What communities could ask the State to keep their Commuter trains

The assumption of management of Cercanías services by Catalonia and the Basque Country has not been done with a single act, but by chaining political investiture agreements, bilateral and mixed transfer commissions, transfer royal decrees, and agreements with Renfe and Adif. In Catalonia, the process is still "in deployment," while in the Basque Country the transfer of competences for Cercanías has been effective since January 1, 2025.

Catalonia: from the 2009–2010 royal decrees to the mixed company model

The transfer of management of Cercanías and regional services in Catalonia is structured in two major phases:

• First competence block (2009–2010): the basic legal framework consists of:
  • Royal Decree 2034/2009, of December 30, on the transfer to the Generalitat of the functions of the State General Administration corresponding to the commuter rail passenger transport service, published in the BOE on 12/31/2009 (text in BOE).
  • Erratum correction of the same RD, dated 01/14/2010 (link).
  • Royal Decree 1598/2010, of November 26, which extends the transfer to regional rail services on the Iberian gauge network in Catalonia (link).
  These royal decrees approve the agreements of the State–Generalitat Mixed Transfer Commission (art. 149 CE, 2006 Statute, arts. 169 and 140), by which the Generalitat assumes the regulation, planning, management, coordination, inspection, and tariff authority of Cercanías and regional services in Catalonia, while the State reserves functions over infrastructure of the General Interest Railway Network, operational safety, railway company licenses, personnel training and certification, etc. RD 2034/2009 explicitly states the subrogation of the Generalitat in the program contract with Renfe and the need for a Generalitat–Renfe agreement and an agreement with Adif for infrastructure use.
• Second phase: "integral" transfer and mixed company (Sánchez–ERC Stage):
  • The PSOE–ERC investiture agreement of November 2023 expressly includes the “integral transfer of Rodalies” to the Generalitat, as recognized by the Ministry of Transport itself in the note “Santano calls the agreement for the creation of the new Rodalies company a historic milestone” dated 06/19/2025 (MITMA).
  • On 07/22/2024, the Generalitat details in a note the agreements of the State–Generalitat Mixed Commission regarding Rodalies, all “derived from the investiture agreement between ERC and PSOE” and focused on action plan financing, new lines (Rodalia Lleida), and operating deficit (Govern note). This financing is also structured through Council of Ministers agreements and royal decrees of direct aid and financing reinforcement (for example, the RD for up to 97 million in 2024, explained by MITMA on 10/08/2024: link).
  • On 02/17/2025, the State–Generalitat Bilateral Infrastructure Commission agrees to take the key step: constitution of the mixed company “Rodalies de Catalunya, S.M.E., S.A.” and transfer of the infrastructure of line R1 (Sagrera Bifurcation–Maçanet Massanes section), after exclusion from the RFIG (Moncloa note).
  • On 06/19/2025, the agreement to create Rodalies de Catalunya, S.M.E., S.A. is publicly presented, which will be the future operator of Cercanías and regional services in Catalonia, jointly owned by Renfe Viajeros (50.1%) and the Generalitat (49.9%), with a board of nine members (five appointed by the Government and four by the State) and a presidency proposed by the Generalitat (MITMA). This company is the instrument to move from mere “authority” over the service (already transferred in 2009–2010) to integrated direct management of the service, stations, and even part of the infrastructure.
  These milestones are complemented by motions in the Senate (ERC and Junts demanding immediate and integral transfer and criticized by the Government: Demócrata), which are part of the parliamentary environment but have no direct legal effects.

Basque Country: complete transfer via royal decree and contractual subrogation

In Euskadi, the sequence is more closed and already executed:

