If Pedro Sánchez does not manage to form a Government after the 29N, his continuity at the head of the PSOE would open a dilemma: to keep the leader who mobilizes part of the left or to replace the politician who concentrates the rejection of his adversaries. A resignation could pursue something more than closing a Presidency. It could also seek for the socialists to regain political space before the municipal elections of 2027.
DEMÓCRATA published yesterday, October 22, an analysis by the consultant Imma Aguilar Nàcher, which placed that possibility in the debate. Under the title And if the strength of love is not enough?, it suggested that Sánchez would abandon the socialist leadership if he failed to form a Government. The author presented it as an interpretation of his behavior, not as information about his intentions.
The affective argument has concrete precedents. In his letter of April 24, 2024, Sánchez described himself as a man "deeply in love with my wife" when explaining his doubts about continuity. On October 17, in Fuenlabrada, he again placed Begoña Gómez at the center of his speech with a declaration of love and a kiss before the party members.
Analyzing the political dimension of those gestures does not question the affection he may feel for his wife, as any other leader for their partner. Feeling and communication can coexist. What is relevant is that Sánchez has already incorporated his family life into the public explanation of his decisions.
This precedent allows for examining a possible farewell, but not anticipating it: in April 2024 he decided to stay and his current speech is still oriented towards governing. The following five arguments describe incentives for a withdrawal if he could not do so; they do not prove that he is preparing it.
1. Remove from PP and Vox the adversary that keeps their discourse united
The first incentive would be to alter the axis of confrontation. Anti-Sanchismo allows gathering criticisms of management, parliamentary agreements, and the president's environment under one figure. The PP's campaign offers recent examples: on October 17, Miguel Tellado focused part of his speech in Granada on identifying Sanchismo with corruption and calling for Sánchez's departure.
If the PSOE were to lose the Government and Sánchez remained as head of the opposition, his adversaries would retain a known objective. PP and Vox could prolong the confrontation of the pre-campaign, now from a position strengthened by the polls. For the PSOE, the risk would be changing institutional position without managing to change the conversation.
A withdrawal would hinder that continuity. With another socialist leadership, the right would have to confront a different interlocutor and dedicate more attention to their own decisions. If PP and Vox governed together, their agreements, discrepancies, and unmet commitments could gain more prominence against the permanent denunciation of the previous president.
The effect would have limits. The right could continue to challenge his legacy and present the successor as a continuity. Moreover, Sánchez also mobilizes those who oppose PP and Vox. The change would reduce a focus of rejection at the cost of risking a source of adherence: the electoral balance would depend on who replaced him and with what project.
2. Avoiding that the PSOE faces two defeats: losing the Government and being left without a project
The second reason would be organizational. Losing La Moncloa means losing the capacity for governmental initiative, institutional visibility, and the possibility of turning proposals into decisions. A party that moves to the opposition needs to rebuild its agenda with different instruments.
In that scenario, a PSOE focused on permanently defending its leader and its government period could find more difficulties in explaining what it proposes for the future. The political pressure on its management and the public debate on judicial procedures could absorb a good part of its activity. A renewal would offer the opportunity to separate the defense of what has been done from the development of an alternative.
It would be about recovering political autonomy. Sánchez's departure would not itself alter any judicial procedure nor exempt anyone from accountability. Nor should remaining in the Government be confused with protection against the courts.
Now, comparative research forces us to consider the opposite risk. Despina Alexiadou and Eoin O’Malley studied parties from nine countries over 25 years and found evidence compatible with greater leadership instability and electoral deterioration after the departure of strong leaders. Their work, published in European Journal of Political Research, does not allow for predicting the Spanish case, but questions whether replacing the leader is enough to recover the party.
Therefore, the usefulness of a resignation would depend on the transition: a recognized leadership, a strategy, and a clear distribution of responsibilities. If it opened a succession war, it could precisely aggravate the weakness it intended to avoid.
3. Facilitate agreements with the PP: what Robles suggests and what it does not demonstrate
A change could reduce the political cost of certain agreements between PP and PSOE. After a campaign very focused on Sánchez, it could be easier for the popular party to justify an institutional pact with a new socialist leadership. The PSOE, for its part, would have room to combine opposition and agreements without each negotiation being interpreted exclusively as a personal victory or defeat for the former president.
This possibility becomes interesting with the election of Margarita Robles as number two of the socialist candidacy for Madrid, confirmed. Her institutional trajectory and moderate profile allow interpreting the decision as a signal to voters who value experience and dialogue between parties.
4. Give voice to the territories before the municipal elections of 2027
The calendar adds a concrete incentive. The local and regional elections scheduled for May 2027 would arrive a few months after 29N. The PSOE itself has already organized primary processes to choose those candidacies. The result of the general elections will therefore condition a territorial campaign that has its own agenda.
If the national debate continued to be focused on Sánchez, mayors and socialist candidates could find themselves defending the leader again before explaining their management or proposals. An exit would offer them the possibility of regaining prominence: talking about housing, transportation, public services, or local projects with less dependence on the confrontation in Madrid.
For it to work, the succession would have to be accompanied by effective autonomy. Changing the general secretary while keeping all campaigns subordinated to the same national debate would hardly modify the problem.
Time also matters. A quick and accepted succession could allow for the party to be restructured before May. A prolonged dispute would consume those months and force candidates to compete under an image of division. The same calendar that would advise renewal could become a reason to postpone the succession if there is no prepared alternative.
5. Preserve his authority on the left and leave open a possible return
The fifth reason would affect Sánchez himself. A departure presented as a personal decision and a service to the PSOE could help him preserve the recognition of his supporters, instead of subjecting his leadership to prolonged wear from the opposition.
Here fits the hypothesis of love posed by Imma Aguilar. If the government project ceased to be viable, the family cost could acquire another meaning in his public explanation. The leader who justified resisting to continue his task could argue that the time has come to take care of his personal life and make space for those who must rebuild the party.
The credibility of that farewell would also depend on how he assumed the result and his responsibility. An emotional appeal can accompany accountability; if he intended to replace it, he would run the risk of seeming like a way to evade defeat.
The possibility of returning has a precedent in his trajectory. Sánchez resigned as general secretary in October 2016 and regained the position in the primaries of May 2017. That experience explains why his withdrawal could be interpreted as something different from a definitive end.
But returning after an internal crisis would not be the same as doing so after a long presidency and a loss of government. Maintaining public influence also does not guarantee recovering votes. An eventual return would depend on the evolution of the country, the new socialist direction, and whether militants and voters would want to trust him again.
The hypothesis contains a final tension: Sánchez could leave to allow the PSOE to stop depending on Sánchez. If his successor were to be dependent on his return, that renewal would remain incomplete. Preserving his authority would also require accepting that the party could build a future without him.