Iustitia Europa asks the Supreme Court to suspend the elections of November 29 due to the impossibility of executing its precautionary measures on the external census.

As of October 9, 2026, Iustitia Europa's request to suspend the general elections of November 29 before the Third Chamber (Contentious-Administrative) of the Supreme Court is pending resolution. The Supreme Court has not yet decided either to suspend the elections or to definitively reject the petition: the current phase is the urgent processing of allegations and decision on precautionary measures.

Iustitia Europa's action is part of the procedure already opened in the Supreme Court following appeals against the electoral effects of the so-called “grandchildren’s law”, specifically regarding registrations in the Electoral Census of Absent Residents (CERA) of those who obtained nationality under the additional provision of the Democratic Memory Law and its implementing instruction. That procedure led, in September, to an order from the Chamber that provisionally suspended certain electoral effects of those registrations, at the request of Vox and Iustitia Europa.

After the early election call and the announcement of the November 29 elections, Iustitia Europa has submitted new documents so that the Supreme Court ensures the full effectiveness of those precautionary measures in the electoral event. According to information published by Demócrata and other media, in one of these initiatives the party goes further and requests that the November 29 vote be suspended for the strictly necessary time to make the precautionary measures on the external census practically enforceable, alleging the practical impossibility of reviewing all affected files in time.

In response to this new scenario, the Contentious-Administrative Chamber has opened an accelerated procedural phase. As reported by Demócrata, the Supreme Court has granted a “non-extendable” 48-hour period for all parties involved to submit allegations regarding:

• The manner of executing or reviewing the September 10 order that suspended the electoral effects of certain registrations in the CERA linked to the grandchildren’s law.
• The consequences of that suspension in the context of the early election call and the November 29 schedule.
• The proposals of Iustitia Europa and Vox to ensure that the precautionary measure has real effects on the census used in the elections.

In parallel, press reports detail that Iustitia Europa has formalized its request in a procedure identified as 1013/2026, in which it demands, as a first option, the temporary suspension of the vote and, subsidiarily, that the Supreme Court order technical measures to control the vote of the approximately 160,000–163,000 affected voters: specific computer identification of those records, traceability of their votes, and the possibility of a separate or verifiable count in case of subsequent challenge to the result.

In contrast, the State Attorney's Office, representing the Government, has argued what it calls a “material impossibility” of executing within the deadline the requirements that would arise from that interpretation of the precautionary measures on the external census. It maintains that, with the electoral calendar already underway, it is not feasible to review all files one by one or apply an additional filter without risking the organization of the process and the exercise of the right to vote of the newly naturalized.

Therefore, the current procedural picture is as follows:

• There is an open contentious-administrative procedure in the Third Chamber regarding the electoral effects of the grandchildren’s law and registrations in the CERA.
• Within that procedure, a precautionary measures piece has been constituted whose September order already suspended certain electoral effects.
• After the early election call, Iustitia Europa has requested new measures, including the suspension of the November 29 elections or, subsidiarily, a reinforced system to control the affected votes.
• The Supreme Court has opened an urgent allegations procedure (48 hours) for all parties (Iustitia Europa, Vox, State Attorney's Office, Central Electoral Board, Prosecutor's Office, among others), before issuing a new order.
• At this moment, the Chamber has not yet resolved this incident: the request is under study and pending order.

In conclusion, the “processing phase” of Iustitia Europa's request to suspend the elections is the ongoing precautionary incident: the petition has been made, the Supreme Court has activated an urgent procedure to gather positions from all parties, and the matter is now awaiting the decision of the Third Chamber, which must rule both on the suspension of the vote and, if applicable, on alternative measures to control the external census.

Luis María Pardo is a practicing lawyer and president of Iustitia Europa, a Spanish nationwide party born from the combination of strategic litigation and legal activism. He does not hold institutional positions in the State (he is neither a deputy nor a high-ranking official), but he has become the main face and legal-political architect of the party, playing a relevant role in the debate on the rule of law, corruption, and the rules of the political system.

