The battle of the Senate that can change the majority of the Constitutional after the 29N

The right seeks the three-fifths that would allow it to renew four magistrates without negotiating with the left, while an initiative from civil society demands joint progressive candidacies to contest the majority of the Upper House.

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The Senate elections have traditionally been relegated to a secondary role in the general elections, overshadowed by a Congress in which the investiture is decided and on which the continuity of the Government depends. On November 29, however, the Upper House will have an unusual importance due to a majority that until now had barely entered the electoral discussion, that of the three-fifths that would allow the right to face the pending renewal of the Constitutional Court without the left.

The dispute is therefore not limited to who will have the absolute majority in the Senate. The result could open the door to a change in the balance of the Constitutional Court and, at the same time, has led progressive sectors to seek formulas to concentrate a vote that, due to the particularities of the electoral system of the Upper House, can translate into several seats in each province.

In this context, this Tuesday in Madrid Senators and Senators for Democracy is presented, an initiative that emerged from civil society that demands joint candidacies from leftist forces. Its promoters do not only aim to prevent PP and Vox from reaching the three-fifths, but to take advantage of the election system of the senators to try to contest the absolute majority even from the right.

The Constitutional Court, the key to the three-fifths

The Senate has pending since the end of 2025 the renewal of the four magistrates of the Constitutional Court that it is responsible for proposing, for which the Constitution requires a three-fifths majority. The mandates of Cándido Conde-Pumpido, María Luisa Balaguer, Ricardo Enríquez, and José María Macías expired on December 17, although the four continue in their positions until they are replaced.

The renewal could again alter the balance of a court that currently has seven magistrates considered progressive and five conservatives. The majority last changed at the beginning of 2023, after the four members designated at the end of the previous year by the Government and the General Council of the Judiciary joined, two from each institution, ending the predominance that the conservative sector had maintained until then.

Those magistrates were appointed, in general, for nine years, so that this third of the court will not be renewed until 2031. The four positions that now depend on the Senate thus constitute the most immediate possibility of modifying the current majority, without waiting another five years for the next renewal of that block.

For the right, the difference between achieving or not achieving the three-fifths is therefore substantial. If PP, Vox, and the forces that may support them reach that majority and agree on the candidates, they will be able to push through the four appointments without negotiating with the left. Below that threshold, they will have to seek support outside their block.

The change does not allow for anticipating the direction of future rulings, as the magistrates exercise their functions independently, but it can change the balance of an organ that will have to resolve the appeals of unconstitutionality that are presented against the laws approved during the next legislature.

The left seeks to concentrate the vote for the Senate

The possibility that the right reaches the three-fifths has focused the left's attention on a Chamber that has traditionally received much less attention during campaigns. This Tuesday, Senators and Senators for Democracy is officially presented at the Ateneo de Madrid, which calls on PSOE, Sumar, IU, Podemos, Más Madrid, Compromís, and other progressive forces to explore joint candidacies in the different constituencies.

Among the people linked to the promoting group are Cristina Almeida, Javier Pérez Royo, Gloria Elizo, Bruno Estrada, Cristina Monge, and Juan Torres. Their proposal is based on the idea that the division among similar candidacies can particularly penalize in the Senate, while concentrating votes on the same names allows competing for more positions in each province.

The declared objective goes beyond preventing PP and Vox from reaching the necessary majority to renew the Constitutional Court without agreeing with the left. The platform aims to contest the absolute majority of the Senate from the right, for which it intends to extend electoral agreements among the different progressive formations.

The formula has precedents. In previous general elections, different forces have reached agreements to present joint candidacies for the Senate in certain constituencies, although the initiative launched now aims to expand that strategy for the 29N.

How senators are elected and why alliances can be decisive

Unlike what happens in Congress, in Senate elections, closed party lists are not voted on, but individual candidates. The voter can choose names from the same party or distribute their votes among candidates from different parties, a peculiarity that makes electoral coordination a much more important factor.

The general rule establishes that each peninsular province elects four senators, although each citizen can vote for a maximum of three candidates. The four names that receive the most support obtain the seats, without a proportional distribution among parties as is applied to elect members of Congress.

This limited voting system explains that usually the most voted candidacy obtains three senators and the second one gets the fourth, as long as their respective electorates concentrate their votes on the names presented by each party. When several parties from the same space run separately, however, their candidates may end up competing against each other to be among the four most voted.

