The electoral advance halts the suspension of Ana Belén Vázquez due to the pepper spray incident.

Within the framework of the Regulations of the Congress of Deputies and the Senate and parliamentary doctrine, the early dissolution of the Cortes Generales generally causes the termination of disciplinary proceedings related to deputies for acts committed in that legislature. These procedures do not automatically continue in the new legislature, nor through the Permanent Deputation, unless it is agreed to initiate a new proceeding regarding the deputies who are re-elected.

Effects of the dissolution on deputies and the Boards

The dissolution of the Cortes ends the mandate of deputies and senators in accordance with the Constitution and parliamentary Regulations. In the Congress, the Regulation expressly provides that, once the Congress is dissolved or its mandate expires, only the Permanent Deputation remains in office, later reporting to the new Plenary on the matters dealt with and decisions made. Regulations and doctrine agree on three ideas:

• The representative mandate is temporary: it ends with the dissolution, so the rights and duties that make up the deputy's status (attendance, voting, secrecy, discipline, etc.) apply to a specific period.
• The internal governing bodies of the Chambers (Boards and Presidencies) that impose disciplinary sanctions are elected for each legislature. Upon dissolution, their powers cease, except those expressly attributed to the Permanent Deputation.
• The disciplinary regime (for example, in the Congress, the chapter on “parliamentary discipline” and sanctions on deputies) is designed to correct the behavior of those who hold the status of deputy at that time.

General regime of disciplinary proceedings upon dissolution of the Cortes

Based on this, the rule applied in parliamentary practice is as follows:

• Disciplinary proceedings underway against deputies do not automatically continue beyond the legislature in which they were initiated. Upon dissolution, they are considered, in practice, exhausted or lapsed, unless the resolution approved before dissolution has already imposed a sanction and only its material execution remains.
• If the sanction has not yet been agreed upon, the Board and the Presidency cease to have authority to continue processing, because neither the Chamber nor the status of deputy exists to project disciplinary power.
• Consequently, at the start of the new legislature, there is no “pending proceeding” that the new Congress or Senate must resolve. What can be done, if reasons persist, is to consider initiating a new proceeding against those who are re-elected.

From the perspective of sanctioning guarantees, this solution is coherent: the Regulation refers to the general principles of sanctioning law (legality, non-retroactivity, prescription, competence of the sanctioning body, etc.), and it would be problematic for a new Chamber to sanction, without new initiation, conduct that occurred before a different composition and with a Board that did not participate in the investigation.

Role of the Permanent Deputation

The Permanent Deputation, according to the Regulations, guards the powers of the Chamber when it is not in session and assumes specific functions in case of dissolution or expiration of the mandate (especially regarding decree-laws and states of alarm, exception, and siege). However:

• It is not expressly granted the competence to process or resolve disciplinary proceedings against deputies.
• Dominant parliamentary doctrine understands that the Permanent Deputation is not a “mini Chamber” inheriting all powers of the Plenary and the Board, but a continuity body with limited functional mandate.

Therefore, the most accepted solution is that the Permanent Deputation does not continue personal disciplinary proceedings beyond purely instrumental actions (for example, reporting that they existed or that they remained unresolved upon dissolution).

Symmetries and differences between Congress and Senate

Both the Congress and Senate Regulations:

• Provide a specific disciplinary regime for their members, articulated through the Board and the Presidency.
• Regulate the Permanent Deputation with continuity functions in case of dissolution, without expressly including continuation of disciplinary proceedings against parliamentarians.

Practice in both Chambers is basically the same: disciplinary proceedings end with the legislature and, if the new Chamber considers it necessary to act on the same facts against re-elected deputies, a new procedure must be opened, again respecting the procedures of hearing, proposal, and imposition of sanction.

In summary, the early dissolution of the Cortes interrupts the processing of personal disciplinary proceedings against deputies, which are not automatically transferred to the new legislature nor continued through the Permanent Deputation; any subsequent action requires, in practice, initiating a new proceeding before the new Chamber.

The Board of the Permanent Deputation of the Congress is the internal management body of the Permanent Deputation itself. Its functions are organizational and related to managing the work of that body, and must be distinguished both from the powers of the Permanent Deputation as a whole and from those of the Board of the Congress when the Plenary is in session.

