Europe has forgotten that it can also say no. Canada has just reminded it.

The former advisor in the Permanent Representation of Spain to the European Union warns: "One thing is to avoid a trade war and a very different one is to accept that the transatlantic relationship functions permanently according to a logic in which Washington pressures and Europe adapts."

5adc08d7 d4d5 4b8b a518 1ae1558b98c0

5adc08d7 d4d5 4b8b a518 1ae1558b98c0

Add DEMÓCRATA to Google

Ask FREN

Published

7 minutes

Most read

España vota · Congreso y Senado

Elecciones generales 29 de noviembre de 2026

Se eligen 350 diputados y los senadores de elección directa. Encuestas, calendario, candidaturas, programas y todo lo que necesitas saber para votar.

Faltan 43 días y 16 horas para que abran los colegios electorales.Hasta que abran los colegios, el domingo 29 a las 09:00 (hora peninsular).
Entra en el especial

Próximas fechas

  1. HoyÚltimo día para comunicar coaliciones electoralesFecha prevista
  2. Presentación de candidaturas al Congreso y al Senado21–26 oct · Fecha prevista
  3. Voto desde el extranjero (CERA): envío de la documentación24–30 oct · Fecha prevista
  4. Publicación de las candidaturas presentadasFecha prevista
Calendario completo

Almost a year ago I wrote about what I then considered a worrying setback for Europe: the transition from a European Union that aspired to become an autonomous global actor to a Europe increasingly dependent on the United States. It was not about questioning the transatlantic alliance, nor much less about defending a Europe opposed to Washington. It was something much simpler: to warn that an alliance between equals ceases to be so when one of the partners systematically accepts the conditions of the other for fear of the consequences of saying no.

Then it might have seemed like an exaggeration. A year later, the issue is back on the table. And this time there is a particularly uncomfortable example for Europe: Canada.

The Government of Mark Carney has just rejected an agreement with the United States that it considered harmful to Canadian interests. The negotiations have failed and Washington has imposed new tariffs of 50 percent on certain Canadian products. Ottawa has announced that it will respond with equivalent measures. Not because Canada believes that a trade war is desirable nor because it thinks that confronting the United States will not have consequences but precisely because it knows that it will.

The Prime Minister of Canada, Mark Carney, talks with the President of the USA, Donald Trump, during the G7 summit in Évian, France. Europa Press/Contacto/Christopher Katsarov
The Prime Minister of Canada, Mark Carney, talks with the President of the USA, Donald Trump, during the G7 summit in Évian, France. Europa Press/Contacto/Christopher Katsarov -

There lies the issue. Canada depends much more on the United States than the European Union. Its economy is extraordinarily integrated with the North American one and a much larger proportion of its exports are destined for the United States. If anyone has reasons to think twice before confronting Trump, it is Canada, and yet Carney has decided that there are certain interests that justify assuming an economic cost.

The mirror of Europe

The comparison with Europe is inevitable. A year ago, Donald Trump and Ursula von der Leyen reached an agreement in Turnberry, Scotland, which was subsequently reflected in the joint declaration of August 2025. Since July 1 of this year, the agreement has been formally in effect. For the majority of European exports to the United States, a tariff ceiling of 15 percent was established, while the European Union eliminated tariffs on U.S. industrial products and opened greater access to certain agri-food products.

The European Commission presented the agreement as an instrument of stability and predictability. It would be absurd to deny that avoiding a tariff escalation has advantages: a trade war between the two largest economies in the Western space would have significant costs for European companies, workers, and consumers. But one thing is to avoid a trade war and another very different thing is to accept that the transatlantic relationship operates permanently according to a logic in which Washington pressures and Europe adapts.

Because the problem is not only the 15 percent. It is what that 15 percent represents.

The European agreement was reached after extraordinarily intense U.S. pressure and in a context in which Europe needed to maintain its relationship with Washington intact for economic, energy, and, above all, security reasons. The Union obtained stability, yes, but it also made significant concessions. And the situation of sectors such as steel and aluminum, subjected to U.S. tariffs of 50 percent, remains pending, while Brussels has suspended its own retaliatory measures.

Yielding to Trump has not served to end Trump's pressures. On the contrary: the threats have continued, the demands as well, and the logic of the relationship has not changed: Washington pressures and Europe seeks a way to accommodate.

