Junqueras and the 29N: what is missing for him to be able to be a candidate

There are no legally pending parliamentary procedures for the full validity of Organic Law 1/2024, of June 10, on amnesty for institutional, political, and social normalization in Catalonia, regarding the cases of the procés, including those similar to Oriol Junqueras. The legislative process is closed and the law is in force; what remains open is, above all, the judicial application case by case and the constitutional control and interpretation of the norm.

1. Situation of the Amnesty Law

According to the official note from the Congress, the law was definitively approved on May 30, 2024, when the Congress lifted the Senate's veto by an absolute majority, and its parliamentary processing was declared concluded and “ready for publication in the BOE and entry into force.” It was then published in the BOE of June 11, 2024 as Organic Law 1/2024, entering into force the same day it was published.

The text fully establishes:

• The objective and temporal scope of the amnesty (Title I, arts. 1 and 2).
• The effects on criminal, administrative, and accounting responsibility, including disqualifications and records (Title II, arts. 3 to 8).
• The jurisdiction and procedure to apply the amnesty in each judicial order (Title III, arts. 9 and following).
• Amendments to the Organic Law of the Court of Auditors and the Penal Code to introduce amnesty as a cause for extinguishing responsibility, and the clause of entry into force on the day of publication in the BOE.

That is, from a parliamentary point of view, no specific regulatory development or a second legislative phase essential for its effectiveness is missing.

2. What the Parliament can still do (but it does not condition applicability)

Once the law is approved and published, the Cortes Generales only retain their ordinary instruments of political control and monitoring, regulated in the Rules of Procedure:

• Non-legislative motions (Title X of the Congress Rules): allow groups to approve resolutions urging the Government to guarantee the application of the amnesty, report periodically, etc. But these resolutions have no direct legal effects on criminal or accounting processes.
• Communications, programs, plans, and reports from the Government (Title XI, arts. 196‑201): the Government can send communications or plans about the application of the law; commissions or the Plenary debate them and approve resolution proposals, again of a political nature.
• Informative appearances of the Government (arts. 202‑203): commissions or the Plenary can call ministers to report on how the amnesty is being applied, what criteria the Executive follows before European courts, etc.
• Interpellations and questions (Title IX): serve to demand explanations from the Government about its actions defending the law before the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court, or the Court of Auditors, but do not alter the content or validity of the norm.
• Ultimately, a future reform of the Amnesty Law itself is always possible, again following the legislative procedure, if the parliamentary majority wishes to change its scope or clarify disputed aspects.

None of these instruments is, however, a condition for the law to be applicable. They are mechanisms of political control and pressure on the Government and, indirectly, on the judiciary, but not “pending phases” of the legislative procedure.

3. What is pending: judicial decisions

What determines today the “complete application” of the amnesty in cases like Junqueras’ are no longer parliamentary steps, but three judicial levels:

• The application by ordinary courts and the Supreme Court, which must decide in each case whether the facts fit within the scope of the law and whether exclusion causes concur (especially regarding embezzlement and possible personal benefit or impact on European financial interests).
• The control of the Constitutional Court over:
  • The general constitutionality of the law (already upheld in a ruling that declares the amnesty for the procés valid, with critical dissenting opinions).
  • The amparo appeals of pro-independence leaders – including Junqueras – against Supreme Court decisions that denied them amnesty, especially for embezzlement.
• The interaction with the Court of Justice of the European Union, whose rulings have endorsed the compatibility of the amnesty with EU law and have conditioned the interpretation of key aspects such as embezzlement. This reinforces pressure on the Supreme and Constitutional Courts but remains a judicial front.

4. Application to cases similar to Junqueras'

In cases of convicted individuals from the procés with disqualification sentences for embezzlement, like Junqueras, the current situation is:

• The law is fully in force and expressly provides for the extinction of responsibility and lifting of disqualifications when its requirements are met.
• Some courts have applied the amnesty to less controversial cases; however, the Supreme Court has maintained reservations about certain embezzlement cases, which has led to amparo appeals.
• The Constitutional Court and the CJEU have become the ultimate arbitrators on how the law should be interpreted in these borderline cases.

Therefore, for Junqueras and analogous cases, no parliamentary procedure is missing. What remains pending is the completion of the chain of judicial decisions — Supreme, Constitutional, and, if applicable, European instances — that determine whether their specific convictions and disqualifications are amnestied under Organic Law 1/2024.