1. General framework: what is the Permanent Deputation

The Regulation of the Congress dedicates articles 56 to 59 to the Permanent Deputation. From this it follows that:

• The Permanent Deputation is chaired by the Presidency of the Congress and formed by at least 21 members, appointed by the groups in proportion to their size.
• The Permanent Deputation itself elects from among its members two Vice Presidencies and two Secretariats, following the system provided for the election of the Board of the Congress, but adapted to the smaller number of positions.
• Its central mission is to guard the powers of the Chamber when it is not in session.
• Upon dissolution or expiration of the Congress mandate:
  • It assumes all powers of the Congress regarding decree-laws (art. 86 CE).
  • It exercises powers over states of alarm, exception, and siege (art. 116 CE).
• Between sessions, it can request the extraordinary convocation of the Chamber (art. 73.2 CE).
• After elections, it reports to the new Plenary on the matters dealt with and decisions made.

These are powers of the Permanent Deputation as a collegiate body, that is, of all its members collectively, not of its Board.

2. Composition and nature of the Board of the Permanent Deputation

The internal structure of the Permanent Deputation reproduces, on a smaller scale, that of the Plenary of the Congress. Therefore:

• The Presidency of the Deputation is the Presidency of the Congress itself.
• Two Vice Presidencies and two Secretariats are elected, which, together with the Presidency, make up the Board of the Permanent Deputation.
• The Regulation establishes that the sessions and functioning of the Deputation generally apply the provisions for the Plenary; therefore, the Board of the Deputation acts similarly to the Board of the Congress, but limited to that body.

The Board of the Permanent Deputation is, therefore, an organ of internal governance and work organization of the Deputation, not a decision-making body on the substance of matters constitutionally attributed to it.

3. Functions and powers of the Board of the Permanent Deputation

By reference to the Plenary regime and parliamentary practice, its main functions can be summarized in four major blocks:

a) Organization of work and agenda

• Propose and set, in agreement with the Presidency and groups, the agenda of the sessions of the Permanent Deputation (for example, ratification of a decree-law, authorization or ratification of a state of alarm, etc.).
• Plan and coordinate the meeting calendar of the Deputation when the Congress is dissolved or outside the ordinary session period.

b) Qualification and processing of documents

• Qualify the documents and communications addressed to the Permanent Deputation (requests for convocation, initiatives, proposals for agreements, requests for appearances related to its powers, etc.).
• Decide on the admission or rejection of such documents, applying the Regulation of the Congress.
• Determine the appropriate processing of those documents (debate and vote in session, filing, referral to other bodies, etc.).

c) Direction of sessions and procedural guarantees

• Assist the Presidency in the material direction of the sessions of the Permanent Deputation: organization of turns, times, and votes, interpretation and application of the Regulation during debates.
• Ensure the respect of the rights of groups and minorities within the Deputation (speaking times, access to information, etc.).
• Resolve, within the Deputation, internal order incidents (for example, on substitutions of titular members by substitutes).

d) Administrative and internal representation functions

• Channel the relationship of the Permanent Deputation with the Chamber services (legal advisors, economic and personnel services, documentation, etc.) regarding its own functioning.
• Exercise internal representation and coordination functions with the Board of the Congress, especially during dissolution periods, when other Chamber bodies are not fully operational.

4. Differences with the Board of the Congress in Plenary

Although the Board of the Permanent Deputation is inspired by the Board of the Congress, there are relevant differences:

• The material scope of action is narrower: it is limited to matters entrusted by the Regulation and the Constitution to the Permanent Deputation (powers of the Chamber in dissolution or between sessions), while the Board of the Congress organizes the entire work of the Chamber in Plenary.
• The Board of the Congress has stable powers in overall management of the Chamber (general organization, administration, internal regime, etc.), which only extend to the Permanent Deputation insofar as it acts as a functional extension of the Congress.
• Major substantive decisions (ratifying or repealing a decree-law, authorizing a state of exception, requesting extraordinary convocation of the Congress) correspond to the Plenary of the Permanent Deputation, not its Board.

In sum, the Board of the Permanent Deputation fulfills, within the restricted scope of that body, a function equivalent to that of the Board of the Congress regarding the Plenary: organizing, channeling, and ensuring the proper functioning of work, while political decisions rest with the entire Deputation.