An uncontested power

The question, therefore, is not whether Europe should have provoked a trade war. The question is another: is it using all its negotiating power or has it accepted too soon that resisting is not worth it?

The response requires first recognizing an uncomfortable reality: Europe has power, but it also has weaknesses. The European Union is not the uncontested economic power that some discourses seem to describe. It has very serious problems: deindustrialization, lack of investment, technological dependence in strategic sectors, demographic aging, high debt in several member states, and still insufficient military capacity. The war in Ukraine has also highlighted to what extent Europe continues to depend on the United States for certain essential elements of its security.

But recognizing those weaknesses does not mean denying European strengths. The Union remains one of the largest markets in the world. It has a regulatory capacity that affects companies all over the planet. It has fundamental industries in strategic sectors, an internationally significant currency, enormous commercial and financial capacity, and a market of more than 400 million consumers. And, above all, it has something that Canada does not have to the same extent: the possibility of collectively using an economic power of continental dimensions.

The problem is that having power and being willing to use it are not the same thing. It is also not about imagining that Europe can confront the United States without paying any price. To say that it has no cost would be naive. For Europe, it would mean facing possible trade reprisals, difficulties for certain exporting companies, higher costs for consumers and industrial sectors, and, in strategic terms, a more complicated relationship with the main guarantor of its security.

But precisely for that reason, the question must be posed in political terms and not sentimental ones. Prudence consists of accepting a cost when doing so protects a greater interest; docility is accepting imposition because we are afraid of the cost of resisting. Europe has been confusing both things for too long.

The cost of the slam

Canada is now demonstrating that saying no is not free either. Carney has not promised Canadians that facing the United States will be painless. On the contrary: he has warned of the costs and has prepared measures to protect the affected sectors. But he has raised a fundamental idea: preserving independence and the ability to decide about one's own future may justify assuming an economic cost, because the alternative - accepting certain impositions - may be even more harmful in the long run.

Canada also does not intend to live on the sidelines of the United States. It is trying to reduce its dependence, seek new markets, and strengthen its own economic capacity. It is not breaking with Washington. It is trying to ensure that its relationship with Washington does not solely determine the limits of its economic policy.

And that is perhaps the main lesson that Europe should draw. It is not about breaking with the United States; that would be absurd. Washington is an indispensable ally and a fundamental economy for Europe. It is also not about automatically responding to every tariff with another tariff, nor about turning every provocation or imposition into a succession of gestures of national pride. It is about something much more serious: firmly maintaining our interests and, above all, reducing the dependencies that limit our decision-making capacity.

The Prime Minister of Canada, Mark Carney Europa Press/Contacto/Sammy Kogan
The Prime Minister of Canada, Mark Carney Europa Press/Contacto/Sammy Kogan -

Europe needs more industry, more investment, more technology of its own, and more defense capacity. It needs to diversify its markets and its energy sources. It needs to use its trade instruments with greater determination when its essential interests are at stake. And it needs to establish in advance what concessions it is willing to accept and which it is not. That is strategic autonomy.

For years we talked about it as if it were an academic concept. The European Union came to define it as the ability to cooperate with our partners when possible and act autonomously when necessary. It was a sensible idea: not breaking with the United States, but stopping dependence on the United States. But what credibility does that autonomy have if in the face of every pressure from Washington the European response consists of seeking the least uncomfortable formula to accept?

Part of the answer is, without a doubt, in our own institutional weaknesses. The Union is not a State and needs to reconcile the interests of twenty-seven governments. Part is also in fear: the war in Ukraine has reinforced military dependence on the United States. And part comes from a conception of power that Europe does not seem to have updated.

For decades we got used to thinking that rules, institutions, law, and consensus were enough to order the world. It was a magnificent idea as long as others were willing to play by the same rules.

But the world has changed. The United States is increasingly using its economic power as a tool of pressure. China combines trade, technology, industry, and political power. Other powers use energy resources, markets, and strategic positions to defend their interests. And Europe continues to speak too many times as if we were still in that world where the common interest should prevail over the logic of power.

The capacity to decide

This is not about turning Europe into another China or another United States. It is simply about it ceasing to be one of the few great powers that seem ashamed to act as such.

