The "single command" that the PP claims for Ceuta does not appear by that name in the National Security Law. The norm does allow the president of the Government to declare a "situation of interest for National Security" and, within that mechanism, appoint a functional authority in charge of directing and coordinating the actions of the different administrations involved. This would mean centralizing the political and operational response to the crisis, but not granting that person extraordinary powers or placing all Ceuta institutions under their orders.
The PP has brought this request to Congress after the massive entry of migrants recorded at the end of July. Cuca Gamarra demands that the Government consider what happened a national security crisis, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, increase police and military forces, strengthen Immigration, and accelerate returns. The measures are part of two non-legislative propositions of equivalent content presented for debate in the Joint Commission of National Security and in the Interior Commission.
The expression "single command" simplifies, therefore, a mechanism that is much more concrete. For it to exist, a step must first be taken that only Pedro Sánchez can adopt: formally declaring a situation of interest for National Security through a royal decree.
What exactly is the "single command"
Law 36/2015 on National Security does not use that expression. Its article 24 establishes that, when the president declares a situation of interest for National Security, the royal decree may include the appointment of a "functional authority" and must specify exactly what powers it will have to direct and coordinate the necessary actions.
That is what the PP is politically calling "single command."
Its function would be to prevent each involved agency from responding to the crisis separately. In a scenario like that of Ceuta, it would be necessary to coordinate actions affecting Interior, Defense, Immigration, child protection, the Government Delegation, authorities of the Autonomous City, and, eventually, other public services.
It does not mean merging all those agencies under a new structure. It means placing their action in response to that crisis under a coordinated and previously defined direction.
The National Security Law itself defines these situations as crises that, due to their severity, urgency, dimension, and transversal nature, require "reinforced coordination" from the authorities that already have competencies.
Who could be that command
The law does not determine in advance who has to occupy the so-called functional authority.
The decision would correspond to the president of the Government, who should include the appointment in the royal decree or determine it within the mechanism provided to manage the crisis. The National Security Council would advise Sánchez on the choice.
That is why it cannot be stated now that the command would have to correspond to the Minister of the Interior, the Government delegate in Ceuta, a military official, or any other specific position.
The identity would depend on the decision of the Executive and, above all, on the functions that it wished to concentrate in that authority.
What it would mean in practice for Ceuta
The main difference would be in the chain of coordination.
Currently, the different actors act according to their competencies: the National Police and Civil Guard depend on the Ministry of the Interior; the Armed Forces have their own structure; the Government Delegation develops the state competencies in Ceuta; the Autonomous City maintains its own, including those related to certain public services and child protection.
The declaration would allow to organize those resources within a common response directed from the National Security System.
The royal decree would have to establish five essential issues: what crisis is being faced, what territory it encompasses, how long the mechanism will remain activated, what competencies the functional authority will have —if designated— and what human and material resources will be necessary.
The competent administrations would be obliged to provide the necessary means that are under their dependency within the limits established by law.
Applied to the demands of the PP, it could serve to integrate within the same operational direction the police reinforcements, the management of Immigration, border surveillance, and other state resources specifically aimed at responding to the crisis.
But the royal decree would have to determine what resources are mobilized. The declaration does not automatically generate more police, civil guards, military personnel, or immigration officials.
What a single command could not do
This is one of the fundamental differences compared to a state of exception.
Declaring a situation of interest for National Security does not suspend fundamental rights, does not allow the use of extraordinary powers, and does not imply intervening in Ceuta. The law itself requires managing the crisis through the ordinary powers that the different administrations already have.
The competencies of the Autonomous City and those of the different ministries do not disappear either.
The Constitutional Court made this issue clear in 2016 when examining the National Security Law: the mechanism establishes a reinforced coordination, but does not alter the distribution of competencies among administrations. Resources can be temporarily put at the service of the common response without changing their organic dependence permanently.
That is why "single command" can lead to a broader idea than what the legislation actually contemplates. The functional authority directs and coordinates certain actions; it does not receive a general power over all the institutions present in the territory.
