The first technical report of Urda estimates that the AVE collided with the Iryo at between 160 and 200 kilometers per hour

The judicial investigation of the Urda railway accident is, as of October 29, 2026, in an initial phase: technical analyses remain to be completed, circulation decisions reconstructed, and possible negligent behaviors identified. There is no definitive judicial attribution of responsibilities. It is important to distinguish between the proceedings already ordered, whose conclusion has not been communicated, and the actions that could be agreed upon as new evidence emerges.

What the judge has already ordered

The case is led by the magistrate of seat number 2 of the Civil and Instruction Section of the Orgaz Court of First Instance, in Toledo. She has decreed the secrecy of the proceedings, restricted access to the accident area, and prohibited the removal of objects to preserve evidence. She has also ordered the seizure of the black boxes, under the custody of the Judicial Police of Toledo, according to the judicial information published by Demócrata.

Additionally, she has ordered to obtain information from the Atocha control center about the circulation, the Adif report regarding those responsible for the command, and the protocols applied before, during, and after the accident. The Civil Guard has already taken a statement from the operator who authorized the resumption of movement; that statement does not equate to a declaration of guilt, as reflected in the information about the interrogation.

Procedures remaining to be completed

• Expert examination of the recorders of both trains. Speeds, braking, signals received, and sequence of movements must be cross-checked, preserving the chain of custody: the traceability of who collects, preserves, and analyzes each piece of evidence.
• Reconstruct communications. It is crucial to compare the orders from the control center with the warnings from the drivers and establish what information was known at each moment. The released audios must be evaluated along with the complete records.
• Determine the extent of the failure. The expert reports must clarify the operation of the LZB safety system, its incidents and maintenance, and which circulation procedures should have been applied after the failure.
• Individualize the decisions. It will be necessary to specify who authorized each movement, their competencies, the instructions received, and whether there were supervision or organizational failures. New statements and complementary reports may be necessary.
• Complete forensic actions and damages. The victims, injuries, and sequelae must be specified, as well as documenting the harm to relatives and affected parties for their claims.

The core of the provisional reconstruction is the 17 minutes between authorization and impact, but that chronology does not constitute a judicial conclusion: investigated sequence.

How responsibilities will be determined

To attribute criminal responsibility, it is not enough to identify an error: a specific conduct, the breached duty of care, and its causal relationship with deaths or injuries must be proven. After evaluating reports and expert analyses, the court must decide whether there is evidence to summon individuals as suspects, carry out further proceedings, or dismiss the case. Any accusations filed do not by themselves prove the alleged facts.

In parallel, civil liabilities and insurers must be identified, coverages verified, and compensations quantified. The injured parties may appear and claim in the criminal case or reserve the corresponding civil actions.

Finally, the technical investigation by AITAT seeks to clarify causes and prevent accidents: it does not replace the judicial decision on guilt. The agency keeps all lines of investigation open, according to its communication of October 29. The secrecy prevents public knowledge of the full details of the actions taken and does not yet allow setting a closing schedule.

The AITAT investigates the causes of railway accidents and incidents to prevent their recurrence, not to determine guilt or responsibilities. Its main framework is Law 2/2024, of August 1, and its Organic Statute, approved by Royal Decree 141/2026, of February 25.

1. Which accidents must it investigate

Article 4 of Law 2/2024 assigns it the mandatory investigation of serious railway accidents occurring on the General Interest Railway Network. This includes collisions or derailments causing at least one death, five serious injuries, or damages immediately estimated at two million euros at minimum; also other accidents with equivalent consequences having an evident effect on safety regulations or management.

It may decide to investigate other accidents and incidents that, under slightly different circumstances, could have caused serious accidents, including technical failures. To decide, it assesses severity, recurrence of events, their impact on safety, and requests from administrators, railway companies, authorities, and competent autonomous communities.

2. How it conducts the investigation

The Authority has a Directorate for the technical investigation of railway accidents and incidents. The Council makes decisions about the investigation and approves technical reports; this latter function is non-delegable —articles 29 and 31 of the law—.

The Statute requires homogeneous procedures that allow analyzing all causes, including human and organizational factors, and an immediate response system with available personnel, protective means, and protocols to preserve evidence —articles 10 and 11—. Therefore, its examination is not limited to material failure or individual action.