That is why the Canadian case is so important, not because Canada is more powerful than Europe - it is not - nor because its economy is in better shape to withstand a trade war, nor because confronting the United States is always the right answer. Obviously, it is not.

It is important because it has understood something elementary: a power is not defined solely by the resources it possesses, but also by the lines it is willing to defend and the price it is willing to pay to defend them.

The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen Marek Ladzinski / Zuma Press / Europa Press / Cont
The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen Marek Ladzinski / Zuma Press / Europa Press / Cont -

Europe does not need to imitate Canada in everything. It needs to regain the ability to say no when its fundamental interests demand it. But, for that, it is not enough to approve new documents on strategic autonomy, economic sovereignty, or technological independence. It is necessary to build the capacities that allow making them a reality. It is necessary to invest, produce, innovate, diversify, and defend itself. And, when the next pressure comes, to use European economic power instead of merely lamenting that others use it against us.

The agreement with the United States does not have to be undone. But it should not become the beginning of a permanent policy of concessions either. An agreement serves to stabilize a relationship; not to renounce the ability to negotiate the next one.

Because that is, ultimately, the true European problem. Not that the United States is powerful. Not that Trump pressures. Not that saying no has no consequences. The problem is that Europe runs the risk of having forgotten that it can also say no. Canada has just reminded it.

More key points, information and questions with FREN

AI-GENERATED CONTENT

What parliamentary procedures are necessary to modify a trade agreement between the European Union and the United States?

To modify a trade agreement between the European Union and the United States (for example, a free trade agreement or an investment agreement), the procedures are mainly European, but in many cases also involve national parliaments, including the Spanish one. It is not a “simple correction,” but usually processed as a modification or an additional protocol to an existing international agreement.

1. Preliminary phase: political decision and negotiation mandate

Before reaching Parliament, there is an essential political-diplomatic phase:

  • Proposal from the European Commission: the Commission identifies the need to modify the agreement (due to regulatory changes, new subjects to include, updating standards, etc.) and prepares a recommendation addressed to the Council.
  • Authorization from the EU Council: the Council (ministers of the Member States) approves a negotiation mandate that sets the objectives, limits, and red lines of the agreement modification.
  • Information to the European Parliament: since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament must be promptly informed of the progress of negotiations and may adopt political resolutions marking its position.

2. Negotiation with the United States and signing of the modified text

With the approved mandate, the Commission (usually the Directorate-General for Trade) negotiates with the U.S. Administration. When an understanding is reached, a modification text of the original agreement is drafted (a protocol, amendment, or complementary agreement).

This text is submitted to:

  • Approval by the EU Council for signature: the Council authorizes the signing of the modified text, which is done on behalf of the Union (and, if it is a “mixed” agreement, also on behalf of the Member States).
  • In parallel, the United States must follow its own internal procedures (Congress, as appropriate) to authorize the signing and subsequent entry into force.

3. Procedure in the European Parliament

Once the modification text is signed, the key step at the European parliamentary level is:

  • Examination by the competent committee (usually the International Trade Committee, INTA): debate on the economic, social, and environmental impact, with hearings of experts and the Commission.
  • Report and recommendation: the committee prepares a report recommending to the European Parliament Plenary whether to give its consent to the modification.
  • Vote in Plenary: the European Parliament grants (or denies) its consent. In modern trade agreements, this consent is legally essential; without it, the Council cannot conclude the agreement.

4. Role of national parliaments (including the Spanish one)

The role of national parliaments depends on whether the agreement is:

  • Exclusively within the competence of the EU: if the matter is entirely within the Union’s competence, the modification is legally perfected with the consent of the European Parliament and the Council’s decision. National parliaments do not vote on its ratification, although they may debate and politically oversee their governments.
  • Mixed agreement (EU + Member States): if the content also affects state competences (for example, certain investments or matters regulated at the internal level), the modification requires ratification by each Member State.

In the case of a mixed EU–U.S. agreement, the typical procedure in Spain would be:

  • Referral by the Government to the Cortes Generales of the modification text of the agreement, accompanied by a statement of reasons and, if applicable, impact reports.
  • Parliamentary debate and authorization: the Congress of Deputies (and, if applicable, the Senate) debate and vote on whether to authorize the State to be bound by that treaty modification.
  • Formal ratification: with parliamentary authorization, the Executive proceeds to deposit the instrument of ratification and, when all parties involved have done so, the modification enters into force under the terms provided in the text itself.