To validly impose a disciplinary sanction on a deputy of the Congress, the requirements and guarantees established by the Regulation of the Congress must be met, especially in Chapter Eight (“On parliamentary discipline”, arts. 99 to 107), in connection with the general duties of the members of the Chamber. Below is a summary, in clear language, of those requirements.

1. Legal basis and general principles

The starting point is that deputies are obliged to conform their conduct to the Regulation and to respect order, courtesy, and parliamentary discipline, as well as to maintain secrecy when appropriate. The sanctioning power of the Chamber is framed within the parliamentary police power recognized by the Constitution (art. 72.3) and is regulated in Chapter Eight.

Several principles arise from these provisions:

• Legality and internal typification: sanctions can only be imposed in expressly provided cases (repeated absences, breach of secrecy, disorderly conduct, etc.).
• Organic competence: each type of sanction must be agreed upon by the body to which the Regulation attributes that power (Board, Presidency, Plenary).
• Motivation and proportionality: at least in sanctions agreed by the Board or Plenary, the infringing conduct, its severity, and the extent of the sanction must be indicated.
• Respect for parliamentary inviolability: discipline cannot be used to sanction opinions or votes protected by inviolability, but behaviors that breach order or regulatory duties.

2. Types of infractions and sanctions

The Regulation distinguishes several sanctioning figures:

• Deprivation of parliamentary rights (art. 99): the Board may deprive a deputy of some or all rights under arts. 6 to 9 (speaking, presenting initiatives, etc.) in two cases: repeated voluntary absence from Plenary or Committees, and breach of the duty of secrecy. The deprivation may extend to the proportional part of the Group's subsidy.
• Prohibition to attend one or two sessions and immediate expulsion (art. 100): the Presidency may impose these sanctions under arts. 102 to 104, when there are repeated calls to order and disruption of the session.
• Temporary suspension of the status of deputy (art. 101): decided by the Plenary for parliamentary discipline reasons, when: the conduct sanctioned under art. 99 persists; weapons are carried in the premises; expulsion from the chamber is disobeyed; or serious duties under art. 17 are breached (e.g., disclosing secret proceedings or conduct severely compromising the Chamber).
• Sanctions related to order in the premises (arts. 104 and 106): refusal to obey the order to leave the chamber allows aggravation of the sanction (non-attendance at the next session and possible proposal to the Plenary for longer suspension). Also, if a deputy promotes serious disorder in the premises, the Presidency may suspend them up to one month from their status as deputy, and the Plenary may extend or aggravate the sanction following art. 101.

3. Competent bodies and procedure

The Regulation distributes competences:

• Board of the Congress (art. 99): agrees on deprivation of parliamentary rights for absence or breach of secrecy. The agreement must be motivated and indicate the extent and duration of the sanction.
• Presidency (arts. 100, 102-104, 106): may call to order, withdraw the floor, prohibit attendance for the rest of the session, expel from the chamber, and in case of serious disorder, suspend the deputy up to one month.
• Plenary (art. 101 and referral from 106): decides on temporary suspension of deputy status when proposed by the Board or the Statute Commission, in a secret session and after debate involving Group spokespersons.

Minimum procedural guarantees required are:

• Hearing and prior warnings: in calls to order, the deputy is expressly warned, and expulsion is linked to having been called three times, with a warning on the second.
• Motivation: the sanctioning agreement of the Board must be motivated; by extension, Plenary decisions involving suspension must be based on a proposal identifying the facts.
• Collegiate decision: the most serious sanctions (suspension of deputy status) require Plenary agreement, upon proposal of the Board or the Statute Commission, adopted after a specific debate.

4. Material limits and review

The disciplinary power is limited by:

• Inviolability and freedom of expression in parliamentary sessions: the political content of opinions or votes cannot be sanctioned, but offensive expressions, disorderly conduct, or disclosure of secrets can be.
• Proportionality: art. 99 requires grading the extent and duration of the sanction; art. 106 conditions extension or aggravation by the Plenary to follow art. 101 criteria.
• Respect for criminal guarantees: if the conduct could be criminal, the Presidency must refer it to the competent judicial body, without substituting the criminal process with internal discipline.

Regarding review, the Regulation generally provides that Board agreements may be appealed before the Board itself, and the most serious disciplinary decisions depend on the Plenary, which acts as the final instance within the Chamber. This constitutes a closed system of internal guarantees without prejudice to possible external constitutional or judicial control.