Functions and competencies within Iustitia Europa

According to the organization itself and coverage by media such as Demócrata and The Objective, Pardo's functions in Iustitia Europa are articulated on several levels:

• President and organic leader: Iustitia Europa defines itself as a "Spanish nationwide political party presided over by lawyer Luis María Pardo," who leads the political and strategic direction of the project, aimed at fighting corruption, institutional reform, and strengthening judicial independence.
• Candidate for the Presidency of the Government: at a members' congress, the party officially designated him as candidate for the Presidency, reaffirming his political leadership and positioning him as the electoral reference in the November 29, 2026 general elections (news on Demócrata).
• Institutional representation and spokespersonship: he acts as the main spokesperson before media and courts. He explains the party's initiatives, formulates accusations, and sets the discourse on judicial independence, depoliticization of institutions, term limits, and the end of legal immunities (Demócrata's polling analysis).
• Director of legal strategy: he promotes Iustitia Europa's standing as a popular prosecutor or complainant party in high political impact cases, such as the Koldo case, investigations into Begoña Gómez and David Sánchez, the census linked to the so-called "Grandchildren’s Law," the Plus Ultra case, or proceedings on the Ceuta crisis (appeal on the Grandchildren’s Law, complaint on Ceuta, Plus Ultra case).
• Programmatic driver: he is the visible face of a package of reforms that includes direct election of the President of the Government, greater citizen control, reduction of party subsidies, election of the General Council of the Judiciary by judges, depoliticization of constitutional bodies, and elimination of legal immunities. His role is to translate that agenda into political proposals and messages understandable to a cross-sectional electorate.

All these functions are internal to the organization: they define political leadership, decision-making capacity on strategic direction, and prominence in judicial and media action, but do not entail public powers over State institutions.

Role in the Spanish legal-political context

Pardo's role is situated at the intersection of lawyering, legal activism, and partisan politics:

• Judicialization of political oversight: Iustitia Europa has turned popular prosecution and contentious-administrative litigation into vehicles of political control. As president, Pardo promotes taking Government and administrative decisions to the courts — from corporate bailouts to decisions on the electoral census — arguing the defense of legality and fundamental rights.
• Actor in the rule of law debate: his public interventions emphasize criticism of the "78 regime," denunciation of the politicization of the General Council of the Judiciary, the Prosecutor's Office, and the State Attorney's Office, and defense of an independent judiciary. In interviews such as "If PSOE or PP do not support our reforms, there will be no Government", he presents himself as an alternative to traditional parties, conditioning hypothetical majorities on acceptance of his reform agenda.
• Bridge between litigation and electoral representation: Iustitia Europa has shifted from being mainly a judicial action organization to projecting itself as a party with expectations of seats (for example, four deputies for Madrid and around 11.4% of the vote in an NC Report poll disseminated by the party itself). Pardo capitalizes on this transition, presenting judicial successes or initiatives as credentials for electoral competition.
• Interlocutor of cross-sectional discontent: polls collected by Demócrata describe Iustitia Europa as an option capable of attracting voters from PP, Vox, PSOE, and Sumar/Podemos, as well as abstainers. Pardo's discourse — focused on "changing the system's rules" rather than a classic ideological program — seeks to channel discontent with party elites and corruption management.
• Controversial figure: his commitment to the penal and contentious route to resolve political conflicts places him in a debated space: for his supporters, he defends legality against a captured system; for his critics, he contributes to the over-judicialization of political life and institutional polarization.

Overall, Luis María Pardo is not an institutional jurist but a lawyer-leader of a political project that uses the combination of courts, public opinion, and ballots to try to reconfigure the balance between parties, citizens, and institutions in Spain.

The Law regulating the Contentious-Administrative Jurisdiction (LJCA) does not contain a specific provision that speaks of “suspending an electoral process” as such, nor does it grant the Supreme Court a precautionary power different from the general one. What it does is regulate some common precautionary measures (arts. 128 to 135 LJCA) that also apply when the object of the appeal is an act of the Electoral Administration under the terms of the Organic Law of the General Electoral Regime (LOREG). From there, the suspension of phases of the electoral process (proclamation of candidacies or elected officials, voting, counting, etc.) can only come from applying that general regime, with an especially strict balancing of the public electoral interest.