The Supreme Court is the highest judicial body in all branches of the Spanish judicial system, except for constitutional guarantees which correspond to the Constitutional Court. Its position is mainly defined by the Spanish Constitution (arts. 117 and 123) and the Organic Law of the Judiciary (LOPJ). Below are its essential competencies and responsibilities.

1. Highest judicial body

The Supreme Court is the pinnacle of the ordinary judicial organization. This implies:

• Unification of doctrine: it ensures that lower courts apply the law uniformly. Its rulings set interpretative criteria that serve as binding references for courts and tribunals.
• Supplementary-interpretative character: although formally its rulings only bind the specific case, its doctrine is generally followed, forming consolidated jurisprudence when there is a repeated line of decisions on the same issue.
• Statewide scope: it exercises jurisdiction over the entire Spanish territory and all ordinary judicial branches (civil, criminal, administrative litigation, social, and military).

2. Competencies by judicial branches

a) Civil Chamber

The First Chamber mainly handles:

• Cassation appeals in civil matters, to correct incorrect application or interpretation of the law by lower courts.
• Extraordinary appeals for procedural infringement in civil matters.
• Certain civil liability trials against high authorities (e.g., for acts outside the exercise of their public functions).

b) Criminal Chamber

The Second Chamber assumes especially sensitive functions:

• Handles criminal cassation appeals against rulings issued by superior courts.
• Tries, in sole instance, certain privileged defendants (national deputies and senators, government members, high court magistrates, Attorney General, etc.) for crimes committed in the exercise of their offices.
• Handles revision appeals of final criminal rulings in specific cases (new evidence, ECHR rulings, etc.).

c) Administrative Litigation Chamber

The Third Chamber ultimately controls the legality of public administrations’ actions:

• Resolves cassation appeals in administrative litigation against rulings of the National Court and High Courts of Justice.
• Hears in first and sole instance certain acts and provisions of the Government and highest administrative authorities (e.g., some royal decrees and Council of Ministers agreements).
• Exercises control over state regulations as established by law.

d) Social Chamber

The Fourth Chamber is the apex of the social order (labor and social security):

• Resolves social cassation appeals against rulings of High Courts of Justice and the National Court.
• Sets jurisprudence in labor law, collective labor relations, and social security benefits.

e) Military Chamber

The Fifth Chamber is the supreme body of military jurisdiction:

• Handles appeals against military tribunal rulings.
• Tries certain military crimes committed by Armed Forces members and, in some cases, civilians subject to military jurisdiction.

3. Cassation and review function

One of the Supreme Court’s central responsibilities is its cassation function. Through the cassation appeal:

• In principle, the proven facts are not re-evaluated, but the legal correctness of the appealed ruling is reviewed.
• Violations of law, consolidated jurisprudence, or procedural rules are corrected, ensuring homogeneous application of the law.

Additionally, it handles review appeals and other extraordinary appeals, serving as the ultimate guarantee against serious errors or material injustices in final decisions.

4. Disciplinary responsibility and internal governance

The Supreme Court, through its Governing Chamber and in connection with the General Council of the Judiciary (CGPJ), also has internal responsibilities:

• Organization and internal functioning of Chambers and Sections (case distribution, internal rules, etc.).
• Collaboration with the CGPJ in judicial discipline, although disciplinary power mainly belongs to the Council.
• Participation, through reports and proposals, in improving the functioning of the Administration of Justice.

5. Relationship with the Constitutional Court

Although the Supreme Court is the highest judicial body of the judiciary, it is subordinate, regarding fundamental rights and constitutional control, to the decisions of the Constitutional Court:

• Its rulings may be subject to amparo appeals before the Constitutional Court when fundamental rights violations are alleged.
• It is bound by constitutional jurisprudence, which may require reinterpreting or even annulling previous Supreme Court criteria.

Overall, the Supreme Court’s competencies articulate a key role: guaranteeing the unity of interpretation of the legal system, offering a last instance of control over judges and administrations, and providing legal certainty to the entire system.

Oriol Junqueras i Vies (Barcelona, April 11, 1969) has developed a trajectory combining academic training as a historian, public dissemination, and an intense political career that has made him one of the central figures of Catalan independence, before, during, and after leading Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC).

