UGT and CCOO ask to overturn the lobby decree for "violating the constitutional role" of the unions

The decree-law you are referring to is the Royal Decree-Law 21/2026, of August 25, on transparency and integrity of the activities of interest groups, published in the BOE on August 26, 2026 (text in the BOE). As of today (September 11, 2026), the decree-law is in force but has not yet been ratified or repealed by the Congress of Deputies and is pending debate and ratification vote, scheduled for next week.

Identification of the regulation

At the state level, the regulation of interest groups has been articulated in two ways:

• A Bill on transparency and integrity of the activities of interest groups, registered as project 121/000046 and with a long procedure in the Congress (registered in January 2025, total amendment rejected, closure of amendments to the articles in September 2025, and referral to the Plenary in September 2025).
• Subsequently, the Royal Decree-Law 21/2026, with the same material purpose (to regulate the relationship between interest groups and the General State Administration and to create a state, public, and mandatory lobby register). This decree-law was approved by the Council of Ministers on August 25, 2026, and published in the BOE on August 26, 2026.

It is this second instrument, Royal Decree-Law 21/2026, that "regulates the activity of interest groups" in the terms currently being debated and to which the press refers as the "Lobby Law" or "lobby decree."

Parliamentary status of Royal Decree-Law 21/2026

From a parliamentary point of view, the current status can be summarized as follows:

• Approval by the Government: the decree-law was approved by the Council of Ministers on August 25, 2026. The official note from the Ministry for Digital Transformation and Public Function details that its purpose is to regulate, within the scope of the General State Administration and its institutional public sector, the relationship between interest groups and officials and personnel susceptible to influence, and to create a state public and mandatory register of interest groups.
• Publication and entry into force: RDL 21/2026 was published in the BOE on August 26, 2026, so it is already in force. Several press reports highlight that since August 27 its obligations (registration, regulatory footprint, publicity of meetings, etc.) apply, although its validity remains conditioned on the decision of the Congress.
• Pending ratification: like any decree-law, it must be submitted to the Plenary of the Congress within a maximum period of 30 days for the Chamber to decide its ratification or repeal. Recent news from Demócrata indicates that:
  • Initially it was emphasized that "the Congress has neither voted nor ratified it" and that the Government had the constitutional 30-day period.
  • Subsequently, it has been reported that the Executive has requested that the ratification be voted on next week and that the decree-law will be seen in a Plenary around September 16, 2026, within the ordinary session period.
• No vote held yet: in the parliamentary voting records and in the Plenary chronicles consulted, as of September 11, 2026, there is no vote on ratification or repeal of Royal Decree-Law 21/2026. Press references insist that "the Chamber will have to hold the debate and vote on the decree-law within a month" and that it is still "pending that parliamentary procedure."

Practical consequences of the current status

In legal and political terms, this means:

• RDL 21/2026 produces full effects from its publication in the BOE: the state register of interest groups is created by a norm with the rank of law, the registration and publicity obligations for officials and public personnel are already in force, and the sanctioning regime is formally in effect.
• However, its survival depends on the decision of the Congress. If the Plenary ratifies the decree-law, the norm will be confirmed; if it repeals it, the Royal Decree-Law will lapse and cease to be in force, raising the question of how to cover that gap (possible return to the bill, new initiative, etc.).
• Until the ratification debate is held and the voting result is known, the parliamentary situation can be described as: decree-law in force, pending debate and ratification vote in the Plenary of the Congress, not yet held.

In parallel, the Bill on transparency and integrity of the activities of interest groups (121/000046), prior to the decree-law, remains formally in process in the Congress, with referral to Plenary agreed and a committee phase already held, although its pace has been very slow. The approval of RDL 21/2026 is precisely presented as a response to that parliamentary blockage, but it does not change the fact that, as of today, the decree-law is pending ratification.

The Spanish Constitution recognizes trade unions a central role in the democratic system, especially through articles 7 and 28. From these provisions derive their fundamental competencies, understood not as a “closed list” of specific functions, but as a set of powers to fulfill the mission assigned to them by the Constitution.

1. Article 7 CE: institutional function of trade unions

Article 7 establishes that workers' unions (and employers' associations) contribute to the defense and promotion of the economic and social interests that are their own. Several basic competencies derive from it:

• Representation of workers: trade unions are the entities called to collectively represent workers before employers and public authorities. This representation is projected at the company level, in sectors of activity, and generally.
• Defense of economic and social interests: they are not limited to salary or strict working conditions but cover broader issues (social protection, employment, equality policies, occupational health, work-life balance, etc.), as long as they relate to the social position of workers.
• Promotion of those interests: the Constitution does not stop at “reactive” defense; it also legitimizes proactive action. From this derive competencies such as:
  • promoting regulatory improvements or labor reforms,
  • participating in the development of public policies through social dialogue,
  • promoting agreements and economic and social pacts of general scope.
• Institutional interlocution: constitutional recognition makes trade unions necessary interlocutors in collective labor relations and in the design of the labor relations system, legitimizing their presence in negotiation tables, consultative bodies, and dialogue processes with public authorities.
• Organizational autonomy: although not expressly mentioned in art. 7, their constitutional function presupposes that trade unions can freely organize themselves and establish their own bodies, internal rules, and strategies to fulfill that representative mission.

