This is the Irish cut to the European budget: less cooperation and fewer officials.

Dublin saves the national allocations of the CAP and Cohesion and proposes a review of own resources to raise 55 billion annually, in an attempt to bring positions closer among the Twenty-Seven before the European summit and pave the way for an agreement before the end of the year.

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The Irish Presidency of the Council of the European Union has already sent to the Twenty-Seven the new proposal on which to begin negotiating the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2028-2034. A text that introduces a significant cut in the spending planned by Brussels and that will be discussed this very week by the heads of State and Government. The objective is to try to bring positions closer during the European Council summit, with the aim of reaching an agreement before the end of the year.

Dublin, which has introduced significant changes regarding the initial approach of the European Commission, claims that it seeks to achieve a balance between the fiscal constraints of the capitals and the need to finance the new priorities of the continent, "without undermining the policies based on the Treaties."

Specifically, the proposed cut compared to the initial initiative of the European Commission is 8%, which amounts to 141 billion euros, limiting the next community budget to 1,622,011 million.

A budget cut that has been made public in the same week in which the highest community leader, Ursula von der Leyen, has positioned herself before the European Parliament against reducing the volume of the next financial framework.

Cohesion and agriculture: a cut of 3%, but without touching the national allocations

Where is the cut coming from? One of the items that is being reduced is related to heading 1, which includes cohesion policies, agriculture, and rural and social prosperity.

The proposal contemplates a 3% adjustment compared to Brussels' plan, which is achieved by moderating the increases planned for the EU Facility and applying cuts in community agencies such as Frontex.

That said, Ireland has not wanted to cut the pre-assigned national allocations for the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) or for the Cohesion Policy. A decision especially relevant at a time when both policies have become one of the main sources of tension among the Member States.

Furthermore, the new negobox —the negotiation document that collects the different budgetary options that the capitals must reach an agreement on— keeps unchanged the Commission's proposal to allocate a fixed amount of almost 150 billion euros to exclusively finance the repayments of the principal and the interest of the debt incurred through the NextGenerationEU funds between 2028 and 2034.

Competitiveness and defense: a 13% cut compared to the initial proposal

One of the most significant cuts affects the heading related to competitiveness, prosperity, and security, which experiences a reduction of 13% compared to the initial proposal of the community Executive.

Specifically, the European Competitiveness Fund is set at 355.911 billion euros, excluding from this figure the Innovation Fund. This instrument, along with Horizon Europe, forms a global investment package of over 400 billion euros.

The Irish proposal also specifies the allocations for some of the main strategic priorities of the continent. For the defense of the community bloc, Dublin proposes to allocate 96.418 billion euros, while digital leadership would receive 39.654 billion.

For its part, the clean transition would receive 20.184 billion euros and the section corresponding to health, biotechnology, and bioeconomy would have another 15.703 billion.

External action: the biggest cut in the community budget

The most pronounced adjustment, however, affects the external action of the European Union. The Irish Presidency has reduced the proposal initially presented by Brussels by 17%, making this heading the main victim of the budget review.

According to the sources consulted, "responding to the demands of the Member States, the cut is applied horizontally in the geographical pillars of the Global Europe Instrument."

However, Dublin has chosen to protect certain allocations considered priorities. Specifically, it maintains the 25 billion euros allocated to humanitarian aid, as well as the funds committed for the recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine.

The European public administration also does not escape the adjustment. The document incorporates a reduction of 8.8% compared to the proposal of the European Commission.

Ireland has rejected the substantial increase in places requested by Brussels and demands to stabilize the staff of the community institutions at their current levels, "promoting gains in administrative efficiency and the use of new technologies such as AI."

Own resources: Dublin wants to raise 55 billion annually

How to finance the next community budget? The Irish Presidency has also announced this Saturday a revised package of own resources, designed to generate approximately 55 billion euros annually.

The most relevant modification regarding the initial proposal affects the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). The new negobox raises the call rate of this instrument from the 75% originally proposed by the European Commission to 90%, thus increasing the proportion of revenue that would be directly allocated to the community budget.

