The Kings visit Ceuta for the first time since 2014 and convey their support to the city after the border crisis.

The measures to reinforce the Ceuta border following the 2021 migration crisis have not materialized into a single “Ceuta border reinforcement law” that has been approved and is in force. The parliamentary response has been articulated through a combination of motions and non-legislative proposals (political impetus agreements) already approved, and a key legal reform of the Immigration Law that is still under processing. Therefore, much of the material and operational reinforcement depends more on executive decisions by the Government than on a specific norm approved by the Cortes.

1. Legal reforms on border rejection (core legislative process ongoing)

The most clearly legislative axis is the reform of the tenth additional provision of Organic Law 4/2000 on Immigration, which regulates the special regime of border rejection in Ceuta and Melilla. Following the Supreme Court doctrine on the returns of people entering by swimming, the Popular Party has promoted a bill so that this regime applies to entries both by land and by sea.

• The Senate Plenary has approved the consideration of this bill, with the absolute majority of the PP, and the initiative is now sent to the Congress of Deputies to continue its legislative processing, where the Popular Party demands an urgent procedure.
  See, for example, Demócrata's coverage of this Senate vote: article on the border rejection reform.
• Until the Congress debates, amends, and approves (or rejects) the text, the reform is not yet in force. Therefore, the parliamentary processing of this central piece remains open and at an intermediate stage.

In summary, the only significant legislative initiative specifically connected with the management of massive entries in Ceuta is this amendment to the Immigration Law, currently in progress and without final approval.

2. Motions and non-legislative proposals on reinforcement of resources and infrastructure

Apart from the legal reform, the Cortes have debated and approved various political impetus initiatives related to the reinforcement of the border and security in Ceuta:

• In the Senate Interior Commission, the PP managed to approve in February 2026 a motion urging the Government to permanently reinforce the human and material resources at the Ceuta border (more Civil Guard and National Police, modernization of the fence, rehabilitation of the Benzú and Tarajal breakwaters, improvement of surveillance and rescue systems, etc.). This motion is concluded as a parliamentary act, but its execution depends on the Executive.
  Detailed information in the PP note: “The PP demands the Government reinforce human and material resources at the Ceuta border”.
• In the Congress Plenary, in September 2026 a motion following an urgent interpellation on “the crisis facing the Autonomous City of Ceuta” was approved, which includes political mandates such as:
  • Immediately and permanently reinforce the presence of National Police, Civil Guard, and, when appropriate, Armed Forces in Ceuta.
  • Increase resources for identification and processing of returns, repatriations, and asylum applications.
  The text is approved and the processing of the motion has already concluded, but it remains a political impetus resolution, not a binding law.
  Congress press release: motion on the Ceuta crisis.
• Additionally, the PP has registered in Congress a non-legislative proposal with a plan of about 650 million euros for Ceuta and Melilla, combining border reinforcement (extending the perimeter towards the sea, deployment of Frontex, more agents and technology) and economic and social measures. These NNPs follow the usual dynamic: registration, debate in commission or plenary, and eventual approval or rejection as political impetus agreements.
  Coverage in Demócrata: PP plan for Ceuta and Melilla.

In all these cases, even when motions and NNPs have been approved, the “parliamentary processing” is concluded: they do not themselves generate new legal norms but rather political orientations and demands to the Government, whose execution is discretionary.

3. Comprehensive Security Plan and other initiatives derived from 2021

After the May 2021 migration crisis, the National Security Strategy included the commitment to a Comprehensive Security Plan for Ceuta and Melilla. To date, various parliamentary and press sources indicate that:

• The PP has promoted motions in the Senate demanding that this plan be developed “once and for all,” emphasizing its connection with the 2021 episodes.
• However, there is no record that this plan has been translated into a law or that its content is regulated in a specific norm approved by the Cortes.

