The leader of the socialists in the Eurochamber accuses the PP of blocking a common resolution on Ceuta in Brussels.

The European Parliament resolution on the May 2021 Ceuta migration crisis is not "in process": it is an act already fully approved and closed since June 10, 2021. In the current 2026 Ceuta crisis, what is being discussed in Brussels is the possible adoption of a new resolution, which as of today is in a strictly political and preliminary phase (debates, requests, and contacts), with no evidence that a formally registered text scheduled for a vote in the Plenary exists yet.

1. The June 10, 2021 resolution: current status

According to the analysis in From the Green March to Ceuta 2026, the European Parliament approved on June 10, 2021 a resolution on the May 2021 crisis in Ceuta. The text:

• Condemned Morocco for using border controls and migration, particularly of unaccompanied minors, as a mechanism of political pressure against Spain.
• Was adopted with 397 votes in favor, 85 against, and 196 abstentions.

As with all European Parliament resolutions, once voted and published, its "processing" concludes. There are no additional phases (it is not binding legislation that goes to the Council or requires transposition); its effect is political: it sets the Parliament's position and serves as a reference for future decisions, debates, or initiatives.

In fact, various actors continue to cite that 2021 resolution as a precedent:

• The Demócrata report recalls that it is a formal position of an EU institution, not of a single party, emphasizing its weight in the current debate on migration instrumentalization.
• The Sumar initiative in the Spanish Congress, noted in Sumar proposes reviewing the World Cup with Portugal and Morocco, explicitly cites the June 10, 2021 resolution to argue that Morocco was already censured by the European Parliament.

In summary: the 2021 resolution is fully in force as a political statement, but its parliamentary process has been closed since its approval in 2021; there are no "new phases" within the European Parliament regarding that text.

2. The new Ceuta crisis (2026) and the idea of a new resolution

Following the massive entry of people into Ceuta since July 30, 2026, the European debate has reopened and a new parliamentary response is being considered:

• The European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) has held an extraordinary session on the Ceuta crisis, promoted by the European People's Party, according to The European Parliament will address this Thursday....
• The President of Ceuta, Juan Jesús Vivas, has traveled to Brussels and openly requested that the European Parliament approve “a specific resolution” that:
  • Reaffirms that Ceuta and Melilla are borders of Spain and Europe.
  • Conditions any “constructive collaboration” with Morocco on the effective respect of the borders.
  This is reflected in Vivas demands a resolution in the European Parliament....
• Other analyses, such as Ceuta: the mirror of the failure of European migration policies, point out that the LIBE meeting “could have concluded with a firm proposal to promote a resolution,” but emphasize that the current majorities in the European Parliament make a strong response similar to 2021 less likely.

That is, as of today there is a political demand for a new resolution and an open debate, but available information does not confirm that a draft with an official number or a voting date in the Plenary has been set. We are facing a preliminary phase: contacts, political pressure, and committee discussion.

3. Expected next steps in the European Parliament

If parliamentary groups finally reach sufficient agreement, the expected institutional steps would be:

• Formal presentation of a resolution proposal by one or more groups or a committee (likely LIBE).
• Negotiation of a compromise text among the main groups (EPP, S&D, Renew, Greens, etc.), which may include amendments.
• Inclusion of the resolution on the agenda of a Plenary in Strasbourg or Brussels, usually linked to a prior debate on the Ceuta situation or migration policy.
• Vote in the Plenary. If approved by simple majority, the resolution would be published and would have the same status as the 2021 one: a political statement of the European Parliament without further processing phases.

From there, the “next steps” would no longer be internal to Parliament but at other levels: reaction from the Commission and the Council, use of the resolution by national governments (such as Spain), and reference to that text in future parliamentary initiatives on migration, the southern border, or relations with Morocco.

Iratxe García Pérez, as president of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) group in the European Parliament, holds a set of formal and informal competencies that place her among the most influential figures in the Parliament. Her role combines internal political leadership of the group, institutional representation before other Parliament bodies, and strategic leadership in building European legislative majorities.

According to an interview published by the newspaper Demócrata, the social-democratic group led by García comprises around 135 MEPs from 25 countries and is the second-largest force in the European Parliament. In this context, the group president is described as the “captain” responsible for:

• Defining the group's political priorities: setting the internal political agenda of S&D, identifying major legislative files where the group wants to focus efforts (European budget, green agenda, social policy, etc.). Based on these priorities, the work of MEPs and coordinators in each committee is guided.
• Coordinating the parliamentary activity of MEPs: directing the preparation of the group's position on various dossiers, supervising the work of negotiating teams, and harmonizing national sensitivities within the European social-democratic family. This involves articulating a common line in a territorially and ideologically diverse group.
• Representing the group in the Conference of Presidents: Demócrata notes that one of her central functions is to represent S&D in the Conference of Presidents, the political governing body of the European Parliament where it is decided what is debated in plenary and the legislative calendar is organized. From this position, García has direct influence over which topics reach plenary, when, and with what priorities.

Another Demócrata piece, about the most influential Spanish MEPs, further specifies these internal powers. It indicates that the group president:

• “Leads its board and secretariat”: responsible for the group's internal governing body and its administrative and political structure. Through this board, decisions on strategy, distribution of responsibilities, and internal resources are made.
• “Coordinates the position before each plenary vote”: plays a decisive role in finalizing the group's stance in plenary, after listening to rapporteurs, coordinators, and national delegations. This coordination translates into voting instructions to MEPs.
• “Sets the political line on major files”: in the most impactful dossiers (e.g., Multiannual Financial Framework, climate policy, or response to international crises), the S&D presidency marks the general orientation the group will defend before the Commission and the Council.