As for the emissions trading system (ETS), the call rate of 30% is maintained, but a new feature is introduced: the possibility of a gradual application between 2028 and 2034 for those member states covered by the Modernization Fund.

The aim of this modification is to reduce the "regressive impact on their economies," taking into account the existing differences between the productive and energy systems of the Twenty-Seven.

The proposal that 90% of the revenue from the corresponding own resource be transferred directly to the community budget is also maintained, while member states would retain the remaining 10% as collection costs.

Likewise, the proposals regarding the resource on non-recycled waste from electrical and electronic equipment, the tobacco tax, and the contribution from large companies, called CORE, remain intact.

More flexibility for states in managing European funds

One of the issues that has raised the most controversy throughout the community debate has been related to governance and the application rules of the next budget.

In this area, Ireland has raised the possibility of granting additional leeway to member states to reallocate funds within their National and Regional Collaboration Plans, one of the main instruments provided for in the new budgetary architecture.

Dublin sets as an example the introduction of "a 25% flexibility reserve for the mid-term review or crisis situations." This mechanism would allow capitals to have a greater capacity for adaptation to unforeseen circumstances, without the need to completely alter the initial programming of the funds.

Along with this modification, the proposal also includes a simplification of the execution and audit rules, with the aim of providing greater clarity to the final beneficiaries in the procedures for disbursing community resources, according to the consulted texts.

The friends of Cohesion, the frugal ones, and the Parliament: a three-way negotiation

The discussions that now open, with the new negobox on the table, do not seem easy.

A group of 17 countries, including Spain and Italy, called "friends of Cohesion," is pushing to limit cuts to cohesion policies and preserve the weight of traditional allocations within the next financial framework.

On the opposite side are those dubbed "frugal," with Germany and the Netherlands among their main representatives, who advocate for a containment of community spending to reduce the budgetary burden that member states will have to bear.

In the midst of all this, the European Parliament. The negotiator of the European People's Party (EPP), Siegfried Mureșan, has rushed to outright reject the Irish proposal through his social media as soon as the document was made public.

The Eurochamber will also have a decisive role in the outcome of the negotiations. As recalled by the Minister of Agriculture, Luis Planas, in an interview granted to Demócrata, the approval of the next Multiannual Financial Framework will require the unanimity of the member states.

A requirement that gives each capital the ability to block the final agreement and that forces finding a balance between the different budgetary sensitivities.

The text will also need the consent of the European Parliament, which has the power to ratify or veto the financial framework, although not to directly modify the agreement reached by the member states.

With this scenario, Ireland puts on the table the first major political adjustment of the Brussels proposal. The negotiation now enters a decisive phase: to determine how much the Twenty-Seven are willing to contribute, what priorities should be financed, and how far community spending can be reduced without compromising the strategic ambitions of the Union for the next seven years.

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

At what stage of the parliamentary process is the 2028-2034 Multiannual Financial Framework and what are the next steps until its final approval?

The Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2028‑2034 is, as of October 12, 2026, in an advanced but still incomplete negotiation phase: the European Commission has already presented its proposal, the European Parliament has set its position and is ready to negotiate, while the Council (and ultimately the European Council) has not yet finalized a common position. Therefore, the MFF regulation is not approved and several formal steps remain until its final adoption.

1. Current situation in each institution

a) European Commission

  • The Commission presented the legislative package of the MFF 2028‑2034 on July 16, 2025, with a long-term budget proposal close to 2 trillion euros, around 1.26 % of the EU GNI, including the NextGenerationEU debt service within the framework ceilings.
  • Since then, its role is mainly that of mediator and technical support: it defends its proposal, issues clarifying communications, and participates in trilateral contacts with Parliament and Council, but the legal protagonism now passes to the other two co-legislating institutions.