Consequently, the current balance is as follows: there is no closed and in-force law that, as such, constitutes the comprehensive parliamentary response to the 2021 crisis. What does exist is a set of already approved impetus initiatives (motions and NNPs) and a reform of the Immigration Law in parliamentary processing, expected to be the main normative piece if finally approved by Congress and Senate.

The Statute of Autonomy of Ceuta (Organic Law 1/1995, of March 13) configures the President of the City as the central piece of the Ceuta institutional system. His powers and functions are especially deduced from articles 6, 9, 12, 15, 16, and 17 of the Statute, in connection with the general powers of the City in Title III.

First, the Statute defines in article 6 the institutional bodies of the City: the Assembly of Ceuta, the President, and the Government Council. That is, the President is not just a reinforced mayor but a distinct institution along with the Assembly and the executive collegiate body.

Article 9.1 specifies that the Assembly's Board is composed, among others, by the President of the City, who presides over it. From this derive several functions:

• Presidency of the Assembly: directs the Plenary sessions, orders debates, and ensures respect for the Assembly's Rules.
• Convocation function: although details are referred to the Rules, the President intervenes in the convocation of ordinary and extraordinary sessions (articles 10 and 11, in relation to 9).

Based on what the Statute further states, article 12 c) expressly attributes to the Assembly the election of the President of the City from among its members. The following provision (article 15, which includes the paragraph about the President in the consulted text) specifies the personal statute and core functions of the Presidency:

• Multiple institutional presidency: the President presides over the Assembly and the Government Council, whose activity he directs and coordinates.
• Supreme representation: he holds the “supreme representation of the City,” implying being the highest political and institutional representative of Ceuta before the State, other communities, and the citizenry.
• Mayor status: the Statute establishes that the President “also holds the status of Mayor,” which grants him the functions typical of the head of local government according to local regime legislation, adapted to the City's special autonomous framework.
• Power of appointment and dismissal: he freely appoints and removes the Councilors who make up the Government Council (articles 15 and 16), thus configuring the political team managing the City's executive action.
• Delegation of functions: he can temporarily delegate certain executive functions to members of the Government Council, providing flexibility in the Executive's organization.

Regarding the nature of his political responsibilities, the Statute introduces control and responsibility mechanisms similar to those of a parliamentary head of government, included in subsequent articles regulating the vote of confidence and the motion of censure:

• Vote of confidence (article related to confidence): the President, after deliberation with the Government Council, can submit a vote of confidence to the Assembly on his program or a general policy declaration. If he does not obtain confidence by simple majority, he must resign, opening a new presidential election process.
• Motion of censure (article related to censure): the Assembly can demand the President's political responsibility through a constructive motion of censure (which must include an alternative candidate for the Presidency). If approved by absolute majority, the proposed candidate is invested and appointed President of the City.

These provisions place the President at the center of a political trust relationship with the Assembly: he directs the Executive and the City's policy but remains subject to parliamentary control and can be replaced if he loses that trust.

The material competence of the President is also understood in light of articles 16 and 17:

• The Government Council, presided over by him, is the body that exercises the City’s “executive and administrative functions” (art. 16.1).
• The Government Council is responsible for the “direction of the city's policy and the exercise of the corresponding executive and administrative functions” (art. 17.1), as well as the regulatory development of norms approved by the Assembly in certain cases (art. 17.2 and 3).

Consequently, the President exercises the highest executive functions in all sectors of Ceuta’s competence listed in article 21 (territorial planning, urbanism, housing, transport, culture, heritage, health, social assistance, local police, etc.), insofar as these competences are deployed through the Government Council he directs and coordinates.

In summary, the Statute configures the President of the Autonomous City of Ceuta as:

• The highest institutional and political authority of the City.
• President of the Assembly and the Government Council.
• Head of the Executive and responsible for directing general policy.
• Mayor of the City, with the functions typical of municipal government reinforced by the autonomous statute.
• A figure subject to parliamentary control through the vote of confidence and motion of censure, with direct political responsibility before the Assembly.

