An official body from Morocco accuses the Spanish Police of "mistreatment and assaults" on migrants in Ceuta

With the information available from official Spanish sources and recent political and social coverage, there is no trace of a “final report” from the National Human Rights Council (CNDH) of Morocco specifically on the events in Ceuta, nor of its possible processing before Spanish or European institutions. Debates in Spain about what happened at the border and its implications for human rights are relying on other actors (Moroccan NGOs, Spanish parties, judicial bodies, international organizations), but not on a formal document from the Moroccan CNDH. To date, therefore, it cannot be stated that this report has been approved, published, or officially sent to Spain, at least in light of the sources consulted up to August 11, 2026.

What Spanish sources say (and do not say)

The Spanish political press closely following the Ceuta migration crisis and the relationship with Morocco, such as the newspaper Demócrata, collects numerous statements on human rights, but none attributed to the Moroccan National Human Rights Council.

For example, Demócrata details the position of the Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH), which holds Rabat responsible for the origin of the migration crisis and speaks of “political instrumentalization” of vulnerable people in its analysis of Ceuta, but always as an independent NGO, not as an official state body of Morocco (AMDH analysis).

Spanish political initiatives calling for international investigations into Morocco’s role are also recorded. Sumar, a parliamentary partner of the Government, has asked the UN to investigate migrant deaths and the possible use of migration pressure as a political tool (Sumar’s request to the UN) and, in parallel, has used the framework of the 2030 World Cup to question Morocco’s human rights commitments after the Ceuta crisis (Sumar’s parliamentary motion on the 2030 World Cup).

On the judicial front, Demócrata reports on the complaint filed by the party Iustitia Europa before the International Criminal Court Prosecutor to investigate whether the events in Ceuta could constitute crimes within its jurisdiction (Iustitia Europa complaint). And the National Court has opened proceedings based on another complaint about the mass entry, with requests to the Civil Guard, but without mentioning reports from the Moroccan CNDH.

None of these pieces — all very focused on the human rights dimension — mention that the Moroccan National Human Rights Council has prepared, concluded, or sent a “final report” on Ceuta.

Institutional and diplomatic context from Spain

Spanish government sources focus mainly on the immediate management of the crisis and bilateral cooperation with Rabat. La Moncloa has publicized Pedro Sánchez’s activity in Ceuta and his denunciation of the “violation of Spanish territorial integrity” in the city, while insisting on cooperation with Morocco for repatriations and border control (Sánchez’s activity in Ceuta and press conference in Ceuta).

The Ministry of the Interior has reported technical measures such as the installation of an inflatable barrier on the Tarajal jetty, in compliance with new case law on hot returns (Interior’s note on the barrier). And from other fronts, Spain’s obligations on human rights in border management have been emphasized, as reflected in El Diario’s report on the Andalusian High Court ruling.

Again, in this ecosystem of official notes and Spanish judicial decisions, there are no references to a Moroccan CNDH report on Ceuta, nor to any processing of that hypothetical report before Spanish or European bodies.

Other voices on human rights in Morocco

In parallel, there is a series of political statements on the human rights situation in Morocco in general (Western Sahara, internal repression, use of migration as pressure). Izquierda Unida, for example, has called on the Government to intensify its efforts to guarantee human rights in Morocco and has criticized the regime of Mohamed VI (IU’s position on human rights in Morocco), while the EAJ-PNV has expressed concern about UN resolution 2797 on the Sahara and about the “systematic violation” of rights in that territory (PNV statement).

These debates help to understand the political and human rights climate framing the Ceuta crisis, but they also do not provide data on a possible Moroccan CNDH report focused on that city.

Conclusion: what can be stated today

With all the above, and subject to what may be found in official Moroccan channels to which there is no direct access here, there is no evidence in the main Spanish political, parliamentary, governmental, or media sources that a “final report” from the National Human Rights Council of Morocco on the events in Ceuta exists, has been approved, or is being processed. The actors currently structuring the debate on responsibilities and rights violations (Moroccan NGOs like AMDH, Spanish parties, judicial bodies, UN, ICC, etc.) are operating outside that hypothetical document.

If the interest is to know the internal status of work or rulings of the Moroccan CNDH, the most reliable way would be to consult its official communications directly, since, at least until August 11, 2026, that report has not entered the Spanish or European political or institutional circuit recorded by the available sources.

Moroccan legislation specifically on the National Human Rights Council (CNDH) — in particular dahir no. 1-11-19 promulgating law no. 76-15 — does not appear in the sources I have access to. Therefore, it is not possible to reliably detail article by article what exactly its powers and functions are according to Moroccan regulations. I can only offer a general orientation and warn that, for rigorous legal work, it is essential to consult directly the Bulletin Officiel of Morocco or the CNDH itself.

Limitations of the available information

The research conducted has located documents on:

• The human rights situation in Morocco and Western Sahara, for example the analysis by Fundación Alternativas in this study or political statements by the PNV on UN Security Council resolution 2797, as collected in this statement.
• Debates in Spain on policy towards Morocco and the Sahara, including those related to human rights and the 2030 World Cup, gathered in several pieces from the newspaper Demócrata, such as this analysis on Morocco’s plan for the Sahara or this news on the debate in Spain.
• International criticisms of Morocco’s human rights record, such as those noted in HRW reports cited by Demócrata or news about repression of activists and journalists.

However, none of these sources reproduce the text of dahir no. 1-11-19 or law no. 76-15, nor an official summary of the CNDH’s powers. Nor does a technical sheet of that body appear in Spanish press releases on bilateral relations, such as the Ministry of the Presidency’s note on judicial cooperation with Morocco (here), or in documents on Spanish foreign action in human rights, such as Foreign Ministry notes on the UN Human Rights Council (Albares speech or Spain’s election to the Council).

