The increase of pensions for 2027 enters the campaign: the INE will publish the CPI two days before 29N

The validation of a royal decree-law on pension revaluation follows exactly the same process as any other decree-law. The basic framework is in Article 86 of the Constitution and Article 151 of the Congress Regulations (amended in 2025), along with the provisions on the Permanent Deputation. From there, the procedure can be described in a clear sequence of phases.

1. Approval by the Government and publication

• Approval in the Council of Ministers: the Government approves the royal decree-law on pension revaluation in the Council of Ministers, citing the “extraordinary and urgent need” required by Article 86.1 CE.
• Promulgation and Official State Gazette (BOE): the text is promulgated and published in the "Official State Gazette". From that moment it comes into force under the terms established by the royal decree-law itself (often the same day or the day after its publication).
• Immediate submission to the Congress: according to Article 86.2 CE, the Government must submit it “immediately” to the Congress of Deputies for debate and a vote on the entirety.

2. Deadline and competence of the Chamber

• Maximum period of 30 days: the Congress must debate and vote on the validation or repeal of the royal decree-law before thirty days have passed since its promulgation (art. 86.2 CE and art. 151.1 of the Congress Regulations).
• Competent chamber: the competence lies with the Plenary of the Congress or, if the Chamber is dissolved or its mandate has expired, with the Permanent Deputation, which assumes the powers related to decree-laws (art. 57 of the Regulations).
• Insertion in the agenda: the Regulations allow the decree-law to be included in the Plenary agenda as soon as it has been published in the BOE, without waiting for the end of the 30-day period.

3. Session convocation

• If the Congress is in an ordinary session period, the debate is included in the agenda of a Plenary within the 30-day period.
• If the Congress is not convened (outside session period), it must be convened “for this purpose” to debate and vote on the decree-law, or the Permanent Deputation is convened if the Congress is dissolved or its mandate has expired.

4. Debate on the entirety

• Presentation by the Government: a member of the Government (typically the head of the Ministry of Inclusion, Social Security, or Economy, as appropriate) presents to the Chamber the reasons for the extraordinary and urgent need and the content of the royal decree-law.
• Debate according to the rules of entirety debates: parliamentary groups intervene with the turns and times established by the Regulations. Specific amendments to the articles are not debated; what is discussed is the entire text and the appropriateness of the instrument.

5. Vote on validation or repeal

• Single vote on the whole: once the debate concludes, a single vote is held in which each deputy casts their vote.
• Required majority: a simple majority of the votes cast is sufficient (more affirmative than negative votes). An absolute majority or specific reinforced quorum is not required.
• Meaning of the votes (art. 151.3 of the Regulations):
  • Affirmative votes are understood as favorable to validation.
  • Negative votes are understood as favorable to repeal.
• Consequences:
  • If validated, the royal decree-law remains in force as such.
  • If repealed, it ceases to be in force, without prejudice to possible subsequent regulation of the matter through ordinary law or other instruments.
• Publication of the agreement: the validation or repeal agreement is published in the BOE by resolution of the Presidency of the Congress.

6. Decision on its processing as a bill

• Once validated, the Presidency of the Congress asks if any parliamentary group wishes the royal decree-law to be processed as a bill.
• If any group requests it, the request is submitted to the Plenary's decision:
  • If the Plenary approves it, the text is processed as a bill through the urgent procedure.
  • In this processing, total return amendments are not admissible, but amendments to the articles are allowed, which permits adjusting or modifying the pension revaluation design.
• If no one requests it or the Plenary rejects this processing, the validated decree-law remains definitively as such.

7. Specific role of the Permanent Deputation

• In case of dissolution of the Congress or expiration of the mandate, the Permanent Deputation:
  • Assumes all the powers that the Constitution attributes to the Congress regarding decree-laws (including validation or repeal).
  • Meets, debates, and votes following the same rules as the Plenary.
  • Once the new Congress is constituted, reports to the Plenary on the agreements adopted, including the validation of pension revaluation decree-laws if any.

In summary, the validation procedure is a rapid parliamentary control, with a maximum period of thirty days, a simple majority vote, and the possibility of opening, if the Congress so decides, a subsequent processing as a bill to more precisely adjust the content of the royal decree-law on pensions.