3. Powers regarding the site and evidence

Articles 21 and 22 of the law allow investigative personnel, coordinating with the authority and judicial police:

• Immediate and unhindered access to the accident site, the damaged material, and its remains.
• Document evidence and controlled collection of components for examination.
• Access to data recorders, their content, and other relevant records.
• Request autopsy results and medical examinations when necessary to clarify causes.

These powers have limits: seizure and judicial custody of remains correspond to the judge; recovering them requires judicial authorization or, if no judicial investigation exists, authorization from the Security Forces. Evidence must maintain traceability.

4. Independence and relation with justice

The AITAT has organic and functional autonomy and full independence from the Government and administrations. The Statute requires preserving that independence from any public or private entity. Its investigation is independent of administrative, judicial, or parliamentary procedures.

It does not replace criminal investigation: it must report possible crimes and fatal accidents, coordinate access and evidence, and not interfere with judicial actions. Conflicts during the investigation are resolved by the judicial authority —articles 18 to 26—.

5. Prevention, victims, and cooperation

Its purpose includes formulating safety recommendations. Additionally, it may analyze emerging risks and propose preventive actions and regulations to the Government or Parliament. It must report annually on its activity, recommendations, and information received about their implementation.

It must clearly inform victims and relatives about the progress of the investigation. If it does not harm its objectives, it will provide factual information within the first 48 hours and, before publication, conclusions and recommendations. It protects testimonies and sensitive data.

Finally, it cooperates with foreign bodies, agrees on who investigates cross-border accidents, and invites the agency of the State where the company is established or the vehicle involved is registered or maintained.

Sources: Law 2/2024 and Organic Statute.

Railway protection systems such as LZB are regulated by a set of Spanish and European standards, not by a provision exclusive to high speed. The central references are the Railway Traffic Regulations, which establish how they are used, and Royal Decree 929/2020, which regulates their safety, interoperability, and authorization.

1. General framework of safety and interoperability

The Law 38/2015, of September 29, on the railway sector, provides the legal framework. Its article 65 assigns the State Railway Safety Agency (AESF) as the authority responsible for safety on the General Interest Railway Network; article 68 supports the regulation of technical conditions of infrastructure and rolling stock.

Royal Decree 929/2020, of October 27, develops that law and incorporates Directives (EU) 2016/797, on interoperability, and 2016/798, on railway safety. It distinguishes between control-command and signaling on the ground and onboard, and requires proving technical compatibility and safe integration of subsystems: that is, that equipment works together without introducing unacceptable risks.

2. Specific regulation of LZB

The most direct operational reference is Royal Decree 664/2015, of July 17, which approves the Railway Traffic Regulations (RCF). Its fifth book regulates safety installations and classifies systems according to their performance:

• LZB and ERTMS level 2: continuous information and supervision.
• ERTMS level 1 and EBICAB: punctual information and continuous supervision.
• ASFA: punctual information and punctual or semi-continuous supervision.

The transitory specification 3 of the fifth book, identified by sections 5ET3, develops LZB: architecture, cab indications, braking curves, connection, data input, system entry and exit, and action upon abnormalities. It defines it as a system with cab signaling and continuous supervision, which activates the emergency brake when the supervision speed is exceeded.

Additionally, article 5.1.3.4 requires the onboard system compatible with the route to be connected, except for exceptions in the regulation itself. Sections 5AP1.1.5 regulate transitions between Digital ASFA and LZB/ERTMS with the train in motion.

3. Requirements for onboard equipment

Order TMA/576/2020, of June 22, approves the technical instruction IF MR ALC-20 for self-propelled units, locomotives, and coaches. Its section 4.2.13.2 expressly addresses LZB and Digital ASFA as class B systems, differentiated from the interoperable European system.

It requires certificates of compliance with their specifications and test protocols, as well as integration requirements in the vehicle. It also contemplates STM modules, which allow integrating functions of national systems with the European equipment, and requires demonstrating safe integration when scheduled transitions between systems occur. The normative references of this instruction were updated by the Resolution of May 10, 2023 of the AESF.

4. Authorization, operation, and supervision

Royal Decree 929/2020 requires the infrastructure manager to have a safety authorization covering design, maintenance, and operation, including traffic control and signaling. The AESF authorizes and supervises fixed subsystems; its institutional framework is established in Royal Decree 1072/2014.

For ERTMS projects on track with ETCS or GSM-R, article 113 of Royal Decree 929/2020 adds prior approval by the European Union Railway Agency before tendering. In short, to assess a specific LZB, the RCF, the technical requirements of the equipment, and the conditions of its authorization must be examined jointly, not only the high-speed designation of the line.