What can reasonably be expected from a National Human Rights Council

In the absence of the Moroccan legal text, only a very general inference can be made, based on how analogous bodies function in other countries and on the role attributed to human rights councils in international documentation used by Spain, for example in the II National Human Rights Plan described in this note or in the agreement with the Spanish Association for Human Rights published in the BOE ([link]).

In that comparative framework, a body like the Moroccan CNDH usually has, at least, these general functions (I emphasize: as a comparative reference, not as a literal reproduction of law 76-15):

• Advising public authorities on human rights matters (reports, opinions, and recommendations on laws, policies, and practices).
• Monitoring the human rights situation in the country, preparing periodic reports and, where appropriate, contributing to international reviews (for example, before UN bodies).
• Receiving complaints or reports of rights violations and forwarding them to competent authorities, with follow-up capacity.
• Education and awareness-raising on human rights (campaigns, training, dissemination).
• Cooperation with international organizations and national civil society in this field.

This type of function is what is expected of a national human rights body in line with the so-called “Paris Principles,” frequently referred to by European and Spanish institutions when talking about strengthening the human rights architecture, as seen in documents from the European Commission (Q&A on the Rule of Law) or the European Parliament on human rights violations in third countries (resolution on DRC, Iran, and Algeria).

Need to consult Moroccan sources

Since the consulted sources do not reproduce law no. 76-15 nor summarize its contents, it is not possible to go beyond this comparative approach. No further information is available in the consulted sources on the specific powers (for example, whether it has the power to visit detention centers, quasi-judicial capacity, legislative initiative, etc.).

For a serious analysis of Moroccan legislation, it is advisable to go directly to the Bulletin Officiel of the Kingdom of Morocco or the institutional website of the CNDH and, if applicable, contrast it with specialized studies such as those published by analysis centers on Morocco, for example Fundación Alternativas in this work.

Also, my main specialty is politics and normative activity in Spain; when it comes to internal law of third countries (such as the detailed legal regime of the Moroccan CNDH), and the consulted databases do not contain it, I cannot supplement it with reliable information.

The available sources do not contain detailed and specific regulation on the legal requirements that a formal accusation of mistreatment allegedly committed by foreign security forces on Spanish territory must meet in Spain. However, there is general information on how laws are challenged before the Constitutional Court and on the regime of certain laws, but not on the specific procedure for criminal complaint or accusation in the scenario you raise. Therefore, it is not possible to offer a complete and definitive technical answer on all the legal requirements of that accusation. Below is a general framework of an orientative nature within the Spanish constitutional system, also clarifying the limits of the available information.

1. General constitutional framework and control of laws

The situation you raise (alleged mistreatment by foreign security forces acting in Spain) falls, from the rule of law perspective, within the core of fundamental rights, particularly the right to physical and moral integrity and the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment. When it is considered that a law or a norm with the force of law violates the Constitution, the mechanism provided in Spain is the constitutional challenge, according to the explanations available in the consulted sources.

According to that information, the following may file a constitutional challenge, among others:

• The President of the Government
• Fifty deputies or fifty senators
• The executive collegiate bodies of the Autonomous Communities and, where appropriate, their Assemblies

The general deadline is three months from the official publication of the law or norm with the force of law, and the Constitutional Court may declare total or partial unconstitutionality, which implies the nullity of the affected part. This data does not directly answer your question about how to file an accusation of mistreatment, but it does delimit who can react at the constitutional level if the problem stems, for example, from a law that enables or covers actions contrary to fundamental rights.

2. Limits of the available information for your specific case

What you raise is, in reality, a criminal and state responsibility problem (and possibly public international law), not so much an abstract challenge of laws. However, the consulted sources do not include:

• The specific criminal offenses that would apply to mistreatment or torture committed by foreign agents in Spain.
• The minimum formal requirements of a complaint or criminal charge in these cases (content, competent body, deadlines, etc.).
• The rules on jurisdiction of Spanish courts when foreign security forces intervene on national territory.
• The regulation on immunities, international cooperation agreements, or special statutes of foreign police forces that might operate in Spain.
• The particularities of state patrimonial liability and contentious-administrative routes in such a scenario.

Since these contents are not available in the sources, it is not possible to rigorously develop the “legal requirements” of the accusation you raise without creating unsupported information.

3. What can be drawn from the constitutional system

Even with this limitation, two general ideas can be drawn from the constitutional framework, always at an abstract level:

• If the mistreatment situation were covered or facilitated by a Spanish law that violated the Constitution, the legitimized subjects (President of the Government, fifty deputies or senators, autonomous executive bodies) could go to the Constitutional Court through a constitutional challenge to purge that norm.
• Matters related to fundamental rights and their protection are usually articulated through organic laws, which, according to the available information, require an absolute majority of the Congress in the final vote on the entire text. This underlines the especially guarantor character that the legal system intends to give to these issues.

However, this remains at a general normative level and does not replace the specific technical analysis that your scenario would require, which combines criminal law, criminal procedure, administrative litigation, and international law.

4. Scope of the answers I can offer

As an assistant focused on Spanish politics and legislation, and conditioned by the available material, I can:

• Explain constitutional mechanisms (such as the constitutional challenge) and the role of the Cortes Generales or the Constitutional Court.
• Provide context on types of laws, necessary majorities, and special procedures when fundamental rights are affected.
• Help interpret, in political-institutional terms, the balances between security and fundamental rights.

What I cannot do, with the current information, is detail the specific procedural and criminal requirements of an accusation for mistreatment committed by foreign security forces in Spain, nor precisely describe the channels of responsibility and international cooperation applicable in that specific case. For that, it would be essential to consult the current criminal and procedural legislation, as well as international conventions and specific agreements on the presence of foreign forces on Spanish territory.