned themselves on issues related to audiovisual platforms, major studios, and streaming services.

If you reformulate the question connecting it with regulation, political debate, or Spanish or European institutions (for example, comparing corporate governance models of publicly traded audiovisual companies in the EU versus the US from a regulatory perspective), I will be able to help you with much more detail and rigor.

For a company to acquire and exploit in Spain the broadcasting rights of a major sporting event like the Football World Cup, it is not enough to just “pay FIFA.” It must comply with a set of contractual and regulatory requirements that derive mainly from Law 13/2022, General Audiovisual Communication, Competition Law (CNMC and EU), and rules on events of general interest and informational access.

1. Validly contracting the rights

• Legitimate holder: rights are acquired from the organizer (e.g., FIFA) or its authorized agent. The contract must clearly specify what is being purchased: live broadcast, delayed, highlights, clips for social media, on-demand content, etc.
• Business delimitation: it is essential to define territory (usually Spain and sometimes Andorra), duration, languages, platforms (DTT, IPTV, OTT, streaming, mobile), sublicensing rights, and exclusivity.
• Production and signal: regulations cover who produces the signal, technical standards, service continuity, use of graphics and official content, and security mechanisms against unauthorized broadcasts.
• Compliance with other rules: the contract itself usually refers to compliance with audiovisual, competition, and intellectual property laws applicable in the country where it is exploited (in this case, Spain).

2. Authorization as an audiovisual provider in Spain

The entity exploiting the rights in Spain must be an audiovisual communication service provider according to the Law 13/2022, General Audiovisual Communication. This implies, depending on the type of service:

• License or prior notification: linear television, whether free-to-air or pay, requires an enabling title and registration; on-demand services and certain online platforms are subject at least to notification and registration.
• Registry inscription: the company must appear in the corresponding registry (state or regional) as a provider, with its ownership data and control structure.
• Content regime: it must comply with general obligations of pluralism, protection of minors, European work quotas, rules on commercial communications, etc., imposed by law on all providers.

3. Events of general interest and free-to-air broadcasting

The commercial exclusivity of the contract with FIFA is limited by the regime of events of general interest to society provided in Law 13/2022 and developed through a catalog approved by the Government by agreement of the Council of Ministers.

• Certain matches (especially those of the Spanish national team and final phases of the World Cup) may be included in that catalog, which obliges that they can be viewed free-to-air, totally or partially.
• If the rights holder is not a free-to-air operator, they are usually forced to sublicense those matches to a third party for free broadcast, under objective and non-discriminatory conditions.
• The company cannot configure contractual exclusivity in a way that prevents compliance with these legal obligations.

4. Competition control and CNMC supervision

The commercialization and acquisition of sports rights are subject to Spanish and EU Competition Law. In Spain, the National Commission on Markets and Competition (CNMC) ensures that sales and award models respect free competition.

• Tender or award procedures must be transparent, competitive, and non-discriminatory, avoiding unjustified favoritism among operators.
• The duration of exclusivity, packaging in lots, renewal clauses, and sublicensing restrictions are analyzed to prevent market closure or reinforcement of dominant positions.
• In professional football, Royal Decree-Law 5/2015 establishes specific obligations for joint sale of rights and requires marketing entities to request prior CNMC reports on sales conditions; although focused on club competitions, the logic (plurality of buyers and non-discrimination) extends to major events.

5. Advertising, informational access, and other obligations

• Advertising during the event: Law 13/2022 limits how ads are inserted in sporting events: interruptions can only occur when play is stopped and without preventing following the action. On-screen overlay advertising is also regulated.
• Right to brief news summaries: other media may have the right to broadcast short match summaries in news programs, under reasonable conditions and without the rights holder blocking this basic informational access.
• Anti-piracy measures: the company must protect its rights against illicit broadcasts, using technological measures and, if applicable, court blocking orders, common in major competitions.
• Data protection and consumer rights: if access is through subscription platforms, data protection rules, general conditions, price transparency, and user support apply.

In summary, acquiring World Cup rights involves both a good private contract with FIFA and fitting that agreement into the public framework: authorization as an audiovisual provider, respect for events of general interest, strict observance of competition rules, and compliance with advertising, informational access, and public protection obligations set by Spanish and European regulations.