There lies the interest of joint candidacies. If several forces present the same candidates and manage to get their voters to concentrate their support on them, they increase their chances of placing them among the top positions, although the agreement does not guarantee any result because each voter retains the freedom to combine names from different parties or to use only part of their votes.

The distribution is different in the island territories and in the autonomous cities. Gran Canaria, Mallorca, and Tenerife each elect three senators, while Ibiza-Formentera, Menorca, Fuerteventura, La Gomera, El Hierro, Lanzarote, and La Palma elect one. Ceuta and Melilla each have two.

To the senators directly elected at the polls are added the designated by the autonomous communities, which have one initially and another for each million inhabitants. Their election corresponds to the respective autonomous parliaments, so the final composition of the Upper House does not depend exclusively on the votes cast on November 29.

 

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AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What procedures are necessary for the Senate to renew the magistrates of the Constitutional Court?

The renewal of the magistrates of the Constitutional Court that corresponds to the Senate is mainly regulated by Article 159 of the Spanish Constitution, by Articles 16 and following of the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court (LOTC), and by Articles 184 to 186 of the Senate Regulations. The procedures, involved bodies, majorities, and what happens if there is no agreement are detailed below.

1. Basic constitutional and legal framework
  • Article 159 of the Constitution: the Constitutional Court is composed of 12 members, of which four are proposed by the Senate, by a majority of three-fifths of its members.
  • Article 16 LOTC (current wording):
    • The magistrates of the Constitutional Court are appointed by the King at the proposal of the Chambers, the Government, and the General Council of the Judiciary.
    • The Senate must choose the magistrates corresponding to it from candidacies presented by the Legislative Assemblies of the Autonomous Communities, under the terms determined by its Regulations.
    • Candidates from the Congress and the Senate must appear beforehand before the corresponding committees.
    • The term is nine years and the Court is renewed by thirds every three years.
2. Start of the procedure and submission of candidacies
  • According to the LOTC, the President of the Constitutional Court requests the proposing bodies (including the Senate) to initiate the procedure before the expiration of the affected mandates.
  • In the Senate, according to Article 184 of the Regulations:
    • The Board of the Senate opens a deadline for the submission of candidacies.
    • For magistrates of the Constitutional Court, special provisions of paragraph 7 of Article 184 apply:
      • The President of the Senate communicates to the Presidents of the Autonomous Legislative Assemblies the opening of the deadline.
      • Each Legislative Assembly may present up to two candidates.
    • The candidacies must prove that constitutional and legal requirements are met (condition of jurists of recognized competence, years of practice, etc.) and are accompanied by a list of merits.
    • The Board may request a report from a committee on the fulfillment of requirements and decides on the admission for processing. If a candidacy is rejected, the proposing group or Assembly may replace it within the deadline set by the Board.
    • Once the deadline has ended, the Board sends the admitted candidacies to the Appointments Committee.
3. Phase in the Appointments Committee
  • According to Article 185 of the Senate Regulations:
    • The Appointments Committee is chaired by the President of the Senate and composed of the spokespersons of the parliamentary groups (with weighted vote).
    • It verifies the legal requirements and may agree on the appearance of the candidates.
    • During the appearance, senators may ask questions about the candidate's career and merits, with protection of their honor and privacy.
    • Proposals on candidates who, being summoned, do not appear cannot be submitted to the Plenary.
    • The Committee prepares a report of suitability and a proposal with as many candidates as there are vacancies; in the case of magistrates of the Constitutional Court, this proposal may include other candidates if there were not enough autonomous candidacies within the deadline.
    • If the process is delayed or fails, the President of the Senate may propose to the Board the opening of new deadlines for the submission of candidacies.
4. Debate and voting in the Senate Plenary
  • Article 186 of the Regulations regulates this phase:
    • The report of the Appointments Committee is presented in the Plenary, followed by debate with intervention of the spokespersons.
    • The voting is secret, by ballots or by secret electronic procedure. Each senator may include as many names as there are vacancies to be filled.
    • The candidates with the highest number of votes are elected, provided they reach the three-fifths majority required by Article 159 of the Constitution.
    • If all vacancies are not filled in the first vote due to not reaching the required majority, a new vote is held among the best-placed candidates (Article 186 provides specific rules for second votes and ties).
5. Lack of agreement and effects of the deadlock
  • The Constitution and the LOTC do not provide for an automatic sanction if the Senate does not reach the three-fifths majority and does not make a proposal for some of the vacancies.
  • In practice, if there is no political agreement:
    • The procedure may be prolonged with successive candidacy deadlines and new votes.
    • The magistrates whose term has expired continue in office until their replacements take office (LOTC), which allows the Court to function but maintains a pending renewal situation.
  • Once elected by the Senate, the names are submitted to the King, who formally appoints the magistrates of the Constitutional Court.
Can you explain what personal and professional requirements candidates for magistrate of the Constitutional Court proposed by the Senate must meet? What exact role do the Legislative Assemblies of the Autonomous Communities play in proposing candidates to the Constitutional Court? What precedents are there of deadlocks or delays in the Senate to renew magistrates of the Constitutional Court and what practical consequences did they have?