2. Article 28 CE: trade union freedom and its powers

Article 28.1 recognizes the fundamental right to trade union freedom. This right is the premise of all trade union competencies because it protects the necessary space to exercise them. From this article derive, among others, the following powers:

• Create unions and affiliate: any worker can found unions and affiliate with the one of their choice, as well as leave it. This power ensures trade union pluralism and, therefore, competition of projects and defense strategies.
• Organize trade union activity: trade union freedom includes the right of unions to draft their statutes, elect their representatives, organize their internal structure, and plan their action without interference from public authorities or employers, within the respect of the legal framework.
• Trade union action: includes the capacity to:
  • negotiate collective agreements,
  • raise collective labor conflicts,
  • legally defend their members and the worker collective,
  • carry out campaigns, assemblies, information, and trade union training.
• Right to strike (art. 28.2, closely linked): although formally recognized to workers, in practice its collective exercise is closely connected with the action of trade unions, which call, organize, and lead strikes as a legitimate pressure instrument for the defense of labor interests.
• Reinforced protection: as a fundamental right, trade union freedom enjoys reinforced protection (appeal for protection, preferential and summary procedure before courts), which guarantees that unions can perform their functions without reprisals or discrimination.

3. Summary: key constitutional competencies

Together, articles 7 and 28 CE configure trade unions as:

• Institutional representatives of workers in the defense and promotion of their interests.
• Basic subjects of collective bargaining and collective conflict, including strike organization.
• Actors of social dialogue and participation in the development of socio-labor policies.
• Organizations endowed with internal freedom and autonomy to set their structure, purposes, and action strategies.

These competencies are not exhaustively developed in the Constitution itself but are specified in labor and trade union legislation and in the practice of social dialogue, yet their foundation and ultimate legitimacy lie precisely in articles 7 and 28 of the Spanish Constitution.

The Spanish Constitution regulates decree-laws in article 86 CE as an exceptional instrument of governmental legislation with the rank of law. For the Government to approve a royal decree-law, strict material, formal, temporal, and parliamentary control requirements must be met, which limit its use and guarantee the central role of the Cortes Generales.

1. Enabling requirement: the “extraordinary and urgent necessity”

The basic enabling premise is the existence of a case of extraordinary and urgent necessity. Paragraph 1 of article 86 CE starts from this formula: the Government can only issue provisional legislative provisions — decree-laws — “in cases of extraordinary and urgent necessity.”

This implies:

• There must be an objective situation of urgency, which advises adopting immediate measures that cannot wait for the ordinary or even urgent legislative procedure.
• The Government must explicitly state and justify in the preamble of the royal decree-law and in the ratification debate the specific reasons for that extraordinary and urgent necessity.
• The link between the urgency situation and the content of the decree-law must be direct and reasonable: the measures adopted must be suitable to address the situation and not exceed what is necessary.

2. Material requirements: content limits

The same article 86.1 CE establishes that decree-laws:

“may not affect the organization of the basic institutions of the State, the rights, duties, and freedoms of citizens regulated in Title I, the regime of the Autonomous Communities, nor the general electoral law.”

From this derive several material limits:

• They cannot affect the essential design of the State powers (Cortes Generales, Government, Crown, Judiciary, Constitutional Court, etc.).
• They cannot regulate or directly alter the content of fundamental rights and public freedoms and, in general, the rights, duties, and freedoms of Title I of the Constitution. This matter is fundamentally reserved for law, and in many cases for organic law.
• They cannot alter the regime of the Autonomous Communities, that is, the constitutional and statutory scheme of political autonomy and its basic elements.
• They cannot modify the general electoral law, whose core is also constitutionalized and reserved for organic law.

These vetoes do not prevent a decree-law from having indirect effects in these areas, but they prohibit it from affecting their essential configuration or altering their basic elements.

3. Formal requirements: competent body and form

Decree-laws are provisional legislative provisions of the Government, which are approved:

• By the Council of Ministers, as the collegiate body of the Executive.
• With the legal form of royal decree-law, sanctioned and promulgated by the King, like other norms with the rank of law.
• With mandatory publication in the Official State Gazette (BOE), a necessary condition for their validity.

4. Temporal requirements and parliamentary control

Article 86.2 CE configures the provisional nature of the decree-law through intense parliamentary control:

• The decree-law must be immediately submitted to debate and vote on the entirety in the Congress of Deputies.
• The Congress, even if not convened, must be called for this purpose.
• The Chamber must expressly decide on its ratification or repeal within a maximum period of thirty days from its promulgation.
• The Congress Rules must provide a special and summary procedure for that ratification.

If the Congress does not ratify the decree-law, it is repealed, although the conservation of certain effects already produced may be foreseen according to ordinary legislation. If it ratifies it, the decree-law is stably integrated into the legal system with the rank of law.

5. Possible processing as a bill

Article 86.3 CE adds that, during that same thirty-day period, the Cortes Generales may decide to process the decree-law as a bill through the urgent procedure.

This mechanism:

• Allows that, once ratified, the text is submitted to debate and amendments typical of the ordinary legislative process, reinforcing parliamentary guarantees.
• Reinforces the provisional and exceptional character of the decree-law: its function is to provide an immediate response, but the content can be refined, corrected, or limited through subsequent processing as law.

In sum, the Constitution enables the Government to issue decree-laws only in situations of extraordinary and urgent necessity, with very strict limits on the matters they can regulate, with a specific formal procedure, and under intense and rapid parliamentary control that decides their ratification, repeal, and possible transformation into law.