At the broader institutional level, these functions fit within the general organization of the European Parliament described by Moncloa in its note “European Parliament: what it is and what its functions are” (Spanish Government information note). It recalls that:

• MEPs are not grouped by nationality but by political affinities in European parliamentary groups.
• Each group must meet a minimum number of deputies and national origins, and these groups are central actors in legislative and budgetary negotiation.

Within this framework, the presidency of a group like S&D has, de facto, several additional powers:

• Interlocution with other political families: García is the main negotiator of the social-democratic family in agreements with the European People's Party, liberals, and greens to build “pro-European” majorities that enable legislation to pass and, if applicable, support or condition the European Commission.
• Public projection of the group: Demócrata emphasizes that the president has the capacity to influence the “public projection” of her political family. She is the main voice of S&D in debates on major crises (migration, geopolitical, economic) and in defining the social-democratic alternative against other currents.
• Impact on the balance of majorities in the Chamber: by coordinating discipline and voting strategy of the second-largest force in the European Parliament, her position is key to tipping many votes and shaping the direction of the European agenda.

In summary, the competencies and powers of Iratxe García as president of the Socialists and Democrats group combine:

• Internal political leadership of S&D (priorities, ideological line, vote coordination).
• Governance of the group itself (board, secretariat, work organization).
• Institutional representation in the Conference of Presidents, with the capacity to influence the agenda and legislative calendar of the European Parliament.
• Negotiating leadership in building majorities and interlocution with other European political forces.

All this makes her position not only an organic role within the social-democratic group but also a post with direct impact on the functioning and political orientation of the European Parliament as a whole.

There is no official and closed count, easily accessible in a single public source, indicating how many “resolutions on border crises” the European Parliament has debated or approved in the current legislature (2024‑2029). Moreover, the term “border crisis” itself is not a legal or statistical category of the Parliament but a political or journalistic label. This means that an exact and verifiable figure cannot be given solely with the available open sources. However, it is possible to identify some of the resolutions and texts most directly related to crises at the EU's external borders in this legislature and explain what they cover.

1. Difficulty in establishing an exact number

• The European Parliament's public databases do not classify resolutions by “border crisis” but by broad subjects (migration, asylum, fundamental rights, foreign policy, security, etc.).
• Many initiatives affecting borders are processed as regulations or directives, not as political resolutions, and others as debates without resolution, initiative reports, questions, etc.
• Searches in European Parliament notes and dossiers show clear cases where resolutions linked to border tensions exist, but they do not allow reconstructing an “exhaustive inventory” without reviewing all acts of the legislature one by one.

Therefore, with the available information, one can only speak of a small number of resolutions explicitly linked to crisis or tension situations at borders, and offer representative examples, not a closed total figure.

2. Examples of key resolutions and texts in the current legislature

a) Migration and Asylum Pact and crisis situations

On April 10, 2024, Parliament adopted the new Migration and Asylum Pact, a package of ten legislative texts that deeply reforms European asylum, return, and external border management policy:

• Press release: MEPs approve the new Migration and Asylum Pact.
• One of the regulations is on “crisis and force majeure situations”, which creates a specific mechanism to respond to sudden arrivals or instrumentalization of migrants.

Although these are regulations (not resolutions), Parliament emphasizes that these instruments are designed to manage crises at the external borders, with explicit references to the instrumentalization of migrants by third countries.

b) Resolution on Belarusian hybrid attacks against Lithuania

In December 2025, the European Parliament adopted a resolution denouncing “Belarusian hybrid attacks” against Lithuania, combining military means, drones, and border pressure:

• Press release: Parliament denounces continuous Belarusian hybrid attacks against Lithuania (18/12/2025).
• The text refers to border closures, airspace violations, and detentions in retaliation against EU cargo operators.

This resolution is a clear example of a parliamentary act that qualifies a border situation as a hybrid crisis and calls for coordinated EU responses.

c) Resolution on military mobility and “military Schengen”

In the same week of December 2025, Parliament adopted another resolution on military mobility and the so-called “military Schengen”:

• Press release: MEPs back “military Schengen” to help withstand potential Russian aggression (17/12/2025).
• The resolution calls for removing obstacles to the rapid crossing of internal borders by troops and military equipment in peacetime and crisis.

Although focused on defense, it is explicitly framed in the preparation for crises at the EU's borders, mainly linked to the Russian threat.

3. Other parliamentary debates and references

European Parliament press dossiers for European Councils note that during this legislature, the Plenary has:

• Debated the reintroduction of internal border controls by some States and its impact on Schengen, for example in October 2024: October 2024 European Council press kit.
• Repeatedly debated the instrumentalization of migration at eastern borders (with Belarus and Russia) and the strengthening of external border security.

In many of these cases, there are broader debates and sometimes resolutions (on human rights, the war in Ukraine, the situation in certain countries) that include sections on borders but are not formally presented as “resolutions on border crises.”

4. Indicative conclusion

With accessible data, it can be said that in the 2024‑2029 legislature the European Parliament has approved at least several resolutions clearly linked to crises or tensions at borders (such as the one on Belarusian hybrid attacks against Lithuania and the one on military mobility), in addition to a major legislative block – the Migration and Asylum Pact – designed precisely to better manage crises at external borders. However, it is not possible to set a single closed number of “resolutions on border crises” without a manual and new analysis of all resolutions of the legislature, something beyond the systematized information of the consulted public sources.