What are the specific powers of the president of the Constitutional Court according to Spanish legislation?

According to the Spanish Constitution and Organic Law 2/1979, of October 3, of the Constitutional Court (LOTC), the president of the Constitutional Court is the highest internal authority of this body and concentrates functions of institutional representation, direction of collegiate bodies, and internal organization and management. Below is a summary of his specific powers, based on the current provisions identified in these norms.

1. Constitutional framework and election method

The Constitution, in Article 159, establishes that the Constitutional Court is composed of twelve members and provides that: "The President of the Constitutional Court shall be appointed from among its members by the King, at the proposal of the Court in plenary session and for a period of three years". The detailed regulation of that proposal and the rest of the functions is developed in the LOTC.

According to the current text of the LOTC:

  • Internal election: the Court in Plenary elects its president (and, by the same procedure, its vice president) from among its members by secret ballot.
  • Majorities: an absolute majority is required in the first vote; if not reached, a second vote is held among the most voted, and the one with the highest number of votes is elected. In case of persistent tie, the magistrate with the longest seniority in office is proposed, and if this coincides, the oldest.
  • Appointment and term: the name of the elected is submitted to the King for appointment for a period of three years, with the possibility of a single re-election for another term of the same duration.
2. Institutional representation functions

The LOTC expressly assigns to the president the representation of the Constitutional Court. This implies:

  • Representing the Court before the Crown, the General Courts, the Government, the General Council of the Judiciary, and other State institutions.
  • Holding the representation of the Court in official acts, institutional relations, and formal communications with other constitutional bodies and authorities.

This representation function is the basis of his role as the visible head of the body and as the main institutional interlocutor on behalf of the Court.

3. Direction of the Plenary, Chambers, and Sections

The LOTC organizes the Court into Plenary, Chambers, and Sections, and assigns the president a central role in its functioning:

  • Presidency of the Plenary: the Plenary is composed of all magistrates and is chaired by the president of the Court (in his absence, the vice president, and lacking both, the most senior magistrate, and if there is equality, the oldest).
  • Presidency of the First Chamber: the president of the Court is also the president of the First Chamber, which he chairs; only in his absence is it chaired by the most senior magistrate (or, in case of equality, the oldest).
  • Convocation of collegiate bodies: it is the president's responsibility to convene and preside over the Court in Plenary and to convene the Chambers. In this way, he promotes and organizes the Court's jurisdictional activity.
  • Participation in the Sections: for ordinary dispatch and decisions or proposals on admission or rejection of constitutional processes, the Plenary and Chambers are organized into Sections composed of the respective president (or his substitute) and other magistrates. The president thus intervenes in the filtering and distribution phase of matters.
4. Internal organization and management powers

The LOTC details a block of specifically administrative and organizational powers, which make the president the main person responsible for the internal functioning of the Court:

  • Measures for the functioning of the body: adopts the necessary measures for the proper functioning of the Court as a whole, the Chambers, and the Sections.
  • Communication of vacancies: communicates to the Chambers (Congress and Senate), the Government, or the General Council of the Judiciary, as appropriate, the vacancies that occur in the composition of the Court, so that the procedures for proposing new magistrates may be initiated.
  • Appointment of lawyers: appoints the lawyers of the Constitutional Court, who are the technical-legal support body for the magistrates.
  • Convocation of personnel competitions: convenes competitions to fill civil servant positions and labor staff posts serving the Court.
  • Administrative powers over personnel: exercises administrative powers over the Court's personnel (direction, organization, service regime), within the framework established by the LOTC itself and applicable public service regulations.
5. Other functions related to the magistrates' statute

The Organic Law also connects the president with the magistrates' statute in specific aspects:

  • Intervenes in the processing of resignations, cessations, and vacancies, since in certain cases the cessation or vacancy is decreed by the president himself, while in others it corresponds to the Plenary.
  • Formally requests the proposing bodies (Congress, Senate, Government, General Council of the Judiciary) to initiate the procedures for proposing new magistrates when the renewal by thirds of the Court approaches.