• Political investiture agreement with the PNV: analysis articles collected by Demócrata indicate that the PNV conditions its support for Sánchez on a broad package of statutory transfers and that the degree of compliance with that investiture agreement is measured precisely by the transfers executed (including Cercanías) and by completing the Gernika Statute (transfer analysis).
• Mixed Transfer Commission of 03/11/2024: in that meeting, the agreement to transfer to Euskadi the functions of the State General Administration regarding Cercanías services is approved, which is then submitted to the Council of Ministers.
• Royal Decree 368/2024, of April 9, transferring to the Basque Autonomous Community the functions of the State Administration corresponding to commuter rail passenger transport services, published in the BOE on 04/19/2024 (BOE).
  • Formally approves the agreement of the Mixed Commission and details that the CAPV assumes regulation, planning, management, coordination, inspection, and tariff authority over the Bilbao and San Sebastián Cercanías cores and the C4f meter-gauge line, as well as certain future services (Alsasua–Vitoria–Miranda, Karrantza–Bilbao, etc.).
  • Establishes that the transfer will be effective when the Subrogation Agreement of the General Administration of Euskadi in the public service contract between the AGE and Renfe Viajeros is signed, and foresees a Cooperation and Monitoring Commission.
• Contractual subrogation and tripartite agreements:
  • According to the Resolution of 07/03/2025 on the AGE–Renfe–Euskadi agreement in the Alsasua‑Vitoria‑Miranda corridor (BOE-A-2025-15718), RD 368/2024 foresees that the transfer is effective from the entry into force of the Subrogation Agreement; this was signed on 11/28/2024 and the transfer “has been effective as of January 1, 2025.”
  • MITMA also describes a tripartite agreement between the Government of Spain–Basque Government–Renfe signed in Bilbao on 11/28/2024, which operationally develops the transfer and is accompanied by the State's commitment to invest more than 400 million euros in railway infrastructure in Euskadi (MITMA note).
• Effective start of Basque management: a note from the Basque Government dated 12/31/2024 confirms that, since January 1, 2025, the Department of Sustainable Mobility manages the five transferred Cercanías lines, which continue to be operated by Renfe but under Basque authority (tariff policy, sanctioning regime, inspection, etc.) (Basque Government note).

In summary, both in Catalonia and Euskadi the “management of Cercanías” has been supported by the Statutes of Autonomy, investiture agreements that set the political objective, agreements of the Mixed Transfer Commission and their embodiment in transfer royal decrees, completed with subrogations in the public service contract with Renfe and new governance instruments (mixed company in Catalonia, specific agreement and cooperation commission in Euskadi).

In the Spanish constitutional system, the president of an autonomous community does not have isolated “transport competences” as an individual body, but exercises, in this area, the competences that the Statute of Autonomy and laws attribute to the community through the autonomous government. His role is mainly political direction, representation, and coordination of the entire government action in transport matters.

a) Political direction and coordination of the autonomous government in transport

The Constitution (art. 152 in its general scheme) and the Statutes of Autonomy configure the president as the highest authority of the autonomous executive power and, in many cases, also as the supreme representative of the community and, ordinarily, of the State within it. From this derive, in transport matters:

• Setting strategic lines of transport and mobility policy in the autonomous territory (investment priorities, balance between transport modes, vision on sustainability, road safety, etc.).
• Direction and coordination of the competent ministers (usually Transport, Infrastructure, or Territory), ensuring coherence with other policies: urban planning, environment, industry, tourism, social services, etc.
• Promotion and supervision of autonomous transport plans and strategies (infrastructure master plans, sustainable mobility plans, public transport plans, etc.), which are usually approved by the Government Council.
• Overall political responsibility before the autonomous parliament for government action in this area, including accountability in general policy debates or specific appearances on transport.

b) Own or delegated normative and executive powers

Legally, the autonomous community may have, according to its Statute and the Constitution (arts. 148 and 149 CE), legislative and executive competences in:

• Road transport whose itinerary runs entirely within the community.
• Autonomous road network and, where applicable, part of the transferred local network.
• Urban and metropolitan transport, coordinating with municipalities.
• Certain ports, airports, or railways of non-general interest, when provided by the Statute and state laws.

The president does not personally issue those norms, but:

• Leads the legislative initiative of the autonomous government: decides, together with his Council, to promote transport laws (e.g., sustainable mobility law, public transport law, autonomous roads law) before the parliament.
• Orders or promotes the drafting of regulations and other general provisions in transport matters, usually adopted as decrees of the Government Council, at the proposal of the competent minister.
• When the Statute provides, he may sign legislative decrees and regulatory decrees approved by the Government Council, as well as sanction and promulgate autonomous transport laws.
• In competences delegated by the State (e.g., management of certain stretches of state roads, management of railway or commuter infrastructure), the president heads the body that assumes execution, politically responsible for compliance with state legislation and delegation conditions.

c) Relations with the State and other autonomous communities

Transport matters are strongly shared with the State (which retains, among others, competences over transport affecting several communities, railways and roads of general interest, ports and airports of general interest), so the president plays a key role in:

• Participation in sectoral conferences and cooperation bodies State–CCAA on transport, infrastructure, mobility, ports, airports, etc., defending the political and technical position of his community.
• Negotiation and signing of collaboration agreements with the General State Administration and other autonomous communities to coordinate transport services, infrastructure financing, joint network operation, or transport consortia.
• Promotion of consortia and inter-administrative entities (e.g., metropolitan transport consortia) in which the community participates, requiring political agreements at the highest level.
• Raising competence conflicts or appeals (through legal channels) when the autonomous government understands that a state norm or decision invades its transport competences.