It is also not a state of alarm, exception, or siege
The National Security Law expressly establishes this separation.
A situation of interest for National Security is designed for crises serious enough to require a coordinated action from different administrations, but that can be managed using the ordinary powers of the State.
If the situation required resorting to exceptional powers, one would have to refer to the specific constitutional regulations corresponding.
The mechanism proposed by the PP for Ceuta would therefore not imply the automatic declaration of any of those exceptional states.
The final word belongs to Sánchez
The PP can request the activation of the mechanism from Congress, but cannot declare it from Parliament.
Article 15 of the National Security Law expressly assigns to the President of the Government the competence to declare a situation of interest for National Security. He must do so by royal decree.
This also limits the effect of the initiatives registered by the popular party.
Non-legislative propositions are instruments through which Congress or its committees set a political position and urge the Government to act. They are not laws and their agreements have a political scope, not binding legal effects on the Executive. This is explained by Congress itself when describing its parliamentary control instruments.
Therefore, even if the PP managed to push its proposal forward in the Joint Commission of National Security, where it proposes to debate it alongside another identical initiative in Interior, the vote would not activate the single command.
The Government would then have to assume the request and Sánchez would have to formally declare the situation.
What would have to happen to activate it?
The law requires that the crisis has certain characteristics.
It must be a situation whose seriousness, dimension, urgency, and transversality make a reinforced coordination of the competent authorities necessary. The regulation does not contain a closed list of events that must automatically be considered situations of interest for National Security.
The PP believes that the crisis in Ceuta meets those conditions and wants the Executive to recognize it as a matter of national security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.
It is up to the Government to accept or reject that interpretation.
The PP demands much more than a single command
The coordination mechanism is only part of the measures presented by the popular party.
The initiative proposes a National Normalization Plan, more effective National Police and Civil Guard, presence of specialists from the Central Unit of Immigration Networks and Document Fraud, and a reinforcement of at least 50 Foreign Affairs officials, according to the proposal announced by Gamarra.
The party also demands more participation from the Armed Forces and calls for strengthening the material and technological means at the border.
An eventual declaration of a situation of interest for National Security could provide the coordination framework for some of those resources, but would not approve all these measures by itself. Some depend directly on decisions from the Government and the corresponding ministries, and others would require regulatory changes.
The return of minors would not be automatic either
One of the politically most sensitive points of the proposal is the PP's request to return those who entered Ceuta irregularly, including minors.
In this latter case, the existence of a single command would not allow for a collective or automatic return to be ordered.
The Immigration Law and its regulations establish a specific procedure for unaccompanied foreign minors. Before agreeing to a repatriation, their family circumstances must be analyzed, among other issues, and it must be determined that the return responds to the best interest of the child. The alternative may be reunification with their family or their handover to the protection services of the country of origin when adequate conditions exist.
The procedure corresponds to the State Administration and also requires the intervention of protection services and the Public Prosecutor's Office, as well as guarantees for the minor to be heard.
The initiative itself of the PP included in the starting piece conditions the return on respecting those legal guarantees and the best interest of the child.
What would really change if the Government accepted the proposal
The main difference would be political and organizational.
The management of the crisis would stop relying solely on ordinary coordination between ministries and administrations and would move to the formal framework of crisis management of National Security, directed by the president of the Government and assisted by the National Security Council.
An authority could be appointed with express capacity to coordinate the assigned actions, determine what resources the administrations must provide, and establish a specific duration for the device.
The Government would also have to inform Congress immediately about the measures adopted and about the evolution of the situation.
What would not change is the constitutional framework: neither the single command could assume unlimited powers, nor would the declaration allow for the suspension of rights, nor would it automatically make legal measures that need to comply with immigration law, child protection, or defense.
That is the real scope of the request that the PP has brought to Congress: not to create an authority with exceptional powers in Ceuta, but to ask Sánchez to formally elevate the crisis to the National Security System and concentrate under a functional direction the response of the different state bodies.