A level 2 fire in Las Hurdes (Cáceres) forces the evacuation of 600 people and mobilizes the UME

Operational Situation 2 within the framework of forest fires in Extremadura corresponds, in practice, to fires of greater potential severity, in which extraordinary state resources must intervene and there is a significant risk to the population and non-forest assets. Its activation combines the provisions of Decree 132/2022, of October 26, approving the INFOEX Plan of Extremadura and the State Civil Protection Plan for Forest Fire Emergencies.

1. Basic regulatory framework

• The INFOEX Plan (Decree 132/2022) classifies fires by operational levels (0, 1, and 2). Level 2 is defined as a fire in which, “at the request of the INFOEX Plan Management, extraordinary state resources are incorporated” or when the simultaneity of fires requires such incorporation.
• The State Plan establishes operational situations 0, 1, 2, and 3. Situation 2 is described as an emergency in which one or more fires, in their foreseeable evolution, can severely affect the population and non-forest assets, require immediate protection and relief measures, and may necessitate the incorporation of extraordinary resources or even escalate to a national interest emergency.
• The classification of the operational situation at these levels corresponds to the competent body of the Autonomous Community, which must communicate it to the State when resources from the General State Administration intervene or may intervene.

2. Material requirements for Operational Situation 2

For practical purposes, the activation of Operational Situation 2 requires the following circumstances to concur (either cumulatively or very intensely):

• Serious impact or risk to the population: fires that already affect or may soon affect populated areas, basic infrastructures, supply networks, or non-forest assets of special value (urban–forest interface).
• Need for extraordinary state resources: the Autonomous Community's own device (INFOEX, provincial and municipal resources) is considered insufficient to guarantee control and civil protection, requiring at the autonomous request:
  • extraordinary state resources (for example, UME, additional MITECO resources, etc.), or
  • state reinforcements beyond their ordinary deployment.
• Simultaneity of fires that, although individually manageable, collectively exceed the autonomous capacity and require mobilization of extraordinary state resources.
• High potential severity index according to the State Plan methodology (combining meteorological hazard, fuel, value of exposed assets, and population vulnerability).

3. Competent bodies and decision-making

• The overall direction and coordination of the INFOEX Plan corresponds to the head of the department responsible for forest fires.
• The Management of the INFOEX Plan lies with a Steering Committee, in which the department and the main bodies with emergency and civil protection competencies participate.
• The executive direction corresponds to the Command Management, located at the Regional Operations Center (COR), which evaluates the fire situation in real time.

In practice, the proposal to move to level 2 / Operational Situation 2 originates from the Command Management and the COR, who assess:

• the fire's evolution,
• the threat to people and non-forest assets, and
• the sufficiency of autonomous resources.

This proposal is submitted to the INFOEX Plan Management / autonomous body competent in civil protection, which is the one that formally declares the level/situation change.

4. Procedure and formal communications

• Technical evaluation at the COR with operational information from INFOEX and that transmitted by 112 Extremadura.
• Request for extraordinary state resources to the State, by the competent autonomous body, when the need for extraordinary reinforcement is perceived.
• Declaration of level 2 of the fire within the INFOEX Plan framework and, correspondingly, raising the operational situation of the autonomous plan (up to Situation 2) according to the State Plan criteria.
• Immediate communication of the situation to:
  • Coordination Center of the General State Administration (Directorate General of Civil Protection and Emergencies),
  • Government Delegation in Extremadura, and
  • other involved state bodies (for example, for the activation of the UME).
• Possible constitution of the CECOPI (Integrated Operational Coordination Center) when the severity advises it, integrating autonomous and state commands.

5. Operational effects of activation

• The Command Management of the INFOEX Plan assumes the technical direction of fires declared level 2.
• Protection of the population is prioritized: preventive evacuations, road closures, protection of critical infrastructures and urban environments.
• Extraordinary state resources are integrated into the autonomous command structure, under the rules of the State Plan and the corresponding protocol (for example, the UME action protocol).
• Inter-administrative coordination and updating of information to the various civil protection bodies are reinforced, depending on the fire's evolution.

