IBEX 35 today, Tuesday, August 11: Acerinox, Repsol, and Amadeus lead the increases

In Spain, the rules governing share buyback programs (treasury stock) are not currently at a specific stage of parliamentary processing: the core of the legal framework is already fully approved and in force. The main framework consists of the Revised Text of the Capital Companies Act, Law 6/2023 on Securities Markets and Investment Services, and European regulations on market abuse and prospectuses, applied and developed by the CNMV. There are broader financial reforms in preparation or in a pre-legislative phase (government draft bills) that could make punctual adjustments to this regime, but they have not yet entered the General Courts.

Current framework: legislation already in force (no open parliamentary processing)

Share buyback programs are essentially based on:

• The Revised Text of the Capital Companies Act, approved by Royal Legislative Decree 1/2010, which regulates the original and derivative acquisition of own shares, sets limits (for example, the maximum percentage of treasury stock) and establishes obligations for redemption or disposal and unavailable reserves.
• Law 6/2023, of March 17, on Securities Markets and Investment Services, which regulates, among other things, information on significant holdings and treasury stock, the regime of public takeover bids, and CNMV supervision.
• European regulations on market abuse and prospectuses, which allow buyback programs under a “safe harbor” provided price, volume limits, and transparency requirements are respected, and which apply directly in Spain.
• Regulatory developments and accounting criteria (for example, the ICAC resolution on financial instruments) that specify the treatment of own equity instruments and buyback operations.

This entire block is already in force: it does not appear in the registry of initiatives of the Congress or Senate because it is not a “law under processing,” but consolidated law that companies apply when designing and executing their buyback programs notified to the CNMV, as seen in multiple cases of listed companies covered by the newspaper Demócrata.

Ongoing reforms: pre-parliamentary phase, not yet in Congress/Senate

Available information indicates that potential modifications affecting buyback regulation are being channeled through large financial packages promoted by the Government, not through a specific “buyback law”:

• The Draft Bill for the transposition of various European securities market regulations, approved in first reading by the Council of Ministers on March 24, 2026, modifies Law 35/2003 on IIC, Royal Decree-Law 5/2005, the Revised Text of the Capital Companies Act, Law 22/2014, Law 5/2015, and Law 6/2023, among others, as noted in the Council of Ministers reference and its coverage in Demócrata.
• This text is now in the Draft Bill phase in the Executive, with a public consultation open (not yet as a bill in Congress). The consultation is published on the Ministry of Economy portal: [link].

That is, although this package tweaks key rules (including the Capital Companies Act and Law 6/2023, where much of the treasury stock regime and information is inserted), it has not yet entered the parliamentary phase: it is in the Executive stage of the regulatory cycle (draft bill, Council of State opinion, etc.), prior to submission to the Cortes.

Absence of a monographic reform on buybacks in the Cortes

Based on available parliamentary information and the monitoring by the newspaper Demócrata of main economic initiatives in Congress and Senate, there is no record of a bill or draft bill specifically dedicated to modifying the regime of share buyback or treasury stock programs. References to the Capital Companies Act in processing are framed within other packages (for example, corporate sustainability information or headquarters returns), without detailing structural changes in articles on own shares or treasury stock limits.

Therefore, as of August 11, 2026, the strict answer to the question is:

• The rules currently regulating buyback programs (LSC, Law 6/2023, CNMV/ICAC regulations and criteria) are not in parliamentary processing; they are already approved and in force.
• The possible relevant reforms are, at best, in the Draft Bill phase in the Government (public consultation, Council of Ministers agreements), without registration yet as a bill in the Cortes.

Consequently, the degree of “parliamentary maturity” of concrete changes on buybacks is very limited today: we are talking about initiatives in preparation in the Executive, but not about a buyback law advancing through committee, commission, or Plenary.

