Feijóo begins to narrow distances on social media, although Sánchez remains at the forefront of digital power.

As of today, following the dissolution of the Cortes on October 6, 2026, there are no pending parliamentary procedures underway regarding Feijóo's “new housing measures”: the open processes have been interrupted and, if the PP wants to turn them into law, it will have to register its initiatives again in the next legislature and go through all the phases again. What can be identified is how far those proposals had progressed and what steps they would have lacked to become current regulations.

1. Context: dissolution of the Cortes and effect on initiatives

According to available information, as of October 15, 2026, the General Courts have been dissolved since October 6, within the framework of the November 29 election call. This implies that:

• All bills and motions linked to the PP's “housing plan” that had not been completed have been interrupted and lapse with the end of the legislature.
• To resume these measures, the PP will have to register them again from scratch in the Congress or Senate in the next legislature.

In parallel, the Government approved in September 2026 two decrees on housing matters (on suspension of evictions, temporary rentals, rooms, limits on fund purchases, contract extensions, etc.). These decrees are not part of Feijóo's package; in fact, the PP announced it would vote against their ratification, so they cannot be considered “housing measures proposed by Feijóo.”

2. Main PP initiatives linked to Feijóo's housing plan

Parliamentary and press sources allow identification of several legislative axes of the PP presented under the umbrella of Feijóo's “housing plan”:

• Bill on administrative and procedural measures for legal certainty in territorial and urban planning, promotion of urban development and housing (the so-called PP “Land and Housing Law”), promoted in the Senate and later sent to the Congress as part of the goal to promote one million homes and speed up licenses and planning.
• Organic Bill against illegal occupation, which strengthens the “anti-squatting” package (rapid eviction, tougher penalties, changes in the Penal Code and Civil Procedure Law).
• Reform of the Horizontal Property Law (use of videoconferences in meetings, digital minutes book, email notifications, etc.), presented as part of a “block of housing measures” referred to by the PP and also linked to the internal brand “Feijóo Law” in the Senate.
• Non-legislative motions (PNL) and motions on youth access to housing, fight against occupation and “inquiokupación” and rural housing plans, approved in Congress or Senate, which do not create new laws but do pressure the Government to change its policy.

In May 2026, the PP itself celebrated having completed in Congress the consideration of its “block of housing measures”, that is, that the Chamber accepted to jointly process the land law, the anti-squatting law, and the horizontal property reform. However, various reports (including from the PP itself and Demócrata) indicate that:

• The PP's land law, approved in the Senate, was blocked in the Congress at early stages due to successive extensions of the amendment deadline.
• The PP's anti-squatting law, also approved in the Senate in 2024, was never debated or voted on in the Congress Plenary; it remained in a limbo of deadline extensions when the Cortes were dissolved.
• The bill on horizontal property had been taken into consideration by Congress and was in the processing phase, but had not completed the entire legislative process.

3. What procedures would have been missing (if the legislature had not been interrupted)

For Feijóo's housing measures to effectively become new laws, their main bills still had, in general terms, the classic steps of the ordinary legislative procedure:

• In Congress (for initiatives sent from the Senate or registered by the Popular Group):
  • Effective closure of the amendment period (overcoming the blockage by successive extensions).
  • Possible committee working group and report (Housing and Urban Agenda Committee or other competent ones), incorporating or rejecting partial amendments.
  • Debate and vote in Plenary on the text and reserved amendments.
• In the other Chamber:
  • Review by the Senate (if Congress was the originating chamber) or by Congress (if Senate was), with possible vetoes or amendments.
  • If applicable, second round in Congress to lift vetoes or decide on Senate amendments.
• Final phase:
  • Submission to the King, sanction and promulgation.
  • Publication in the Official State Gazette (BOE) and entry into force on the date provided in each law.