The Prime Minister does not approve royal decree-laws alone, not even in Social Security matters. His role is central as head of the Government and president of the Council of Ministers, but the formal competence to issue royal decree-laws corresponds to the Government itself as a collegiate body, under the conditions of Article 86 of the Constitution and the regulations on the Government.

Firstly, the Prime Minister directs the Executive's action (art. 97 CE) and presides over the Council of Ministers. This grants him political impetus and agenda-setting capacity: he effectively decides whether a draft royal decree-law is submitted to the Council and when. He can commission the competent ministers (in this case, those of Social Security, Labor, Treasury, etc.) to prepare a decree-law proposal to respond to a situation of extraordinary and urgent need, an inescapable constitutional requirement. But the final decision to approve it is always collegiate: the Council of Ministers adopts it by agreement and the text is formally issued by the Government, not by the Prime Minister personally.

Secondly, regarding the relationship with sectoral ministers, the Prime Minister sets the broad guidelines and coordinates. The technical content of the royal decree-law in Social Security matters — for example, on pensions, contributions, or system management — is developed in the competent departments, which assume the technical and legal initiative. The Prime Minister can mediate conflicts between ministries (for example, between Social Security and Treasury) and perform the final political synthesis, but does not replace the material competence of each minister. The head of Social Security usually defends the text in the Council and prepares, together with the Presidency, the explanatory statement justifying the urgency.

Thirdly, the constitutional requirements of the royal decree-law strictly limit presidential action. Article 86 CE requires that there be a situation of extraordinary and urgent need, which must be reasoned in the decree-law itself. It also sets material limits: royal decree-laws cannot affect the organization of the basic State institutions, the rights, duties, and freedoms of citizens regulated in Title I, the regime of the Autonomous Communities, nor the general electoral law. In Social Security, the scope of action is relatively broad, but when measures affect rights recognized in Title I (for example, the essential content of the right to Social Security or union freedom linked to benefits and contributions), the Government — and within it the Prime Minister — must strictly respect those limits. Not even urgency allows crossing those material boundaries.

Fourthly, the internal procedure is articulated around the Council of Ministers. Once the draft is prepared by the competent ministries and legally supervised (usually by the State Attorney General's Office and regulatory coordination bodies), the Prime Minister decides its inclusion in the agenda and presides over the deliberation. If the Council agrees to approve the royal decree-law, the text is signed by the King and the Prime Minister, according to the general rule of countersignature. The Prime Minister's signature implies political and legal responsibility before the Cortes, but does not mean that the competence is his exclusively: he acts as the ultimate responsible of a Government act.

Fifthly, subsequent parliamentary control reduces the Executive's room for maneuver and balances the Prime Minister's position. The Congress Regulations, in Title VI, develop Article 86.2 CE: the Congress (or the Permanent Deputation in certain cases) must hold a debate and vote on validation or repeal within thirty days following promulgation. A Government member presents the reasons that led to issuing the decree-law and, after the debate, votes in favor are understood as support for validation and votes against as support for repeal. Additionally, the Congress can decide that the validated decree-law be processed as a bill by the urgent procedure, with the possibility of introducing amendments.

This parliamentary control does not retrospectively modify the Prime Minister's formal powers in approving the decree-law, but acts as a very relevant political counterweight: the Prime Minister knows that any use of this power, also in Social Security, will be scrutinized by the Congress, which can repeal the text or profoundly alter its content through processing as a bill. In short, the Prime Minister leads and coordinates the Government's decision to resort to the decree-law, but always within a framework of collegiate Government competence, subject to strict constitutional limits and intense subsequent parliamentary control.

Since 2000, opposition to measures on pension revaluation has shifted hands depending on who was in Government and the content of the reform. Very briefly:

• Against the freeze for 2011 decided by a PSOE Government, the PP led the opposition.
• Against the 0.25% revaluation index approved by the PP Government in 2013, the PSOE and the parliamentary left led the contestation.
• Against the 2021–2023 reforms of the PSOE–Unidas Podemos coalition Government, the main opponents have been PP and Vox, with occasional support from other groups in specific votes.

1. Pension freeze for 2011 (Zapatero Government)

In 2010, the Government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (PSOE) approved the adjustment that entailed the freeze of the revaluation of most contributory pensions in 2011, except for minimum and non-contributory pensions, which increased by 1% (according to economic press and subsequent parliamentary debates, where it is recalled that “it froze pensions except the minimum ones”).