5. Parliamentary control and monitoring

After the modification enters into force, both the European Parliament and the Cortes Generales may:

  • Request periodic reports on the application of the modified agreement.
  • Submit resolutions, questions, hearings of ministers or the European Commission.
  • Propose new guidelines for possible future revisions.

In summary, modifying an EU–U.S. trade agreement always involves a dual parliamentary circuit: the European one (with a central role for the European Parliament) and, if the agreement is mixed, the national one (including the Spanish), where the chambers must authorize the modification as if it were an international treaty.

What are the competencies of the President of the European Commission in trade policy?

The President of the European Commission is not the “trade minister” of the EU, but does have a central role in the political orientation and coordination of the entire common trade policy. Their competencies combine political leadership, internal organization of the Commission, and external representation, always within the framework set by the Treaties (especially Article 17 of the TEU and Articles 207 and 218 of the TFEU).

1. General political direction of the Commission

The President defines the general political guidelines of the Commission, which are concretized in the Political Guidelines and the annual Work Programme. In trade policy, this means:

  • Setting strategic priorities (for example, focus on certain partners, commitment to sustainable trade, trade defense, diversification of supply chains).
  • Indicating to the Commissioner responsible for Trade the red lines and political objectives to follow in negotiations and legislative proposals.
  • Ensuring that trade policy is coherent with other Commission priorities: climate, digitalization, security, competition defense, or development policy.

2. Allocation and control of portfolios (including Trade)

The President distributes the portfolios among the Commissioners and may reassign or restructure them. In trade policy, this translates into:

  • Deciding which Commissioner will hold the Trade portfolio and whether it is combined or formally coordinated with others (for example, vice-presidencies for the economy, “An economy that works for people,” etc.).
  • Assigning specific trade-related responsibilities to other Commissioners (competition, agriculture, industry, climate, neighborhood, enlargement) to integrate the trade dimension into their policies.
  • Supervising the work of the Trade Commissioner, being able to give political instructions, request revisions of proposals, or reassign sensitive files to an executive vice-president.

Although the Trade Commissioner carries the technical and negotiating weight day-to-day, their political mandate derives from the trust and guidelines of the President.

3. Internal coordination of trade decisions

As President of the College of Commissioners, they lead and moderate meetings in which the following are approved:

  • Negotiation mandates that the Commission will propose to the Council for trade agreements with third countries or regions.
  • Legislative proposals in trade policy (trade defense measures, foreign investment control, instruments against economic coercion, etc.).
  • Implementation or execution decisions of trade agreements already in force (for example, activation of safeguard clauses or dispute settlement mechanisms).

The President ensures that trade decisions have collegiate support and are consistent with the Commission’s overall programme. In strategic or sensitive files (for example, relations with China or the United States), they usually get directly involved, promoting specific meetings among Commissioners and services.

4. External representation of the EU in trade

The Commission is the negotiator of the common trade policy, and the President has a key role in the political dimension of that representation:

  • Participating in summits with third countries and international organizations where trade is a central issue (G7, G20, EU–third country summits), reinforcing or complementing the work of the Trade Commissioner.
  • Conveying to heads of state or government of third countries the EU’s priorities and limits in trade negotiations, especially when there are blockages or strategic issues (subsidies, security, critical technologies).
  • Coordinating with the High Representative and Member States to ensure trade policy is coherent with foreign and security policy, for example in imposing economic sanctions or export restrictions.

Although Article 207 TFEU attributes initiative and negotiation to the Commission, the approval of mandates and agreements corresponds to the Council and the European Parliament. The President of the Commission cannot “sign” a trade treaty alone nor modify tariffs without legal basis and following formal procedures.

5. Crisis management and cross-cutting priorities

In crisis situations with strong trade impact (pandemics, wars, supply crises, energy shocks), the President:

  • Coordinates the Commission’s response, including emergency trade instruments (temporary export restrictions, relaxation of rules, creation of strategic reserves).
  • Promotes integrated packages combining trade, industrial, and state aid policies to strengthen the EU’s resilience.
  • Sets the approach regarding “critical” or “strategic” partners, promoting concepts such as reducing dependencies or “de-risking” global chains.