In summary: Feijóo's housing plan did translate into several bills and parliamentary motions on land, occupation, and horizontal property, but none of the major legislative pieces were completed when the Cortes were dissolved. Therefore, the PP's “new housing measures” still had the entire central and final stretch of the legislative procedure remaining (amendments, reports, plenaries in both Chambers, sanction, and publication), and now they could only be reactivated by registering them again in the new legislature.

In the Spanish legal system, there is no single “statute” of the Prime Minister's institutional communication, but several norms clearly outline his powers. The Prime Minister has an essentially political, directive, and coordinating role in this matter; day-to-day management falls to administrative bodies such as the Presidency of the Government, the State Secretariat for Communication, and the Commission on Advertising and Institutional Communication.

1. Basic legal framework

• Constitution and Law 50/1997, on the Government: Article 97 of the Constitution assigns the Government the direction of internal and external policy. Article 2 of Law 50/1997 specifies that the Prime Minister directs the Government's action and coordinates its members, represents the Government, and sets the guidelines of government policy. Additionally, Article 2.2.j) empowers him to create, modify, and suppress ministerial departments and State Secretariats and to approve the organizational structure of the Presidency of the Government.
• Law 29/2005, on Advertising and Institutional Communication: establishes the legal regime for advertising and institutional communication campaigns of the General State Administration and its public sector. It defines what an institutional campaign is, sets its legitimate objectives, and establishes principles and prohibitions.
• Law 40/2015, on the Legal Regime of the Public Sector: regulates the general regime of the state public sector and, among other aspects, the cabinets as political and technical support bodies for the Prime Minister, ministers, and state secretaries, also linked to communication.
• Presidency of the Government structure norms (for example, Royal Decree 676/2025, on the structure of the Presidency of the Government, and Royal Decree 772/2002, which created the State Secretariat for Communication): develop the organization of Moncloa and detail the functions of the State Secretariat for Communication, including coordination of the Government's information policy and the State's institutional communication.

2. Direct powers of the Prime Minister in institutional communication

Based on this legislation, the Prime Minister's powers can be summarized as follows:

• General political direction: as director of the Government's action (Art. 2 Law 50/1997), he sets the major orientations of the Executive's communication policy, including priorities of institutional communication and strategic messages about public policies.
• Configuration of the institutional architecture: under Art. 2.2.j) of Law 50/1997, he can, by royal decree, create, modify, or suppress ministries and State Secretariats and approve the organizational structure of the Presidency of the Government. From this derives his capacity to define the position, rank, and functions of the State Secretariat for Communication and the Prime Minister's Cabinet.
• Promotion and political supervision of the Annual Plan: Law 29/2005 and its regulatory development (such as Royal Decree 947/2006, which regulates the Commission on Advertising and Institutional Communication) foresee that the Government approves an Annual Plan of advertising and institutional communication. The formal decision is collegiate by the Council of Ministers, but the Prime Minister politically guides its content and is accountable for it before the Cortes.
• Delegation and avocation: the reform of Law 50/1997 linked to Law 40/2015 specifies that the Prime Minister can delegate certain powers to vice-presidencies and ministers, but also take matters for decision in the Council of Ministers. This allows conducting sensitive institutional communication decisions to the highest collegiate body.

3. Powers through dependent bodies

Several norms on the structure of the Presidency of the Government specify how these powers are exercised in practice:

• State Secretariat for Communication: Royal Decree 772/2002 created it and assigned it “the execution of the Government's action in information policy and communication.” The updated regulation (Royal Decree 676/2025) details that it is responsible for:
  • Coordinating the Government's information policy and developing criteria for its determination.
  • Promoting and coordinating the State's institutional communication policy.
  • Preparing and disseminating Government and Prime Minister communiqués, the Council of Ministers' summary, and directing the General State Administration's information services.
  • Organizing coverage of governmental activity and providing communication assistance to the Prime Minister in his appearances.
  • Supporting the Commission on Advertising and Institutional Communication and managing communication in national alert situations.
  All this is exercised “under the organic dependence of the Prime Minister,” which reinforces his directing capacity.
• Prime Minister's Cabinet: according to Law 40/2015 and Royal Decree 676/2025, it is a political and technical assistance body responsible, among other functions, for providing information, advising, and facilitating coordination of Government action and communication with citizens, functions closely connected with communication strategy.