In this episode:

• The governing party was the PSOE.
• The PP positioned itself as the main opposition party, denouncing the freeze and demanding to maintain the update with the CPI. In Congress, a motion was even promoted demanding not to freeze pensions, supported by practically all opposition except the socialist group (referenced in the press of the time, cited in later compilations).
• Other left-wing and nationalist groups (IU, ERC, among others) and unions also criticized the measure for the loss of purchasing power.

This is the only recent episode in which the freeze was approved with a socialist Government and the opposition led by the PP focused on avoiding loss of purchasing power.

2. 0.25% revaluation index (PP reform of 2013)

With Mariano Rajoy's Government (PP), Law 23/2013 introduced the Pension Revaluation Index, which in deficit situations limits the ordinary increase to 0.25% annually. According to Demócrata's analysis, between 2014 and 2018 that 0.25% was applied generally, while inflation was higher, implying accumulated losses of purchasing power.[3]

In this cycle (2013–2018):

• The PP governed.
• The PSOE led the opposition to the new index, demanding a return to the CPI and denouncing a “silent cut” of purchasing power.
• IU, UPyD and later Podemos joined, as well as various nationalist parties (PNV, ERC, BNG, among others) and pensioners' platforms. In the Toledo Pact debates, it is recalled that if the 0.25% had been maintained, in a few decades the average pension would have lost about half its real value.[Search Demócrata, id 3]

In summary, in the 2013–2018 stage, the block leading opposition to the revaluation policy (0.25% and disappearance of CPI as automatic reference) was formed by PSOE and the rest of the parliamentary left, with support from nationalists and pensioners' social movements.

3. 2021–2023 reforms of the PSOE–Unidas Podemos Government

From 2021, the PSOE–Unidas Podemos coalition Government promoted several reforms that, according to Demócrata's note, entail:

• The repeal of the 0.25% index and the sustainability factor of the PP.
• The legal linkage of the annual pension revaluation to the average CPI, to maintain purchasing power.[Demócrata, id 3]
• An increase in contributions (Intergenerational Equity Mechanism) and gradual increase of maximum bases to strengthen income.

In response to these reforms:

• PSOE and Unidas Podemos govern.
• The PP positions itself as the main opposition party to this package, voting against the 2021 law and subsequent developments and accusing the Government of raising system costs and risking its sustainability.[RTVE and Demócrata, collected in the investigation]
• Vox also votes against the 2021 reform and later CPI-linked revaluations, questioning both the cost of increases and the public pension model itself. The press reports statements from its spokesperson warning that they would not support “not even a decree only on revaluation” because they do not support “anything from this Government”.[Nueva Economía Fórum, 01/24/2025]
• Ciudadanos rejects at least some CPI-linked revaluations in the 2023 Budgets, according to voting summaries in the press.
• Other groups (for example CUP) oppose the 2021 text from critical positions on the general system architecture, while ERC, EH Bildu, BNG, Más País tend to critical abstention in that first phase.

Thus, in this stage, opposition is not so much against the idea of raising pensions, but against the combination of automatic CPI + higher contributions and the financial impact of the reforms.

4. Recent episodes in the XV legislature

Although your question focuses on reforms up to 2023, the dynamic continues in the XV legislature:

• In 2024 and 2025, PP, Vox, and Junts have caused the fall of several “omnibus” decrees that included the annual pension revaluation along with other social measures, forcing the Government to split the texts and approve specific decrees to guarantee the increase.[Demócrata, ids 10 and 125845]
• The Government accuses these parties of “leaving millions of pensioners in suspense,” while PP and Junts maintain they support revaluation but reject the packaging with other policies.

Conclusion

Looking at the whole period:

• Against the 2011 freeze: opposition leadership by PP, with broad support from the rest of the opposition.
• Against the 0.25% index and CPI delinking (2013–2018): opposition leadership by PSOE and the parliamentary left (IU, then Podemos), accompanied by nationalists and pensioners' platforms.
• Against the 2021–2023 reforms that lock in the CPI and raise contributions: opposition led by PP and Vox, with occasional support from other groups like Ciudadanos.

In short, there is no single party that has “always” led the opposition to revaluations: PP and PSOE have alternated that role depending on who governed and what type of revaluation or formula was proposed, while forces to their left and right have aligned more stably with their respective views on sufficiency and sustainability of the system.