In summary, according to Spanish legislation, the president of the Constitutional Court is the highest institutional and organizational authority of the body: he represents it, directs the Plenary and the First Chamber, convenes collegiate bodies, promotes the distribution and admission of matters through the Sections, and exercises administrative leadership over its personnel and resources, all based on the framework established by the Constitution and the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court.

What requirements does the Constitution establish for a political force to reach three-fifths in the Senate?

The Spanish Constitution does not set specific "requirements" for a single political force to reach three-fifths of the Senate (3/5), in the sense of a concrete percentage of citizen votes or a specific electoral rule. What it does establish is:

  • That certain decisions (particularly, the ordinary constitutional reform of Article 167 CE) require the favorable vote of three-fifths of the members of the Senate.
  • That the Senate is composed of senators elected by universal suffrage plus senators appointed by the Autonomous Communities (Art. 69 CE), and all count equally for that calculation.

From there, for a single political force to reach that threshold is only a matter of number of seats, not an additional legal condition.

1. What does "three-fifths of the Senate" mean in constitutional terms

When the Constitution requires a three-fifths majority in the Senate, it refers to:

  • The fraction 3/5 of the total number of "de jure" senators, not of those present in a specific session.
  • That is, it is computed over the total members of the Chamber, including:
    • Senators elected in provincial, island, and Ceuta and Melilla constituencies.
    • Senators appointed by the autonomous parliaments.
  • To know the exact figure, the formula is applied: seats needed = rounding up of (3/5 × total number of senators).

The Constitution does not give the numerical figure because the total number of senators varies slightly over time (as autonomous representations change), but the criterion is always that percentage over the legal total members.

2. Material requirements for a political force to reach 3/5 alone

If the question is posed in material terms ("what is needed for my party to have three-fifths of the Senate alone?"), the requirements derive from that scheme:

  • That the political force obtains, adding:
    • Senators obtained by direct election (Senate lists), and
    • Senators appointed by autonomous parliaments where that force has a majority or a decisive weight,
    at least three-fifths of the total seats.
  • This implies, in practice:
    • A very large majority in the general elections to the Senate (in many provinces three or four senators are elected, and the majoritarian system tends to overrepresent the most voted force).
    • A predominant weight in several autonomous parliaments, because the autonomous chambers appoint a relevant number of senators and their distribution responds to the balance of autonomous forces.

From a constitutional point of view, however, this is not formulated as an "added requirement"; it is simply the arithmetical consequence of the three-fifths rule applied to the Senate's composition.

3. What is the purpose of that reinforced three-fifths majority

The best-known reference to the three-fifths in the Senate is in the ordinary constitutional reform procedure (Art. 167 CE):

  • The reform project must be approved by a majority of three-fifths in both the Congress and the Senate.
  • If there is no agreement between both Chambers, a Mixed Commission is foreseen and, ultimately, the Congress may impose the text by a two-thirds majority, provided the Senate approves it by at least an absolute majority.

Therefore, even if a single force achieved three-fifths of the Senate, it would not be able to reform the Constitution alone if it does not also obtain the required majorities in the Congress. The three-fifths majority in the Senate is a consensus lock among political forces, not an autonomous power of the Senate detached from the Congress.

4. Summary

In summary, the Constitution establishes as the only formal "requirement" to reach three-fifths in the Senate that the votes of three-fifths of the total number of senators be gathered. How to control that number of seats depends exclusively on the electoral result in the Senate and the weight in the autonomous parliaments, without the Constitution adding any legal condition other than that reinforced majority.

How many specific seats currently constitute three-fifths of the Senate and how are they distributed between elected and autonomous senators? In what other cases, besides constitutional reform, does the Constitution require reinforced majorities in the Senate? How does the Senate's electoral system (limited vote in provinces, autonomous appointment) affect the real possibility of a party reaching three-fifths?

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