d) Role in strategic infrastructures with concurrent competences

In infrastructures where state and autonomous competences concur — state highways crossing the community, major ports, airports of general interest, railway networks — the president:

• Defines the community's political position regarding projects and routes (new railway lines, port or airport expansions, road variants, etc.).
• Negotiates investment programming (inclusion in state plans, financing agreements, co-financing with European funds) and the urban and environmental conditions of the project.
• Coordinates the integration of these infrastructures with the autonomous and local transport network (interchanges, accesses, connection services, integrated tickets, etc.).
• In the urban and metropolitan scope, promotes the creation and reform of transport authorities that coordinate community, municipalities, and, where applicable, the State.

In short, the specific legal competences over transport are determined by each Statute and by the competence distribution laws, but the autonomous president always acts as head of the executive, main intergovernmental negotiator, and ultimate political responsible for strategy and coordination in this area.

In Spain, an autonomous community can only assume the management of railway services in its territory if it respects the competence distribution between the State and communities and uses the legal instruments provided for this purpose. The key is to distinguish between the state general interest network and infrastructures and services of an autonomous nature, as well as to articulate, where appropriate, transfers or agreements with the State.

1. Basic constitutional framework

The Constitution attributes to the State:

• Art. 149.1.21.ª CE: exclusive competence over public works of general interest or whose execution affects more than one autonomous community.
• Art. 149.1.24.ª CE: exclusive competence over railways and transport that run through the territory of more than one autonomous community and the general regime of communications and transport.

Autonomous communities may assume, through their Statutes of Autonomy (art. 148 CE), competences over:

• Railways and transport whose itinerary runs entirely within their territory.
• Regulation of intracommunity land transport and, where applicable, railways not integrated into the state general interest network.

2. General Interest Railway Network (Law 38/2015)

Law 38/2015, of September 29, on the railway sector defines the General Interest Railway Network (RFIG) as the set of infrastructures, stations, and terminals essential to guarantee a common railway transport system throughout the State, including:

• International traffic itineraries.
• Lines linking different autonomous communities.
• Connections with main population centers or installations essential for the economy or defense.

The State exercises full competences of planning, construction, and regulation over the RFIG. However, the law itself foresees margins for autonomous participation:

• To include an infrastructure that runs entirely through a single community and is owned by it, its prior consent is required.
• The exclusion of an infrastructure from the RFIG, when the reasons of general interest cease, may be followed by its transfer to the autonomous community, by agreement of the Council of Ministers and the community.

3. Instruments for a community to manage railway services

From this framework, the main legal requirements for an autonomous community to assume the management of railway services are:

• Sufficient statutory competence
  The Statute must attribute competence over intracommunity railways and land transport whose itinerary does not exceed the autonomous territory. Without this statutory basis, the community cannot normatively assume management.
• Transfer or delegation instrument from the State
  When services are provided on the RFIG or are considered of state general interest, the assumption requires:
  • Either an organic law of transfer or delegation under art. 150.2 CE.
  • Or a Royal Decree of transfer of functions and services and a Council of Ministers agreement, published in the BOE, specifying which lines or services are transferred (as several communities have done with commuter or regional services), including personnel, materials, and financing.
• Regulation of service provision
  Once holding the competence, the community must:
  • Establish its own normative framework for intracommunity railway services, respecting the basic state legislation (Law 38/2015) and EU Law.
  • Define, where applicable, public interest services and public service obligations through law or norm with sufficient rank.
• Technical and organizational capacity
  Direct or indirect management requires having:
  • A railway company with license and safety certificate according to state and European regulations.
  • Agreements with the infrastructure manager (ADIF/ADIF-AV or other owner) for infrastructure capacity, fees, safety, and operational coordination.
• Respect for competence limits
  Even assuming management of certain services:
  • The community cannot unilaterally alter the qualification of a line as RFIG nor the exclusive competences of the State over public works of general interest.
  • It must respect the market unity and the rules of competition and non-discriminatory access to infrastructure established in Law 38/2015.

4. State–community agreements and coordination

Besides formal transfers, practice relies on collaboration agreements and program contracts between the State, communities, and public railway companies to:

• Finance deficit commuter or regional services.
• Coordinate schedules, transport titles, and integrated tariff systems.
• Jointly plan investments in stations and infrastructures affecting both administrations.

In summary, an autonomous community can only manage railway services in its territory if: its Statute grants it competence; a formal state transfer or delegation has occurred when appropriate, published in norms; and the provision is articulated respecting the state and European framework of safety, competition, and general interest network.