The Assembly of Ceuta has 25 seats and the absolute majority is set at 13. Between the autonomous elections of 2015, 2019, and 2023 a clear evolution is observed: a shift from the dominance of the Popular Party to a much more fragmented scenario, with the emergence of Vox and the strengthening of localist formations (MDyC and, later, Ceuta Ya!).

Composition after the 2015 elections

In the 2015 autonomous elections, the Assembly of Ceuta was clearly dominated by the Popular Party (PP), which obtained 13 seats, exactly the absolute majority. The distribution was:

• PP: 13 seats
• PSOE: 7 seats
• Movement for Dignity and Citizenship (MDyC): 3 seats
• Caballas: 2 seats

This distribution allowed the PP to govern alone, without the need for formal investiture or government pacts. The opposition block was divided between a PSOE with relevant but clearly minority weight and two localist candidacies (MDyC and Caballas), which together summed 5 deputies. There was no representation yet of state forces to the right of the PP nor new brands to the left of PSOE.

Cycle change in 2019: entry of Vox and loss of PP absolute majority

In 2019 the most abrupt change of the analyzed period occurred. The resulting composition was:

• PP: 9 seats
• PSOE: 7 seats
• Vox: 6 seats
• MDyC: 2 seats
• Caballas: 1 seat

The PP lost 4 seats compared to 2015 and thus the absolute majority. The central novelty is the entry of Vox with 6 deputies, becoming suddenly the third force in the Assembly. PSOE remained stable at 7 seats, while the localist space weakened: MDyC dropped to 2 and Caballas to 1.

Although the PP no longer controls the chamber alone, the sum PP + Vox reaches 15 seats, well above the absolute majority. From the political composition point of view, 2019 marks the transition from a dominant party system to a tripolar chamber: PP, PSOE, and Vox concentrate most seats, with a smaller but still present localist space.

2023 elections: stabilization of PP, slight decline of PSOE and Vox, and localist strengthening

In 2023 the total number of seats remains 25, but the forces are reordered. The distribution is:

• PP: 9 seats
• PSOE: 6 seats
• Vox: 5 seats
• MDyC: 3 seats
• Ceuta Ya!: 2 seats

The PP retains its 9 seats, consolidating the 2019 recovery compared to the previous absolute majority situation but without improving results. In contrast, both PSOE and Vox lose one deputy each (from 7 to 6 and from 6 to 5, respectively). The localist space strengthens: MDyC recovers the 3rd seat and Ceuta Ya! —the political heir of Caballas— obtains 2 seats, effectively reproducing the 3+2 sum that existed in 2015.

In terms of blocks, the sum of the state right (PP + Vox) goes from 15 seats in 2019 to 14 in 2023, still above the absolute majority. The progressive and localist opposition block (PSOE + MDyC + Ceuta Ya!) sums 11 seats, insufficient to form an alternative majority but with greater weight than in 2015.

Summary of the 2015–2023 evolution

Looking at the period as a whole, three major trends can be summarized:

• Loss of PP hegemony: it goes from 13 to 9 seats between 2015 and 2019 and remains at 9 in 2023. From a party with absolute majority to a central force that needs support to ensure governability.
• Emergence and consolidation of Vox: enters strongly in 2019 (6 seats) and remains the third force in 2023 (5 seats), configuring a broader and more competitive right-wing block.
• Reconfiguration of the progressive and localist space: PSOE slightly stabilizes downward (from 7 to 6), while localist candidacies, weakened in 2019, recover ground in 2023 to again reach 5 seats between MDyC and Ceuta Ya!, similar to the MDyC + Caballas sum of 2015.

In sum, the Assembly of Ceuta has shifted from a clear absolute majority model to a more plural balance, where governability depends on agreements between PP and Vox and where localist forces have regained a relevant role as a specific voice of Ceuta’s reality.