In summary, Operational Situation 2 means recognizing an emergency of high potential severity, with significant risk to people and non-forest assets, in which the Junta de Extremadura requests and coordinates the entry of extraordinary state resources within a reinforced command and coordination structure between the Autonomous Community and the State.

The Military Emergency Unit (UME) is the Armed Forces unit specialized in intervening in major emergencies, including forest fires. In this area, its role is essential but always complementary to that of the autonomous communities, which retain ordinary competence in fire prevention and extinction.

Basic competency framework

Prevention and extinction of forest fires generally correspond to the autonomous communities: they organize their devices, approve their plans, hire personnel, and manage their ground and aerial resources. The State acts as support and reinforcement when the magnitude of the fire exceeds the autonomous capacity or exceptional circumstances occur.

The UME is integrated into this state support. According to official information and analysis collected by the newspaper Demócrata, the UME:

• Is a first intervention operational unit in serious emergencies, capable of deploying within a few hours anywhere in the national territory.
• Intervenes in forest fires when they are large disasters that overwhelm ordinary devices or require extraordinary reinforcement of resources.
• Does not replace autonomous services but acts as an extraordinary reinforcement within the National Civil Protection System.

Specific legal framework

The UME and its role in emergencies, including forest fires, are articulated in several regulations:

• Royal Decree 416/2006: formalizes the organization and initial deployment of the UME as a permanent joint force and establishes its mission to intervene in situations of serious risk, catastrophe, or calamity. The UME is conceived as a first intervention unit in emergencies, including large fires.
• Royal Decree 1097/2011: approves the UME Intervention Protocol and details the situations in which it can be activated: natural disasters, forest fires, technological risks (chemical, nuclear, biological, radiological), terrorist attacks, as well as international emergencies within the EU Civil Protection Mechanism.
• Law 17/2015, of the National Civil Protection System: strengthens its role by granting it the status of “public service of intervention and assistance in emergencies”. In emergencies of national interest, the UME is directly linked to the Ministry of the Interior regarding operational direction of the emergency.
• Royal Decree 521/2020: consolidates the UME structure within the basic organization of the Armed Forces, ensuring its immediate availability and rapid intervention capacity.

How the UME is activated in a forest fire

The UME does not act on its own initiative in forest fires. Its deployment responds to an order from the Government of Spain, based on requests and Civil Protection assessment:

• At a level 2 of an autonomous fire plan, the community maintains emergency direction but may request support from state resources, including the UME. It then integrates into the device under the command structure provided in the territorial plan, coordinating with forest firefighters, aerial resources, Civil Guard, health services, etc.
• When the situation worsens and a national interest emergency (level 3) is declared, under Law 17/2015, the superior direction of the emergency passes to the Minister of the Interior, and the operational direction on the ground is entrusted to the UME chief. This has occurred, for example, in large fires that required coordinating resources from several administrations and ordering tens of thousands of evacuations.

Specific functions in fire management

In practice, the UME assumes several lines of action in forest fires:

• Direct attack on the fire with its ground firefighting modules, integrated into intervention battalions.
• Logistical and command and control support: creation of Unified Emergency Commands to coordinate state, autonomous, and local resources; management of communications, analysis of fire evolution, and resource allocation.
• Protection of people and infrastructures: support for evacuations, confinements, road closures, and protection of population centers and critical infrastructures.
• Collaboration with other bodies: integrated work with autonomous forest firefighters, state brigades, aerial resources operated by other ministries, Civil Guard, and Civil Protection services.

With all this, the UME has consolidated as a key pillar of the state device against large-scale forest fires, always in coordination with the autonomous communities and within the framework of the National Civil Protection System.

In the last two to three months, several autonomous communities have requested or received support from the Military Emergency Unit (UME) for forest fire extinction, beyond the large Madrid–Ávila–Toledo device. Below, I summarize, by community, the clearly documented cases in official notes and recent press.