b) European Parliament

  • The Parliament adopted its negotiating mandate on the MFF on April 28, 2026, through a provisional report that sets its position on the budget structure and the overall and heading-by-heading figures.
  • That position calls for an MFF of around 1.78 trillion euros at 2025 prices (about 2.01 trillion at current prices), equivalent to 1.27 % of the GNI, and demands that the repayment of the NextGenerationEU debt (0.11 % of the GNI) be excluded from the MFF ceilings.
  • On October 7, 2026, in a debate with the Commission and Council, MEPs reiterated this red line: they will not give their consent to a budget that “weakens” Europe nor to cuts below the Commission's proposal.
  • From a procedural point of view, Parliament has already done its part in this phase: it has approved its mandate and only formal negotiations with the Council remain, and finally to give or deny its consent to the MFF regulation.

c) Council of the EU and European Council

  • Member States have advanced on several partial elements (for example, negotiating mandates on sectoral programs included in the future MFF, such as support for the fisheries sector or external action), but a global closed position on the total volume, distribution among policies, and treatment of recovery debt does not yet exist.
  • The Council presidencies are working on a “negotiation box” with figures and options that must first be agreed upon by ministers (General Affairs Council) and, above all, by heads of State or Government in the European Council.
  • The political goal indicated by both European sources and Parliament itself is to reach a political agreement before the end of 2026, so that during 2027 the derived legislation can be approved and the new framework can start on January 1, 2028.
2. What are the next steps until final approval
From the current situation, the pending formal steps can be ordered as follows:
  • 1. Closure of a common position of the Council: the 27 must agree, at Council level, on the detailed proposal of the MFF regulation (total volume, ceilings by headings, flexibility margins, debt treatment, etc.). This basis usually crystallizes after a prior political agreement of the European Council.
  • 2. Political agreement in the European Council: heads of State or Government must reach a global compromise, which in practice sets the final “package.” This agreement requires unanimity and is the politically most delicate point of the negotiation.
  • 3. Council–Parliament negotiations (trilogues): with the Council position and Parliament mandate already defined, the interinstitutional negotiation phase opens to adjust figures, program architecture, flexibility rules, and conditionalities until a common compromise text is reached.
  • 4. Consent of the European Parliament: the MFF regulation is not adopted by ordinary co-decision but through a consent procedure. Parliament votes yes or no on the agreed package; it needs an absolute majority of MEPs to approve it.
  • 5. Formal adoption by the Council: after parliamentary consent, the Council formally adopts the regulation establishing the MFF 2028‑2034.
  • 6. Approval of the Own Resources Decision: in parallel, the decision setting the EU's revenue sources must be approved (and ratified by all national parliaments), key to financing both the new MFF and the repayment of recovery debt.
  • 7. Linked sectoral legislation: the regulations of major programs (agriculture, cohesion, competitiveness, research, migration, etc.) aligned with the new framework are approved through the ordinary legislative procedure.
  • 8. 2028 annual budget and programs: finally, based on the MFF already in force, the 2028 annual budget is negotiated and adopted, and the national and regional operational programs that specify on-the-ground execution are approved.

In summary, the MFF 2028‑2034 is politically on track but not closed: Parliament is ahead with its mandate, the Commission defends its proposal, and the main bottleneck is that the Council and European Council reach the necessary unanimity to enter the final phase of agreement and parliamentary consent.

Could you detail exactly how the figures and priorities proposed by the Commission and the European Parliament for the MFF 2028‑2034 differ? What scenarios are considered if Member States fail to reach an agreement on the MFF before the end of 2026? How does the negotiation of the MFF 2028‑2034 affect Spain in terms of CAP, cohesion, and other key funds?

What are the competences and functions of the Presidency of the Council of the European Union according to the Community Treaties?

The Presidency of the Council of the European Union, as established by the Treaties (mainly Article 16 of the Treaty on European Union, TEU, and Articles 237 and following of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, TFEU), is not a separate “body,” but the function exercised, in turn, by each Member State at the head of the Council. Its competences and functions are always understood within the collegiate framework of the Council and the institutional balance with the Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Council.