Relevant references and links

Below are concentrated the main official and press links that contextualize the current framework and ongoing financial reforms (commercial law, securities market rules, Government initiatives, and examples of listed companies’ buyback programs):

• Law 6/2023 on Securities Markets
• Revised Text of the Capital Companies Act
• Law 9/2012
• Law 11/2015
• IS Regulation (RD 634/2015)
• IIC Regulation (RD 1082/2012)
• Law 18/2022
• Law 25/2011
• Law 5/2020 ITF
• ICAC Resolution 2019
• CNMV – post-trading reform
• CNMV – CIE takeover bid on own shares
• CNMV – Naturgy offer
• CNMV – accounting circular consultation
• Demócrata – Council of Ministers 03/24/2026
• Public consultation on securities markets draft bill
• Demócrata – BBVA buyback
• Demócrata – Santander buyback
• Demócrata – Repsol plan
• Demócrata – IAG plan
• Demócrata – Amadeus plan
• Demócrata – Mapfre plan
• Demócrata – new Repsol plan

In the U.S. constitutional system, the president holds broad powers in foreign policy and the imposition of economic sanctions, although subject to certain controls by Congress and the courts. The Constitution grants him the headship of State, Government, and the Armed Forces, as well as a central role in treaty-making and recognition of states and governments. On this basis, several federal laws empower the president to declare national emergencies and block assets, restrict transactions, or impose embargoes. However, Congress can condition, expand, or limit these powers through specific legislation and budgetary control.

Constitutional framework in foreign policy

The basis of presidential powers is in Article II of the U.S. Constitution, which establishes that the president is:

• Head of State and Executive: directs foreign policy, sets the general line, and represents the country internationally.
• Commander in Chief: exercises supreme command of the Armed Forces, allowing him to order deployments, limited operations, and use of force within the margins set by Congress.
• Director of diplomatic action: appoints ambassadors (with Senate confirmation) and receives foreign representatives, which is interpreted as the power of recognition of states and governments.
• Treaty negotiator: can negotiate and sign international treaties, which only enter into force if they obtain the advice and consent of the Senate by a two-thirds majority.

Besides treaties, the president frequently uses executive agreements, which do not require Senate ratification and are based on his own constitutional authority or laws delegated by Congress. These agreements have become a key instrument of contemporary foreign policy.

Relationship with Congress and limits

Although the president leads foreign policy, Congress retains significant power:

• Power to declare war and regulate the Armed Forces.
• Power of the purse: controls funds for military operations, foreign aid, and sanctions programs.
• Legislative capacity: can pass laws authorizing, delimiting, or even obliging the president to impose certain sanctions.
• Oversight: specialized committees in the Senate and House exercise political control over foreign action and sanctions regimes.

Regarding the use of military force, the 1973 War Powers Resolution seeks to require the president to notify Congress and withdraw troops after a period if there is no authorization, although its practical application is debated.

Powers regarding economic sanctions

U.S. economic sanctions are mainly based on laws that delegate broad powers to the president to act in the face of threats to national security, foreign policy, or the country’s economy. Among the most relevant are:

• International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 1977): allows the president, after declaring a national emergency regarding an unusual and extraordinary external threat, to block assets, prohibit financial and commercial transactions, and regulate international trade with the designated country, entity, or person.
• Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA, 1917): grants broad powers in wartime to restrict trade and block assets of enemy countries; today it is used much less but is the historical antecedent of sanction powers.
• Sectoral and geographic laws: Congress has passed multiple laws that require or authorize the president to impose sanctions on specific countries (e.g., Iran, Russia, North Korea) or for specific conduct (terrorism, nuclear proliferation, corruption, human rights violations).
• Export Control Reform Act and export control regulations: allow restricting exports of technology and strategic goods for national security and foreign policy reasons.

In practice, the president uses these laws through executive orders, often administered by the Treasury Department (Office of Foreign Assets Control, OFAC) and other departments. These orders detail:

• Which persons, entities, or sectors are designated.
• Which types of transactions are prohibited or restricted.
• Which licenses or exceptions may be granted (e.g., for humanitarian aid).