Academic and professional stage prior to frontline politics

Junqueras graduated in Modern and Contemporary History and earned a doctorate in the History of Economic Thought from the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. According to consulted biographies, he worked as a university professor and researcher, focusing on economic history, political thought, and Catalonia’s history. Simultaneously, he developed notable historical dissemination work in media — radio, television, and press — and cultural activities, which gave him a public profile before fully entering institutional politics.

Beginnings in politics: municipal and European scope

His first organizational involvement occurred locally. In the mid-2000s, he began collaborating with ERC in Sant Vicenç dels Horts (Barcelona). In 2007 he was elected councilor and, in the 2011 municipal elections, he became mayor, a position he held until 2015. This experience consolidated his image as a grassroots leader with strong municipal implantation.

In parallel, he jumped to the European stage. In 2009 he was elected Member of the European Parliament within the Europa de los Pueblos–Verdes candidacy, a coalition including ERC and other forces of the European Free Alliance. He held the seat until 2012. In this phase, he combined his European projection with teaching and dissemination, at a time when he was not yet the main organizational reference of ERC.

Access to the presidency of ERC and party reconstruction

The internal crisis and poor results of ERC after the tripartite culminated in his election as party president in September 2011. His leadership had a dual objective: to rebuild the organization and expand its electoral base. Under his presidency, ERC went from 10 seats in 2010 to 21 deputies in the 2012 Catalan elections, where Junqueras led the ERC–Catalunya Sí candidacy.

This result positioned him as the main opposition reference to Artur Mas’s Government and, de facto, as one of the central leaders of the pro-sovereignty space. Since then, he also served as president of the republican parliamentary group in the Parliament of Catalonia.

From ERC leadership to the Generalitat Government

In the cycle of the independence process, Junqueras promoted, together with the former Convergència, the Junts pel Sí coalition for the 2015 Catalan elections. The candidacy won the regional elections and paved the way for the Government led by Carles Puigdemont.

In January 2016, Junqueras was appointed Vice President of the Generalitat and Minister of Economy and Finance. From this position, he assumed key competencies in economic policy, budgets, and public finances. During 2016 and 2017, he became one of the main strategists of the procés, both in internal negotiation within the independence bloc and in international projection.

As Vice President, he played a prominent role in the political organization of the October 1, 2017 referendum and the sequence that led to the unilateral declaration of independence. After the application of Article 155 of the Constitution and the intervention of Catalan autonomy, he was dismissed from his Government responsibilities.

Imprisonment, conviction, and pardon

In November 2017, he was placed in preventive detention. In October 2019, the Supreme Court sentenced him to 13 years in prison and 13 years of disqualification for sedition and embezzlement linked to the independence process. Despite imprisonment, he remained ERC’s main reference, maintaining his presidency and leading the lists in the April 2019 general elections and the May 2019 European elections.

In June 2021, the Spanish Government granted him a partial pardon, which affected the prison sentence but did not initially remove the disqualification. According to the analysis published by Demócrata, his eventual full political habilitation depends on how the Amnesty Law and Constitutional Court decisions are applied, although European rulings have weakened some of the arguments used to maintain the disqualification.

Internal crisis in ERC, resignation, and return to the presidency

Junqueras presided over ERC from 2011 until June 2024, a period marked by the electoral growth of independence, participation in the Government, and later a complex relationship with Pedro Sánchez’s Government and the PSC. After a series of adverse electoral results and intense internal debate about strategy — particularly regarding agreements with the PSOE — he announced his resignation from the presidency before the National Executive in June 2024. The general secretariat assumed the functions temporarily until an extraordinary congress.

However, his withdrawal was temporary. In December 2024, at a congress with a very divided membership, he was re-elected president of ERC with a narrow result. Since then, according to the press and party communications, his priority has been to rebuild internal unity, redefine the relationship with the PSC and the central Government, and design a “new national ambition” for Catalan independence, while his disqualification situation continued to condition his access to elective public offices.

Current situation and political role

Currently, Junqueras remains president of ERC and one of the most influential voices of the independence movement. His activity focuses on party leadership, alliance building — both in Catalonia and internationally, for example through his participation in the Puebla Group — and the elaboration of ERC’s political narrative after the most intense cycle of the procés.

Overall, his trajectory traces a path from historian and disseminator to municipal leader and MEP, culminating in the leadership of ERC and the vice presidency of the Generalitat during the independence process, followed by imprisonment, conviction, partial pardon, and return to party leadership in a more fragmented and demanding context for Catalan sovereignty.