1. Basic legal framework in the Treaties

Article 16 TEU establishes that the Council exercises, jointly with the European Parliament, the legislative and budgetary functions, and performs policy definition and coordination functions according to the conditions set out in the Treaties. The Presidency acts as the “chair in turn” of that body: it organizes its work and ensures the proper functioning of procedures.

Article 16.9 TEU specifies that the Presidency of the Council formations, except the Foreign Affairs Council, is held by representatives of the Member States according to an equal rotation system. Articles 237 and 240 TFEU, together with the Council's Rules of Procedure, develop how the Council's activity is convened, prepared, and organized, tasks in which the Presidency is a central piece.

2. Organization of the Council's work

The most characteristic competence of the Presidency is the direction and organization of the Council's work:

  • Calling Council meetings (in the various sectoral formations, except Foreign Affairs) and its preparatory bodies (mainly COREPER and working groups).
  • Setting the agenda of those meetings, in coordination with the Council Secretariat and taking into account political priorities, legal deadlines, and balances among Member States.
  • Planning medium-term work, through the Presidency program, which fits into the common program of the “trio” of successive Presidencies foreseen by the European Council.
  • Ensuring continuity of legislative files and major work lines between Presidencies, avoiding breaks or blockages.

These functions do not grant the Presidency its own decision-making power: decisions continue to be adopted by the Council, in its formations, by the majorities provided in the Treaties (qualified majority, unanimity, etc.).

3. Conducting meetings and mediation function

The Presidency also plays a role in directing debates:

  • Presides over sessions of the Council formations (again, with the structural exception of Foreign Affairs, presided by the High Representative), as well as COREPER and most working groups.
  • Orders the use of the floor, proposes working methods, summarizes interim conclusions, and formulates compromise proposals.
  • Acts as an impartial mediator among Member States to bring positions closer, especially in complex or politically sensitive files.

Although the Treaties do not expressly use the term “mediation,” this role derives from the combination of the power to preside and the collegiate nature of the Council: the Presidency must promote consensus and, when not possible, facilitate reaching the required majorities.

4. Role in legislative and budgetary functions

Since the Council exercises, with Parliament, the legislative and budgetary functions, the Presidency has a key practical role in:

  • Leading legislative deliberations within the Council during the ordinary legislative procedure or special procedures.
  • Directing interinstitutional negotiations with Parliament and Commission (the so-called “trilogues”), presenting negotiating mandates approved by the Council and exploring compromise agreements.
  • Promoting the adoption of the EU budget, in cooperation with Parliament, respecting the deadlines and rules of the TFEU for the budgetary procedure.

In all cases, the Presidency acts as spokesperson for the Council's collegiate outcome, not on behalf of the Member State holding it.

5. External representation of the Council

The Presidency also assumes important institutional representation functions:

  • Represents the Council in its relations with the European Parliament, for example in plenary debates on legislative priorities, political accountability, or agreement negotiations.
  • Participates in coordination with the Commission and the European Council to ensure coherence between the Union's general political agenda and the programming of sectoral work.
  • In external action, the general rule of the Treaties is that the Union's representation corresponds to the European Council (President) and the Commission; and, specifically in the common foreign and security policy, to the High Representative. The Presidency may perform complementary representative functions, always subordinate to that framework.
6. Neutrality, collegiality, and limits

Although the Member State holding the Presidency can set priorities within the Union's general framework, the Treaties and institutional practice impose a principle of neutrality and service to the Council as a whole:

  • It cannot unilaterally impose legislative decisions or policy positions; it can only promote and organize.
  • It is obliged to respect the institutional balance and the competences of the Commission (legislative initiative, execution) and Parliament (co-legislator and budgetary authority).
  • Its action is framed within the strategic orientations of the European Council and the Treaties, which do not allow the Presidency to alter the distribution of competences or established procedures.

In summary, according to the Community Treaties, the Presidency of the Council concentrates functions of promotion, organization, direction of debates, and representation of the Council, but does not add its own will outside collegiality nor create new competences: it operates as a political and procedural gear at the service of the body it integrates.