Controls and judicial review

Although presidential powers are very broad, there are limits:

• Congress: can repeal or modify enabling laws, condition suspension of sanctions, or impose periodic reviews. In some recent regimes, such as certain sanctions on Russia or Iran, the president must notify Congress and cannot lift sanctions without following procedures established by law.
• Judiciary: federal courts can overturn measures that violate constitutional rights (e.g., due process) or exceed legal mandate.
• International law: although not always enforceable domestically, it politically conditions the use of sanctions, especially when affecting allies or treaty obligations.

In summary, the President of the United States has a combination of his own constitutional authority and broad legislative delegations that allow him to lead foreign policy and design complex economic sanctions regimes, albeit under the supervision and corrective capacity of Congress and the courts.

In the last general elections held in Spain on July 23, 2023, the Popular Party obtained 137 deputies in the Congress of Deputies. This result made the PP the largest parliamentary force in the Chamber, although without reaching an absolute majority (176 seats). Various subsequent poll reports, collected by the newspaper Demócrata, repeatedly take that figure of 137 deputies as a reference for the PP’s result on 23J. From there, demographic scenarios of the legislature have been compared based on that parliamentary base.

The PP result on 23J: 137 seats

Analysis news and polls published during 2024, 2025, and 2026 in Demócrata agree that, in the July 2023 general elections, Alberto Núñez Feijóo’s PP achieved 137 seats and around 33.1% of the votes. For example, the early 2024 polling aggregator recalls that the PP “got 33.1% on 23-J” and takes that data as a base to compare its later vote estimate improvement, already placing it around 36%, according to the article This is how the general election voting intention polls stand.

Several subsequent polls explicitly cite that seat figure as a reference:

• Hamalgama Métrica recalls that in the 23J elections the PP obtained 137 and Vox 33 seats, projecting a later improvement up to 146 deputies for the Populars ([link]).
• GAD3 highlights that the PP “would reach 141 deputies, four more than the 137 obtained in the July 2023 general elections” ([link]).
• Other polls (Sigma Dos, Target Point, NC Report, Instituto DYM, GESOP, Ipsos, SocioMétrica, etc.) also repeatedly use the figure of 137 deputies as the real floor from which they project future rises or falls of the PP in the legislature.

This journalistic and polling consensus confirms that the effective result of the PP in the last general elections was 137 seats, compared to 121 deputies for the PSOE, a balance of power that conditions all subsequent parliamentary politics.

Parliamentary relevance of the 137 deputies

With 137 deputies, the PP was above any other force but below the absolute majority. In the right-wing bloc, the sum with Vox (33 deputies on 23J, according to the same Demócrata information) reached 170 seats, insufficient to invest Feijóo without additional support. That arithmetic explains that, as the analysis on the “investiture bloc” recalls, the Government environment has needed to rely on a constellation of parties (Sumar and nationalist and independentist forces) to counterbalance the 171 seats of PP, Vox, and UPN in the XV Legislature ([link]).

Those 137 deputies place the PP as the leader of the opposition institutionally, but also as a reference in debates on parliamentary control, commission composition, and calls for new elections. Demócrata has documented, for example, the PP group’s struggle with the Presidency of Congress over the constitution of commissions and the reactivation of control sessions ([link]), as well as tactical moves around parliamentary groups and deputy transfers ([link]).

The use of the 137 seats figure in the current debate

From a political and media point of view, the number 137 deputies has become the yardstick to measure the PP’s performance in all subsequent polls. Most of the surveys collected by Demócrata in 2025 and 2026 present scenarios in which the PP:

• Remains close to that figure (137–141 seats) or improves to the range of 144–153 deputies, according to different polling firms.
• Or falls slightly below (123–132 seats in some studies), but always taking 137 as the real starting point of 23J.

Consequently, when public debate talks about whether the PP “improves” or “worsens” results, the unavoidable reference is those 137 seats obtained in the last general election.

Other links cited in the consulted information

Besides the pieces already mentioned, the news and analyses related in the newspaper Demócrata and other media include, among others, the following contents: [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], as well as various pieces of political, territorial, and parliamentary memory context: [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], [link], among others.