Andalusia

• Niebla Fire (Huelva): the Andalusian Government raised the Infoca Plan to operational situation 2 and requested extraordinary resources, which involved the deployment of the UME. According to the Junta and the newspaper Demócrata, the intervention took place around August 7–8, 2026, with about 60 soldiers and 15 vehicles performing firebreak and extinction support work in the Raboconejo area (municipality of Niebla).
• Los Gallardos / Lubrín Fire (Almería): the Andalusian and central governments kept the UME deployed for several days around July 11–12, 2026, although the fire was already stabilized. The fire burned about 7,000 hectares and forced the evacuation of about 1,600 people, as confirmed by the Junta president and the Defense minister.

Aragon

• Cinco Villas Fire (Zaragoza): in July 2026, the UME supported the Aragonese device and BRIF brigades in the large fire originating in Orés, with more than 12,000–15,000 hectares affected and around 1,000 evacuees. Demócrata reports that UME soldiers worked in the Malpica de Arba area in support and containment tasks.
• Las Peñas de Riglos Fire (Huesca/Zaragoza): in August 2026, the UME was deployed in this fire with more than 16,000 hectares burned. During this operation, there was the death of one UME soldier and three injured, according to Aragonese press.

Castilla-La Mancha

• La Mierla Fire (Guadalajara): the Castilla-La Mancha Government requested UME intervention due to an "extreme" behavior fire in the Sierra Norte of Guadalajara. Deployment occurred in mid-July 2026, with personnel from the First Emergency Intervention Battalion reinforcing the Infocam Plan after the evacuation of the entire town of La Mierla and confinement of nearby areas.
• Province of Toledo: the province was included by Interior in the national interest emergency initially declared for Madrid and Ávila. Fires originating in Almorox (Toledo) were part of the same front where the UME assumed a central operational command role.

Castilla y León

• Ávila Fires (e.g., Burgohondo) in July 2026: Interior declared the national interest emergency in Ávila province, and the central government transferred operational command to the UME. Interventions were coordinated with the Community of Madrid due to the interterritorial nature of the fire (Ávila–Madrid).

Community of Madrid

• Sierra Oeste Fire (Villa del Prado, San Martín de Valdeiglesias, Aldea del Fresno, Pelayos de la Presa): the Community of Madrid reported on July 23, 2026 a “critical” situation with multiple fires. The UME deployed three sections (two in San Martín and one in Villa del Prado, with about 40 personnel per section), within an operation that led to the evacuation of more than 10,000 people and was later managed as a national emergency with command led by the UME.

Valencian Community

• Fire between Soneja and Azuébar (Castellón): at the beginning of July 2026, the Valencian Government formally requested the Ministry of the Interior the deployment of the UME due to the “very negative” evolution of the fire, with risk to Azuébar and the natural environment of the Balsa de la Dehesa de Soneja.
• Vall d’Uixó Fire (Castellón): in August 2026, the PSPV denounced that nearly 75 % of the personnel working on extinction came from the UME and the central government, in a fire that burned more than 9,000 hectares in the Serra d’Espadà.

Catalonia

• La Bisbal d’Empordà Fire (Girona): the Catalan Government requested UME intervention at the beginning of July 2026, due to the risk of “simultaneity” of several fires. The Fourth UME Battalion was mobilized, with more than 200 soldiers and about 60 vehicles, to reinforce the Catalan device in the area.

Region of Murcia

• Fire in the districts of Los Garres and Lages (municipality of Murcia): at the beginning of June 2026, the Autonomous Community activated level 2 of the Infomur Plan and requested the intervention of the UME along with aerial reinforcements from other communities. The fire forced preventive evacuations and a broad deployment of ground and aerial resources.

In summary, in the summer of 2026 the UME has been mobilized for forest fires, at least, in Andalusia, Aragon, Castilla-La Mancha, Castilla y León, Community of Madrid, Valencian Community, Catalonia, and Region of Murcia, as evidenced by official notes (Interior, autonomous governments) and recent news. It is likely that there have been additional actions with less media impact, but the above are the main and best documented in the last two to three months.