In summary, the President of the European Commission does not decide trade policy alone, but is the political director and ultimate coordinator of the Commission’s action: setting priorities, distributing responsibilities, ensuring internal coherence, and embodying, together with the Trade Commissioner, the EU’s voice on the international stage when trade intersects with the global political agenda.

What requirements must the European Union meet to impose trade retaliation measures according to community regulations?

The European Union can only impose trade retaliation measures (retorsion or suspension of concessions) when a series of material and procedural requirements established both by international law (especially the WTO) and by community regulations, in particular Regulation (EU) No 654/2014 and trade defense rules (anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguards), are met.

1. Existence of a prior violation or unjustified harm

First, there must be an action by the third country that justifies the reaction:

  • Non-compliance with international obligations (for example, under the WTO Agreement or a bilateral or regional agreement with the EU), established by a dispute settlement body.
  • Illegal or discriminatory measures against EU exports or investments that breach commitments on market access, national treatment, most-favored-nation treatment, or other obligations.
  • Within trade defense instruments, existence of dumping, prohibited subsidies, or sudden import surges causing serious injury to an EU industry.

Without a sufficiently founded finding of such unlawful or harmful conduct, the EU cannot legitimately qualify its measures as retaliation, as it would risk being non-compliant itself.

2. Exhaustion or blockage of the dispute settlement mechanism

WTO law and community regulations require that the EU does not proceed directly to retaliation:

  • There must have been a prior attempt at negotiated resolution (diplomatic consultations, joint committees provided in agreements, etc.).
  • Normally, a formal dispute settlement procedure is initiated (for example, before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body) and a decision or blockage of the procedure is awaited.
  • Under Regulation (EU) 654/2014, trade policy measures can only be used when:
    • There is a decision favorable to the EU that the third country does not implement, or
    • The third country blocks the procedure (for example, preventing the functioning of the appellate body) and, therefore, the EU cannot obtain effective redress.

The logic is that retaliation is a last resort when ordinary dispute resolution channels have proven ineffective.

3. Formal decision of the Union and appropriate legal basis

Trade retaliation is not decided by a Member State alone, but by the Union’s institutions:

  • The Council, on a proposal from the Commission, usually adopts the implementing act (for example, an implementing regulation) that specifies the measures.
  • The European Commission investigates the facts, consults Member States, and, when appropriate, also consults affected economic operators.
  • The legal basis in the Treaties (usually the TFEU articles related to common trade policy) and applicable secondary legislation (Regulation 654/2014 or other trade defense instruments) must be clearly indicated.

This procedure ensures internal political and legal control and allows measures to be reviewed by the Court of Justice of the EU if challenged.

4. Proportionality and equivalence of the measures

WTO law and EU law impose proportionality requirements:

  • The economic intensity of retaliation must be equivalent to the harm caused by the third country or to the level of suspended concessions.
  • Measures must be necessary to induce compliance, avoiding broader restrictions than strictly necessary.
  • They should be selective and calibrated, so that they preferably affect sectors related to the infringement or where the impact is most effective and least disproportionate for the EU.

Lack of proportionality could expose the EU to new international claims.

5. Respect for internal rules on transparency and consultation

Finally, community regulations require certain internal procedural requirements:

  • Publication of draft measures and final decisions in the Official Journal to ensure transparency and legal certainty.
  • Consultation of interested parties (importing and exporting companies, sector associations) when the nature of the measure requires it, especially in trade defense.
  • Possibility of review and withdrawal of measures if circumstances change (for example, if the third country finally complies with the international decision).

Overall, the EU can only adopt trade retaliation when it has demonstrated an infringement or unfair treatment by a third country, has unsuccessfully tried to resolve the dispute through ordinary channels, acts through a formal institutional procedure, and respects the principles of proportionality, transparency, and review. In this way, retaliation policy remains within the framework of international and community rule of law.

Play

Test your knowledge with FREN!

How much do you know about this topic? Answer the following 3 questions.

What tariff percentage was set as the ceiling for most European exports to the United States in the 2025 agreement?

Question 1 of 3

What measure did Canada take after the failure of trade negotiations with the United States?

Question 2 of 3

Which European sectors are still affected by 50% U.S. tariffs according to the article?

Question 3 of 3