1. Basic premise: jurisdiction and object of the appeal

According to articles 1.3.c) and 2 LJCA, the contentious-administrative order has jurisdiction over the actions of the Electoral Administration “under the terms provided in the LOREG.” Therefore, for the Supreme Court to even consider a precautionary suspension:

• There must be a contentious-administrative or cassation appeal within its jurisdiction whose object is an electoral act or agreement (for example, an agreement of the Central Electoral Board).
• What is practically suspended are specific acts (proclamations, call agreements, decisions on candidacies, etc.), although their suspension may in fact affect the development of a phase or the entire electoral process.

2. Procedural requirements for the precautionary measure

The general regime is in Chapter II of Title VI (arts. 128-135 LJCA):

• Request by interested parties (art. 129.1): parties may request “at any stage of the process the adoption of all measures that ensure the effectiveness of the judgment.” They are not adopted ex officio except in very exceptional cases.
• Separate piece and hearing (art. 131): the precautionary incident is processed separately, with hearing of the opposing party during a period not exceeding ten days, and must be resolved by order within the following five days.
• Urgency and authorization of non-working days (art. 128.3): in suspension incidents or adoption of precautionary measures, the judicial body may authorize non-working days when their denial could cause irreversible harm. This is especially relevant in electoral matters, where deadlines are peremptory.
• Urgent precautionary measures (art. 135): if “circumstances of special urgency” are alleged, the Court may adopt or deny the measure without previously hearing the other party, within two days, and then convene a hearing to decide on its maintenance, modification, or lifting.

3. Material requirements: periculum in mora, fumus, and balancing of interests

Article 130 LJCA sets the central criterion to grant or deny suspension:

• Periculum in mora (art. 130.1): the measure can only be adopted when “the execution of the act or the application of the provision could cause the loss of the legitimate purpose of the appeal.” In electoral terms, this means that if the process continues (holding the vote, proclaiming candidates, etc.), a favorable eventual judgment would arrive too late to repair the harm (for example, effective deprivation of the passive suffrage right).
• Reasoned balancing of interests (art. 130.1): the Court must carry out a detailed assessment of all conflicting interests. In electoral matters, the following weigh very heavily:
  • the public interest in the regularity, certainty, and continuity of the electoral process (that elections be held on the legally established date);
  • the fundamental rights of active and passive suffrage of those affected;
  • and the interests of third parties (voters, other candidacies, representative institutions).
• General and third-party interest (art. 130.2): even if there is a risk of loss of the appeal's purpose, the measure may be denied when it causes a serious disruption of general or third-party interests. Suspending the vote or the proclamation of elected officials is usually considered an extreme disruption of the democratic general interest, hence the extremely exceptional nature of such suspension.
• Appearance of good right (fumus boni iuris): although not expressed with these words, Supreme Court doctrine requires that the claim not be manifestly unfounded; the more intense the measure (for example, paralyzing a complete election), the higher the level of fumus usually required.

4. Scope, guarantees, and execution of the suspension

Once agreed, precautionary measures:

• Are maintained in principle until a final judgment (art. 132.1), but may be modified or revoked if circumstances change.
• Are accompanied, if applicable, by security or guarantees to mitigate damages (art. 133) and are communicated to the administrative body for immediate compliance (art. 134).
• In electoral matters, the Court usually opts for less disruptive measures (for example, corrections on ballots, adjustments in partial proclamations, partial counts, or repetition in certain polling stations) rather than total suspension of the vote or process.

In summary, the LJCA requires the Supreme Court that, to provisionally suspend an electoral process or any of its phases, there be a real risk of uselessness of the appeal, a sufficient appearance of illegality, and a very strict balancing justifying that, despite the enormous weight of the general interest in holding elections, suspension is the only means to effectively protect the rights involved.