Felipe VI warns from Melilla: "We are prepared to defend our values and our freedoms"

Modifying the status of Ceuta and Melilla as autonomous cities is not a simple change of ordinary law: it involves reviewing the constitutional territorial model. This essentially requires two major blocks of action:

• a constitutional reform, to redefine the position of Ceuta and Melilla; and
• the approval or reform of their future Statutes of Autonomy, through organic laws.

1. Prior constitutional reform: why it is necessary

The current status of Ceuta and Melilla is directly established by the Constitution, which places them in a unique position compared to the autonomous communities. Altering that position (for example, fully equating them to an autonomous community or giving them another regime) requires modifying the Constitution itself, an ordinary law or an isolated organic law is not enough.

The reform must specify:

• how Ceuta and Melilla are integrated into the territorial organization of the State, and
• what minimum rank and content their future Statutes of Autonomy or equivalent norms must have.

Depending on the scope of the change (whether it affects only specific provisions or the basic structure of Title VIII on territorial organization), the reform would be processed through the ordinary constitutional reform procedure (art. 167 CE) or the enhanced procedure (art. 168 CE). The key is whether the change is understood to affect “core” elements of the territorial model—in which case the enhanced procedure would tend to apply—or if it can be reduced to a punctual modification.

2. Steps and majorities of the constitutional reform

Generally, the reform follows this scheme:

• Initiative: it can come from the Government, the Congress, the Senate, or the Assemblies of the autonomous communities. A drafted text of constitutional reform is submitted.
• Processing as a reform project or proposal:
  • qualification and admission for processing;
  • debate in the Congress with the possibility of amendments;
  • committee report and vote in the Plenary.
• Majorities:
  • if the scheme of art. 167 CE applies, a three-fifths majority in the Congress and a three-fifths majority in the Senate is required; if there is no agreement, a mixed commission is foreseen and, ultimately, a reinforced vote in the Congress;
  • if it is understood that the change falls under art. 168 CE (enhanced reform), a two-thirds majority in each Chamber is needed, dissolution of the Cortes, new approval by two-thirds of the new Chambers, and finally, a mandatory referendum.
• Referendum:
  • in the ordinary procedure (art. 167), it is only necessary if requested by a qualified minority of parliamentarians;
  • in the enhanced procedure (art. 168), the referendum is always mandatory.
• Sanction, promulgation, and entry into force: once the reform is approved, the King sanctions it and it is published in the Official State Gazette (BOE).

3. Statutes of Autonomy of Ceuta and Melilla

Once the new status is constitutionally defined, it must be “filled with content” through Statutes of Autonomy (or norms of the same rank) specific to Ceuta and Melilla. The Statutes are organic laws, so they require an absolute majority in the Congress in the final vote on the entire text.

The parliamentary procedure for approval or reform of the statutes essentially follows the scheme of any organic law:

• Presentation of the initiative (government bill or private member's bill).
• Complete processing in the Congress:
  • admission for processing and publication;
  • deadlines for total and article-by-article amendments;
  • work in the committee and subcommittee with report;
  • debate and vote in the Plenary, where an absolute majority is required in the final vote.
• Referral to the Senate, which can approve, amend, or veto the text. The Congress has the final say on amendments and vetoes.
• Sanction, promulgation, and publication in the BOE.

4. Political and technical sequence

In practice, the change would be articulated in two linked major phases:

• first, a constitutional reform that enables and defines the new position of Ceuta and Melilla; and
• then, approval of their Statutes through organic laws, developing the level of self-government, own institutions, and distribution of competences that the reformed Constitution allows.

Both processes require reinforced majorities and broad consensus, so the central element is not only legal-procedural but also political: without broad agreement in the Congress and the Senate, modifying the territorial status of Ceuta and Melilla is not feasible.

In the last regional elections to the Assembly of Melilla, held on May 28, 2023, the party that obtained the majority of seats was the People's Party (PP). According to the electoral data consulted, the PP won 14 of the 25 seats in the Assembly, which gave it an absolute majority in the Melilla chamber.

The Assembly of Melilla is the legislative body of the autonomous city and is composed of 25 deputies. Achieving 14 seats means surpassing the classic threshold of absolute majority (half plus one), which in this case is 13. Obtaining that fourteenth seat by the PP not only made it the most voted force but also allowed it to have a capacity to govern alone arithmetically, without the need for stable support from other parties for investiture or for the approval of most ordinary initiatives.

The 2023 results thus consolidated the role of the PP as a hegemonic force in Melilla's politics. Available information indicates that, after those elections, the institutional leadership of the city again fell to Juan José Imbroda, from the People's Party, who is listed as president of the Autonomous City of Melilla. This continuity in the presidential figure links to a long trajectory of Imbroda at the head of Melilla's institutions, having already presided over the city during several previous terms.

Although the data consulted focus on the main fact—the PP's majority with 14 seats—they do allow some clear political implications to be drawn. First, the configuration of the Assembly resulting from the May 28, 2023 elections left the PP in a position of clear negotiating advantage over the other parties. Even in scenarios where it might need occasional agreements (for example, for issues requiring reinforced majorities or to provide political stability in tense situations), part of that strength comes precisely from having enough votes to pass a large part of the government agenda alone.

Second, the PP's absolute majority in Melilla fits into a broader context of territorial strength of the PP in several autonomous areas in this political cycle. Although each territory has its own dynamics, Melilla's case is often cited as an example of a consolidated stronghold, with very personalized leadership around Imbroda and an electorate that has repeatedly supported that political option.

The rest of the Assembly seats were distributed among other political formations present in the autonomous city, but none of them reached a number of representatives comparable to the PP nor, of course, an absolute majority. This fragmentation in the non-PP space further reinforces the specific weight of the People's Party within the chamber.

From an institutional point of view, having a single party control the majority of seats in a small chamber like Melilla's has very visible effects on daily functioning:

• It facilitates the approval of the autonomous city's budgets, as it mainly depends on the internal discipline of the majority group.
• It allows greater control over the Assembly's Board and the organization of parliamentary work (agenda, pace of processing initiatives, etc.).
• It grants the majority party a central role in the appointment of institutional positions linked to the Assembly and in the dialogue with the central Government.

In summary, to the question of which party obtained the majority of seats in Melilla in the last regional elections, the answer is clear: the People's Party, with 14 of the 25 seats in the Assembly of Melilla, achieved an absolute majority and positioned itself at the center of the political and institutional power of the autonomous city after the 2023 elections.