Can you explain with concrete examples how a recent Presidency has set its work priorities in the Council? What differences exist between the role of the Council Presidency and that of the President of the European Council according to the Treaties? How is the “trio” Presidency system organized in practice and what effects does it have on policy continuity?

What legal requirements must Member States meet to reallocate funds within their National and Regional Cooperation Plans under the European budget framework?

For a Member State to reallocate funds within its national and regional plans under the EU budget framework (whether in cohesion policy, agricultural funds, recovery programs, or other instruments), it must comply with a set of legal requirements mainly derived from Union Law: the specific Regulations of each fund or program, the EU Financial Regulation, and, where applicable, the implementing and programming acts approved by the Commission.

Basic regulatory framework

In general terms, internal reallocations are governed by:

  • The EU Financial Regulation, which sets principles of sound financial management, transparency, budgetary stability, and control of fund use.
  • The specific Regulations of each fund (e.g., Common Provisions Regulation for structural funds, EAFRD regulations, Just Transition Fund, etc.), which detail the margin for transfers between priorities, categories of regions, or years.
  • The programming documents approved by the Commission (operational programs, strategic plans, partnership agreements, implementing decisions), which are legally binding and set financial allocations.

Substantive requirements

Reallocations are not free: they must respect a series of substantive limits:

  • Respect for the program's objective and scope: funds can only be moved between measures, priorities, or axes that remain compatible with the objectives defined in the legislation and the approved program. Financing cannot be redirected to actions outside the material scope of the fund.
  • Mandatory minimum proportions: many regulations impose minimum percentages for certain objectives (e.g., climate and environment, social inclusion, youth, rural development, innovation). Reallocation cannot cause the plan to fail to meet these thresholds.
  • Cofinancing rules: any change must maintain the agreed EU/Member State cofinancing percentage and national effort, unless the regulation explicitly allows modification and the Commission authorizes it.
  • Horizontal principles (gender equality, non-discrimination, sustainable development, climate and environmental protection): reallocation cannot empty these principles of content nor cause unjustified negative impacts.
  • Compatibility with State aid: if the financed measures are economic aid to companies or other operators, changes must continue to respect State aid rules (notified schemes, category exemptions, aid intensity limits, etc.).

Procedural requirements

Besides material limits, there is a procedure that usually includes:

  • Prior evaluation by the national or regional managing authority, justifying the need for reallocation (economic changes, low execution in a line, new priorities, crisis, etc.) and its coherence with the overall strategy.
  • Stakeholder participation: fund regulations require applying the partnership principle. Any significant program revision must be consulted with regional and local authorities, social partners, and other relevant stakeholders.
  • Formal modification of programming documents: if the reallocation exceeds certain financial thresholds or alters the program's logic (e.g., moving funds between investment priorities), it usually requires a formal modification request to the Commission and a new approval decision.
  • Notification and exchange with the Commission: even for minor adjustments allowed within pre-established margins, Member States must inform the Commission and reflect changes in monitoring systems and statistical information.
  • Respect for programming and execution deadlines: reallocations must be decided within the programming period and before commitment and payment deadlines (n+2, n+3 rules, or others applicable), so that funds can be effectively executed.

Control, audit, and transparency

Finally, reallocations must be integrated into the financial control system:

  • Adjustment of national management and control systems, so that changes are traceable and auditable.
  • Updating annual implementation reports and published information to ensure transparency towards citizens.
  • Availability of an audit trail allowing the Commission, the European Court of Auditors, and national auditors to verify that the reallocation complies with rules and that expenses remain eligible.

In summary, Member States can flexibly adapt their National and Regional Cooperation Plans by moving resources between priorities, but only within the legal framework of EU regulations, respecting objectives, mandatory percentages, cofinancing conditions, and approval and control procedures established by the Commission.

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What is the amount of the cut proposed by the Irish Presidency compared to the initial plan of the European Commission for the 2028-2034 community budget?

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Which items of the European budget have been protected from cuts in the Irish proposal?

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What percentage reduction does the external action heading experience in the Irish budget proposal?

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