4. Applicable limits and principles

Law 29/2005 establishes the material principles framing institutional communication, which bind all bodies and thus also condition the Prime Minister's actions:

• Legitimate objectives (Art. 3): campaigns may only be promoted for purposes such as informing about rights and obligations, functioning of institutions and public services, electoral processes, health or safety risks, promotion of constitutional values, culture or heritage, etc.
• Guiding principles: campaigns must conform to the general interest, institutional loyalty, truthfulness, transparency, effectiveness, responsibility, efficiency, and austerity in spending.
• Prohibitions (Art. 4): campaigns aimed at highlighting management achievements for propaganda purposes, undermining legitimate actions of other administrations, spreading discriminatory messages or contrary to constitutional values, or causing confusion with political party symbols and messages are prohibited.
• Special protection during electoral periods: Law 29/2005 refers, for electoral processes and referendums, to the Organic Law of the General Electoral Regime, which limits publicity and institutional acts that could be used to highlight government achievements during campaigns.

In summary, the Prime Minister does not directly manage each campaign but politically directs and coordinates the Government's institutional communication, configures the bodies that execute it, and is accountable before the Cortes that such communication respects the principles of neutrality, truthfulness, general interest, and pluralism established by Spanish legislation.

In the last general elections held in Spain, which took place on July 23, 2023 (23‑J), the results in the Congress of Deputies for PSOE, PP, and Vox were as follows, according to official general scrutiny data:

• People's Party (PP): 137 seats and 33.05 % of valid votes.
• Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE): 121 seats and 31.70 % of votes.
• Vox: 33 seats and 12.39 % of votes.

Together, these results shaped a very fragmented Congress without automatic majorities. The PP was the most voted force and the party with the most seats, but fell short of an absolute majority on its own. The PSOE, although second in votes and seats, retained a very high representation sufficient to aspire to form an alternative majority with other groups. Vox, meanwhile, consolidated as the third force on the right of the national spectrum, but with significantly fewer seats than the two major nationwide parties.

Looking at the relationship between vote percentage and seats, several relevant elements stand out:

• The PP, with just over a third of the votes (33.05 %), obtained 137 of the 350 seats. Its parliamentary weight rests on good performance in medium and small provinces, where the distribution system favors the strongest candidacies.
• The PSOE, with a very close vote result (31.70 %), obtained 121 deputies. The seat gap with the PP was greater than the vote percentage difference, something usual in the Spanish provincial system.
• Vox, with 12.39 % of the votes, secured 33 seats. The party maintained significant presence in many constituencies, but its intermediate size means that in several provinces its votes do not translate into as many seats as those of PP and PSOE.

The sum of PP and Vox in those elections was 170 seats (137 + 33), below the 176 needed for an absolute majority. This figure has since been used as a reference to analyze the balance of blocks in Congress: the right and far-right came close but did not reach the ability to form government on their own. This opened the door for the PSOE to seek support among other formations — mainly nationalist and left-wing — to try to form an alternative majority.

From the point of view of vote percentage, the three parties together accounted for almost three quarters of the electorate:

• PP + PSOE: around 64.75 % of votes.
• PP + Vox: approximately 45.44 %.
• PSOE + Vox: around 44.09 %.

These combinations illustrate that Spanish politics remains strongly structured around the two major nationwide parties, but with Vox as a key actor for building right-wing majorities. Meanwhile, other formations — such as Sumar and nationalist and regionalist parties — complete the distribution up to 350 deputies, being decisive for any investiture or approval of relevant laws.

In summary, in the July 23, 2023 general elections, the PP won in votes and seats, the PSOE retained a very strong position as the second force, and Vox consolidated as the third nationwide force with 33 deputies. The combination of these results explains the complex negotiation scenario and tight arithmetic that has marked the subsequent legislature.